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Abstract 
 
 
Name: David Mc Carthy 
 
 
Submission Date: September 2015 
 
 
Title: A Necessary Difficulty: The Poethics of Proximity in John Ashbery and Michael Palmer  
 
 
Both John Ashbery and Michael Palmer are noticeably absent from recent surveys of the ethical 
turn in innovative American poetry during the latter half of the twentieth century. By analysing 
the work produced during the first half of their careers as they write a poetic subject into 
existence, this thesis will demonstrate that the reason for this absence is due to the “necessary 
difficulty” of their respective poetic projects. Rather than identifying particular personal and 
political issues that might help explain away the difficulty of their work, my reading of Ashbery 
and Palmer will illustrate how difficulty is the constitutive feature of the ethical considerations 
and commitments informing their attempt to call attention to the initiating encounter between 
self and other that permits ethical praxis in the first place. Using a methodology derived from 
Mikhail Bakhtin’s aesthetic theories and Emmanuel Levinas’ phenomenological ethics, 
Ashbery and Palmer will be shown to enact a “poethic sensibility” that reconfigures reading 
and writing poetry as a way of living in the social world of others as a responsive and 
responsible subject. Furthermore, the concern they exhibit regarding their own ethical 
subjectivity will be shown to extend to the reader’s, as s/he is encouraged to realise his/her own 
“response-ability” through the lived experience of proximity engendered by their necessarily 
difficult texts. By departing from the presupposition that the poem and the self it represents 
and/or articulates are intended to be properly comprehended by another person, this thesis will 
explore the ethical encounter that occurs between the poet and the reader at the very limits of 
the known and knowable, where “(my)Self” encounters “(an)Other” in its absolute, irreducible 
alterity as the constitutive moment of ethical subjectivity.       
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Introduction: The (Dis)Enchantment of Self with Self 
 
At the very beginning of the second half of the twentieth century, Charles Olson issued a call 
in “Projective Verse” (1950) that poets would be responding to in myriad different ways for 
the next fifty years, giving permission and obligating poets to “[get] rid of the lyrical 
interference of the individual as ego.”1 Olson’s announcement of the end of “enchantment of 
self with self,”2 the end of poetry as solely a medium of self-expression and self-disclosure, 
would irrevocably involve the New American Poets and their successors in what is perhaps the 
most, if not important, then at least defining debate of the period, the need to complicate the 
traditional binary opposition of self-other and the attendant socio-cultural, political and 
personal relations it structures. Mikhail Bakhtin and Emmanuel Levinas are crucial to 
understanding why this apparently ontological question would prove so influential to literature 
because they insist that it is always already an ethical question founded on the act of self-
creation, both existential and aesthetic. While their philosophies have an immediate application 
to the concerns of everyday life, their radical thinking derives from how they refocus our 
attention on what has been forgotten, habitually overlooked, or intentionally ignored in daily 
life, namely the responsibility I have toward another person that conditions me as a subject in 
the world. Due to the belief in the rights and freedoms of the individual, society is self-oriented, 
which both Bakhtin and Levinas blame on the ontological presupposition that prioritises the 
self as an independent being. This persistent “egology”3 is challenged by their alternative 
theses that turn our perspective from the self to an other, thus confirming that ethics is 
constitutive of our being and all other concerns are derivatives of the question raised regarding 
my responsibility by the experience of proximity to another embodied, cognisant subject.  
         While both Bakhtin and Levinas are concerned with concrete human life as it is actually 
lived and experienced by singular human beings in concrete contexts and situations, there are 
important differences between them. In their “endeavour to give a cogent account of the same 
complex, unitary phenomenon, namely sociality,” Bakhtin conceives of language as 
“permeated by [the] traces of intersubjectivity” that “constitute and inform it,” whereas Levinas 
                                                      
1
 Charles Olson, “Projective Verse,” Collected Prose, ed. Donald Allen and Benjamin Friedlander (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1997), 247. 
2
 John Ashbery, “Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror,” Collected Poems 1956-1987 (New York, NY: Library 
Classics of the United States, 2008), 477. 
3
 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonson Lingis (Pittsburgh, PA: 
Duquesne University Press, 1969), 35. 
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investigates language on a “pre-existential, pre-ontological level.”4 While dialogue for the 
latter is “both an originary, pre-existential mode of ethical communication, which constitutes 
the dialogically summoned ‘I’ and...the properly ‘discursive’ interaction between human 
beings,” the former “conceives dialogue as a universal phenomenon informing human 
existence and as the relation between utterances as manifestations of this existence.” 5 
However, it is precisely because of these differences that a dialogue between Bakhtin and 
Levinas is possible. Although the self-other relation is a recurring obsession within many 
systems of thought in the twentieth century, Bakhtin’s and Levinas’ preoccupation with the 
attendant issues of dialogue, alterity, responsibility and the social significance of language 
make them indispensable for exploring what it means to write and read a self in poetry, for 
negotiating the “thicket of difficulties” 6  engendered by the ethical considerations and 
commitments involved in representing and/or articulating “I” amongst other(s’) “I’s.” While 
Levinas “speaks of [a] first philosophy” as “a philosophy of dialogue that cannot not be an 
ethics,”7 Bakhtin is the only figure to use authorship as a paradigm for thinking about self-
representation and self-articulation, such that a dialogue between them offers a way of 
exploring the difficult issue of poetry’s ethics. Furthermore, how they write is equally 
important to what they write because it betrays their concern for the subjectivity of the reader, 
that the reader him/herself realise exactly what being a responsive and responsible subject 
actually involves. The consistency in Bakhtin’s and Levinas’ writings derives from the 
questions asked regarding the fundamental ethical issue of how the self exists amongst others 
rather than in the often disorienting array of answers proposed. Continuous repetitions, re-
contextualisations and intentional contradictions characterise their arguments because they are 
trying to make the reader realise the considerations and commitments involved in writing and 
reading as an ethical subject, hence the multiplicity of perspectives, variations on a term for a 
particular phenomenon, interruptions and divergences of the argument, and the prevalent sense 
of incompletion, all of which both permit and obligate the reader’s participation in the dialogue.  
This concern for the reader’s subjectivity, that s/he be responsive to the text and 
responsible for his/her particular reading, that s/he interpret it but without imposing closure or 
reducing the otherness s/he experiences as s/he engages with the very limits of the known and 
                                                      
4
 Michael Eskin, Ethics and Dialogue in the Works of Levinas, Bakhtin, Mandel’shtam, and Celan (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), 7.  
5
 Ibid, 18. 
6
 Levinas, TI, 29. 
7
 Emmanuel Levinas, Alterity and Transcendence, trans. Michael B. Smith (New York, NY: Columbia University 
Press, 1999), 98.  
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knowable, is also crucial to appreciating the “poethics” of John Ashbery and Michael Palmer. 
Similar to Bakhtin and Levinas, the experie3nce of reading Ashbery and Palmer confirms the 
importance of realising one’s own subjectivity but never at the expense of others’, the sense of 
being permitted to interpret a text according to one’s own spatial-temporal circumstances  but 
always being obligated to acknowledge the limits of one’s capacity to comprehend, that 
Ashbery and Palmer ultimately resist comprehension and confront us with a difficulty that 
cannot be reduced but compels us to keep returning and responding to them. Their concern for 
the reader’s subjectivity manifests throughout their work, most explicitly in what Ashbery 
terms “that other ‘I’”8 and Palmer explains as “I [being] the reader’s ‘not yet,’”9 how the 
reader’s sense of self is at stake when s/he reads “I” as much as the poet’s is when he writes 
“I.” Just as Ashbery and Palmer enlarge the dialogue to include other readers, this analysis can 
be expanded to include other poets, predecessors, contemporaries and successors, who display 
a certain ethical sensibility in their writing. However, what differentiates Ashbery and Palmer 
is that they are not content with demonstrating how they are ethical subjects but insist on 
creating occasions where the interdependency of the poet and the reader as constitutive of each 
others’ subjectivity as other is apparent. The method of writing and reading as a responsive 
and responsible ethical subject encouraged by their work articulates a poetics of everyday life, 
a “poethics” that enacts a way of acting in and interacting with the social world of others.   
 
 
Thickening Poetics with a H 
 
Since the publication of New Literary History’s pioneering special issue “Literature and/as 
Moral Philosophy” (1983), a subgenre of literary criticism has burgeoned around figures who 
advocate a phenomenological literary hermeneutic, a deconstructive rhetorical philology and 
an ethically informed mode of textual analysis, most notably J. Hillis Miller, The Ethics of 
Reading (1989); Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989); Tobin Siebers, The 
Ethics of Criticism (1990); Wayne C. Booth, The Company We Keep (1992); Simon Critchley, 
The Ethics of Deconstruction (1992); Samuel Goldberg, Agents and Lives (1993); Robert 
Eaglestone, Ethical Criticism (1997); Adam Newton, Narrative Ethics (1997); Colin Mc Ginn, 
Ethics, Evil and Fiction (1999); Jill Robbins, Altered Reading (1999); and Derek Attridge, The 
                                                      
8
 John Ashbery, “The Skaters,” CP, 149.  
9
 Michael Palmer, “Left Unfinished Sixteen Times,” CA, 122.  
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Singularity of Literature (2004). While each of these texts concentrate on fiction to advance 
the inherent ethical capacity of literature, the subsequent decade has seen ethical criticism 
applied to modernism, Lee Osser’s The Ethics of Modernism (2009); drama, Larry Bouchard’s 
Theatre and Integrity (2011); trauma narratives, Martin Modlinger’s and Philipp Sonntag’s 
Other People’s Pain (2011); and autobiographical fiction, Robert Mc Gill’s The Treacherous 
Imagination (2013), to name but a few divergences. This trajectory of ethical literary criticism 
indicates a marked refusal, or perhaps even an inability, to explore the ethics of poetics in 
English language literature, proof that Socrates’ dismissal of poets from the ideal state in 
Plato’s Republic has become so entrenched that the social function of poetry and its purpose 
regarding day-to-day living are almost innately secondary to other forms of discourse, other 
ways of writing about ethics or even being ethical. Socrates famously critiques poetry as an 
imitative art that appeals to the inferior, appetitive part of the soul: 
 
 
And in the case of sex, anger, and all the desires, pleasures, and pains that we say 
accompany all our actions, poetic imitation has the very same effect on us. It nurtures 
and waters them and establishes them as rulers in us when they ought to wither and be 
ruled, for that way we’ll become better and happier rather than worse and more 
wretched.10      
 
 
As imitators, they are inferior to the real world of making, the implication being that “only 
activities producing tangible results are to be taken seriously.” 11  Another reason for the 
subordination of poetry to other forms of literary discourse in terms of ethics is the tendency 
to equate the first-person, singular speaker of a poem with the actual poet, such that any 
discussion of pertinent ethical issues is misconstrued as prescriptive, absolutist moralising, a 
practice wholly incongruous with the postmodern relativist climate in which ethical literary 
criticism germinated. According to this logic, poets are capable of exploring and enacting 
morality, the rules that determine our social responsibilities and how these are adhered to, 
whereas authors of other forms of literary discourse can imaginatively engage with ethics, the 
systematic study of the reasoning framework informing these rules.  
Fortunately, the exception to this general dismissal of poetry from the debates ethical 
literary criticism seeks to engender is innovative American poetry from the second half of the 
                                                      
10
 Plato, “Republic X,” Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy: From Thales to Aristotle, Fourth Edition, ed. S. 
Marc Cohen, Patricia Curd and C. D. C. Reeve (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2011), 628. 
11
 Francisco J. Gonzalez, Dialectic and Dialogue: Plato’s Practice of Philosophical Inquiry (Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 1998), 134. 
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twentieth century. Beginning with Tim Woods’ seminal The Poetics of the Limit (2003), which 
analyses the Objectivists, in particular Louis Zukofsky, and the school of Language poetry to 
show that “contemporary poetics, through the critique of reference and normative syntax by 
way of linguistic games and the play of the signifier, are concerned with ethics and the 
relationship between language and ethics,”12  and continuing with G. Matthew Jenkins’ Poetic 
Obligation (2008) and John Wrighton’s Ethics and Politics in Modern American Poetry (2012), 
innovative American poetry of this period can be seen as being “motivated by an ethical 
concern for others as a social responsibility.”13  Richard Deming’s Listening On All Sides 
(2007) even establishes an ethical practice of writing and reading so that experimental 
American poets can be appreciated in “their roles as exemplars [of a pragmatist poetics], as 
close listeners to the words others…use and how they use them” in “a community of those who 
see participation in meaning – its circulations and implications – as neither settled nor 
transparent.” 14  Woods’ suggestion that the “poetics of the limit…[is a] poetics of 
interruption”15  is crucial to the understandings of poetics, ethics, proximity and difficulty 
delineated in my analysis. Both Ashbery and Palmer will be shown, therefore, to explore what 
happens at this limit, at the point where myself ends and another begins, at the furthest reaches 
of what can be said in poetry. By reading Ashbery and Palmer as examples of how ethics can 
be enacted through poetics, arguing ultimately that their poems acknowledge “the 
possibility…for…otherness beyond the limit [of the known and knowable], a prolepsis in 
poiesis, that the text holds open and presents as the potential of language use,”16 my argument 
deviates from the alternative route pursued by Jenkins and Wrighton.  
Firstly, Jenkins’ study focuses on three generations of poets, represented by George 
Oppen and Charles Reznikoff, Edward Dorn and Robert Duncan, and Susan Howe and Lyn 
Hejinian, respectively, who draw on the lessons from their Modernist predecessors to enact an 
“ethical-linguistic turn,” with the primary intention of precisely locating this turn historically, 
to determine the socio-cultural and intellectual circumstances determining the movement 
“beyond didacticism and pronouncement toward… [the] indirect ethical inquiry” of a more 
“nonprescriptive, linguistically self-conscious ethics.”17 He astutely observes that “their poetry 
                                                      
12
 Tim Woods, The Poetics of the Limit: Ethics and Politics in Contemporary American Poetry (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003), 4. 
13
 John Wrighton, Ethics and Politics in Modern American Poetry (New York, NY: Routledge, 2010), 2. 
14
 Richard Deming, Listening On All Sides: Toward an Emersonian Ethics of Reading (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2007), 3-5. 
15
 Woods, 255. 
16
 Ibid, 186. 
17
 G. Matthew Jenkins, Poetic Obligation: Ethics in Experimental American Poetry After 1945 (Iowa City, IA: 
University of Iowa Press, 2008), 3. 
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is their ethics,” that their writings are informed by ethically volatile issues engendered by their 
lived experiences, for example, the violating and violent judgements perpetrated against 
communists for Oppen and Jews for Reznikoff, Dorn’s insistence on an open, more eclectic 
community in the face of an increasingly homogenised and paranoid consumption-based 
technocracy, Duncan’s homosexuality at the beginning of the sexual revolution, and Howe’s 
and Hejinian’s gender at the height of the feminist movement. While Jenkins’ textual analysis 
concentrates on the formally challenging, engaging with the materiality of the poem in terms 
of its shape and construction, he aims to demonstrate that this “poetry is not 
intentionally…difficult”18 once we accept that “it is incumbent upon us [as readers] to find the 
ethical theories that best resonate with the ethics of the poetry and poetics.”19 When achieved, 
readers can identify the ethical themes of the work, i.e. sensitivity to identities and social 
positions that have been othered by a dominant culture, acknowledgement of linguistic frames 
used to construct and enforce conventional morals, awareness of complicity in underwriting 
presupposed identifications, etc., the implication being that the difficulty of these authors can 
be negotiated when the correct theory is applied to them. While Jenkins acknowledges the 
impossible task of fulfilling our obligation to others through a close reading of radical alterity 
in a text, he suggests that the other manifests in these poets’ work in the form of 
“indeterminacy, aporia, contradiction, irony, deixis, multiple meanings, variation, disruption, 
paratxis, mistake, accident, chance, ambiguous pronoun reference, paradox, equivocation, 
framing, and so on.”20 In doing so, he demonstrates how the other can be identified, thus 
compromising the radical alterity that makes it so important as what interrupts the self, the 
sense of otherness encountered at the very limit of the known and knowable that can be 
experienced but never explained. The difficulty experienced when reading Ashbery and 
Palmer, therefore, will necessarily not be explained away but instead shown to be the 
constitutive feature of their poetics as ethical praxis, inseparable from the social function and 
purpose they assign poetry as part of day-to-day living.     
 Secondly, Wrighton’s study provides what he terms a “poethical trajectory” to 
supplement Woods’ “first phase poethical praxis” with a second and third stage represented by 
poets “preoccupied with an emancipatory social activism.”21 He identifies a “performative 
dialogics”22 at the centre of this praxis as the poets’ various ethical engagements align them 
                                                      
18
 Ibid, 21. 
19
 Ibid, 225. 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 Wrighton, 1-2. 
22
 Ibid, 2. 
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with pertinent political questions of the period. The second phase includes Olson’s ethical 
imperative to “challenge the dehumanising effects of industrialisation,” Allen Ginsberg’s 
“ethical response to the consumer culture and capitalist technocracy of the fifties,” Gary 
Snyder’s “ecopoetics as instructive of an ethical responsibility in the representation and social 
production of space,” and Jerome Rothenberg’s ethnopoetics as a “direct challenge to cultural 
imperialism.”23 The third phase involves a “turn to language” and is demonstrated by Bruce 
Andrews’ “positively valued re-writings of the social body in a participatory poetics or 
emancipatory constructivism.”24 All of these poets are shown, in one way or another, to reorient 
language so it is no longer “the medium of a market-oriented self-identification” through which 
the individual secures an identity...by gaining purchase on a range of commodified positions 
within the socio-political totality.”25 Wrighton’s analysis is vital to understanding how these 
poets are involved in the political struggle of reconciling the “disparity between the possibility 
of language (to maintain an idealised ethical relation) and the reality of language (as the site of 
political coercion and social conditioning)”26 through their “poethical praxis.” However, his 
concentration on the practical application of their “poethics” to address particular socio-
political issues means ethics and morality are often synonymous in his analyses, even if 
morality is considered contextually determined rather than absolute. While this might be 
necessary to prevent such difficult poetry being dismissed as the preserve of an intellectual 
elite, inane obscurantism or irrelevant and impractical abstraction, my analysis is concerned 
with a “poethics” that precedes, even exceeds, any practical application. “Poethics” for 
Ashbery and Palmer is not just a way of “engaging in a specific politics”27 or a critique of 
language use but an opportunity for enacting the constitution of subjectivity and exploring how 
it is represented and articulated, respectively. Theirs is a poetry of fundamentals because they 
acknowledge that without the reader there is no poet and without the poet there is no reader. 
Before there can be any practical application of ethics in a particular historical moment, there 
is the ethical encounter with another person made possible by the experience of proximity to 
what is unknown and unknowable.   
Both Jenkins’ and Wrighton’s studies are vital for understanding the ethical turn in 
innovative American poetry of this period but their emphasis on how ethics is historically 
conditioned fails to properly appreciate its universal, timeless quality, how ethics is always 
                                                      
23
 Ibid, 18-20. 
24
 Ibid, 20. 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Ibid, 180. 
27
 Ibid, 2. 
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already a response to someone elsewhere and otherwise, to someone beyond the limits of one’s 
capacity to comprehend and outside one’s ability to control or coerce. In addition, neither gives 
appropriate attention to Joan Retallack’s idea of the “poethical wager,” the risk involved in 
committing oneself to something whose outcome is uncertain, to writing “as, not just about, a 
form of living in the real world,”28 such that the fact one is writing and how one does so is 
equally if not more significant than what one writes about. Ashbery and Palmer are involved 
in a project that is at once permissive and obligatory but always in a pre-political sense. This 
analysis of the interconnection between poetics and ethics not only employs Retallack’s 
neologism but is also informed by the similar intention to reveal how Ashbery and Palmer insist 
on positing the poem as an event in the real world rather than object representing or 
commenting on the real world. Both poets explore what it means to be social in the first place, 
not just the ontological question of how one exists in proximity to others but the precedential 
ethical considerations and commitments involved in acting in and interacting with a social of 
others. They ultimately demonstrate how ethics can inhabit poetry as more than just subject 
matter, as the only subject that matters in fact, because it informs not just how but why one 
writes and reads poetry in the first place. 
 
 
The End of Friendship with Self Alone: John Ashbery and Michael Palmer  
 
 
As two poets who have always maintained an active role in the visual arts, Ashbery through 
his art criticism and Palmer through his collaborations, the creative-cultural environment 
initiated by Abstract Expressionism would prove hugely influential on the development and 
emergence of their respective poetics. The paintings of Jackson Pollock, Willem de Kooning, 
Mark Rothko and Barnett Newman collectively, rather than individually, first suggested the 
possibility of a new aesthetic paradigm that was at once simple and complex, urgent and 
meditative, abstract and literal, expressive and secretive. While each of these dialectics feature 
in the poets’ work at different stages and to varying degrees, both are aware of the unfortunate 
incongruence between the potential suggested by Abstract Expressionism and the socio-
political reality of the period. The aesthetic features of this art most appreciated at the time, i.e. 
scale, action, energy, space, etc., served as tacit “operators of sexual difference” that were part 
                                                      
28
 Joan Retallack, “The Poethical Wager,” The Poethical Wager (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
1996), 40. 
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of an “informing metaphorics of masculinity.” 29  Consequently, it provided a “crucial 
component of cold war U.S. national identity, differentiating the nation politically and 
culturally from a Europe portrayed as weakened and effeminate.”30 As a result, Ashbery and 
Palmer carefully avoid positioning themselves as proponents of oppositional individuation, 
knowing how easily the individualist existential experiences expressed by these painters were 
misappropriated to promote the national principles of individualism and democracy both 
domestically and abroad. The inevitable fate of the Abstract Expressionists explains why 
Ashbery and Palmer have always sought out artists who are less readily assimilable to the 
dominant national discourses of the period, the former frequently championing the work of 
Joseph Cornell, Larry Rivers, Jane Freilicher and Joe Brainard, and the latter collaborating with 
Irving Petlin and Augusta Talbot and foreign artists such as Gerhard Richter, Sandro Chia and 
Micaëla Heinich. Nevertheless, the creative environment engendered by the Abstract 
Expressionists confirmed the importance of “outside” for establishing and maintaining an 
aesthetic paradigm that is as difficult as it is necessary. Palmer identifies this need to decentre 
identity in Ashbery, to “move beyond the subject – in both senses of the word.”31 Both poets 
were Harvard educated, which undoubtedly made them aware that positioning oneself inside 
the postwar American poetic tradition required adherence to the pedantic new critical pedagogy 
and confessional, expressivist poetics. Ashbery’s ten-year relocation to Paris and Palmer’s 
permanent relocation to San Francisco, in addition to their committed refusal to be aligned with 
any particular poetic movement, indicates, therefore, their burgeoning “poethic” sensibility, 
how the poetry is a way of living in the real world and how living in the real world reciprocally 
informs the poetry.       
 Such early awareness of the importance of what is and must remain outside also 
explains both poets’ continued interest in translation or perhaps their interest in translation 
affirmed the importance of what is beyond articulation in one’s native, habitual language and 
what cannot be appropriated into America’s vernacular epistemology. The recently published 
Collected French Translations: Poetry (2014) and Collected French Translations: Prose 
(2014) suggest that Ashbery’s translations are not just an addendum to his other creative-
critical projects but rather a conduit for them, as “the very curious style of [what he was 
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translating often] got into [his] own work and would keep recurring long after [he] had done 
this translation.”32 He admits “that there are echoes [of others’ voices]…even today in my 
poetry”33 and they allow him to avoid ready-made word patterns and associations that he might 
otherwise fall into when writing though he is never aware of these echoes while actually 
writing. Developing on his graduate studies in comparative literature, Palmer, like Ashbery, 
sees translation as the opportunity for a poetic encounter with hitherto unnamed and unknown 
others. His most notable translations include those of Vincente Huidobro, Alexi Parshchikov 
and Emmanuel Hocquard, and his co-editing of Nothing the Sun Could Not Explain: Twenty 
Contemporary Brazilian Poets, demonstrating his abilities across multiple languages. Palmer’s 
own poetry is characterised by its complex intertextuality, which “[manifests] in the 
borrowing…of other people’s words,”34 hence his claim to “have been writing a book, not in 
my native language.”35  Because translating is always an interpretation, it complicates the 
notion of reading and writing as separate activities, explaining his suggestion that “writing is 
also a kind of reading”36 and by extension reading is also a kind of writing.  
Translating also raises important questions about how readers should respond to a text. 
By interpreting the text, readers create another, different composition for which s/he, like any 
translator, is ultimately responsible. For both Ashbery and Palmer, the act of translating is 
crucial to their “poethics” since it represents both the permission to be responsive but also the 
obligation to be responsible. Furthermore, Palmer insists that: 
 
 
All poetry is, of course translation, a bearing across from one region to another, a 
crossing of borders, a conjoining of same with other. It is a voyage out of the self-same 
or the self-identical…into a fluid semantic and ontological field. That is, to translate is 
also to be translated, to commit to an act of becoming…human perhaps.37 
 
 
Translation makes Ashbery’s and Palmer’s intended “poethics” explicit, that we are reading 
poets who are always not only reading others but responding to them in their own writings. By 
extension, we as readers are given permission but are also obligated to respond to Ashbery and 
Palmer as others and to remain responsible for our interpretative responses. Translating allows 
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for “extensions of voice, beyond that one with which we come into the world. The elsewhere 
so necessary to any understanding of the here-and-now.”38 It is not simply speaking through 
others’ voices but speaking with them, entering into a “timeless, borderless dialogue 
with…other[s]”39 in the groundless ground of the poem. This is “an ‘elsew(here) that includes 
the word ‘here,’ as well as a ‘nowhere’ which can be read ‘now here,’”40 since the “time of the 
reading [and/as writing] is here-and-now: a now which happens at any moment, and hence a 
here which exists anywhere.”41 Perhaps their shared interest in Raymond Roussel (Ashbery 
researched him for a never-completed doctoral project in the late fifties and Palmer completed 
an undergraduate thesis on his work in 1965) explains the strange temporality of the “now 
here” in their poetry, what Palmer describes as “songs in the future-past.”42 The effect of 
Roussel’s work depends on the “correspondence of the present and the absent” and the 
“spatialisation of time and memory” by “subjecting the temporal to various structures of 
simultaneous juxtaposition or succession of image-like scenes without context.”43 Both poets 
self-reflexively acknowledge this sense of “nowhere – now here” in each other’s work, 
Ashbery observing how: 
 
 
we [are encouraged to] follow the movement of the argument…intently…[as] it 
appears…urgent to do so, but, as they say, where it stops nobody knows. That ‘where’ 
is the delightful, dangerous, and ultimately generous place where we end up if we 
follow Palmer.44    
 
 
While in his review of Shadow Train (1981), Palmer identifies how:  
 
 
we are left with…neither territory nor map but an oscillation between them, a dialectical 
shadow play of presence and absence. Echoes and quotations surface and are 
reabsorbed…A series of ‘first persons’ is projected and erased. The speaker is not only 
masked but destabilised as a reference point.45  
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Ashbery and Palmer might be irreconcilable opposites in terms of the economies of their 
writing, with the former “much more engaged by the permanency of the ephemeral…and of 
those eruptions of the trivial into consciousness” conveyed through a gradually more expansive 
“generative [and] exploratory sense” of allowing the poem “to carry on…through an idea of 
extension,”46 whereas the latter’s “poetry has not so much developed as refined and reduced 
itself to the elements that were always there”47 through its “[involvement] with some sort of 
implosive intensification.”48 Palmer could easily be speaking about his own work when he 
praises Ashbery for the “remade” quality of his language and how his voice is always only 
“placed along and within the voices of others,”49 highlighting the importance of the dialectic 
of absence and presence that informs both their work and is so crucial to appreciating the ethics 
motivating their poetics of proximity, of always already being just one amongst many others. 
However, where Palmer directly alludes to the “possibility of a life entirely given over to the 
poem. A life that was not referential to ‘the literary,’ what qualifies as literature, as to the actual 
exigencies and demands of the poetic vocation,” 50  Ashbery, typically, is more hesitant, 
suggesting that since his prose writing is the “[result] of an activity that has always been 
something more than a hobby, if less than a calling,”51 then by a process of limitation his other 
activity, poetry, is closer to a vocation. Translation and vocation both help conceptualise poetry 
as the response to a preliminary call from another person, entering into a conversation with a 
voice that originates outside the self. Furthermore, Ashbery and Palmer are largely responsible 
for provoking the recent interest in “cross-pollination” between “traditional [forms]...and more 
experimental modes of writing.”52 For example, Ashbery combines the meditative enquiries of 
the Transcendentalists with the capacious French prose poem and reinvigorates conventional 
forms like the pantoum and the sestina using ekphrasis, while Palmer uses a hermeneutics of 
scepticism to enlarge the capacities of the confessional, expressivist poem and introduces a 
continental lyricism and philosophy to the explorations of a truncated self engendered by the 
example of Emily Dickinson. Through these combinations, they engender “productive 
encounter[s] that [answer] most frequently to the name ‘innovation.’”53 The sense of encounter, 
however, is further utilised to accentuate the ethics inherent in their poetics because these 
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innovations highlight the “obscurity [read: difficulty] of poetry...[an] obscurity, if it is not 
congenital, has been bestowed on poetry by strangeness and distance (perhaps of its own 
making) and for the sake of an encounter.”54 If writing poetry is both to translate and be 
translated, the poetic vocation is extended to the reader who is called to respond by the voice 
of another person, in this case the poet, which means the difficult poem is a site of potential 
encounter between self and other. Because the difficult poem requires “an effort of attention 
[by the reader] that is as active as that which goes into the writing,”55 the reader becomes a 
translator, not only transforming the poet’s original work but rewriting the poems so they might 
be “closer to the originals than the originals themselves.”56 Writing poetry, therefore, is to be 
interpreted by another person, to be always already put into question by the reader but Ashbery 
and Palmer are equally concerned with how the reader might be put into question, might be 
called to respond as a responsive and responsible subject by the voice of another person and 
removed from the self-same, the “enchantment of self with self.” 
 Despite these “curious resemblances,”57 my analysis of Ashbery and Palmer is not an 
attempt to enforce complete consensus or correspondence between them. Even disregarding 
the influence their particular geographical locations, New York and San Francisco respectively, 
and the attendant personal and poetical relationships, have on their projects, vital differences 
exist between them. For example, Ashbery’s homosexuality resulted in an immediate 
disconnect from the containment culture of fifties America, whose virulent homophobia 
required careful negotiation for reasons of self-protection, while his expatriate experience in 
France, “living in a country where the language spoken was not [his] own,”58 forever changed 
his relationship to language as a medium of expression and self-disclosure. Working as an art 
critic meant he was acutely aware of the appropriative tendency of mainstream American 
culture, which readily neutralised whatever was remotely other about innovations in the visual 
arts, while his phenomenology of everyday life involves tracing thoughts voicing themselves 
and inscribing a social world.  Palmer, on the other hand, lost faith in language after witnessing 
its complicity in the intentional misremembering and misleading re-presentation of events 
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associated with America’s neo-imperialist expansion during the sixties, while his active 
involvement in experimental dance confirmed the possibility of an embodied form of non-
linguistic signification. His attendance at the Vancouver Poetry Conference (1963) first 
introduced him to a new conceptualisation of community, eventually resulting in his own idea 
of the imagined community consisting of different poets and readers involved in the same 
timeless project. Furthermore, his interest in Wittgenstein, particularly his argument that 
“ordinary language is all right”59 and suggestion that “Philosophy ought really to be written 
only as a form of poetry,”60 explains why Palmer’s “poetics of everyday life is thus not simply 
the empirical record of the actual words of this or that person,” not the “expression or 
externalisation of inner feeling” but the critique of that expression” to affirm that poetry ought 
really to be written as philosophy.61      
Nevertheless, they share a “poethic” sensibility, a concern for what poetry can do as a 
way of living in the social world of others and a concern for the subjectivity of the reader that 
warrants analysing them, if not comparatively, then at least in proximity to each other. At the 
heart of this is not just a reappraisal of why one should write and read poetry but also a radical 
reconfiguration of how one does so. Because their work is founded on exploring the ethics that 
precedes any politics, my readings of Ashbery and Palmer are intended to demonstrate how 
they realise what I term a “poethics of proximity,” which requires an extended analysis of the 
various considerations and commitments that both permit and obligate this as they manifest in 
the collections up to that point. Ashbery’s work up to and including SPCM will be analysed to 
illustrate how he engages with the question of self-representation in poetry, while Palmer’s 
work up to and including Sun will be analysed to reveal how he explores self-articulation in 
poetry. Both these questions are motivated by their concurrent interest in exploring how the 
subject author’s a self, how it writes itself into existence as one subject amongst others, and 
determining whether or not this can be done in an ethical, that is, in a responsive and 
responsible, manner. While their projects don’t exactly share a common trajectory, there are 
important parallels in how they move away from “the enchantment of self with self” and turn 
toward the other in order to realise a “poethics of proximity.” Firstly, this movement involves 
undermining the poetic subject as autotelic by recognising the importance of what lies outside 
the self and in doing so affirming its status as a heteronomic entity. This turn toward what is 
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outside the poetic subject will be discussed in relation to Ashbery’s Some Trees (1956) and The 
Tennis Court Oath (1962) and Palmer’s Blake’s Newton (1972) and The Circular Gates (1974). 
Secondly, Ashbery and Palmer will be shown to welcome what is outside into their poetry 
through a process of self-erasure and the dialectic of presence and absence in Rivers and 
Mountains (1966) and The Double-Dream of Spring (1970), and Without Music (1977) and 
Notes for Echo Lake (1981), respectively. In this case, what is outside manifests in another 
person and both will be shown to extend the permission and obligation to become ethical 
subjects to the reader by allowing him/her to inhabit the poem and become responsible for 
his/her interpretation. Thirdly and finally, Ashbery’s act of self-representation in Three Poems 
(1972) and Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror (1975) and Palmer’s act of self-articulation in 
First Figure (1984) and Sun (1988) will be addressed to demonstrate how a “poethics of 
proximity” informs the constitution of ethical subjectivity, a process coextensively undertaken 
by both the poet and the reader as they respond to each other as other, an experience signalled 
by being at the very limits of the known and knowable.  
 To help further differentiate between Ashbery and Palmer, their concern for how an 
ethical subject is authored through the writing and reading of poetry will be analysed according 
to the trajectory of Bakhtin’s “aesthethic” theories and Levinas’ phenomenological ethics. 
Firstly, there is a noticeable shift from ethics to aesthetics when Bakhtin’s texts are read in the 
order in which they were written rather than the order of their publication in English, Toward 
a Philosophy of the Act (written: 1919-21/published: 1993), Art and Answerability (1919-
1924/1990) and The Dialogic Imagination (1934-41/1981). However, when his “overriding 
goal…is seen as a philosophical [inquiry],”62 there is an undeniable continuity in his work 
engendered by his study of how a self is authored through performed acts. In TPA, Bakhtin 
argues that the subject comes into existence by performing actions in the presence of others 
and being irreducibly answerable for them. In DI, his attention turns to literary discourse as he 
develops his principle of dialogism to explain how language always already consists of the 
voices of others and to use language is to always already be responding to others. Therefore, 
every utterance inherently involves the speaker in relations with other speakers, thus precluding 
the autonomous, self-sufficient monologue in favour of a dialogue. This trajectory proves 
crucial to appreciating how Ashbery utilises his knowledge of visual art aesthetics to configure 
the poem as an event between embodied subjects during which answerable acts are performed, 
whereas dialogism helps explain Palmer’s understanding of the poem as a conversation 
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between a community of different speakers. Secondly, there is an important change in how 
Levinas conceptualises ethics between his two mature philosophical works, Totality and 
Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority (1961) and Otherwise Than Being: Or Beyond Essence 
(1981). In this first text, he argues that the face-to-face encounter with another person 
constitutes subjectivity, the occasion when the self encounters an other and responds to the 
question posed by him/her by answering for oneself. In the second text, Levinas reconfigures 
ethics to refer to a pre-linguistic experience of ethical encounter. He distinguishes between the 
said and the saying, where the said refers to the self’s actual response to another person while 
the saying refers to a response prior to anything articulated in language, a gesture that orients 
oneself toward another. This trajectory is key to understanding the difference between self-
representation in Ashbery and self-articulation in Palmer. In SPCM, Ashbery realises a 
“poethics of proximity” through the fact-to-face encounter with another person’s self-portrait, 
thus revealing how self-representation is dependent on the presence of an other who instigates 
it, who permits and obligates a response. In S, Palmer’s “poethics of proximity” are realised 
through the act of listening, an originating, pre-linguistic gesture before anything is spoken that 
opens the self to the presence of an other and makes response not only possible but necessary. 
Most importantly, while both Ashbery and Palmer explore how responding to another person 
is crucial to the acts of self-representation and self-articulation, their poetry provides an 
occasion for the reader to consider how s/he might author him/herself as an ethical subject by 
responding to the poet, how s/he can realise a “poethics of proximity” in the face-to-face 
encounter with Ashbery and by listening to Palmer both as unknown and unknowable others. 
In terms of structure, to illustrate how Ashbery and Palmer employ different strategies 
to realise their “poethics of proximity,” this analysis consists of two separate sections. 
Nevertheless, despite the differences in how they realise the ethical potential they identify as 
informing poetry, a number of theoretical terms, methodological proposals and contextual 
issues are utilised to explain the corresponding trajectories of their work. Accordingly, Chapter 
1 explains the primary concepts of “poethics,” proximity, “response-ability” and necessary 
difficulty using the aesthetic theories of Bakhtin and the phenomenological ethics of Levinas. 
In addition, Ashbery’s and Palmer’s works will be posited as responding to the pedagogical 
practices of New Criticism, which will be shown to embody the strategies of containment and 
discourses of consensus associated with the Cold War, thus lending both personal and political 
immediacy to each poet’s decision to compose in open rather than closed forms, and to distance 
themselves from normative poetic standards in favour of more innovative approaches to how a 
poem is initially composed and subsequently interpreted.  
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Part I focuses on Ashbery’s work from the fifties up to the mid-seventies, beginning 
with ST and concluding with SPCM, where, it will be argued, the poet realises his “poethics of 
proximity” through the face-to-face encounter of the aesthetic event. Chapter 2 addresses 
Ashbery’s first two collections to identify how he problematizes the notion of the autotelic 
poetic subject and introduces a heteronomic alternative, that is, a subject that is not self-
contained and autonomous but rather open toward, even constituted by, difference and 
otherness. Ashbery will be shown to challenge strategies of containment and discourses of 
consensus in both collections by engaging with the aesthetics of contemporaneous artists, 
avoiding oppositionality through indifference, preventing the appropriation of otherness by 
positioning himself as an outsider and using repetition to accentuate the sense of irreducible 
difference informing his early work.  
Chapter 3 concentrates on RM and DDS, collections in which Ashbery displaces himself 
as the subject of his poems in order for the reader to make the poem correspond to his/her 
perspective. For this reason, the poem will be shown to be an event rather than an object, while 
Bakthin’s theory of the performed act will be used to explain how Ashbery envisages a situation 
where each instance of interpretation is an instance of composition for which the reader is 
responsible. Ultimately, Ashbery is both absent and present in these collections as he 
encourages the reader to consider how the poem is a site where multiple consciousnesses 
encounter each other, how the poem allows for a sense of proximity because it is an event 
where both the poet and the reader can realise their “response-ability,” the constitutive moment 
of a “poethics.”  
Finally, using Levinas’ analogy of the face-to-face encounter, Ashbery will be shown 
in Chapter 4 to realise a “poethics of proximity” in the encounter between “(my)Self” and 
“(an)Other” in the event of the poem. Firstly, TP’s immersive, environmental quality will be 
addressed to illustrate how Ashbery is concerned with making the acts performed during the 
writing and reading of his work readily applicable to how one lives in the extratextual, social 
world. Developing on the “response-ability” realised in the previous collection, the experience 
of reading TP, of being confronted with innumerable choices regarding how one should 
proceed with the text, is intended to replicate the lived experience of acting in and interacting 
with the social world of others. This poem is characterised by a necessary difficulty that 
requires a new way of reading, one that allows for an appreciation of the encounter that occurs 
between the poet and the reader in conversation with each other rather than one solely 
concerned with the teleological process of determining meaning. Secondly, in SPCM, Ashbery 
uses ekphrasis to explore how proximity between “(my)Self” and “(an)Other” is realised in the 
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face-to-face encounter. The eponymous poem in this collection sees Ashbery responding to 
“(an)Other” in his act of self-representation, an act he encourages the reader to similarly 
perform a s/he responds to the poet as “(an)Other” when interpreting the poem and realising 
his/her ethical subjectivity. Just as the poet responds to the face of the painter in the self-portrait 
as “(an)Other,” someone who cannot and must not be completely known, the reader responds 
to Ashbery as “(an)Other” and in doing so realises his/her “response-ability” as an ethical 
subject. This encounter is intended to model how “(my)Self” acts in and interacts with the 
social world of others in a way that acknowledges the alterity of “(an)Other” without 
appropriating or reducing it, it is a relation of proximity rather than complete identification that 
constitutes one’s ethical subjectivity. 
Part II focuses on Palmer’s work from the early seventies to the late eighties, starting 
with BN and finishing with S, which documents the poet’s realisation of a “poethics of 
proximity” as he explores the encounter between individuals that occurs in conversation prior 
to anything being said. In Chapter 5, Palmer will be shown to challenge strategies of 
containment and discourses of consensus in BN and CG as he attempts to reconfigure the poetic 
subject, and the poem itself, as open to difference and otherness. This intention might be similar 
to Ashbery, but Palmer pursues it in an entirely different way by collapsing the distinction 
between the inside and outside of the poem through serial compositions and derivations from 
other sources. Furthermore, Palmer uses these collections to investigate the possibility of 
positioning himself outside the body politic and in doing so creating a community of difference, 
thus indicating the ethical concerns informing his poetics at this early stage. 
Chapter 6 addresses the next two collection, WM and NEL, where Palmer seeks to 
explore the conventions of the lyric poem to reveal that it is informed by the presence of 
multiple voices rather than the singular voice of a speaker or poetic subject. Through a process 
of self-erasure, Palmer creates a vacant subject position that the reader can inhabit as an 
embodied consciousness when s/he reads the poem. In doing so, he returns the lyric to its 
original function as a text to be performed, thus providing a model for how the reader realises 
him/herself through performed actions in the extratextual, social world. Such lyrics he terms 
“analytical,” as they investigate how embodiment occurs during the writing and reading of 
poetry, a process that involves both presence and absence as the poet and reader encounter each 
other within the poem. Bakhtin’s theory of dialogism will also be reconfigured to explain how 
the lyric is a dialogic rather than a monologic utterance, thus allowing for a method of 
composition and interpretation in which the poet and reader respond to “(an)Other” in the 
poem. Consequently, writing and reading in this manner become gestures extended toward 
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another person in the event of communication rather than being concerned with the transfer of 
meaning or the reduction of uncertainty between “(my)Self” and “(an)Other.”  
Finally, in Chapter 7 Palmer will be shown to realise his “poethics of proximity” as he 
explores the encounter that is possible between “(my)Self” and “(an)Other” in FF and S. In 
these collections, Levinas’ theory of the saying and the said will be used to explain how the 
poet conceptualises the poem as a gesture, a performed act that presupposes an encounter 
between “(my)Self” and “(an)Other” before anything is communicated. Palmer’s concern here 
is with a language of the unsayable, a language that communicates prior to speaking, and his 
collaborations with the choreographer Margaret Jenkins will be addressed in the analysis of 
FF. With S, Palmer realises his “poethics of proximity” by foregrounding the act of listening 
to “(an)Other,” a gesture that welcomes and communicates to “(an)Other” prior to anything 
being communicated but which is the prerequisite of all communication. Because listening 
requires proximity while not necessitating complete identification between the subjects 
involved, it provides a precise example of the originating experience of ethical subjectivity, an 
experience Palmer extends to his reader by encouraging him/her to listen to what is not said, to 
what occurs in the encounter between “(my)self” and “(an)Other” prior to anything that might 
be communicated.             
 
  
Just Being Difficult? 
 
Discussing the ethical responsibility of innovative poetry, especially that which “makes its 
difficulty a basic means to accomplishing its ends,” might initially seem problematic since 
“privileging artistic complexity” is often seen to subordinate “political obligation” and the 
resultant ambiguity and indeterminacy are considered to preclude conviction.63 As George 
Steiner asks, what does it mean when the “language-act most charged with the intent of 
communication, of reaching out to touch the listener or reader” and begin a dialogue is 
“resistant to immediacy and comprehension?” 64  Numerous questions are raised in this 
discussion of responsibility (“being capable of fulfilling an obligation” and “being accountable 
to another for something”) and irresponsibility (“not answerable for actions” and “not liable to 
be called to account”). For example, is the poet responsible to the reader’s expectations of what 
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a poem should be and do, is s/he responsible to the experience being re-presented and/or 
performed, or is s/he responsible to the language and the medium being used? These multiple 
responsibilities are incompatible since ensuring one is satisfied inevitably forces the others into 
secondary importance. However, in Ashbery and Palmer, the emphasis is not on a practical 
responsibility to someone or for something but on an antecedent, precedential “response-
ability” that is realised during the ethical encounter between self and other, the permission and 
the obligation experienced by the poet and the reader of which all subsequent questions of 
practical responsibility are derivatives. By revealing how tentatively we comprehend the many 
permutations of self-reference and continuously confronting us with what lies just beyond the 
limits of what we do and can know, difficulty prolongs this encounter between self and other, 
highlighting the importance of identification, albeit never in the ways that might reinforce us 
as self-sufficient subjects. Difficulty is neither just a property of a text nor merely a classifiable 
set of techniques but an experience that must be understood as a fundamental part of the writing 
and reading process. Because the “issue of poetic difficulty is meaningless” without 
considering the “reader and...reading publics,” it is at once individual and collective, and can 
only be experienced rather than explained away.65   
To understand the necessity of Ashbery’s and Palmer’s difficulty, it must be 
differentiated from the two dominant examples of difficulty in twentieth century American 
poetry, High Modernism and Language poetry, which have primarily determined our 
understanding of the function difficulty performs. Firstly, while the difficulty of high 
modernism “came with an ‘ought,’” meaning it was not just the result of an individual’s 
expression but a “matter of cultural and aesthetic necessity,”66 it equally served “an important 
[but more problematic] social function as a cultural gatekeeper” because “knowing how to 
respond properly to difficult art [and literature] became a way of indicating one’s membership 
in high culture.”67 For this reason, Eliot’s claim that “poets in our civilisation, as it exists at 
present, must be difficult”68 is not as innocuous as it might appear because difficulty was not 
just an argument about comprehension but “was the early twentieth century’s tool for arguing 
about what literature is and who should control it.” 69  Difficulty also articulates a social 
situation, where the “common reader” does not have the necessary “knowledge required to 
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understand difficult modern texts” while a “specialised elite audience” does.70 This knowledge-
based difficulty “demanded an interpreting class” but it also “narrowed aesthetic meaning,”71 
since if the reader responded appropriately to the difficulty, i.e. interpreted the symbols 
correctly, identified the literary allusions, determined the bibliographic references, etc., it could 
be explained away, thus indicating his/her initiation into a coterie of like-minded individuals 
who share a similar sensibility. Secondly, the difficulty of the Language poets is more 
instrumental, since what motivates their innovations is a “demand for a social, political 
dimension in writing – embracing concern for a public, for community goods, for overall 
comprehensions and transformation” that “intersects an overall concern for language as 
medium: for the conditions of its makings of meaning, significance or value, & sense.”72 While 
this poetry is itself not “instrumentalised or instrumentalising” it is more “actively 
explanatory,” a kind of “writing as politics” not just about politics in which difficulty serves a 
particular purpose.73 Difficulty is intended to disrupt the ideological structures of the capitalist 
socio-economic system informing the production and consumption of meaning in poetry by 
precluding confessional, expressivist aesthetics and preventing close-reading. Language poetry 
radically reconfigures the relationship between the poet, the reader and the text to subvert the 
normalised hierarchies and invert the active-passive dichotomy structuring society and 
conditioning poetic composition and interpretation. As a result, the difficulty of such writing 
is only necessary in terms of its function in explaining and enacting this political objective.        
 Both the pro/prescriptive and the instrumental approach to difficulty oversimplifies it. 
For Ashbery and Palmer it is an inherent, if not the constitutive, feature of their “poethics,” 
thus pointing equally to poetry and to life, to a life given over to the poem and to writing and 
reading poetry as a way of living in the social world of others. Their poetry displays a difficulty 
that cannot be explained away or limited to a utilitarian purpose, it is a “necessary difficulty” 
that “encompasses both critique” of how things are but also “celebration” of how things could 
and should be. 74  Necessarily difficult poetry allows for not only the exploration but the 
enactment of what the social might be, it performs the crucial function of developing different 
paradigms of subjectivity and testing the possibility of utopian social relations in ways that are 
impossible in other creative-critical discourses. Neither Ashbery nor Palmer are unnecessarily 
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difficult, they are not simply abstract, obtuse, solipsistic, surreal, indeterminate, exclusive, 
esoteric or whatever other word commonly used to disparagingly denote poetic innovations. 
As Woods’, Jenkins’, and Wrighton’s studies demonstrate, they are part of the more general 
ethical turn in innovative American poetry but unlike their immediate predecessors and 
contemporaries they are not so much concerned with turning their attention to particular ethical 
issues but with exploring how poetry can enact this turning from self toward other that permits 
and obligates all further ethical activities. In this sense, Ashbery and Palmer are not poets of 
the everyday but poets of the everyday. Unlike William Carlos Williams and Frank O’Hara, 
who utilise relatively inconsequential experiences to reconfigure poetry’s social function as a 
way of valuing the personal occasions that are often at best ignored or at worst intentionally 
suppressed by official discourses, Ashbery and Palmer call our attention to the most everyday 
experience that informs all subsequent social interactions, the ethical encounter between self 
and other. However, as Ashbery argues:  
 
 
It is as well to call attention 
To it by exaggeration, perhaps. But calling attention 
Isn’t the same as explaining, and as I said I am not ready 
To line phrases with the costly stuff of explanation, and shall not, 
Will not do so for the moment.75   
 
 
Their concern for the subjectivity of the reader means they are difficult because of the necessity 
of their task, not just explaining how to live ethically but providing readers with the opportunity 
to realise for themselves the considerations and commitments involved in acting in and 
interacting with the social world of others as a responsive and responsible ethical subject. As 
Ashbery explains, this poetry is about “getting from one place to another...from one [or my] 
moment to another [or an other’s].”76  Because “life is very difficult” the poetry must be 
difficult, because “it seems very often that we’re in a situation that is impossible to deal with, 
but somehow it goes on, so it’s very difficult and easy at the same time. It happens by itself 
and we’re part of its happening.”77 Palmer appreciates this aspect of Ashbery, how he “deprives 
you of the simple reading, the either/or that certain lesser readers are always yearning for”78 
but which is, more importantly, the result of certain writing practices. Like Ashbery, he refuses 
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the “erasure of the function of poetry in relation to the world, a trivialising for which one is 
duly rewarded for making the thing manageable” by ensuring the poem remains 
“unmanageable,” that its difficulty makes it a part of living in the social world of others. 79 
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Chapter 1: The Poethics of Proximity: A Necessary 
Difficulty 
 
Poetry is capable of doing things ethical in a way that philosophy simply cannot. This is not to 
deny the latter’s important heuristic capacity regarding ethical matters but to suggest rather that 
poetry offers a different way of conceptualising ethics by drawing our attention to the 
performative actions that constitute us as subjects within the social world of others. Informed 
by the “poethics of proximity,” poetry is not concerned with imperatives or prescriptions but 
with enacting what it is like to be an ethical subject. By testing the possibility of living 
according to a principle you are trying to articulate, writing and reading become activities 
associated with a particular way of living in the real world, the social world of others outside, 
but always exerting influence upon, the self. Accordingly, the social function of poetry is 
pronounced and this acquires important political connotations when contextualised in the Cold 
War period and understood as a response to the dominant discourses of containment and 
consensus that defined this period. This turn to ethics signals a turn toward the other, a powerful 
gesture of resistance against the homogenising forces operating in society intent on neutralising 
difference by appropriating it into categories of the same.  
Poems informed by such “poethics” are no longer limited to their communicative 
capacity in the same way that ethics is not limited to providing a prescriptive morality. They 
come to embody an ethics, a particular way of negotiating one’s social environment and 
interacting with those others who inhabit it. The difficulty of such poems is, therefore, 
necessary because it ensures that otherness is protected from appropriation or reduction by 
insisting on difference and distance between the participants involved in the aesthetic 
experience. Because the poem is no longer limited to its meaning, its significance lies with the 
application of what one learns from it to one’s own experience of life in that moment. It is 
important to remember that despite the centrality of ethics to poetics in such poetry, there is no 
coerciveness, imperatives or prescriptions since how you should live your life cannot be 
specified because no one else is in a position to fully understand another’s life. In this sense, 
“poethics” is not concerned with the content of poetry but rather with the occasion it provides, 
a potential to be realised by the poet and reader that leads them somewhere they did not pre-
empt, toward an encounter with an other that constitutes the self and is integral to it becoming 
a responsive and responsible ethical subject. The condition of such poems recommends a way 
of living in the social world of others, while their affect, rather than content, represents their 
ethical value. If difficulty demarcates the limits of understanding then it also marks the limits 
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the self. However, a “poethics of proximity” is not concerned with highlighting such limitations 
but rather with foregrounding the potential actions possible at such limits, the point at which 
self ends and the social world of others begins.        
 
 
(1.1) The New Criticism: Containment and Consensus 
 
New Criticism is arguably the most influential critical movement of the twentieth century, or 
is at least remembered first and foremost as the preeminent version of formalist criticism, 
because of its ability to translate theoretical and ideological arguments into practical and easily 
applicable pedagogical practices in the form of close reading. However, the well-documented 
failures of New Criticism are used to legitimise the charge levelled at its practitioners that they 
represented a retreat from the world of political, and as I will argue ethical, engagement, during 
a period when such explicit, committed engagements were becoming increasingly necessary. 
The failures of New Criticism derive from its overly formalist method, which manifested in its 
ignoring the constitutive role performed by the reader during the interpretation of a text, its 
denying the importance of the author’s intentions, its privileging certain groups of texts (and 
by extension certain types of authors) over others, and its severing literature from its immediate 
historical-material and socio-cultural contexts. While New Critics may have favoured 
depoliticised readings, their pedagogical practices and interpretive strategies must not 
themselves be depoliticised. There is an irony that the “typical critique of the New Criticism 
as formalistic…is itself formalistic” since it “recognises that [it] was indeed a kind of 
formalism” while ignoring the “historical affiliations, purposes and functions of that 
formalism.”1 Like any other critical theory, its terminology “must be understood to have carried 
extra-critical meanings and performed extra-critical functions” because “the meaning and the 
function of language are never determined solely by the particular discourse” in which it 
appears, language being always “overdetermined…by its interdiscursive context.”2  
 The view that the “New Criticism represents a coterie or even a school is mistaken”3 
given the evidence of disagreements among its practitioners, but nevertheless their reactions 
against preceding and contemporary critical schools, namely aesthetic-impressionistic 
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criticism, the Humanist movement, the anti-genteel Naturalists and the Marxists, warrants 
considering them as at least articulating a “structure of feeling” in postwar American criticism. 
Any attempt at establishing a critical core is consequently prevented by the multiple 
divergences between each member’s theories but for the purpose of this argument, my analysis 
of new critical poetics will concentrate on the pronouncements of John Crowe Ransom, Cleanth 
Brooks and Robert Penn Warren because they each viewed poetry as the most appropriate 
subject for a “critical method built on a holistic approach to interpretation.”4 Ransom’s The 
New Criticism (1941) can hardly be overestimated in its shaping of the New Critical approach 
to poetry. He argues for an “ontological critic”5 who is committed to “the most fundamental 
pattern of criticism: criticism of the structural properties of poetry.”6  By focusing on the 
ontology of poetry, Ransom concentrates on the essential qualities that ultimately differentiate 
it from other discourses, primarily the formal and structural properties. His essentialist 
supposition that poetry offers “a kind of knowledge which is radically and ontologically 
distinct”7 suggests its function exists separate from the intentions of the author, the response of 
any reader and the influence of, or its influence on, its historical-material and socio-cultural 
contexts. His pronouncements result in a “closing-off” of poetry and makes criticism simply 
an evaluative task of differentiating between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ poetry according to a range of 
normative standards. Consequently, poets who did not fit within the new critical paradigm were 
literally unreadable and thus excluded from the canon being formulated according to its 
ontological evaluation of poetry.8 Whether intentional or not, selection is an implicit form of 
argument and it outlines a particular political position, and the New Critic’s selections 
advanced an argument for the exclusion of those “outsiders” who might potentially challenge 
the status quo then favouring a white, male, heterosexual, conservative, Christian centre. An 
“ontological critic” deduces essentialist characteristics that determine who is included and who 
is excluded from their understanding of what poetry is. Dealing in such essentialist deductions 
lends a certain neutrality to texts, providing an enclave of certainty and coherence during a 
period of acute uncertainty and emerging heterogeneity. However, while removing the difficult 
political issues raised by authorial intention, reader participation and extratextual 
correspondence might result in depoliticised readings, the act itself is highly politicised.   
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In a similar vein to Ransom, Brooks and Warren’s Understanding Poetry (1938) 
advances the organic metaphor for literature, in which “a poem should always be treated as an 
organic system of relationships,”9 and suggests that “if we must compare a poem to the make-
up of some physical object it ought not to be a wall but to something organic like a plant.”10 
Both “decried the treatment of poems as anything other than organic entities whose constituent 
parts could not be separated except at the cost of violating the whole.”11 Such a metaphor 
represents a further “closing-off” of poetry, as the text is revered as an autonomous object, self-
contained and governed by its own internal logic of relations between its constituent parts. This 
formalist dictum of New Criticism is most succinctly conveyed in René Wellek and Austin 
Warren’s Theory of Literature (1949), in which an aesthetic, intrinsic criticism is advanced that 
proposes the “prime and chief function [of literature to be] fidelity to its own nature.”12 They 
also “reject as poetry”13  statements of “practical intent (…incitation to direct, immediate 
action) and scientific intent (…additions to knowledge),”14 thus severely limiting the reach of 
poetry into the extratextual world. Ransom’s, Brooks’ and Warren’s understanding of poetry 
is best illustrated using the spatial metaphor of a container. This enclosed space exists within 
impermeable boundaries separating the text from the extratextual world and contains a system 
of relationships that constitutes meaning as specific to the context engendered by the text. 
Ultimately, the text is informed by a strategy of containment as it is conceived to be an organic 
unit containing everything necessary to identifying its essential meaning independent of any 
extratextual significance that might be imported into it.   
 It is not too difficult to appreciate why such a “closing-off” of poetry was so readily 
accepted during the postwar period. The Cold War saw an overt concern with preserving 
imaginary boundaries that figured prominently as impassable limits designed to prevent the 
invasion of invisible threats from outside. Therefore, international, geopolitical boundaries 
were not the only locations where strategies of containment were most immediately apparent 
as these external fronts were replicated by internal ones. By categorising poetry according to 
its apparently essential properties and preventing any extension of its aesthetics into the 
extratextual world through a formalist methodology, New Criticism can be seen as 
                                                      
9
 Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren, Understanding Poetry: An Anthology for College Students (New York, 
NY: Henry Holt and Company, 1938), xv. 
10
 Ibid, i.  
11
 Edward D. Pickering, “The Roots of New Criticism,” Southern Literary Journal 41 (2008): 97. 
12
 René Wellek and Austin Warren, Theory of Literature (New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1949), 
26. 
13
 Ibid, 13. 
14
 Ibid, 229. 
  
 
28 
 
aestheticizing the discourses required to maintain the geopolitical and domestic policies of 
containment while using poetry (both the writing and reading of it) as an instrument to reaffirm 
the attendant ideological and cultural values.  
William K. Wimsatt’s and Monroe Beardsley’s 1946 essays “The Intentional Fallacy” 
and “The Affective Fallacy” concisely demonstrate how New Criticism becomes highly 
politicised when contextualised in the Cold War period. The former argues against the 
relevance of the author’s intention, thus completely devaluing any external information when 
interpreting a text, while the latter discounts the reader’s reaction to a text, thereby precluding 
any value the text might have in the extratextual world. Wimsatt’s and Beardsley’s arguments 
confirm how the New Criticism erected impermeable boundaries between the text and its 
context to exclude anything that might complicate the status of the text as an autonomous, self-
contained object. The fact these theories developed during a period when America was ill-
prepared for the inclusion of differences that might unsettle the fictive and actual boundaries 
erected by containment strategies suggests that an inherent reluctance to engage with the 
outside makes New Critical theories and Cold War politics inseparable, if not mutually 
constitutive. Alternatively but no less troubling, the New Critics provided a way of 
withdrawing “from a dangerous context into the safety of the organically whole work as an 
embodiment of absolute value”15  in an attempt to avoid assuming a contentious political 
position as defined by Cold War ideological tensions. More worryingly perhaps, the removal 
of the author as an intentional agent and the disappearance of the reading subject convey a 
pronounced anxiety regarding one’s ability to act in such a difficult political environment.  
 If the New Criticism just remained a series of theoretical pronouncements based on the 
“holistic life envisioned by the Southern Agrarians”16 its influence would be limited to the 
immediate postwar period. As illustrated above, however, its complicity in advancing the 
containment strategies of the Cold War makes such confinement impossible. In addition, 
Brooks’ The Well-Wrought Urn (1947) meant that new critical theories immediately turned 
into practices, expanding its reach from the abstract and poetic into the practical and pedagogic, 
thereby further reinforcing its cultural values and making it difficult to ignore its highly 
politicised status. Brooks’ text consists primarily of close readings of poems, providing “the 
concrete examples on which generalisations are to be based,”17 most notably his insistence that 
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paradox is the “language appropriate and inevitable to poetry” 18  and that it is heresy to 
paraphrase a poem when attempting to access its meaning. In addition, terms such as irony, 
ambiguity, tension and, most importantly, unity are popularised by Brooks as he codifies new 
critical theories in the practice of close reading and in doing so reinforces the principle of 
consensus. Paradox, like contradiction, allows for the organisation of a complex multiplicity 
into simple binary opposites of truths and untruths. While these oppositions cannot themselves 
be reconciled, they are arranged in a balance and thus achieve a sense of unity. Similarly, irony 
derives from the denotation of a term and its connotation as constructed from its contextual 
meaning in the poem, again reducing any complexity to a simple binary opposite. Brooks’ 
discourse of coherence and cohesion allows him to speak accurately about difficult texts as 
organic wholes, where each part is related to the other to form a vital structure, but reducing 
poems into expressions of a single theme or literary device makes poems all the same.  
Resolving poems according to such binary logic perpetuates the larger, and more 
problematic, ‘us v. them’ oppositional logic that characterised the geopolitics and socio-politics 
of the Cold War period. According to Brooks, the meaning of the poem is the poem itself 
because paradox, irony, ambiguity and tension can only be understood in the context of the 
poem, that is, they are unique to the poem in question and cannot be either paraphrased or 
resolved by recourse to anything outside the text. By insisting that a poem is essentially based 
on unity, Brooks’ theory utilises poetry for its proficiency in “reconciling opposites, fusing 
contraries, amalgamating diversity, and ordering complexity.”19  Like the tendency toward 
containment discussed earlier, the new critical insistence on consensus suggests a desire to 
exclude anything that might disrupt the internal integrity of the text, a stance that becomes 
highly politicised when contextualised in the postwar period of national unity and entrenched 
boundaries between the hegemonic inside and the othered outside. The methodological 
application of new critical theories in the form of close, or, perhaps more appropriately here, 
“close(d),” readings, are so pervasive in literary criticism that we often fail to realise that this 
practice is only the strategy of a particular critical movement and not the inevitable work of 
criticism itself. During the fifties and sixties specifically, it was not “simply that the New 
Criticism [had] become institutionalised, but [it had actually] gained acceptance as the 
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institution itself,”20 an issue that becomes even more important when reading poets committed 
to resisting containment and challenging consensus in all its forms.   
 So accustomed have we become to equating interpretation with the practical application 
of new critical theories, that all critics, conscious or otherwise and regardless of their opinions 
of New Criticism, proceed using some version of, or variation on, close reading. Such a 
phenomenon is typified by the poststructuralist theorists of the seventies, who might initially 
appear to provide readings antithetical to the depoliticised and decontextualized interpretations 
associated with New Criticism, but actually just take the “close(d) reading” strategy to its 
logical, albeit extreme, conclusion. Questions surrounding the removal of the author from the 
site of interpretation and the concurrent concentration on textuality; the amount of subjectivity 
to be permitted and acknowledged in interpretations; and the possibility of readerly agency all 
proceed from, if not the theoretical principles of New Criticism, then at least its antecedent 
example. M. H. Abrams wryly observes that the new critics and poststructuralists share an 
“ahistorical formalism,” the only difference being that the “predisposition to discover 
coherence and a paradoxical unity of meaning” in the former is replaced by the “predisposition 
to discover incoherencies, ruptures and…aporias” in the latter.” 21  It is necessary to 
acknowledge, therefore, that any discussion of the decline of New Criticism is easily 
invalidated by the fact that its values, attitudes and emphases are so embedded in our 
understanding of poetry that they have become its seemingly natural and definitive conditions.  
One pertinent example of New Criticism’s position of hegemonic authority being at the 
expense of other more progressive, expansive and inclusive approaches to literature would be 
F. R. Leavis’ marginal status in transatlantic literary criticism. While he similarly advances the 
importance of paying attention to the words on the page and acquiring practical skills through 
the analysis of literature, he always contends that we must be “critics of both literature and 
more than literature,”22 and that close reading should only ever be a prologue to more important 
work reaching beyond the text, not an end in itself. For Leavis, close reading should never be 
closed, but rather should always venture outside itself to consider what is informing these 
words, “practical criticism of literature must be associated with training in awareness of the 
environment.”23 Other things are invariably excluded when a “close(d) reading” strategy is 
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normalised, “other” being the important word here as Leavis gestures toward the possibility of 
an alternative heteronomic turn, an orientation toward what is outside, what is other and 
different, when considering the value and function of poetry. Certain poets who began writing 
during the period of New Criticism’s ascension also provided a counter by calling attention 
through their innovative work to the fact that privileging new critical poetics was done at the 
expense of other possible compositional and interpretive strategies that were consequently 
excluded. Their radical response to New Criticism qualifies the ‘new’ in their moniker, the 
New American Poets. Charles Olson, Robert Duncan and Frank O’Hara, for example, not only 
challenged the denial of authorial intention, the text’s status as an autotelic object and the 
removal of the reader’s response through their respective theories of proprioception, derivation 
and personism, they also revealed that close reading is only a single possible strategy amongst 
many others rather than the essential task of all readers.  
While the limitations of New Criticism’s ideologies and practices are readily 
identifiable, perhaps its greatest failure is not: its unwillingness to recognise the important role 
aesthetic experience can perform by extending into the real world and supplementing one’s 
experience of the social environment. If poems could be “used to achieve ends that are in 
context specifically pedagogical, to provide those who read them with anything that might 
accurately be called an “education,” it can only be first of all an education in how to read 
poems.”24  By only teaching how to read poems, close reading conventionally understood 
remains a practical strategy without any pragmatic application because it does not extend 
beyond reading texts into how we might read our social, and textually saturated, environment. 
Or as Leavis proposes, “a serious concern for education in reading cannot stop at reading.”25 
The “close(d) reading” strategy formulated by Ransom, Brooks and Warren reinforced the 
socio-political values of containment and consensus, making the New Criticism a vital tool 
during the Cold War period in closing-off culture in an attempt to protect it from the incursions 
of those with other political, and ethical, objectives. Containing the text as an aesthetic object 
and insisting upon its consensual meaning are products of an era dominated by paranoia of the 
invisible threat of invasion by some unknown and uncontrollable source of otherness and 
difference. I am not advocating the complete abandonment of close reading but rather that its 
impetus toward closure should be replaced with an emphasis on “closer,” by suggesting that 
the text be seen not as an aesthetic object separating the author from the reader but as an 
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aesthetic event that allows for a closer relationship between these two active, responsive and 
participative subjects. With this comes increased proximity to otherness and difference, which 
precludes either self-containment or self-sufficiency on both the hermeneutic and existential 
levels, and necessitates an ethics of writing and reading poetry. It is important to remember, 
therefore, that New Critics do not have sole purchase on the practice of close reading, which 
was actually first conceived and practised on the other side of the Atlantic by I. A. Richards as 
an instrumental and pragmatist aesthetics before being co-opted by Ransom, Warren and 
Brooks into a dehistoricising and depoliticising aesthetics. Richards “specifically...oppose[d] 
any attempt to set up the aesthetic as a self-sufficient category insulated from the rest of life,”26 
insisting its value derived from its “ability to act as a means by which readers can develop 
many of their most practical faculties.”27 Close reading was initially a means of “aesthethic” 
education for the “improvement of people’s lives,”28 focusing attention on the reader of the 
text before the New Critics focused attention on the text itself, severing it from its various 
contexts. Most importantly, before Richards’ practical innovations “arrived at the sterile 
concern with hieracrchy and canonicity”29 that occupied the New Critics throughout the Cold 
War period, close reading was intended to encourage “more ethical psychological responses”30 
in readers.  
The protective stance assumed by the nation logically anticipated the violation of its 
geopolitical boundaries by an enemy, a stance replicated by the New Critics, who feared the 
invitation of otherness and difference into the text and avoided any consideration of how the 
poem might be modelled on heteronomy rather than self-sufficiency because it would require 
a reading strategy removed from subject-centred consciousness and open toward the social 
world of others. While the New American Poets helped prevent a single theoretical and 
ideological pronouncement closing-off poetry completely, insisting instead on its opening 
outward, its becoming heteronomous, and denying a single method of reading becoming the 
normalised standard, Ashbery and Palmer engage with the difficulty of otherness inevitably 
raised by such a reorientation. Their work, informed by a “poethics of proximity,” allows 
poetry to realise its social function as a way of acting in the real world, becoming a viable 
means of assuming a properly responsive and responsible orientation in one’s life. However, 
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the difficulty of this task is not something to be reduced by applying a particular reading 
strategy to determine the correct interpretation of the text. The difficulty cannot and should not 
be reduced since it is a necessary component of what this poetry is doing: precluding complete 
comprehension in order to make the poem an event of proximity in which poetics assumes an 
undeniable ethical significance.  
 
 
(1.2) “Poethics:” “Ethics and Aesthetics are One and the Same” 
 
The above quote from Ludgwig Wittgenstein’s Tracatus Logico-Philosophicus (6.421) 31 
highlights the vital “aesthethic” fact that we can no more ignore the ethical implications of 
what we view, read and write than we can the ethical implications of our other activities in life. 
Retallack’s neologism “poethics” denotes the practice in which aesthetics and ethics come 
together in order to address and participate in, rather than simplify and avoid, the difficulties 
of everyday existence. This difficulty derives from the always already social world that requires 
engaging with others who limit our capacity for self-control and are unpredictable, thus 
complicating attempts at containment and consensus. Such a practice requires innovative poets 
who are “acutely aware of the changing circumstances and forms of [their] own times and 
[devise] a distinctive writing procedure that accommodates them,”32 one that is instructive to 
the writer, and by extension the reader, not as a product but in its manner of operation: 
 
 
If you’re to embrace complex life on earth, if you can no longer pretend that all things 
are fundamentally simple..., a poetics thickened by an h launches an exploration of art’s 
significance as, not just about, a form of living in the real world.33 
 
 
A “poethics” provides a way of reacquainting poetry with the difficult conditions of living in 
the real world rather than simplifying and neutralising such complexity as mere linguistic 
device or unifying theme through containment and consensus respectively. “Poethics” also 
means that writing and reading poetry changes the individual rather than expressing him/her; 
it has an important performative capacity. However, consciously redirecting our attention 
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entails cultivating practices of writing and reading that are difficult because difficulty facilitates 
acknowledgement of the limitations of relying uncritically on habitual practices and familiar 
perspectives. Retallack blames the reluctance to do so on a pervasive “attention deficit 
disorder,”34 the systematic discouragement of engaging in sustained projects that are tolerant 
toward uncertainty, open toward difference and attentive to the possibilities in what we do not 
understand. “Poethics,” on the other hand, encourages this radical shift in attention to change 
one’s sense of the relation of language to the world beyond the page as it “vitally engages with 
the forms of life that create its contemporary context,”35 positing the writing and reading of 
poetry as a pragmatic method for “how to operate in that impossible situation, how to take 
oneself beyond one self’s single-point perspective.”36  
 If “self-awareness of oneself and one’s relationship [with others]...is part of ethical life, 
then [writing and] reading contribute to greater self-understanding” by supplementing our lived 
experiences.37 Retallacks’s “aesthethic” theory requires poetry not to be closed-off from the 
extratextual world through an emphasis on certainty, but to be closer to, even constituted by, 
the very conditions of this irreducibly social world of others. With their emphasis on paradox, 
irony, ambiguity and tension, the New Critics advocated a teleological approach to 
interpretation, where the reader’s sole responsibility is to figure out what the text is doing. 
Their poetics was motivated by the principle of verisimilitude, or “unnatural realism,”38 in 
which the text is seen to confirm the reader’s presupposition that a correct reading exists. If the 
state of paradox, irony, ambiguity or tension is determined to be the theme of the poem, the 
text will then be shown to replicate this but this is the limit of its realism. Put another way, 
verisimilitude is limited to what the reader decides is the poem’s theme rather than it having 
any connection with the complexities of everyday existence. This results in a particular type of 
textual production and reception in which the poem is a self-contained, self-sufficient object, 
situated apart from its surroundings and aesthetically admired rather than utilised. As a counter, 
Retallack suggests a “poethics of complex realism”39 with poiesis and hermeneutics having the 
character of occurring in the author’s and reader’s experience of the world as it is, not 
manipulated to affirm the omniscience of the author’s intentions, to coercively persuade 
identification with a particular experience or to legitimise the reader’s singular perspective. It 
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is perhaps testament to the legacy of New Criticism’s theories and practices that it is so difficult 
to appreciate how such a major conceptual shift in poetry might be possible, if not compulsory. 
But moving away from the production and reception of poems as objects toward an 
understanding of the process more accurately resembling an event highlights the performative 
capacity of “poethics,” its ability to act in and change the extratextual environment, perhaps 
accentuating the h even further and prioritising the ethical over the poetic.      
When conceived according to Retallack’s idea, the text only provides the occasion for 
making meaning, it neither aspires toward expressive clarity nor contains the meaning as 
something pre-existent awaiting discovery by the properly trained reader. The presence of the 
text occasions a specific intersection of material, place and time in which the poet and the 
reader are engaged in the properly “poethical” task of making meaning through imaginative 
collaboration. “Poethical” poems, therefore, offer the opportunity to consider the complex 
ethical issues of how subjectivity is constituted, the complicated negotiation with otherness 
that occurs while not appropriating it into categories of the same and why not understanding is 
fundamental to any understanding of the self as it relates to others. Conceived as an event of 
collaboration between poet and reader rather than an object separating them, such poems 
foreground the potential for an encounter and the attendant issues of distance, difference and 
alterity necessary for it to remain ethically informed. In this sense, the circumstances of 
everyday life become the immediate context of the poem.  
It is important to note, however, that “poethics” is not simply the application of ethics 
to poetics. Foregrounding the ethical potential waiting to be realised in the acts of writing and 
reading poetry does not advocate a prescriptive form of either activity. There can be no doubt 
that interest in ethics and literature has enjoyed a revival during the last thirty years, for 
example, feminism, postcolonialism, queer theory and (multi)cultural studies. What Michael 
Eskin identifies as the double turn to ethics and literature, that is, “the ‘turn to ethics’ in literary 
studies and, conversely, the ‘turn to literature’ in (moral) philosophy”40 is, he argues, actually 
a return since “neither ethics nor literature could possibly be back in literary studies and 
philosophy respectively...because they never left.” 41  Certain neologisms, and this project 
certainly employs a number of them, purporting to signify a radical reconsideration of the 
relation between ethics and literature simply reiterate and reinscribe the ethical significance of 
literature as a means of explicating complex philosophical concepts, a potential already 
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identified by philosophers ranging from Plato and Aristotle, through Kant and Hegel, to 
Nietschze and Sartre, and finally Derrida and Blanchot. Words such as alterity, answerability, 
ethical responsibility and dialogism all betray the continued influence of traditional questions 
surrounding the relation between ethics and literature, for example, one’s moral responsibility 
toward others, how to be an active participant within a community of others, the ethical 
significance of the aesthetic, etc. “Poethics” might be seen as just another manifestation of this 
return to ethics in literature if it were not for Eskin’s appeal for: 
 
 
an “aesthetics” according to which ethics (and philosophy in general) and literature only 
exist and make sense in conjunction, as ethics-and-literature; an “aesthetics” that 
conceives of art and our engagement with it not in standard aesthetic but in what has 
been called “poethic” terms, whereby the ethical and the literary are transformed and 
sublated into a qualitatively altogether novel union.42   
 
 
 
“Poethics” is this novel union, an “aesthethics,” rather than just another reinscription of the 
ethical significance of literature. It demonstrates how poetry is capable of doing certain things 
that ethical philosophy cannot and is therefore capable of translating and expanding ethics into 
a more pragmatic text enacting a way of living in the real world. Poetry “is capable of doing 
things ethical in an exemplary way,”43 of doing “something ethically in excess of [ethical] 
philosophy,” hence the ascription of “an ethically exemplary performative function”44 to this 
type of poetry. Because poetry does not have to adhere to the strictures of philosophy it can 
attempt what the latter cannot: representing the unrepresentable as a “non-meaning 
based...form of signification that signifies not for but to a subjectivity, to the constitution of 
subjectivity.”45  
While this radical reconfiguration of what aesthetic experience can affect and the 
consequent reorientation of the relationship between the producer and the receiver is more 
readily apparent, and accepted, in the visual arts and dance, “poethics” ensures it remains 
possible in poetry, even if the poet and reader refuse to acknowledge this potential. However, 
Retallack suggests that innovative poetry consistently utilises this potential because of the 
“invitation [it provides] to the reader to realise the work for him/herself,” 46  thereby 
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emphasising performative engagement in the requirement of reader-interactive processes such 
as attention and response to complete its meaning. If the poet provides the first gesture toward 
the reader in his/her composition, it is the latter’s responsibility to respond through 
interpretation. Within the “poethical” poem, then, neither the poet nor the reader has to provide 
the meaning alone as the work is completed by their imaginative collaboration, their encounter, 
as both make a contribution to the meaning. Therefore, “there’s always at least a dual 
perspective, that of the poet and reader, two very different starting points of equal importance, 
mediated by worlds of experience in between.”47 Such poems are not concerned with complete 
identification with the poet by the reader but rather with the encounter between two 
perspectives, each different to and distanced from the other because of the experiences 
informing each and the unique spatial-temporal position it is oriented from. By retaining 
difference and distance, otherness is protected from appropriation into the self and from being 
categorised in relation to the same, ultimately its alterity remains. The best, in fact the only, 
situation to be aspired to is a relation of proximity, a closer relation between two attentive and 
responsive individuals rather than complete identification between them. “Poethics” ensures 
that the extratextual significance of aesthetic experience denounced by the New Critics is 
realised, as poetry, in particular the reading and writing of it, is shown to perform a vital social 
function: providing a model for how people can interact with each other according to 
fundamental though non-prescriptive ethical principles and informed by the acknowledgement, 
but never the appropriation, of otherness that questions the self and challenges the categories 
it uses to make sense of the social world of others and compose itself as a subject within it.    
 
 
(1.3) Proximity   
 
Normally, “persons are known to each other by acts of interpretation. One approaches another 
with a thematising gaze, conforming one’s sense of the other’s otherness to categories of 
comprehension communicable in language.”48  Levinas, on the other hand, challenges this 
tendency of reducing the Other to the category of the Same by prioritising the approach toward 
another, the encounter, rather than the act of interpretation itself. Levinas terms this sense of 
encounter with another person proximity, whose very nature connotes a certain sociability. For 
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him, the ethical subject exists first and foremost as an “embodied agency open…to the material 
reality of other situated subjects” and the world in which they are situated, where embodiment 
is dependent on not being “a self-contained and autonomous ego, but rather [existing] as a 
world-directed openness ready to allow the world into the relational structure of my body.”49   
In OTB, Levinas discusses such openness as “sensibility,” which is “the subject’s 
subjectivity…its subjection to everything, its susceptibility, its vulnerability.”50 Such openness 
to the world does not simply refer to one’s capacity to receive and process information from 
the world around and outside him/her, which implies conscious intentionality, because 
“sensibility” is the source of subjectivity, it is constitutive of the subjectivity of the subject, 
prior to consciousness and intention. “Sensibility” connects the subject to its world as an 
encounter between the self and what lies outside the self when interiority and exteriority 
interpenetrate, “an inviting of exteriority to dwell within and inhabit us” as the world both 
enters and becomes us.51 The self cannot be separated from the world in the same way that it 
cannot be closed-off from it. This embeddedness, the interpenetration of interiority and 
exteriority, means the outside world acts upon and changes the self to the same extent that the 
self acts in and changes the outside world. Therefore, one’s embeddedness results in one’s 
embodiment, as the subject is situated as a body being acted upon by and acting in the world. 
However, this world is always already a social world consisting of other bodily subjects. As a 
result of this embeddedness and embodiment, our actions assume ethical significance as they 
signal the moment when the self engages with the world of others outside it, when subjectivity 
“emerges from an irreducible and originary contact with human otherness, which saturates 
every form of our encounter with the world.”52 
“Sensibility” toward this social world necessitates an ethical stance because the 
subjectivity of the subject is constituted by the self’s interactions with those other bodily 
subjects situated in proximate relationships to it. However, while such proximity explains why 
the self is best understood as being closer to rather than closed-off from otherness, it does not 
simply refer to a physical or measurable distance, it is not “reducible to the spatial sense” of 
the term.53 If “sensibility” is the origin of subjectivity, then proximity is what allows for ethical 
subjectivity. Being open toward the social world of others constitutes subjectivity, but 
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proximity is the event of intersubjectivity, the occasion when sensibility “begins to take on an 
ethical signification – and importantly, is recognised as taking on this ethical signification.”54 
Proximity is not a geometrical space but is an encounter with another person, “an approach and 
a contact.”55 Therefore, it is best understood as a lived, social space in which openness toward 
the world of others assumes ethical signification as the self acts in and is acted upon by this 
external world and the others who inhabit it. In this sense, “poethics” allows both the poet and 
the reader to explore proximity not just as a way of representing, of talking about, the real 
world and how one interacts with/in it but as a way of actually living in it, of being embedded 
and embodied within it as an ethical subject. For Levinas, “proximity is communication.”56 
Communication in this instance refers to the event of reaching outside oneself and toward 
another person to realise actual intersubjectivity. Given Levinas’ equating proximity with 
communication, it is important to note too that he does not conflate subjectivity with interiority. 
As Joel W. Krueger highlights, Levinas challenges the accepted correlation of subjectivity with 
interiority because “subjectivity…is always co-given with reference to exteriority.” 57 
Communication, according to Levinas’ definition, is not the expression of subjectivity as a pre-
existent, inner realm of experiences, values and judgements directed toward another person but 
the event during which subjectivity itself becomes intersubjectivity, a sharing of consciousness 
as the self interacts with another person.  
Discussing “proximity and/as communication” might give the impression of difference 
and distance between individuals being reduced through encounter, contact and understanding 
but Levinas is insistent that the other should never be reduced to the category of the same by 
such strategies. “Proximity and/as communication” are configured as events in themselves in 
which the self experiences involvement with an irreconcilable and irreducible otherness as the 
primary, constitutive experience of intersubjectivity, the occasion when subjectivity assumes 
ethical signification. Because another person is constituted by its fundamental difference to and 
distance from the self, proximity is not concerned with any resolution of difference that might 
occur through consensus and does not necessarily mean physical nearness or the removal of 
separation to the point of symbiosis. By extension of this logic, communication cannot be 
associated solely with the exchange of knowledge and experience since the complete “relaying 
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of one mind to another is effectively the elimination of a fundamental relation to the other,”58 
its accomplishment results in denying the otherness required as the constitutive experience of 
subjectivity. If “sensibility” prevents containment, then proximity makes consensus equally 
impossible as both are informed by heteronomy, an openness toward and subjection to a force 
outside the self. To be closer to rather than closed-off from otherness, “proximity and/as 
communication” refers to the event of intersubjectivity, the ethical encounter between two 
embodied agencies within the lived space where the self can be affected by the other through 
their interactions. The “poethic” text as defined earlier is proximity rather than being an object 
according to the new critical paradigm. When you open and read such a text, you encounter 
another person. It is a lived space of interaction where the poet and the reader encounter each 
other as embodied agencies and realise their intersubjectivity because the poet is affected by 
the reader’s interpretation and the reader is affected by the poet’s composition. Rather than 
reducing the difference and distance between them, the “poethic” text provides the occasion 
for their encounter.  
Because exteriority is the constitutive feature of my interiority, subjectivity always has 
the potential to be ethical, to be configured as intersubjectivity, the encounter between self and 
other as they interact together. “Inter” and “act” are both vital here to understanding Levinas’ 
argument for ethical subjectivity more generally but also, more specifically, for appreciating 
the “poethic” text as proximity. Firstly, “inter” has a variety of meanings including between, 
among, together and reciprocally that suggest a plurality rather than a singularity. It suggests a 
relation between two bodies, or two embodied agencies, but the “poethic” text is not an object 
that exists between and distinguishes the poet and the reader as two separate selves. Instead, 
“inter” refers to “betweeness,” defined as the state of being between two others. As explained 
earlier, the “poethic” text occasions an intersection of material, time and space that exists 
between the poet and reader and through which they encounter each other to realise ethical 
subjectivity, or intersubjectivity. Accordingly, it requires a “close(r)” rather than a “close(d)” 
approach to the reading and writing of the text because the encounter with, rather than the 
denial of, otherness is integral to the poem. Differences can come into contact as the self 
encounters another but the distance between them is never completely reduced.  
Secondly, “act” refers to praxis in this case, the process by which ethics is enacted and 
embodied through the activities of self and other exerting influence upon and affecting change 
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in their opposite. For Levinas, ethics does not exist in the abstract. There are only ethical 
actions, those moments when an act is performed that affects change and makes containment 
impossible because the self is made to interact with its external environment. The “poethic” 
text involves a mutual responsibility for the meaning since the acts of composition and 
interpretation are considered components of the same event. Again, proximity is aligned with 
the “poethic” due to responsibility. Because proximity denotes the occasion when the self 
interacts with another person, it also signals the point at which the self is responsible to the 
other for its “inter-actions.” However, responsibility does not just refer to personal liability for 
one’s actions but to the “living relation between self and other.”59 No longer just objects that 
engender aesthetic experience, these texts are lived spaces; events or occasions in which the 
poet and the reader “inter-act” as selves and others. Poetry is consequently reconfigured as, not 
just about, a way of living in the world where containment and consensus are precluded in 
favour of difference and distance. In addition, proximity ensures that subjectivity realises its 
ethical signification in the form of embodied agencies who assume responsibility for their 
actions in the text and/as the social world of others.                   
                      
 
(1.4) “Response-Ability” 
 
Despite the important differences between Bakhtin and Levinas discussed in the introduction, 
there is significant correspondence in their ethical philosophies, in particular how they relate 
to a “poethics of proximity.” Firstly, both Bakhtin’s and Levinas’ thinking from the very 
beginning consists of shifting attention from identity (self) to alterity (other), acknowledging 
what lies beyond the boundaries of, and actually constitutes, the self. Their ethical philosophies 
can easily be renamed as an ethics of difference, in which the self is a heteronomous entity, 
subjected to and made a subject by an outside influence acting upon it. Secondly, neither posit 
ethics as a question of creating a reified system of prescriptive imperatives or as an abstract 
system of rules governing how we should behave. Ethics is a defining feature of self-other 
relations that is prior to the codification of actions into theoretical rules of ethical conduct, what 
both term a “first philosophy,” Bakhtin in TPA60 and Levinas in “Ethics as First Philosophy.”61 
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Thirdly, the act of communication features prominently in their respective philosophies, 
inhering within Bakhtin’s concept of dialogism itself but also in his earlier “aesthethic” 
writings on the self’s authoring of subjectivity, and featuring in the face-to-face encounter in 
Levinas’ TI and the relation between the saying and the said in OTB, the two centrepieces of 
his philosophical investigations. There is always something additional, a surplus or excess, to 
communication. It is through this surplus or excess that the act of communication is always 
already ethically engaged. Prior to information transference or hermeneutic disclosure, this act 
is proximity as explained earlier, an openness toward and “inter-action” with the social world 
of others. If the act of communication is central to their ethics, the defining feature of self-other 
relations that does not seek to reduce the alterity of the other by appropriating it into the 
categories of the self, then it must no longer be considered just a “mechanism for uncertainty 
reduction,” our limited understanding of communication as an attempt to comprehend the 
other, but also as the difficult task of “moving from the certainty of the self toward the 
unknowing possibilities that the other presents.”62  
The act of communication also informs the fourth and perhaps the most important 
correspondence between these two thinkers because it allows them to avoid complete 
abstraction and prescription by providing a specific, concrete occasion when self and other 
encounter and “inter-act” but which is not circumscribed by predetermined rules. Bakhtin and 
Levinas share a “mutual insistence on the subject’s irreducible engagement with otherness” 
and insist that when “confronted by an excessive alterity, the subject must perform a response,” 
what the former terms answerability and the latter responsibility.63 These performed responses 
represent Bakhtin’s and Levinas’ ethical praxis, signalling the moment when ethics is enacted 
and embodied through the actions of self and other within the lived space of proximity. 
Alphonso Lingis, the translator of Levinas’ primary works, is probably best suited to explaining 
the ethical nature of communication as it features in his, and also Bakhtin’s, philosophy, “What 
is said is inessential; what is essential is that I be there and speak.”64 For both, the content of 
what is said is secondary to the occasion of an embodied subject performing the act of speaking 
in response to the presence of, and the initiating question proposed by, another person.  
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The act of communication exemplifies how their ethics readily translates into material 
actions, which can only ever occur among embodied subjects in specific contexts. As Michael 
Gardiner observes, “each of them argues that ethics is constitutively linked to corporeality, the 
direct experience of ‘lived’ time and place, and our affective and meaningful relations with 
concrete others.” 65  Bakhtin and Levinas allow us to have an ethical subject that is de-
essentialised, that is, heteronomous and always changing and being changed by performative 
actions that reinterpret and recompose its subjectivity. Jeffrey T. Nealon sees their ethics as 
founded on “dialogic intersubjectivity,”66 which “keeps the otherwise monadic subject open to 
the outside… [and] necessitates that the self…is always open – performatively responding and 
answering – to the other.”67 The idea of a dialogue between multiple voices provides a useful 
metaphor for a social world with a distinctly ethical character, wherein the relations between 
people listening to and answering each other constitutes ethical subjectivity, or as Bakhtin and 
Levinas would term it, my answerability and responsibility as an ethical subject.  
“Response-Ability” refers to the ethical signification of “proximity and/as 
communication,” how it engenders the capacity for a gesture of response, a performative 
action, in a dialogic encounter between the self and another person rather than simply an 
abstract or prescriptive approach. It is also central to understanding a “poethics of proximity,” 
where the text enacts rather than represents a way of living in the social world of others based 
on a non-appropriative, heteronomic subject position. Living in this world inherently involves 
“inter-acting” with others, acknowledging alterity by listening to those concrete others outside 
the self and answering them, which together constitute the response made possible during 
proximity. These actions, however, are not the result of subjective agency, they are integral to 
Bakhtin’s and Levinas’ first philosophy, the primary experience of sociality and attendant 
otherness that precedes any ontological disclosure of subjectivity or epistemological 
understanding. In terms of ontology, it challenges the self as a contained, autotelic entity, while 
in terms of epistemology, it challenges the consensus of the self’s singular perspective. Because 
of this primary experience of sociality, the self is always already responding to others in 
particular socio-material circumstances. As Nealon again highlights, because “one responds or 
answers first and foremost to the social other, rather than responding to or through an abstract 
system of ethical rules to be followed,” 68  the ability to respond in concrete contexts 
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“presupposes a necessary subjection before the…alterity of the other.” 69  In other words, 
“response-ability” presupposes a heteronomic subject in the lived space of proximity. The term 
“response-ability,” therefore, is being used in this instance to convey both the capacity 
(Bakhtin’s answerability) and the obligation (Levinas’ responsibility) one has to respond to 
those encountered and interacted with in the social world of others.  
As mentioned earlier, answerability and responsibility are not issues of subjective 
agency. Responding to another person is a performative not a performance, since it enacts 
change through “inter-action” rather than implying an act of personal volition as the latter does. 
The heteronomic subject has both the capacity and the obligation to respond to the other that 
questions it. For Bakhtin, on the one hand, the constitutive role of “response-ability” is 
explained using answerability and what he terms one’s “non-alibi in being.”70 This notion 
“allocates to each consciousness a measure of responsibility in a world of other 
consciousnesses for which there is no alibi for being elsewhere,”71 I cannot be relieved of 
answerability for the act I have committed by another person because it was performed from 
the unique spatial-temporal position that only I inhabit. As Bakhtin explains, my:  
 
 
non-alibi in being derives from the fact that I occupy a place...that is unique and never 
repeatable, a place that cannot be taken by anyone else and is impenetrable for anyone 
else...That which can be done by me can never be done by anyone else...[and this 
uniqueness] is compellently obligatory.72  
 
 
 
“Response-ability” is “compellently obligatory” because the presence of another person during 
the experience of proximity requires the self to respond and to be answerable for this action. 
For Levinas, on the other hand, “response-ability” is explained through responsibility and what 
he calls the “not-being-able-to-slip-away-from an assignation.”73 As Levinas explains, being 
in question is this “assignation to answer without evasions, which assigns the self to be a self.”74 
Responsibility is not transferable, it is “incumbent on me exclusively, and what, humanly, I 
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cannot refuse...I am I in the sole measure that I am responsible, a non-interchangeable I.”75 
“Response-ability” is “incumbent on [the self] exclusively” since saying I is to respond to the 
question already posed by another person by his/her presence during proximity and to be 
responsible for that utterance. The “subjectivity of a subject is responsibility of being-in-
question,”76 it is being subjected to, and consequently made a subject by, the presence of 
another person during proximity, where my irrefutable “response-ability” ensures that “I am 
not “another,” but me.”77            
          Finally, given both thinkers’ insistence that the ethical subject is constituted through 
“response-ability” in a concrete context of social others, a material intersection of place, time 
and persons, terms such as “Self” and “Other” are too abstract. The “Other” is never a generic 
other because it denotes the presence of another person through voice for Bakhtin and the face 
for Levinas. It corresponds to an other, a particular person who inhabits a different and distant 
spatial-temporal position to me. For this reason, “(an)Other” will be used to denote the source 
of alterity so integral to Bakhtin and Levinas as it conveys both the particularity of another 
person and the irreducible otherness s/he represents. Similarly, “Self” lacks the specificity of 
individuation required for answerability and responsibility as described above. It must become 
my self, made to correspond to a particular spatial-temporal position from where one is 
answerable and responsible. Therefore, “(my)Self” will be used to indicate when self stops 
being a theoretical, unrealised entity and becomes a subject position. It denotes the moment 
when one realises his/her “response-ability” during proximity, answering by saying “I,” by 
making self mine, in response to the question of another person and being responsible for the 
actions performed from the spatial-temporal position that that pronoun demarcates. “(My)Self” 
and “(an)Other” further indicate the importance both Bakhtin and Levinas place in ethical 
praxis, the enactment and embodiment of ethics through performative actions committed by a 
particular person in the presence of actual others made possible by “response-ability” within 
the lived space of proximity.    
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(1.5) A Necessary Difficulty 
 
Texts informed by a “poethics of proximity” radically change how the activities of writing and 
reading poetry are understood since they reveal these acts as being performed by embodied 
subjects realising their “response-ability” during proximity. The etymology of “comprehend” 
exposes its severe limitations in relation to a “poethics of proximity,” from the latin “com,” 
meaning with and/or together, and “prehensus,” meaning to grasp or seize. Comprehension, 
therefore, suggests appropriation, the denial of difference and the removal of distance through 
possession and togetherness. Consequently, difficulty is seen as something preventing 
successful communication, an obstacle to be overcome in order to ensure increased 
understanding and identification. As Wes Avram argues, understanding something as difficult 
or not understood “reinforces the priority of understanding in human experience and situates 
the confusing or incomprehensible thing in dialectical relation to comprehensibility,”78 thereby 
demonstrating the capacity of thought to appropriate the incomprehensible into the 
comprehensible and to reduce its otherness as it is contained in a consensual category of the 
same. A “necessary difficulty,” however, is intended to demarcate the limits of understanding 
and to expose the limitations of comprehension by signalling the presence of an otherness that 
cannot be appropriated or reduced but is instead to be encountered. This otherness is not to be 
eluded since it is an invitation to realise one’s “response-ability,” to answer the question posed 
by this otherness that exceeds the “categories of comprehension communicable in language”79 
through an act of composition, whether that is the poet’s initial composition or the reader’s 
subsequent composition as interpretation.       
A final “close(d)” reading based on containment and consensus precludes any source 
of otherness exerting influence on or affecting change in either the poet or reader. Closing-off 
the text, and by extension the poet and the reader, from the presence of “(an)Other” that 
questions “(my)Self” from its different perspective and distant spatial-temporal subject 
position is to deny poetry its ethical signification, its “poethics” because “poetics thickened by 
a h” is an aesthetic as well as an ethical act founded on intersubjectivity, the “inter-actions” of 
“(my)Self” and “(an)Other that occur during proximity. Texts marked by a “necessary 
difficulty,” that is, texts that make identification (the denial of difference) and appropriation 
(the removal of distance) impossible, are most conducive to enacting a “poethics of proximity.” 
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“Poethic” texts allow us to appreciate how the way in which we write and read texts 
corresponds with how we interpret this world and author ourselves as subjects within it. The 
poets “response-ability” is immediately apparent in this situation as s/he responds to an 
unknowable other in the form of the prospective reader through his/her act of writing. However, 
the reader realises similar “response-ability” because interpretation inevitably creates its own 
text by distorting the original, thereby making every act of reading an act of (re)writing. In this 
sense, both the poet and the reader are answerable and responsible for the text, for the meaning 
generated through the imaginative collaboration that occurs when the poet and the reader 
encounter each other. The “poethic” text is an intersection of time, place and persons within 
which “response-ability” can be realised during the experience of proximity, as “(my)Self” and 
“(an)Other” “inter-act” through the performative actions of writing and reading.    
 Texts marked by a “necessary difficulty” have the ability to engage the poet and the 
reader ethically as both are operating at the limits of understanding, the point at which 
something other is encountered that challenges habitual norms and questions the categories 
used to comprehend the world and our position within it. The otherness encountered in these 
texts refers to whatever it is about them that prevents consensus and resists containment, how 
they challenge all preconceptions within the paradigms of our interpretive techniques to ensure 
that difficulty remains a constitutive feature of their overall effect. These texts are characterised 
by what Derek Attridge describes as “textual otherness, or textualterity: a verbal artefact...that 
stages the ethical as an event.”80 Their ethical significance is not reliant on the deductions or 
conclusions they permit, or on their representations of otherness, because our “involvement...in 
the ethical” is less a question of something we can learn than something that happens to us as 
we write and read, “it occurs as an event in the process of [writing and] reading, not a theme to 
be registered, a thesis to be grasped, or an imperative to be followed.”81   
As a result, the important distinction must be made between “ethics in poetry” and 
“ethics of  poetry,” where the former refers to how a poet might comment on events, real or 
imaginary, that have already happened in order to impose a particular moral imperative or 
prescribe a specific ethical conclusion to be deduced, while the latter refers to the text’s ethical 
value as it allows for the enactment of an encounter between “(my)Self” and “(an)Other” 
during the experience of proximity engendered by its “poethics.” “Poethical” texts neither deal 
with situations that might be considered ethical nor provide exemplary examples of a 
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relationship between self and other for the reader’s observation. “Textualterity” is a result of 
the “necessary difficulty” of certain poets, who make an encounter with otherness possible 
through the inventive, innovative alterity of their “poethics.” As Attridge again observes, it is 
“not an otherness that exists outside language...[but] an otherness brought into being by 
language,” 82  not language’s other but something excessive, inassimilable and ultimately 
unknowable. Innovative poetry, or what Attridge terms the text’s singularity or inventiveness, 
refers to “what we respond to when we feel that the work we are [writing or] reading is unlike 
any other in ways that go beyond mere differentiation and that....opens up new possibilities in 
the literary domain and beyond.”83 When the text stops being an object and becomes an event, 
not the representation of otherness or of a relationship between a self and an other but the 
occasion for enacting an encounter between “(my)Self” and”(an)Other,” the necessity of 
difficulty becomes apparent, as that which prolongs the experience by increasing uncertainty, 
reducing referential clarity, undermining singular authority, foregrounding the materiality of 
the medium and articulating a heteronomic subject. “(My)Self” and “(an)Other” become two 
ethical participants in the event of encounter engendered by the experience of proximity within 
the “poethic” text.                
Most importantly, for the “poethic” to become pragmatic, for it to extend beyond the 
text and inform how we interpret the social world of others outside us and compose ourselves 
as subjects within it, its “necessary difficulty” requires a different approach to the practices of 
writing and reading. To realise its intention to test the limits of knowing in poetry, to complicate 
the assumptions of language’s transparency, referentiality and instrumentality that are so 
central to the poem being a vehicle of teleological communication, the “poethic” text must 
encourage us to reconfigure not just how poetry is written and read but also to re-evaluate the 
reasons why these activities are undertaken in the first place. As Richard Deming suggests, 
“reading and writing are the means of discovering one’s own constitution, that which makes a 
self, however provisionally and contingently, a self.”84 If the initial act of creativity by the poet 
as s/he responds to otherness constitutes his/her subjectivity, then the hermeneutic activities of 
the reader as s/he responds to the otherness of the text is constitutive of his/her subjectivity. 
Put another way, both are subjected ethically, or made ethical subjects, by realising their 
respective “response-ability.” Poesis and hermeneutics, the poet’s and the reader’s respective 
acts of “response-ability,” indicate how the world becomes a lived space, how it is inhabited 
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and made intersubjective as selves and others come into existence as embodied agencies 
through articulated acts. These texts provide pedagogical moments that deepen our 
understanding of ethics in a pragmatic sense because reading is seen “as both a social and 
socialising activity” and “writing…is the means by which one enters that particular field by 
participating and manipulating social dynamics in a public context.”85 At this intersection of 
reading and writing, a certain communication occurs but it is communication as proximity, the 
encounter between “(my)Self” and “(an)Other” during the experience of proximity in the 
“poethic” text.  
It may be easier to discern how the poet’s initial act of composition constitutes his/her 
subjectivity, how s/he authors a self through the act of writing a poem, but the reader’s 
constitutive act of subjectivity is equally important if not as easily apparent, especially when 
discussing a “poethics of proximity.” Despite the general reluctance against considering the 
poem as being personally addressed to a reader due to the connotations of moral imperativeness 
and prescriptive actions, the poem is always written toward a potential, prospective reader, 
“(an)Other” who is different to and distant from the poet and is the source of otherness that 
cannot be appropriated into categories of the same by the poet, cannot be named by or identified 
in relation to “(my)Self.” The potential reader is “(an)Other” who the poet responds to during 
the act of composition, or put another way, the text stages the encounter between the poet as 
“(my)Self” and the reader during the experience of proximity. Difficulty is necessary because 
this is an experience of uncertainty and miscomprehension since “(an)Other” cannot be 
completely known and, therefore, cannot be represented in language. A poem that insists on 
difficulty as its constitutive feature signals the poets encounter with “(an)Other,” when s/he 
reaches beyond the demarcated limits of understanding that define “(my)Self” and interacts 
with the social world of others outside him/herself.  
How difficult texts arise then can be appreciated but if difficulty is not to be explained 
away then how it affects the reader assumes utmost importance as it reveals the intention behind 
a “poethics of proximity.” When faced with a difficult text, the reader is made aware of the 
limits of understanding that define “(my)Self” but is also encouraged to undertake a more 
active, attentive engagement with the text. By refusing to consign the reader to the 
predestination of the poet’s singular intention, these texts foreground the importance of 
interpretation, when the “reader (re)acts…[his/her] reacting (acting again) of the author’s 
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initiating activity, albeit in a transfigured and transfiguring way.”86 The reader’s (re)action to 
the author’s initiating activity cannot change the actual text but the performative action of 
reading introduces an additional perspective and changes meaning through the different choices 
constantly being made. These texts require the reader to respond to the poet as “(an)Other,” 
s/he who exists beyond the parameters of “(my)Self” and cannot be completely known or 
identified with but toward whom the reader is oriented during his/her attempts to engage with 
the otherness encountered at the limits of understanding.  
Texts characterised by their “necessary difficulty” consequently require a 
reconfiguration of what it means to write and read a poem because composition and 
interpretation are shown to be processes within the “dialogic intersubjectivity” of the poet’s 
and reader’s encounter with one another through a text that stages the event of proximity. 
Writing and reading are not the expression, description or representation of subjectivity but 
performatives that enact subjectivity itself, revealing how it is constituted not as a result of 
containment and consensus that delimit the boundaries of “(my)Self” and separate it from 
“(an)Other” but as the consequence of the “inter-actions” possible at such boundaries. Certain 
poets respond to the social world of others outside them in innovative ways, realising their 
“response-ability” in a manner appropriate to their “non-alibi in being” (Bakhtin) or their “not-
being-able-to-slip-away-from an assignation” (Levinas) because no one else has or could have 
responded in that particular way. By extension, truly innovative poetry requires the reader to 
respond in an equally innovative manner, to realise his “response-ability” in a way that no other 
reader possibly could and to be answerable/responsible for that response. A poetics thickened 
by a h, therefore, provides an ethics of writing and reading, but it is a pragmatic pedagogy 
aimed at educating about ethical subjectivity experientially rather than didactically. “Poethics” 
is concerned with the ethics of not the ethics in poetry, how the ethical significance of poetry 
is only realised with the application of how one writes and reads to one’s own experience of 
life in this moment, as something immediately pragmatic rather than something objectively 
understood, rather than the deduction of ethical imperatives from, or the prescription of 
appropriate behaviour through, what one writes and reads. This “aesthethic” approach affects 
change outside the text because it makes the poet and the reader more attentive to otherness in 
the social world than s/he might otherwise have been, highlighting the ethical importance of 
“response-ability,” of responding to others in a way that does not attempt to completely 
comprehend them and always assuming responsibility for the performative actions that affect 
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change in them. Therefore, the turn to ethics in poetics is not a return to the conventional ethical 
significance of literature but a turning of our attention to what has always existed as a possibly 
unrealised or denied potential in poetry due to habitual, pedagogical practices based on 
containment and consensus: that writing and reading poetry is to author an ethical, heteronomic 
subject that is open toward the social world of others in which it is located and which responds 
to “(an)Other” who questions it by realising “response-ability.”   
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Part I: “The Facts Have Hinged on my Reply:” The Face-
to-Face Encounter in John Ashbery 
 
Not only did SPCM win Ashbery the triptych of major American book awards in 1975 – the 
Pulitzer Prize, a National Book Award and the National Book Critics’ Circle Award – it also 
marks the moment when his “wanderings have come full circle,”1 returning to what he calls in 
“Soonest Mended” “the mooring of starting out, that day so long ago”2 located in his first 
collection ST.  From the beginning, he has never been majorly preoccupied either by the 
“madness to explain”3 or with developing a poetics of expression, preferring instead to use 
poetry as a medium of communication, albeit not in the conventional understanding of the 
word. Up to and including SPCM, Ashbery’s multiple innovations are always informed by two 
concerns with attendant “poethical” consequences. Firstly, the question of self-representation 
in poetry: how one author’s a self as an ethical subject, that is, a subject who is heteronomic 
rather than autotelic. For Ashbery, accordingly, self-representation is never a solipsistic task 
because it is always “Leading first to you, and through you to/Myself that is beyond you,”4 
something he successfully achieves in the eponymous poem of SPCM by making the acts of 
writing and reading coterminous, precluding “the enchantment of self with self.”5 This poem’s 
indelible mark can be seen in the immediately subsequent collection Houseboat Days, in which 
the nature of the creative act of self-representation is given extended treatment as Ashbery 
focuses his phenomenological gaze on the conditions of composition. However, in “SPCM,” 
the act of self-representation cannot be separated from the face-to-face encounter that occurs 
when Ashbery writes in response to another’s self-portrait, thus revealing an ethical imperative 
that is never again so explicitly apparent in his work. Furthermore, this sense of encounter and 
interaction between two different people is positively precluded in the next collection. 
“Litany,” from As We Know, is Ashbery’s most innovative poem but the two columns of text, 
which he tells us “are meant to be read as simultaneous but independent monologues,”6 prevent 
dialogue or exchange, suggesting the impossibility of encounter and interaction between two 
different people through poetry as a medium of communication. This particular analysis of 
Ashbery is not concerned with why encounter becomes impossible following SPCM but instead 
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with how he creates the conditions required for it to happen in the first place in the previous 
collections.  
Secondly, the possibility of configuring the acts of writing and reading poetry so they 
than can be  approached just like the other actions we perform that constitute us as ethical 
subjects acting in and interacting with the social world of others. In “SPCM” he manages to 
position himself in the present tense of writing and reading, making the occasion of 
composition and interpretation an event shared by the poet and the reader, where the “past/Is 
now here.”7 This has important “poethical” implications because writing and reading poetry 
become a way of living in the social world of others: 
 
 
This age-old truth I to thee impart 
Act according to the dictates of your art 
 
Because if you don’t know one else is going to 
And that person isn’t likely to be you.8  
 
 
Imparting this “age-old truth” gives the impression that what Ashbery is attempting is 
applicable to all poetry but his commitment to it sets him apart from his contemporaries. Like 
Bakhtin’s and Levinas’ “first philosophy,” Ashbery’s poetry from ST to SPCM builds upon the 
very foundations of, in his case poetic, discourse, or verse, from the Latin “versus,” a line of 
writing,” and “vertō,” to turn around. As a medium of communication, poetry for Ashbery is 
about being turned around, of being turned toward another person as in conversation. He 
articulates an ethics of writing and reading poetry but with practical application, that is, with 
“poethical” implications, because writing and reading this type of poetry is a way of living in 
the social world of others, of acting according to the dictates of his “poethics of proximity.” If 
Ashbery is concerned with self-representation as a poet, his work equally facilitates the self-
representation of the reader because both write a particular self into existence through the 
actions performed in the event of the poem, how they encounter and interact with each other 
as other. Therefore, Ashbery is not being unnecessarily difficult since difficulty is a necessary 
condition of the “poethical,” it corresponds with the challenges faced when trying to author an 
ethical subject who acknowledges the alterity of others but without trying to appropriate and 
thus reduce it.  
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In the two book-length, chronological analyses of Ashbery’s work to date – John 
Shoptaw’s On the Outside Looking Out: John Ashbery’s Poetry (1994) and David Herd’s John 
Ashbery and American Poetry (2000) – the poet’s difficulty, the fact that “nobody 
understands”9 him, is seen to correspond with the more general difficulty of living in the 
present and trying to say something different about the situation we find ourselves in. For 
Shoptaw, Ashbery’s difficulty derives from his “misrepresentative” poems, poems that 
“represent and “behave” differently because the poet “leaves himself and his homosexuality 
out of his poetry.”10 Ashbery “misrepresent[s] in a particular way which [Shoptaw]…call[s] 
“homotextual””  by using “distortions, evasions, omissions, obscurities, and discontinuities” 
and other evasive manoeuvres that are not just aesthetic principles but the survival tactics of a 
homosexual male whose poetics evolved during the particularly repressive and paranoid period 
of American history when homosexuals were publicly investigated and harassed.11 Ashbery’s 
sexuality is not unimportant to his writing but Shoptaw’s critical language of cryptography as 
the “missing centre of his method of composition” suggests that his difficulty can be explained 
away by finding references to gay experiences that are “encoded…hidden, forgotten, or simply 
covered over”12 in the text. This too closely resembles an epistemology of the closet and the 
expression of denial which fails to account for Ashbery’s insistence that his “are not 
autobiographical poems, they’re not confessional poems.”13  Whether concentrating on the 
convention of explicit disclosure or the innovation of intentional misrepresentation, reading 
Ashbery as an autobiographical or confessional poet ignores his intention to make poems “as 
representative as possible,”14 poems characterised by their openness toward the social world of 
others around him.  
Unlike Shoptaw, Herd never tries to explain away the difficulty, seeing it as validation 
for Ashbery’s status as a “great contemporary” because his poetry “exceed[s] the language by 
which we attempt to describe it.”15 For Herd, Ashbery’s difficulty is the result of his continuous 
attempt to make communication possible during a time when “there is no short cut to 
expounding simply the full complexity of the situation which does not exactly fit any common 
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classification,”16 when we find ourselves in situations with unconventional circumstances and 
without precedence. His poetry is, therefore, marked by a sense of its occasion, where a poem 
““belongs” to, or “fits” the occasion”17 because it gives form to “the apothegm appropriate to 
his moment.”18 Ashbery’s intention “is to achieve a poem appropriate to the occasion of its 
own writing,” such that his “concern is with the time, place, situation and circumstances of the 
poem itself.” 19  This might appear somewhat solipsistic, but Herd insists that Ashbery’s 
underlying motif is always communication in the service of understanding, bringing the reader 
“into such a satisfactory relation to the occasion that the utterance appropriate to that occasion” 
is “apparent to all involved.”20 With this idea, however, Herd himself falls victim to the same 
criticism he levels at the more dismissive critics of Ashbery, of “misunderstand[ing] the 
paradigm of understanding according to which his poetry makes sense.”21 In response to the 
criticism that his poetry represents “a failure to communicate,” Ashbery insists his intention is 
always “to communicate” but not “something that’s already known by the reader” which “is 
not really communicating anything.”22  Communication is not about uncertainty reduction 
through confirmation or affirmation but bringing the reader to the limits of understanding, to 
the limits of the known and knowable where an otherness outside “(my)Self” is encountered in 
the presence of “(an)Other.”     
This study seeks to refute Shoptaw’s suggestion that Ashbery’s difficulty can be 
explained away by the right reading strategy and correct Herd’s misunderstanding of 
understanding in how and why Ashbery communicates. However, it does develop upon the 
latter’s argument about Ashbery’s sense of occasion by showing that the poet not only creates 
poems fit for or belonging to their occasion but creates poems that are occasions in themselves. 
What he calls in “Litany” “occasions for all occasions.” 23  Difficulty, consequently, is a 
necessity because it reveals that understanding, or uncertainty reduction, is not the teleological 
goal of communication for Ashbery. Instead, by demarcating the very limits of the known and 
knowable, difficulty signals potential encounter with that which lies outside “(my)Self.” 
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Communication, therefore, refers to the event of reaching outside oneself and toward another 
person to realise actual intersubjectivity, it is the experience or lived space of proximity 
between “(my)Self and “(an)Other.” In this sense, my analysis also engages with Geoff Ward’s 
observation of the “fated nature of encounter” in Ashbery, of “meeting only to miss.”24 In one 
of his most widely anthologised poems, “Paradoxes and Oxymorons,” Ashbery makes this 
sense of encounter explicit: 
 
 
This poem is concerned with language on a very plain level. 
Look at it talking to you. You look out a window 
Or pretend to fidget. You have it but you don’t have it. 
You miss it, it misses you. You miss each other.25 
 
 
Ashbery later explains that “a plain level...is that and other things,”26 suggesting a literal, 
practical aspect but also an additional function in which “other” is crucial. Extending this logic, 
the poet is concerned with communication on such “a very plain level” in the sense of 
conveying meaning but more importantly in how it involves an encounter with another person. 
Ward’s observation is correct, that those meeting ultimately “miss each other,” but it is more 
important than being “universally applicable to the displacements inhering in any act of 
perception”27 because it informs the notion of ethical encounter central to Ashbery’s “poethics 
of proximity.” As will be seen, encounter does not mean complete identification between the 
contrapositions of “I” and “you.” Ethical encounter requires a difference and a distance to 
remain between those meeting. Instead of uncertainty reduction, “miss[ing] each other” 
comprises misunderstanding, further highlighting the necessity of difficulty as that which 
prevents understanding but also marking the very limits of the comprehensible, the known and 
knowable.  
“Paradoxes and Oxymorons” is “concerned with language” but “the poem is you,”28 a 
presence and an absence that is beyond the grasp of the poet, signalling “(an)Other” who is 
unknown to and unknowable for Ashbery. However, equating the poem with another person 
implies “a kind of generosity that allows the reader a genuinely creative role,”29 the poem is 
“you[rs]” or “you[rs].” In Other Traditions, he contests that “poetry is somehow incomplete 
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without the external completion of it by a reader/critic”30 or reader as critic, someone whose 
interpretation is a further composition because it changes the meaning of the poem by making 
it correspond to his/her individual circumstances. In “Litany” again, Ashbery discusses how 
“Great poets of the past, and a few/Great critics as well”31 not only describe “Exactly what is 
taking place all about us”32 but:  
 
 
Make you wish you were in it, or better yet 
…make you realise that you actually are in it 
For better or for worse, with no 
Conceivable way of getting out”33 
 
 
According to this logic, great poetry is “poethic,” not just about but a way of actually living in 
the real world as the actions performed while writing and reading such poetry are equivalent to 
the other actions performed when authoring a self amongst others. If Ashbery is to be a great 
poet then he needs great critics, readers whose interpretations are further compositions because 
they extend his work by making it correspond with the conditions informing their reading, 
making the poem “something to be acted out”34 after it has been read. Charles Altieri identifies 
this “dialectic of call and response”35 throughout Ashbery’s oeuvre but I would go further, 
proposing that his work is a call to respond, an obligation to realise one’s “response-ability” 
because we are tasked with completing the act of communication and in doing so making the 
poem ours. In becoming responsive readers, however, we must be responsible for our 
interpretations because they are further compositions in the same way an ethical subject is 
answerable for how s/he acts in and interacts with the social world of others. 
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Chapter 2: The “Aesthetics of Indifference” in Some Trees 
and The Tennis Court Oath 
 
At the end of the seventies, Ashbery announces in “Litany” from As We Know (1979) that “a 
new school of criticism must be developed”1 for which “all/Is by definition subject matter for 
the new/Criticism, which is us.”2 The requirement for such a pronouncement is interesting 
because it helps us identify a major feature of his work during this and the two preceding 
decades: the need for a more expansive and inclusive approach to the writing and reading of 
poetry. However, like the New Criticism he implicitly critiques, Ashbery’s “new/Criticism” 
should not be seen as a solely aesthetic, depoliticised occurrence, it must also be pragmatic. 
While challenging containment and consensus is a prerequisite for a “poethics of proximity,” 
it is also integral to appreciating how such a “poethics” is a form of living in the real world. 
The new critical practice of close reading advocates an aesthetics founded on containment and 
consensus but, as we have seen, it has quite a pronounced political function given the period 
during which it became entrenched as the normative procedure of literary criticism and a 
determinant in the type of poetry being written and read during the Cold War period. In this 
socio-political context, containment refers to the impermeable boundaries established to 
distinguish between Self and Other, an attitude informed by essentialist categories of identity. 
Consensus, by extension, refers to the moral and political system that operated according to the 
principle that American society could accommodate and absorb every oppositional tendency 
without collapsing.  
The political purpose behind containment and consensus is easily discerned: to protect 
the nation from the Other to its democratic, capitalist socio-economic system by excluding it 
and emphasising political unity as a deterrent against the threat of foreign and domestic 
subversives, whether imagined or actual. However, despite the importance of maintaining 
binary oppositions, the Cold War period marked the moment when the attendant distinctions 
between the private and the public, and the personal and the political, were paradoxically and 
irreversibly collapsed. Mc Carthy’s dogged pursuit of the menacing political Other 
(communism) is well-documented but with his admission that “homosexuality…was the 
psychological maladjustment that led people toward communism,”3 the Red Scare takes on a 
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more lavender hue. Equating political with sexual deviance meant homosexuality was 
designated a threat to national security and became the focus of the same strategies of 
containment and discourses of consensus as its political equivalent. Non-normative sexual 
behaviour became a national obsession during the Cold War period, “a wave of officially 
sponsored homophobia” emerged against those who did not adhere to ““normal” sexual 
behaviour culminating in marriage,” whose sexual perversions, like communism, could infect 
and disintegrate the national consensus.4 Not only the external threats of communism and 
nuclear energy had to be contained, but also the potential for internal subversion posed by the 
increased visibility of homosexuality and the emergence of same-sex communities. It is in this 
climate that Ashbery’s pronouncement against the new critical aesthetics of containment and 
consensus must be situated because it is the extratextual reality his “poethics” is intended to 
participate in. His sexuality invariably means that the personal is always already the political. 
Similarly, what might initially appear solely poetic concerns actually have profound ethical 
significance because they constitute a way of living in the real world according to an aesthetic 
principle he is trying to articulate, the heteronomic turn toward outside influences. 
 Fortunately, Ashbery was not alone in developing imaginative and conceptually 
engaging ways of strategically working against strategies of containment and discourses of 
consensus, finding creative resources in the examples provided by the collage-assemblage artist 
Joseph Cornell and the composer John Cage. In addition, Ashbery can be identified according 
to what Moira Roth termed the “aesthetics of indifference,” referring to a “number of 
[predominantly homosexual] artists [who] made a virtue of indifference and whose ideology 
coalesced during the Mc Carthy period”5 to provide a deliberately apolitical, neutral alternative 
to the bigoted convictions and highly politicised causes associated with the era. As the 
American public was being presented with the histrionics of Mc Carthy’s Red and Lavender 
Scares, Cage, Robert Rauschenberg and, to a lesser extent, Jasper Johns used silence, emptiness 
and passivity to expose how spying, concealment, secrecy, coded messages and misleading 
information were engendering the hysterical obsession with public exposure and self-
disclosure. To the silence, emptiness, absence and erasure they use to negotiate the oppressive, 
oppositional politics and aesthetic paradigms that both informed and enforced the strategies of 
containment and discourses of consensus can be added Ashbery’s poetics of reticence, first 
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articulated in ST and continuing in TCO. The “aesthetics of indifference” can be best described 
as what he terms “a kind of fence-sitting/Raised to the level of an esthetic ideal”6 in “Soonest 
Mended” from DDS (1970). Ashbery’s “[a]esthetic [and ethical] ideal” involves occupying a 
neutralised interstice between two conventionally oppositional categories that completely 
deconstructs the binary opposition itself. For Ashbery, the “Aesthetics of Indifference” prove 
“poethical” since it enacts a way of living in the real world while also conceiving “(an)Other” 
beyond categories of the same that reduce its alterity and appropriate it by placing it in relative 
opposition to “(my)Self.”    
 
 
(2.1) The (Mis)Instruction Manual 
 
In his first attempt at self-portraiture, Ashbery directly refutes the formalist methodology of 
New Criticism that isolates the poem from the contextual conditions of its composition in order 
to read it as an autonomous aesthetic object. “The Picture of Little J. A. in a Prospect of 
Flowers” uses intertextuality to highlight the limitations of this methodology: how it devalues 
context and authorial intention by closing off the text to maintain its status as a self-contained, 
autotelic object. “The Picture…” immediately denies any attendant “close(d) reading” by 
insisting on the context that engendered it through a variety of direct intertextual references 
and extratextual allusions. The title simply changes the subject of Andrew Marvell’s “The 
Picture of Little T. C. in a Prospect of Flowers,” a poem warning against the loss of innocence, 
while its epigraph consists of the concluding sentence from Boris Pasternak’s selective memoir 
Safe Conduct. In a poem centred on the act of self-definition, it is striking how reliant it is on 
other literary voices, “referring in half a dozen lines to figures as divergent as...[those 
mentioned above, in addition to] James Joyce, Thomas Nashe, Daniel Defore, [William] 
Shakespeare and [William] Wordsworth.” 7  Like Wordsworth’s “Ode: Intimations of 
Immortality,” Ashbery’s poem consists of three sections and discusses the principle of lacrimae 
rerum, which means that life is growth, “My head among the blazing phlox/Seemed a pale and 
gigantic fungus,” but a certain loss is inevitable, “Still, as the loveliest feelings//Must soon find 
words, and these, yes,/Displace them.”8 More importantly, Wordsworth’s poem relies on the 
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“notion of pre-existence,”9 making Ashbery’s text an engagement with what pre-exists his 
own, the intertextual context outside, yet constitutive of, his poem. “The Picture...” enacts how 
reading happens, it is “a poem which discloses itself as it tells the story of its reading” and 
“describes its genesis through the work of other writers.”10 “J. A.,” the subject of the poem, is, 
like the poem itself “a wet sponge/ …/…accepting//Everything, taking nothing.” 11  The 
significance given to other people and the outside may gesture toward an immediate 
heteronomic turn in Ashbery’s poetics, but given the sexual and moral politics of the Cold War 
period, their association with the act of self-definition suggests the more problematic activities 
of surveillance, interrogation and coerced confessions:  
 
 
So far is goodness a mere memory 
Or naming of recent scenes of badness  
 That even these lives, children, 
 You may pass through to be blessed, 
 So fair does each invent his virtue.12 
 
 
The dichotomy of moral absolutes is evoked in the act of “naming,” which can refer to both 
disclosure from within or exposure from without, and is juxtaposed with the possibility of a 
more relativist, less essentialised, approach to “good” and “bad” behaviour. Ashbery also 
questions one’s ability to escape categorisations or representations of oneself:  
 
 
Yet I cannot escape the picture 
Of my small self… 
// 
As though the rolled-up future might stink 
As loud as stood the sick moment 
The shutter clicked.13         
 
 
Ultimately, however, “The Picture…” is concerned with the displacements that occur in writing 
and reading, how signifying displaces even “the loveliest feelings” and how what we read now 
will inevitably be displaced by what we read subsequently, to become “lost words/[in which 
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we can] imagine our rewards.”14 Paying close attention to these “lost words” is impossible 
since they do not comprise a textual object to be read but refer instead to the residual effect a 
poem might have on the reader. If the poem cannot be self-contained, then the self it purports 
to represent similarly cannot be understood in terms of containment. Both are informed by what 
is outside of them respectively, they are heteronomic. Ashbery’s “poethics” is the 
counterexample to the methodology provided by New Criticism because by emphasising how 
the text might affect a particular response in the reader, he undermines the strategy of 
containment motivating this Cold War pedagogy of writing and reading.  
Ashbery’s exposition of how not to read in his writing continues in “The Instruction 
Manual,” a critique of the tendency to provide a prescriptive set of normative practices. By 
writing according to its prescriptions, Ashbery exposes the limits of this poetics and the 
consequent circumscriptions that arise from adhering to it. As with “The Picture…,” “The 
Instruction Manual” describes its own coming into being but its closedness is more 
pronounced, the subject being closed-off from the social world of others outside him, “I look 
down into the street and see people, each walking with an inner peace,/And envy them – they 
are so far away from me!”15 and the poem itself being enclosed, its circular structure beginning 
“As I sit looking out of a window of the building/I wish I did not have to write the instruction 
manual on the uses of a new metal”16 and concluding “Back to the instruction manual which 
has made me dream of Guadalajara.”17 Ashbery challenges the “close(d)” writing and reading 
method of New Criticism by advocating inattention to the text, to the instruction manual he is 
writing and “The Instruction Manual” before the reader. This formalist method might appear 
to be an objective, non-discriminatory reading strategy but “to call for close reading, in fact, is 
to do more than insist on due attentiveness to the text. It inescapably suggests an attention to 
this rather than to something else: to the ‘words on the page’ rather than to the contexts which 
produced and surround them.”18  
To highlight this, the closed poem documents how “We have seen young love [between 
“the young fellow with the toothpick”19 and “a young girl/Of fourteen or fifteen,”20 married 
love [between “a dapper fellow/Clothed in deep blue” and “His dear one, his wife, [who] is 
                                                      
14
 Ibid.  
15
 John Ashbery, “The Instruction Manual,” CP, 5.  
16
 Ibid.  
17
 Ibid, 8. 
18
 Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction, Second Edition (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1996), 38, author’s emphasis.  
19
 Ashbery, “The Instruction Manual,” CP, 6. 
20
 Ibid, 7. 
  
 
63 
 
young and pretty,”21 and the love of an aged mother for her son,”22 “a dark-skinned lad with 
pearly teeth [who] grins out at us from the worn leather frame.”23 Ashbery’s intention here is 
to reveal “How limited, but how complete withal, has been our experience of Gudalajara!”24 
This closed poem contains the threat of “deviant” sexuality by paying attention to the 
heteronormative relations between the inhabitants of Guadalajara. Including these in an 
instruction manual, whose practical, utilitarian purpose, to define the function of an object, 
evokes the prescriptive pronouncements of new critical pedagogy, reveals the exclusions made 
in the service of containment, both textual and sexual. Inattention prevents a “close(d)” 
approach to writing and reading but it insists on the closer alternative, paying attention to what 
is excluded, to what is outside of both the text and the self. The speaker in “The Instruction 
Manual” claims to imaginatively escape the mundane task at hand but his imaginings are shown 
by Ashbery to simply reinforce the (sexual) politics of the period as his text is conditioned by 
a strategy of containment. 
 Adhering to the “close(d)” methodology endorsed by the New Critics has important 
ethical implications also. There is a profound absence of otherness in “The Instruction 
Manual,” even though Guadalajara is the “City I wanted most to see, and most did not see, in 
Mexico!”25 The sense of otherness associated with a foreign place is normalised through the 
tour guide, a contentious figure given the U.S. policy of non-colonial imperialism in Latin 
America during the Cold War and a representative of the “imperialism of the same”26 that a 
“poethics” is designed to contravene: 
 
 
 And we must catch a view of the city, before we leave, from a  
         good high place. 
 That church tower will do… 
 /…/ 
 Soon we have reached the top, and the whole network of the 
        city extends before us.27 
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Any sense of otherness in this vastly complex city that the speaker has never actually seen 
before is appropriated by his/her imperialist imagination, reduced to a stereotypical cacophony 
of colours and sounds, and heteronormative relationships. The foreign, what is different or 
other, is reduced to the categories of the same by the speaker’s “close(d)” poem, depriving it 
of exactly that which constitutes its alterity. Ashbery exploits the inherent utility of “The 
Instruction Manual” to warn by example against New Criticism and the type of self-contained 
subject represented in the autonomous, textual objects its practitioners endorse. Otherness 
requires “poethics,” a way of conceptualising the event of aesthetic experience, of writing and 
reading a poem, and its coincidence with how one lives in the extratextual world.    
   
 
(2.2) Thinking Outside the Box 
 
“SPCM” is undoubtedly Ashbery’s most recognised ekphrastic poem but his unique 
engagement with the visual arts began in ST. Cornell’s influence has been a constant in his 
work, admitting in his 1995 “Robert Frost Medal Address” that after having read “a book about 
Joseph Cornell [in the early ‘40s, he] immediately became my favourite artist and has remained 
one to this day.”28  Cornell contested the very aesthetic categories used to confine artists, 
“avoiding the traditional nomenclature of art media, which enforces settled definitions”29 and 
who “in a society organised around acquisition, consumption [and] elimination...cared [only] 
for...the detritus.”30 Accordingly, his “bounded microcosms [provided] metaphors for real-
world ideals”31 that ask viewers to look with renewed and more responsible vision at the world 
than they had before. Ashbery and Cornell share an affinity for the metaphysique d’ephemera, 
the aesthetics of making the everyday transcendent through the transformative power of paying 
attention to what is outside of normative axiological standards or is surplus to requirement. 
“Nothing is one thing only [in Cornell]”32 as objects reappear in different contexts without their 
prior meaning being completely erased, thereby encouraging the viewer to pay attention to 
what is outside the box. Cornell’s “method of working offers explanation for the necessity of 
variations on a theme:” it invites the viewer to elicit further associations because what matter 
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are the lasting familial relations he establishes amongst the otherwise ephemeral “through [the] 
reiteration of certain objects.”33 There is probably no poetic form better suited than the pantoum 
for enacting Cornell’s aesthetics. However, Ashbery’s deviation from its formal constraints 
only further emphasises his appreciation for Cornell as an artist who refutes the viability of any 
strategy of containment.  
 Firstly, “Pantoum,” or as it appears in A Joseph Cornell Album with the subtitle 
“Homage to Saint-Simon, Ravel, and Joseph Cornell,” contains a number of references to the 
objects and images that repeatedly appear in the artist’s boxes.  
 
 
     
      (Fig. 1) Joseph Cornell, Penny             (Fig. 2) Joseph Cornell, Untitled (Soap Bubble Set) 
         Arcade for Lauren Bacall 
 
 
“Eyes shining without mystery” suggests the numerous female actresses that gaze out at the 
viewer through the glass panes of portraits such as Garbo: The Crystal Mask (1939-40) and 
(Fig. 1) Penny Arcade Portrait of Lauren Bacall (1945-46), while “the vague snow of many 
clay pipes” refers to the abstract objects emanating from the pipes in Cornell’s (Fig. 2) Soap 
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Bubble Set(s) from the ‘30s and ‘40s. 34  The Medici Prince and Princess in his (Fig 3.) Slot 
Machine(s) from the ‘40s also appear in the poem as “those dearest to the king.”35  
 
 
        
(Fig. 3) Joseph Cornell, Medici Slot Machine       (Fig. 4) Joseph Cornell, Pharmacy (1943) 
                       Object (1942) 
 
 
However, “Pantoum” is not merely an ekphrastic poem since Ashbery alludes to the 
achievement and the effect of Cornell’s aesthetics as opposed to just re-presenting the material 
objects of his boxes. For example, “connoisseurs of oblivion” refers to his ability to give value 
to the completely forgotten or unknown, that which exists outside our standards of judgement 
and taste (Fig. 4). In the dime stores he frequented, Cornell discovered the literally abject, the 
objects of detritus that he transforms into museum-like homilies to bygone eras through the 
creative act of selecting and paying attention to them. Similarly, how he manages to arrest the 
impermanent, lending a degree of permanence to the ephemeral, is attested to, “These days 
[that] are short, brittle; there is only one night/And that soon gotten over,”36 as seen in his boxes 
capturing the performance of the ballets he so cherished. Cornell ultimately protects what 
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matters to him from being excluded or discarded, due to “Some blunt pretense to safety we 
have.”37  
To understand an artist like Cornell, so reliant on complex visual metaphors, surreal 
juxtapositions and abstract arrangements of objects, his boxes must also be viewed in terms of 
their tangibility, their “thingness,” which requires engaging with their literalisms. With the 
glass panels functioning as demarcated yet transparent boundaries, his boxes are never literally 
impermeable containers, their significance projects beyond the bounded space through 
repetitions in and associations with other boxes. Ashbery is attuned to this, asking “what is in 
store?” 38  like Cornell’s boxes are some kind of surreal department store display. They 
introduce a visual “poethics” to Ashbery, articulating a way of living within the real world of 
external, material objects rather than just representing one. “Pantoum” deftly conveys this 
integral aspect of Cornell’s collage-assemblages in that it similarly enacts, or per-forms, its 
meaning. Normally, a pantoum is comprised of a series of quatrains, with the second and fourth 
lines of each stanza repeated as the first and third lines of the next one. This pattern can continue 
to any length but the final stanza must conclude the series with its second line being the third 
line of the opening stanza and the last line of the poem repeating the first line of the opening 
stanza. However, Ashbery deviates from the formal conventions in the concluding stanza: 
 
 
Some blunt pretense to safety we have: 
Eyes shining without mystery     [1st Line Opening Stanza] 
For they must have motion 
Through the vague snow of many clay pipes.39  [3rd Line Opening Stanza]      
 
 
As can be seen here, Ashbery reverses the order of the repeated lines in the final stanza so that 
it no longer concludes the series but provides the stanza that would have preceded the opening 
one: 
 
 
 Eyes shining without mystery     [2nd Line Previous Stanza] 
 Footprints eager for the past 
 Through the vague snow of many clay pipes,  [4th Line Previous Stanza] 
 And what is in store?     
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Ashbery refuses to close his poem, thereby negotiating, and ultimately resisting, the strategy 
of containment inherent within the pantoum form. Instead of (en)closure, Ashbery insists on 
repetition, an important feature that will be seen in TCO as it allows for difference and 
precludes consensus. Rather than artistic originality, in Cornell “discarded objects are 
reconditioned and revived as meaningful artefacts” as their value is “transferred into a new 
system of evaluation through metaphor.”40 His boxes encourage repeated viewing, or closer 
reading, that transforms spectatorship into a creative endeavour because they “make it 
difficult…to resist a verbal translation of the images,”41 that is, the spectator is compelled to 
focus on the selections of the artist, what he has decided to pay attention to. Like the individual 
objects in Cornell’s boxes, the sentences in “Pantoum” are irreducibly abstruse in isolation. 
Their significance derives from them being repeated throughout the poem, thereby turning the 
reader’s attention to the words Ashbery has selected, which reveal the accordance he is trying 
to highlight between his poetics and Cornell’s aesthetics. While a formalist analysis of 
“Pantoum” is required to identify the poem’s performative capacity, it only makes sense when 
read in terms of the context that engendered it, the aesthetic paradigm provided by the collage-
assemblage artist as a means of negotiating and resisting strategies of containment.  
Cornell’s boxes serve as a metaphor to help explain Ashbery’s view of open and closed 
poetry as not referring to specific poetic forms but rather to one’s attitude to poetry itself, to its 
purpose and potential.  They invite us not only to look at chosen objects but also to reflect on 
our own acts of seeing because “rather than denying interactions between the objects displayed 
and the spectator,” which would heighten the “sense of isolation and enclosure,”42 they stress 
“interaction with the world as a condition for creative production.”43 Being open toward rather 
than closed-off from the world outside us makes containment and consensus in poetry 
impossible, allowing instead for “perpetual inter-relation and interaction between inside and 
outside.”44 From Cornell, Ashbery learns to value what is normally confined to the outside, be 
that context, the excluded, the repressed or the ignored, therefore, “Pantoum” needs to be read 
within the highly policed Mc Carthy era. As a homosexual male during this period, Ashbery 
knew what it meant to be on display to someone or to have to perform in a certain way. 
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“Pantoum” indicates the possible emergence of a “poethics” in Ashbery motivated by the 
example of Cornell, a way of negotiating strategies of containment in the real world that is 
enacted in the poem. It also reveals, in conjunction with “The Picture…,” that the heteronomic 
poem and the subject it purports to represent develop as a response to the Cold War culture of 
institutional homophobia, making the “poethic” already cogently political.  
 
 
(2.3) The “Aesthetics of Indifference” 
 
The eponymous poem in ST explains the political efficacy of an “aesthetics of indifference” 
for Ashbery, utilising what Jonathan Katz identifies as “opposition without oppositionality,”45 
a strategy of homosexual resistance perfectly calibrated to negotiating strategies of containment 
and discourses of consensus. Reticence and accentuation are used by Ashbery to challenge the 
other binary oppositions he is confronted with given his circumstances, including but not 
limited to: concealment and confession, private and public, disclosure from within and 
exposure from without, secrecy and surveillance, and containment and excess. Each opposition 
features in both ST and TCO in numerous ways but in “Some Trees” Ashbery can be seen 
resisting differentiation and separation in favour of assimilation and contact. Its performative 
capacity is also immediately apparent: 
 
 
 These are amazing: each 
 Joining a neighbour, as though speech 
 Were a still performance46  
 
 
Each line literally joins its neighbour due to the enjambment required to adhere to the “AABB” 
rhyming scheme. The poem captures something that is happening, the “still performance” of 
speech, an act of communication which, as Levinas highlights, is the experience of proximity: 
 
 
 ...you and I 
 Are suddenly what the trees try 
 
 To tell us we are: 
 That their merely being there 
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 Means something, that soon 
 We may touch, love, explain.47  
 
 
“I” and “you” are heteronomic in this sense, since the act of communication ultimately refers 
to the event of reaching outside oneself and toward another. Potential to possibly “touch, love, 
explain” also further suggests proximity because they are unrealised, “we may.” A distance and 
a difference between “I” and “you” are implied by the inability to actually touch and the need 
for explanation respectively. Including love among the indicators of proximity serves to 
reaffirm that Ashbery’s “poethics” must, initially at least, be read in terms of his sexuality. In 
the context of the '50s, therefore, the heteronomic turn toward the other, or more generally 
toward what is outside the contained, consensually endorsed self, enacts a way of living in the 
real world as a homosexual. 
Touch is particularly significant because it corresponds with the tactility central to 
Cornell’s aesthetics and provides an alternative modality for how “Some Trees” might be read. 
In tactile art following the readymade, although actual tactile contact is eluded due to these 
objects being held in exhibition display cases or reproduced as photographs for catalogues, 
“imagined or intellectualised contact becomes central to a consideration” of how they are 
received and how they instigate “bodily reactions through disturbance and incompletion, 
attraction and repulsion.”48 Tactile art allows for “bodily reactions” or, as Bakhtin and Levinas 
would argue, embodied responses in the viewer. In the case of Cornell, paying close attention 
to his boxes gives the impression of being in proximity to an irreducible and irreconcilable 
otherness that cannot be appropriated into or expressed through language. He redefines 
aesthetic experience through a tactile approach that: 
 
 
asks viewers to reject their conventionalised and unquestioned modes of perception – 
to approach works within an interchange that is open ended and exploratory, intimate 
yet inconclusive...Tactility acknowledges that there are many unexplored avenues of 
comprehension that, if chosen, would necessarily suggest alternative meanings and 
challenges to the status quo.49    
 
 
Reconfiguring aesthetic experience from the optic to the haptic is to replace distance and 
separation with proximity and contact, and in doing so radically alter the relationship between 
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the object and the spectator. This is another example of Cornell encouraging us to pay attention 
to what is normally excluded or ignored. Perhaps this is what “Some Trees,” and the collection 
as a whole, is “try[ing]//To tell us we are:” subjects joined to a neighbour about to “touch, love, 
explain” during the experience of proximity. As a “still performance” whose “merely being 
there/Means something,” the poem stages a heteronomic turn, an imagined or intellectualised 
encounter between “you and I,” between “(an)Other” and “(my)Self.” Like Cornell’s boxes, 
“Some Trees” is trying to perform something, to make it happen by extending beyond itself as 
text and affecting a particular response in the reader, ultimately changing how s/he interacts 
with his/her environment and what s/he pays attention to within it. By reorienting the reader’s 
attention toward what is other, different, beyond containment and against consensus, Ashbery’s 
“aesthetics of indifference” become apparent.             
 Although written in 1948, “Some Trees” references the same aesthetic principle behind 
Cage’s silent composition 4’33” (1952) and Rauschenberg’s empty composition White 
Painting (1951): 
 
 
 We are surrounded: 
 A silence already filled with noises, 
 A canvas on which emerges 
 
 A chorus of smiles, a winter morning. 
 Placed in a puzzling light and moving,50 
 
 
Cage and Rauschenberg elide self-expression in and preclude the possibility of self-
identification through their respective mediums. Instead, a heteronomic turn manifests in 4’33” 
and White Painting as they are open toward and dependent on what is outside, an otherness 
that is ultimately inexpressible and impossible to represent without reducing it to categories of 
the same. To their silence and emptiness can be added Ashbery’s reticence, “Our days put on 
such reticence/These accents seem their own defence.”51 Silence, emptiness and reticence are 
not due to sexual oppression. Informed by an “aesthetics of indifference,” they are acts of 
strategic resistance against the strategies of containment and discourses of consensus. 
“Reticence” and accentuation comment on the paradoxical status of homosexuality during the 
Cold War period as an “open secret” and “Some Trees” “exhibits the caution attendant upon 
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[such] unsanctioned behaviour” 52  in its closing couplet, implying that both accentuation 
(exhibition) and reticence (caution) are required for the homosexual male to successfully live 
in the real world of social and institutional homophobia. Because “our days put on such 
reticence,” silence, emptiness and reticence are the result of individual choice. Indifference, 
therefore, complicates the “binaries that circumscribe the status quo”53 and condition how we 
identify and express ourselves as political, and sexual, subjects by providing a way out of 
oppositional categorisations. Living within the paradox of an “open secret” further reveals the 
limits of defining oneself according to such categories, making an “aesthetics of indifference” 
all the more relevant to these homosexual men and gesturing toward the “poethic” as it provides 
a way of living in, not just representing, the real world of c/overt homophobia. 
The paradox of calling attention to oneself and being reticent is an example of 
Ashbery’s indifference but, as he concludes “Some Trees,” “these accents [of reticence] seem 
their own defence.” Like Cage’s silence and Rauschenberg’s emptiness, reticence is resistance, 
an aesthetic choice with real world application because it ensures the individual “can escape 
both complicity in the dominant culture and detection as a homosexual,” thereby providing a 
viable political stance for other “closeted homosexuals [who could] ill afford to call attention 
to themselves with an articulated, entrenched oppositional stance.” 54 Conventional opposition 
must be avoided because it “simply reproduce[s] the binary logic through which domination 
writes itself” 55 and continually runs the risk of being co-opted as a tool of hegemony. Once 
marked as oppositional, “any disturbance [or deviation] can be incorporated into a discourse of 
oppositionality that only catalyses [further] oppressive constructions”56 and appropriates what 
might be considered other or different into categories of the same. An “aesthetics of 
indifference” provides a way out of the binary logic of oppositional categories. The fact that 
Cage’s silent composition focuses the listener’s attention on noise and Rauschenberg’s empty 
painting is full of white paint collapses oppositional categories. Their aesthetics encourage a 
reading of Ashbery’s reticence and accentuation as indifference. Despite its closed form of five 
quatrains and standardised rhyming scheme, “Some Trees” is resolutely open toward its 
immediate socio-political environment, just as 4’33” and White Painting are heteronomic 
rather than self-contained, open toward and responding to the environments outside them. To 
understand what the poem is “try[ing]/To tell us we are” it must be read as responding to the 
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climate of social and institutional homophobia and encouraging a response to this environment 
based on “opposition without oppositionality.” Reticence and accentuation pre-empt the 
“shield of a greeting” in “Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror,” the poem in which a “poethics of 
proximity” is realised in the experience of an aesthetic encounter with “(an)Other.” Therefore, 
how Ashbery lives in the real world as a homosexual male fundamentally informs his poetics, 
thickening it with a “h” until it becomes a model for how a non-appropriative, heteronomic 
subject can engage with otherness but without appropriating it into categories of the same or 
reducing its alterity through containment and consensus.       
 
 
(2.4) “Opposition Without Oppositionality” in Some Trees 
 
Ashbery is by no means the only poet who found a solution to the oppressive sexual politics of 
the Cold War period by turning his attention toward the outside. At the same time, those 
associated with the San Francisco Renaissance, primarily Robert Duncan, Jack Spicer and 
Robin Blaser, were beginning to experiment with what was termed the “practice of outside.”57 
Duncan’s derivative poetics, which will be discussed later in more detail as a primary influence 
on Palmer’s early collections, and Spicer’s poetics of dictation are further examples of how a 
certain homosexual sensibility was manifesting in heteronomic poetry, that is, poems that 
cannot be contained because their content is constantly referring to the indeterminable. 
Although Duncan’s and Blaser’s poetics more closely resemble an “aesthetics of indifference” 
in their refusal to be categorised as oppositional, the discrepancy between the poetic and the 
personal/political in Spicer helps us understand Ashbery’s own relation to oppositionality and 
how it features in his transition from ST to TCO. Spicer’s poetics can be best described as a 
textual version of assemblage, as copies of original documents are arranged into incongruous 
combinations to form a new poetic composition. After Lorca (1957), for example, is ostensibly 
composed of translations of the Spanish poet but the accuracy of Spicer’s versions is highly 
contestable and some of his own original poems are even posed as translations themselves. In 
a similar manner to Cornell, paying attention to something constitutes a creative act, as 
discarded, ignored and overly familiar material is reclaimed and reworked until the distinction 
between found object and original composition is no longer tenable.  
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In the first poem of ST, “Two Scenes,” the theme of surveillance, the private being 
made public, is introduced, “We see us as we truly behave.”58 As the piece with which Ashbery 
chose to introduce himself to the reading public, “Two Scenes” is “significant in retrospect 
because it remains broadly representative,” introducing “strategies which will figure in his 
mature style,” 59  such as the simultaneity of multiple perspectives to challenge “singular 
authority”60 and the use of circularity to negate oppositionality. The externalisation of identity 
suggests a dependency on others, while Ashbery’s insistence that “Everything has a schedule”61 
implies, like “The Instruction Manual” earlier, a way of reading his poems. The first scene 
establishes certainty through predestination, “Destiny guides the water-pilot, and it is destiny,” 
and declarative statement, “For long we hadn’t heard so much new, such noise./The day was 
warm and pleasant.”62 While the second scene evokes uncertainty due to contingency and the 
lack of precedence, “This perhaps a day of general honesty/Without example in the world’s 
history,” and the absence “of a singular authority.” 63  However, the opposition between 
certainty and uncertainty is complicated by the poem’s conspicuous dialogism, the inclusion 
of other voices in the quotes concluding each scene that undermine its respective theme. For 
example, “‘We see you in your hair,/Air resting around the tips of mountains’”64 attenuates the 
certainty of the first scene with its polysemous pronouns and the lack of referential particulars 
to determine who is speaking. Whereas “As laughing cadets say, ‘In the evening/Everything 
has a schedule, if you can find out what it is’”65 refutes the uncertainty of the second scene by 
indicating the source of the utterance and identifying a plan of procedure. Therefore, the two 
scenes are not complete opposites because each contains an aspect of its other, which is 
provided by the quotations from voices other than the poet’s. Furthermore, the schedule 
mentioned at the end of the poem returns the reader to the beginning because it explains how 
“The train comes bearing joy” and demystifies the “Destiny [that] guides the water-pilot,”66 
emphasising the circularity of, rather than opposition between, the two scenes. Ashbery also 
seems to be suggesting that no singular authority can predetermine a train of thought because 
it will unavoidably be affected by outside influences, other voices that introduce a different 
schedule and necessitate beginning again. If surveillance suggests the more negative 
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connotations of one’s identity being dependent on another person’s perspective, “Two Scenes” 
makes this dependency reciprocal and mutually constitutive, an opportunity to “see us as we 
truly behave,” to encounter and interact with, rather than being closed-off from, “(an)Other.” 
The presence of other voices in the opening poem of ST indicates that heteronomy must be 
considered to appreciate how Ashbery’s work might be read, “Two Scenes” providing the 
schedule for understanding his trains of thought and how they are affected by outside 
influences.  
In his Vancouver Lectures (1965), Spicer uses the analogy of the radio to explain his 
practice of dictation because “it literalises the actual transmission of words from 
elsewhere…[and] as a model for poetic dictation, it suggests that composition begins with 
listening and not self-expression, with emptiness and not an overflow of autobiographical 
content.” 67  As Spicer explains, “instead of the poet being a beautiful machine which 
manufactured the current for itself, did everything for itself...instead there was something from 
the Outside coming in.” 68  Spicer’s awareness of the importance of what is outside for 
expressing and understanding the inside makes his work resolutely heteronomic. In addition, 
Spicer’s poetics of dictation make explicit what remains implicit in his work: the denial of 
singular authorial intention as the poet discovers “that these poems say just exactly the opposite 
of what [s/]he wants [her/]himself, per se poet, to say”69 and is required “to bring the poems, 
read the poems, to an audience, simply because often [s/]he can find things from the audience’s 
reaction that [s/]he didn’t understand the poem said, which tell him[/her] something about it.”70 
However, “dictation [was] also a release from the responsibility of authorial intention and all 
it denotes.”71 While Spicer confirms the importance of what lies outside the self, a “poethics” 
is impossible due to the denial of individual responsibility, the prerequisite for an encounter 
between “(my)Self” and “(an)Other” as embodied, answerable agents during the experience of 
proximity when “response-ability” is realised.  
Although Spicer consistently marks his sexuality throughout his work it is difficult to 
categorise him because he remains “largely free of predictable tropes of queer abjection and 
self-loathing” and refuses to affirm his homosexuality through “prominent gay aesthetic 
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traditions, especially camp.”72 With the coterie poetics he formulated in San Francisco during 
the ‘50s “he mounted a group offensive among faithful followers” that “railed against 
feminised or assimilated versions of gay identity” and opposed itself to the heterosexual outside 
world, resulting in a “group offensive [that] involved creating a frontal, unadorned image of 
gay reality that excluded not only a heterosexual viewer but a certain kind of homosexual as 
well.”73 There is a profound discrepancy between the poetic and the personal in Spicer who 
identifies himself with the outside but uses oppositionality rather than indifference as a defence 
against being appropriated by the inside, thereby reinforcing the “us v. them” binary. While 
never formulated in any extended critical writings, Spicer “experienced poetry as needing some 
kind of program or set of guidelines for practitioners” 74  to protect it and the coterie 
relationships articulated through it, resulting in an almost militant insistence on strict 
boundaries demarcating the inside from the outside. His example testifies to how a heteronomic 
orientation in one’s poetry does not always correspond with the personal stance assumed by 
the poet, in addition to how the establishment is able to cohere further when the structural 
model of the “dominant culture as inside” and “oppositional culture as outside” is reinforced, 
however inadvertently or not.    
Ashbery’s long-term interest in the status of avant-garde art and outsider artists makes 
him particularly perceptive regarding the dangers of assuming an oppositional stance due to 
the recolonizing force of oppositionality, observing in “The Invisible Avant-Garde” that:  
 
 
in both art and life we are in danger of substituting one conformity for another…[as] 
protests against the mediocre values of our society…seem to imply that one’s only way 
out is to join a parallel society whose stereotyped manners, language, speech and dress 
are only reverse images of the one it is trying to reject.75 
 
 
The only way out, it appears, is to enter into another group however marginal or alternative it 
purports to be, which merely serves to reverse the terms of the “us v. them” binary while 
leaving the logic informing it intact. If Spicer’s poetics of dictation provides an example of 
how a heteronomic orientation toward the outside is possible in poetry as a means of resisting 
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strategies of containment and challenging discourses of consensus, Ashbery discovers in his 
close friend O’Hara how this can be extended into the personal life of the poet to achieve a 
more “poethical” purpose. Writing on the occasion of his death in 1966, Ashbery summarises 
the atmosphere confronted by poets who sought to be different during the previous decade as: 
 
 
a supremely tribal civilisation, where even artists feel compelled to band together in 
marauding packs, where loyalty-oath mentality has pervaded outer 
Bohemia…Whatever it is, join it; you can examine it later and neutralise it, if necessary, 
from within.76   
 
 
O’Hara offers a corrective in his poetry because it “has no program and therefore cannot be 
joined…in a word, it does not attack the establishment. It merely ignores its right to exist, and 
is thus a source of annoyance for partisans of every stripe.”77 O’Hara’s attitude, the stance he 
puts on, toward the establishment perfectly embodies indifference, being different to but not 
the opposite of and, therefore, outside the binary logic that contains individuals within 
oppositional categories and reduces their differences. As “a source of annoyance” for both the 
“us” and the “them,” O’Hara’s poetic and personal stance is political but calibrated in a way to 
critique both without aligning with either. Like Cage and Rauschenberg, his response to the 
oppositional politics of the period helps explain Ashbery’s refusal to be entirely appropriated 
into any reductive category, into any camp, and adds a further level of disapproval to Spicer’s 
famous critique of Ashbery as a “faggot poet.”78 Spicer’s condescending opinion of Ashbery 
and O’Hara in particular, and the New York School more generally, as “urbane…campy…and 
effete”79 further confirms him substituting one conformity for the other by perpetuating the 
derogatory sterotypes associated with discussions of homosexuality during this period. 
Ashbery is not a camp poet in the sense that homosexuality is not inscribed in his poetry 
because he favours a mode of homosexual resistance whose continued viability, unlike 
Spicer’s, is due to the identity it articulates being outside strategies of containment and 
discourses of consensus, of it not being reducible to any camp because it is reliant on being 
different to, but never the opposite of, what he seeks to oppose.     
 
                                                      
76
 John Ashbery, “Writers and Issues: Frank O’Hara’s Question,” Selected Prose, 81.   
77
 Ibid.  
78
 Lewis Ellingham, “‘the King’s Two Bodies’ from Poet Be Like God: Jack Spicer’s Circle in San Francisco, 
1956-1965,” Line 7/8 (1986): 62. 
79
 Ibid, 60-61. 
  
 
78 
 
(2.5) The “Practice of Outside” 
 
Ashbery’s relocation to Paris in 1955 provides one of those rare instances when the poetic and 
the personal almost perfectly coincide. By the time John Bernard Meyers coined the term 
“Poets of the New York School” in 1961, his expatriate status meant it was immediately 
obsolete yet still thoroughly representative of how his physical relocation from New York 
corresponded with the emerging heteronomic orientation in his poetry. His dislike for the New 
York School of Poets is exacerbated by the fact “it seems to designate a place, whereas New 
York is really an anti-place, an abstract climate.”80 The regionalist connotations of the term 
became further entrenched following the publication of Donald Allen’s The New American 
Poetry: 1945-1960, which used momentary coincidences of geographical proximity to organise 
an otherwise heterogeneous selection of innovative poets into consolidated movements centred 
around New York, Black Mountain College and San Francisco.  
 In his assessment of fellow expatriate artists in Paris, Ashbery identifies the desire to 
escape the “acceptance world” of American culture, “which so often ends up by stifling an 
artist’s originality through the efficacious means of over-encouragement.”81 Quoting the artist 
Caroline Lee, Paris is appealing because it gives “the opportunity for…anonymity,” not “in the 
sense of being myself unknown; but anonymous in the sense that my habits, reactions, impulses 
would neither expect nor find comprehending or knowing reactions.”82 As literal outsiders, 
these artists resolve the difficulty of being oppositional without espousing oppositionality: 
“there is not much “protest” in the work, simply because…[whatever protest there is has 
already been] sufficiently expressed by [expatriation itself].” 83  In a similar way to how 
O’Hara’s political critique is the personal stance he assumes toward both the establishment and 
the marginalised, his ability to annoy both components of the us-them binary by “being too hip 
for the squares and too square for the hips,”84 the personal position of these artists constitute 
their political critique. Ashbery’s political critique of the “acceptance world” of American 
culture is constituted by his decision to personally locate himself beyond its reaches. Therefore, 
his poetry does not need to be explicitly oppositional in terms of its content because he himself 
embodies the principle of being oppositional, with the result that any poetry written from his 
outsider position inherently involves an implicit form of oppositional critique. Through his own 
                                                      
80
 John Ashbery, “The New York School of Poets,” Selected Prose, 114.  
81
 John Ashbery, “American Sanctuary in Paris,” Reported Sightings, 91. 
82
 Ibid, 89-91. 
83
 Ibid, 91. 
84
 Ashbery, “Writers and Issues,” 81.  
  
 
79 
 
combination of silence, exile and cunning, Ashbery’s life and poetry during this period position 
him firmly on the outside, literally and figuratively beyond the jurisdiction of the strategies of 
containment and discourses of consensus he opposed in ST while still in America.  
However, there is an even more negative aspect to this “acceptance world,” especially 
when read in terms of a “poethics of proximity,” which also allows for Meyers’ categoristaion 
of Ashbery to be read as a pre-emptive warning. The unprecedented international success of 
Abstract Expressionism as an indigenous, avant-garde movement was because the aesthetic 
philosophy and the compositional practices supporting it closely coincided with the ideology 
of “new liberalism” set forth in Arthur Schlesinger’s The Vital Center, which not only 
accommodated dissidence and opposition but accorded it a position of paramount importance 
in society. This was no accident, since “avant-garde culture in general and Pollock’s painting[s] 
in particular…[articulated the] values that were subsequently assimilated, utilised, and coopted 
by politicians, with the result that artistic rebellion was transformed into aggressive liberal 
ideology.”85 During the ‘50s, modernism becomes completely depoliticsed, identified only by:  
 
 
virtue of formal and stylistic characteristics, (including difficulty), presented as the 
work of heroic individualists working in a free society, and used as evidence that 
American society was so ideologically free that no form was too experimental or 
abstruse for toleration and even support.86 
 
 
The explicitly oppositional stance of painters like Pollock made it remarkably easy to 
categorise and appropriate them, to neutralise their difference as outsiders and restrict their 
capacity for political critique by containing them within the national consensus of liberty, free-
expression and individualism. However, appropriating outsiders and removing their 
constitutive differences has more negative connotations according to a “poethics of proximity,” 
making it an ethical as well as an aesthetic issue and further merging the personal and the 
political.  
By introducing a “necessary difficulty” for the first time as a constitutive feature of 
some of the poems he has written and indicative of their effect on the reader, Ashbery makes 
difference an indicator of otherness rather than something to be overcome in order to arrive at 
a better understanding of what the poem means. The pervasive sense of difference/otherness is 
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TCO’s innovative quality: how it provides an invitation to realise one’s “response-ability” as a 
heteronomic, non-appropriative subject. In what is probably the most difficult poem in the 
collection, the influence of Cornell is once again apparent as Ashbery investigates the capacity 
of repetition to preserve difference and elicit “response-ability” in the reader. “Europe” is a 
collage of found materials, in this case “a circa World War I British novel for girls called Beryl 
of the Biplane that [he] found at a bookstall along the Seine.”87 This collage experiment is 
representative of what Ashbery was attempting in TCO as a whole, “trying to move beyond 
what were to me the successful poems in Some Trees toward something else…troubling the 
waters so as to be able to fish in them later” with the intention of putting “everything back 
together again later so it would be ‘the same only different.’”88 Moving “toward something 
else,” gesturing to something different or other, is achieved in “Europe.” Each separate stanza, 
paragraph, sentence, fragment or word is numbered but there are no grammatical signifiers to 
differentiate between the poet’s original utterance and the repeated material of the collage. 
Because returning to the source text to determine what parts of the text belong to either Ashbery 
or Le Queux is practically unfeasible, “Europe” potentially belongs to both authors, thus 
precluding the possibility of a singular authorial intention being responsible for the text. Put 
another way, the presence of “(an)Other” is made discernible in Ashbery’s poem through his 
repetitions from an external textual source. “Europe” is less concerned with delimiting 
parameters of containment and privileging the singularity of consensus than it is with 
encouraging the reader to consider how containment and consensus are, if not impossible, then 
at least highly problematic as the reader is required to continuously look outside the poem 
toward the source text. In doing so, the reader involves him/herself in differentiating between 
the poet and the novelist, which has significant ethical connotations since it implicates the 
reader in determining where the “(my)Self” of Ashbery ends and the “(an)Other” of Le Queux 
begins. Ultimately, any easy distinction between “(my)Self” and “(an)Other” is denied because 
they are shown not to be self-contained, mutually exclusive categories but fundamentally 
interrelated, mutually dependent ones. “Europe” is probably the best example of the 
heteronomic turn in Ashbery’s poetry because its content literally belongs to an external source.  
A number of references to “waste” reveal the function of his collage aesthetics, with 
the practice of recycling further emphasising the importance of Cornell to Ashbery as the artist 
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who affirmed the transformative, creative potential in simply paying attention to what is 
excluded, ignored or discarded. Recycling other materials through collage provides a concise 
example of how repetition always involves differences, the composition of “new junk.”89 
Recycling and repetition invalidate claims to singular authority due to the inability of any one 
author to control his/her materials, that is, they will always be vulnerable to the intentions of 
others who utilise them in different ways. Accordingly, extracts from Le Queux appear in 
Ashbery’s poem but, as with Cornell’s use of found objects, without their previous meanings 
being entirely erased. “Europe” performs its meaning by enacting a denial of singular authorial 
control in the face of an otherness that resists containment and consensus. The collage 
aesthetics demonstrate Ashbery’s reconfiguration of the activities of writing and reading since 
what he reads literally provides the content of what he writes, resulting in the control of the 
original author being subordinated to the increased authority of the reader since Le Queux 
cannot control what Ashbery does to his text. In this sense, “Europe”’s compositional practices 
encourage particular interpretational practices, to the extent that these activities become 
coterminous. It warns against habitual reading practices focused on content, “The newspaper 
is ruining your eyes,” 90  in favour of “mistak[ing] his book for garbage” 91  which can be 
recycled, remade into something new through the transformative, creative potential of the 
reader paying proper attention to it. O’Hara was probably the first to notice this increased 
demand on the reader in such poems, identifying “Europe” as being “attention demanding” 
with the “kind of obscure appeal which one is absolutely certain...is going to prove fruitful in 
a completely original way.”92 The possibility of a text having multiple authors is a recurrent 
theme in Ashbery and “Europe” exposes the important ethical connotations as it involves both 
“(my)Self” and “(an)Other” in the composition of the text. 
 
 
(2.6) Repetition and Difference in The Tennis Court Oath 
 
As an example of a heteronomic poem, one that is dependent for its meaning on influences 
outside the singular authority of the poet, “Europe” provides an occasion for the reader to 
realise his/her “response-ability” and is purposely characterised by a “necessary difficulty,” a 
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constitutive quality of the text rather than something to be explained away. While repetition is 
integral to this poem, it also serves to make the oppositional categories that containment and 
consensus rely on impossible to preserve, such as text (inside) and context (outside), self 
(authorial intention) and other (readerly agency), composition (writing) and interpretation 
(reading), and authentic utterance and reiteration. Rather than a “close(d) reading,” repetition 
necessitates a “close(r) reading,” in which the reader pays closer attention to the words as they 
appear on the page to identify patterns, assonances, parallels and differences between the 
repeated words and phrases, ultimately realising how containment within a single poem and 
consensus regarding semantic meaning are both impossible. TCO demonstrates how Ashbery’s 
“new/Criticism” will operate because repetition highlights the self-generative capacity of 
language. While a collection structured using repetition denies both containment and 
consensus, it also illustrates how meaning ultimately escapes the poet’s singular intention, how 
the collection requires someone who “care[s] only about signs,”93 an outside influence who 
determines the meaning by what s/he pays attention to, the patterns, assonances, parallels and 
differences s/he identifies and charts throughout the collection. “They Dream Only of America” 
is further proof of the heteronomic in Ashbery and a succinct example of his “new/Criticism” 
promoting a poetry dependent on outside influences. It continually refers outside itself through 
numerous quotes from an unknown speaker and prevents a single, authoritative interpretation 
because each line and/or sentence suggests a competing narrative and is entirely 
decontextualized from what precedes and succeeds it. The only reference to a subject, in terms 
of both matter and position, is in the concluding line, where “I am lost without you.’”94 The 
poem’s subject is dependent on an outside influence in the sense that “I” requires “you” and 
that the meaning of the poem requires the reader to select a particular narrative and develop it 
further, i.e. Ashbery’s literary forbears who dreamed of America in Whitman’s “thirteen 
million pillars of grass” and Twain’s Bildungsroman characters “hiding from darkness in 
barns/[Where] They can be grownups now,” or the threats of surveillance and exposure in the 
images suggesting noir detective films such as “the murderer’s ash tray” and the “key in his 
right hand.”95 Neither of these readings are entirely sufficient because what matters is the 
poem’s heteronomic orientation.  
Repetition further emphasises difference as individual words acquire multiple 
meanings by recurring in a single poem. “America” conveys this accretive function with the 
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identical words “stars,” “stone[s],” “fire” and “sea” never having identical semantic meanings. 
The meaning of “stars,” for example, cannot be essentially deduced by referral to a dictionary 
because it is context-dependent. Ashbery indicates how meaning will gradually accrete in the 
opening lines, “Piling upward/the fact the stars.”96 In a single poem, “stars” simultaneously 
means that other five-pointed symbol of the national bureaucracy, “In America the office 
[Pentagon] hid/archives in his/stall…/Enormous stars on them,”97 the object in the night sky, 
“with moon and the stars,”98 a feature in astrology regarding predestination, “The gift of a the 
stars./The person/Horror[scope] – the morsels of his choice,”99 celebrity status, “the stars with 
privilege jerks,”100 the physical, luminous entity, “what with stars/rocks and that fascinating 
illumination,”101 the symbol from the national flag, “these stars in our flag we don’t want”102 
and something absolutely necessary because it is neither a need nor a desire, “the undesired 
stars/…/…[that] persist, knowing we don’t want it.”103 The other elemental words “stone,” 
“fire” and “sea” recur to a similar extent so that “America” can be read as a radically disjunctive 
sestina that prevents a singular interpretation of the particular semantic content of the repeated 
words. In addition, the poem indicates how repetition facilitates a heteronomic orientation and 
the consequences this has for strategies of containment and discourses of consensus. 
Interspersed throughout “America” are references to the Cold War environment already seen 
in ST, such as the annihilation of one’s reputation through public exposure, “I was almost 
killed/now by reading/on trial,”104 anxiety regarding the violation of borders, “…the janitor 
reaches for the wrench with/which he’ll kill the intruder/Terrain,”105 the fear of foreign bodies, 
“…I had never come here” 106  and the surveillance of private spaces, “can’t keep     
inside/perhaps feeling the sentry.”107 An overarching binary is established between private 
spaces, “…the apartment/…the bed,”108 “a house”109 and “the room,”110 and public spaces, 
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“the out of doors”111  and the “country.”112  The fact that a poem structured on repetition 
addresses the Cold War atmosphere of heightened fear regarding the violation of boundaries, 
the difficulty of keeping public and private spaces separate and the unsustainability of the us 
v. them (self v. other) dichotomy is not accidental. “America” is testament to the significance 
of repetition not just as a means of invalidating New Criticism by making containment and 
consensus impossible in terms of how a poem is written and read but also as a mode of 
resistance against the strategies and discourses of the period that seek to either exclude or 
appropriate difference.  
“America” is a further example of the heteronomic in Ashbery, a poem beyond 
containment because it exceeds the author’s intentions and relies on the reader’s response. It is 
an “act     imitation,”113 performed for someone else who must determine its validity as an 
imitation by paying attention to it and comparing it to something else in the same way repetition 
operates. Ashbery’s reconfiguration of how the text relates to both the poet’s intentions and the 
reader’s response constitutes his “new/Criticism” but it also foregrounds how repetition 
facilitates a relationship between the poet and the reader based on difference rather than 
identification between both individuals. Heteronomic poems such as “Europe” and “America” 
also inform TCO as a whole since patterns of repetition can be traced between multiple poems, 
further removing their meaning from the intentions of the poet and emphasising their reliance 
on the reader’s response to confirm the importance of outside influence. For example, a pattern 
of repetition can be charted through "To Redouté,” “How Much Longer Will I Inhabit the 
Divine Sepulcher…,” “Rain” and “White Roses” based on bodies of water, the spectrum of 
light and darkness, times of day and botanical entities. Ashbery illustrates this aspect of 
repetition in “How Much Longer…” and the effect it has on the reader using an incomplete 
quote from Ben Jonson’s “Song to Celia,” “Drink to me only with [thine eyes]/And the reader 
is carried away.”114 What is repeated is never the same as its original occurrence. In this sense, 
it carries the reader away from the contained poem whose meaning is based on consensus by 
encouraging him/her to consider the differences between, and to respond to, them.  
“To Redouté” (an address to the Belgian painter and botanist Pierre-Joseph Redouté 
who became famous following the French Revolution for his paintings of roses that mentions 
“new thing[s]”115) and “White Roses” (which concludes with an image of spring renewal, “The 
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new white flowers that are beginning to shoot up about now”116) show how repetition allows 
different contexts to inhabit a single poem as they interpenetrate one another. Yet two poems 
that repeat one another in such a profound way also foreground revolution and renewal, the act 
of making something new by returning to the beginning. This gets to the very centre of why 
repetition is so significant to Ashbery in TCO and the consequent necessity of response. While 
it “authenticates difference as that which cannot be subsumed under the category of the 
Same,”117 the attendant alterity permits further creativity beyond the poet’s intention or control, 
it allows the reader to realise his/her “response-ability.” The reader creates something new by 
introducing “different contexts created by each new reading that can never be experienced by 
the poet.”118 “To Redouté” and “White Roses,” therefore, demonstrate how each reading is 
ultimately a return to a new beginning because after having read one there is the compulsion 
to read the other to identify further repetitions before returning to the first again and repeating 
the process using a different word, phrase or theme. Just like Ashbery’s recycling of other 
material, each reading remakes the collection into “new junk,” something different to what the 
poet originally intended. It demonstrates how “the book [is] a trap,”119 that the poem is a tool 
of containment when considered a static, self-sufficient object, and how “the facts have hinged 
on my reply,”120 that in order for “the facts” to be “piling upward,” for meanings unintended 
by the poet to be accumulated and for the poem to preclude consensus, a response from another 
person is necessary. Therefore, a collection based on heteronomy rather than containment and 
consensus emphasises the importance of outside influence, which in turn places the meaning 
of the text beyond the intentions of the poet and provides an occasion for the reader to realise 
his/her capacity to respond.    
While TCO first introduces the notion of a “necessary difficulty” in Ashbery, what 
makes it so important is its “opposition without oppositionality,” how it manages to oppose 
what he achieved in ST but without ever becoming a codified set of prescriptive practices for 
how this can be maintained in subsequent collections. This is possible because the collection, 
just like the painting by Jacques-Louis David from which its title is derived, ultimately remains 
incomplete. Like O’Hara, Ashbery’s poetry here offers no set of guidelines for practitioners to 
ascribe to; there is no programme to be joined and therefore no attempt to initiate individuals 
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into a coterie poetics according to strict conditions determining who is included and who is 
excluded. This highlights the implicit humour in Ashbery’s “aesthetics of indifference.” 
Playing with the other connotations of the title, TCO denies the possibility of pledging 
allegiance to what he is doing because every reader’s response is going to be different. Ashbery 
suggests a “close(r) reading,” paying heightened attention to things to acknowledge the 
differences between them but without appropriating them into categories of the same. 
Difficulty is necessary because difference prevents any one reading being exhaustive but it is 
precisely this difference that changes the poem from a self-sufficient object to something 
existing between the intentions of the poet and the response of the reader. TCO reflects Ashbery 
living in the real world as an outsider, as an expatriate in France, just like ST documents him 
negotiating the challenges facing homosexual men in Cold War America. As will be seen, its 
heteronomy is developed upon in subsequent collections when his attitude toward writing and 
reading poetry reconfigures the relationship between the poet and the reader to provide a model 
for living in the real world of others, one where differences rather than similarities between 
individuals allow for ethical relationships of proximity.  
              
 
Conclusion: The Two Ashberys? 
 
ST and TCO encapsulate the indifference of Ashbery’s earliest poetry, with both collections 
being different from but not the opposite of each other, a fact often overlooked since these 
collections are used to distinguish between the “two John Ashberys…figures who correspond 
to the two traditions of contemporary American poetry.”121 His “ubiquity in recent anthologies 
is unequalled,” anthologies that make “overt claims at defining the shape of contemporary 
writing.”122 On the one hand, he appears in Helen Vendler’s Harvard Book of Contemporary 
American Poetry, Harold Bloom’s The Best of the Best American Poetry 1988-1997 and J. D. 
McClatchy’s The Vintage Book of Contemporary American Poetry, three anthologies 
concerned with consolidating the inheritors of the more sanitised, conservative form of 
modernism favoured by academic institutions into the dominant force in American poetry. Alan 
Golding also discovered that Ashbery was “the last poet cut from [Donald Hall’s] New Poets 
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of England and America,”123 which assembled “academic” poets criticised for their tameness 
and uniformity according to their experimentations with form. On the other hand, he appears 
in Eliot Weinberger’s American Poetry Since 1950: Innovators and Outsiders, Paul Hoover’s 
Postmodern American Poetry and Douglas Messerli’s From the Other Side of the Century, 
New American Poetry: 1960-1990, anthologies that continue Allen’s original intention in The 
New American Poetry 1945-1960 to gather those who represent the “total rejection…of 
academic verse”124 and a commitment to what Marjorie Perloff terms, borrowing from Ashbery 
himself, the “Other Tradition” in modernism. In this sense, Ashbery is enlisted by both sides 
of the “anthology wars.”  
Ashbery criticism itself also falls into two camps, but the stakes are raised considerably 
because “the business of explaining Ashbery becomes a significant kind of cultural self-
definition” that raises questions concerning “the meaning and status of what it is to be 
‘American.’”125 Those like Bloom and Vendler, and others like James Logenbach and Vernon 
Shetley, view Ashbery as the revisionist of a larger genealogy that resulted in a hegemonic 
modernism that continues into the second-half of the twentieth century, with Bloom positioning 
him as the latest link in a chain that includes Emerson, Whitman, Dickinson, Crane and 
Stevens, and Vendler situating him in a lineage stretching from “Wordsworth, Keats [and] 
Tennyson [to] Stevens [and] Eliot.”126 For critics like Perloff, Charles Altieri and Andrew 
Ross, in addition to poet-critics such as Charles Bernstein, however, Ashbery is part of the 
““breakthrough” narrative of postmodernism” that extends the experiments of modernists such 
as Rimbaud, Stein, Williams, Pound and Cage, who cannot be understood according to the 
Romantic-Symbolist tradition. Either way, significant omissions are required to contain 
Ashbery in any tradition or to arrive at a consensual appreciation of what his poetry is doing, 
with the former erasing more difficult collections like TCO, As We Know (1979), Shadow Train 
(1981) and Flow Chart (1991) in favour of the more acceptable DDS, SPCM and Houseboat 
Days, while the latter praise these difficult collections for showing us “how mediated and 
material language is” and “self-consciously examin[ing] the categories by which we define 
writing”127 to deconstruct the syntax that confines us in a particular worldview and dismiss the 
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others as being “too easily recuperable by what writers associated with Language poetry see as 
the post-Romantic vocabulary of mainstream poetry criticism.”128     
What all this demonstrates is that Ashbery’s “esthetic ideal” of “fence-sitting” makes 
any attempt to contain him within a specific category or engender consensus about the purpose 
of his work an exercise in futility. Most importantly, however, his refusal to invent a critical 
apparatus with which to compel agreement on the nature of his achievement and the 
impossibility of charting influence understood in terms of a “temporal line of succession 
descending from his predecessors” 129  means there is no programme to be joined, he is 
resolutely not a camp poet. Furthermore, he demonstrates in ST and TCO how the opposition 
between “open” and “closed” forms used to differentiate between New American and new 
critical poetics, respectively, is itself problematic. The “open” form of poems from TCO such 
as “Rain,” “Europe” and “Idaho” don’t make them any more innovative than the “closed” form 
of poems from ST like “Sonnet”, “The Painter” (a sestina) and “Pantoum.” What makes ST and 
TCO innovative is their inherent openness, their insistence on heteronomy and concomitant 
refusal to be closed-off from outside influences. ST is open toward the social world of others 
because it shows Ashbery strategically resisting the strategies of containment and discourses 
of consensus he experienced as a homosexual male in postwar America, whereas TCO is open 
in that “the facts have hinged on my reply,” the poems are “not intend[ed]..to be finished 
poems…in the way…[he] had done so before”130 because they require the response of another 
person to complete them, they obligate the reader to realise his/her “response-ability.” As ST 
and TCO illustrate, there are not two Ashberys opposed to one another but rather what he terms 
in “The Skaters” from RM  “that other ‘I,’”131 the co-existence of differences during occasions 
when the contrapositions of I and other are no longer separated as opposites but encounter each 
other within the lived space of proximity.
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Chapter 3: “Fundamental Absences” in Rivers and 
Mountains and The Double Dream of Spring 
 
The difficulty of TCO was necessitated by Ashbery’s desire to achieve heteronomy in his 
poetry, to negate strategies of containment and complicate discourses of consensus as they 
existed in both new critical practices and in Cold War society. Certain poems in that collection 
make difference prominent to acknowledge the importance of outside influence as a means of 
relinquishing complete authorial control of the poem and increasing the reader’s capacity to 
respond. Such difficulty is similarly necessary in his subsequent collections because it “isn’t 
there for its own sake” but rather an inherent condition of the task he has set himself and his 
reader; raising awareness of the “difficulty of living in passing time,” within the “ever-
changing, minute adjustments that go on around us and which we respond to.”1 Difficulty does 
not just refer to the hermeneutic variety here because it also “marks the furthest reach of poetic 
meaning,”2 marking the moment when one moves from knowing into unknowing, what he 
identifies in “Fragment” from DDS as “the threshold of so much unmeaning, so much/Being.”3 
RM and DDS achieve what Levinas terms sensibility, not simply one’s capacity to receive and 
process information from the outside world but one’s complete openness toward it. Sensibility 
is constitutive of the subjectivity of the subject prior to consciousness and intention, referring 
to the moment when exteriority is invited to inhabit interiority as the subject interacts with the 
social world of others. Developing on his experiments in heteronomy, Ashbery’s “poethics” 
begin to emerge in these collections, where his concern is exploring poetry’s “significance as, 
not just about, a form of living in the real world.”4 If containment and consensus in the poem 
are no longer possible following ST and TCO, then the type of closed-off subject such strategies 
and discourses endorse is equally impossible to articulate. Ashbery’s “poethic” sensibility in 
RM and DDS posits a poetic subject that manifests from an originary encounter with otherness, 
the difference of another person.   
Rather tellingly, Ashbery observes in an article on Gertrude Stein that “poets, when 
they write about other artists always tend to write about themselves.”5 His comments on other 
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poets also prove similarly informative. Reviewing Stein’s Stanzas in Meditation as “The 
Impossible” in 1957, he describes it as “a hymn to possibility” whose story “is a general, all-
purpose model which each reader can adapt to fit his[/her] own set of particulars.”6  The 
combination of generality and potential specificity explains the impossibility of Stein’s text for 
Ashbery, but this impossibility “denotes a [more] complex version of difficulty – at once 
intellectual and affective, aesthetic and experiential.”7 A more complex version of difficulty 
derives from the attempt "to transmit a completely new picture of reality," the “complicatedness 
of life, [which is Stein’s] subject…its way of happening,” and which often result in "works 
[that] are highly complex and, for some, unreadable."8 Ashbery’s subject is the same, a way of 
living in the “real reality,"9 the external social world of others. In RM and DDS, difficulty, as 
the moment when the certainty associated with “(my)Self” ends and the uncertainty inherent 
in “(an)Other” begins, signals “the end of friendship/With self alone” 10  because the 
“demarcation between the textual and experiential worlds, the world of the poem and the world 
of the reader,”11 is intentionally blurred. What Ashbery is attempting in these collections is 
characterised by its “necessary difficulty” since “we feel that it is still impossible to accomplish 
the impossible,” hence the experiential effect of Stein’s Meditations, where it “seems not so 
much as if we were reading as living a rather long period of our lives with a houseful of 
people.”12 The impossible for Ashbery is collapsing the distinction between the textual and the 
social world so that poetics is thickened by a h and the resultant poems become examples of 
living in the social world of others, of acknowledging and responding to otherness but never 
appropriating or reducing it. Like Palmer, however, this is only difficult but never impossible. 
Ashbery’s solution is what he terms a “one-size-fits-all” type of poetry, a “general, all-purpose 
experience – like those stretch socks that fit all sizes.”13 However, to achieve the combination 
of generality and potential specificity and compose his own “everybody’s autobiography” 
following the example of Stein, a radical process of self-displacement is required.  
 During the period 1955-65, Ashbery is notably absent from developments in American 
poetry, more specifically the two seminal events in which the New American Poetry was 
consolidated and disseminated: the Vancouver Poetry Conference (1963) and the Berkeley 
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Poetry Conference (1965). Like his fellow New York poets, however, Ashbery’s absence is a 
further indication of his commitment to remaining outside, of remaining beyond the confines 
of all poetic programmes be they mainstream or oppositional. RM and DDS are both noticeably 
marked by, even thematically and conceptually dependent upon, absence in the sense of self-
displacement, with Ashbery removing himself as the subject by vacating the centre. He 
displaces himself to the outside of his own poetry by denying explicit autobiographical 
correspondences with the pronouns in his work, achieving what he calls in “Clepsydra” from 
RM “As graceful a kind of non-absence as either/Has a right to expect.”14 Similar to the 
reticence seen in ST, a strategic gesture calibrated to his lived experiences of the time rather 
than an imposed silencing, absence or self-displacement is an intended feature of the poetry 
and not a symptom of his exclusion. Put another way, self-displacement allows for the presence 
of “(an)Other,” thereby extending upon Ashbery’s decision in TCO to reduce singular authorial 
control and increase the reader’s capacity to respond while adding an ethical dimension to his 
poetics. By refusing to incorporate autobiographical material into his poetry, the particulars of 
his life do not reduce the generality of these collections and the reader can consequently adapt 
them to fit his/her own set of particulars. As Ashbery explains, “my biography doesn’t come 
into my poetry very much…which many readers find disturbing…whenever I try to think about 
it, I seem to draw a complete blank.”15 Drawing “a complete blank” constitutes his absence or 
self-displacement and provides the prerequisite generality for a different kind of presence, that 
of the reader who “is able to experience the poem without having to refer to outside sources to 
get the complete experience.”16 “Disturbing” can be replaced with difficult here because the 
reader is being asked to experientially inhabit these poems rather than to intellectually deduce 
their meaning or what they correspond to because they are what Palmer defines as 
“compositions[s] with nothing at [their] centre,”17 a “hollow [that] produce[s]/A kind of cave 
of winds; distribution centre/Of subordinate notions.”18                    
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(3.1) Displacement (or This Space Meant) in Rivers and Mountains  
 
In “The Bungalows” from DDS, Ashbery notes how “standing still means death, and life is 
moving on,/Moving on towards death. But sometimes standing still is also life.”19 Written 
following his permanent return to America, this concluding couplet evaluates a life defined up 
to this point by a series of departures and displacements: from his maternal grandparents’ 
Victorian house in Rochester to his father’s farm outside Sodus in 1934, to Deerfield Academy 
in 1943 and to Harvard in 1945, to New York in 1949 and Paris in 1955 before returning to 
New York in 1965. Defining Ashbery as a poet of displacement is not a negative appraisal 
because it reveals the complex negotiation of space and place occurring in his poetry at this 
time and confirms his status as a poet of the “anti-place,” the “abstract climate” epitomised by 
New York. The geographer Yi-Fu Tuan’s definition of space as general compared to the more 
specific place is useful here, ““space” is more abstract than “place” because what begins as 
undifferentiated space becomes place as we get to know it better and endow it with value.”20 
Place is “enclosed and humanised space”21 but rather than conceiving of them as mutually 
exclusive opposites, Tuan argues that they require each other for definition because “if we think 
of space as that which allows movement, then pause is place; each pause in movement makes 
it possible for [one’s] location [in space] to be transformed into place.”22 Place as “enclosed 
space” has certain connotations of containment that are anathema to Ashbery, but as his 
conclusion to “The Bungalows” makes clear, life is both “moving on” and “standing still,” a 
complex negotiation of space and place, of movement and pause. The multiple displacements 
in Ashbery’s life suggest intentional departures from the overly familiar, exemplified by the 
“anti-place” of New York and Paris “where the language spoken was not [his] own.”23 This 
further explains the preference for the generality of space over the specificity of place in his 
work.      
 While Ashbery is not an ecological poet according to the conventional definition of the 
term, RM and DDS negotiate the two interdependent objectives that J. Scott Bryson identifies 
as the motivations behind ecopoetry: “(1) to create place, making a conscious and concerted 
effort to know the non-human world around us; and (2) to value space, recognising the extent 
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to which that very world is ultimately unknowable.”24 Ashbery may not be an ecological poet, 
one who is interested in the “non-human world,” but he is an environmental poet, one 
concerned with the external environment surrounding him, in this case the social world of 
others, which is valued for being a source of irreducible otherness that is “ultimately 
unknowable.”  In terms of a “poethics,” however, where poetry is a way of living in this social 
world of others, space is more important than place since the latter involves a degree of 
appropriation, of reducing differences into categories of the same by making the unknown 
knowable, in an effort to create a stable sense of subjectivity. For Ashbery, such stability is 
problematic since it suggests containment and consensus. Subjectivity is constituted by 
sensibility; it is open toward the outside and willing to allow the differences and attendant sense 
of otherness found there to prevent it becoming autotelic. RM and DDS, therefore, are not so 
much concerned with creating places than with valuing space, providing momentary pauses in 
movement that encourage us to attend to the social environment outside us and understand our 
places within it but without possessing it as an object of comprehension, as something grasped 
in terms of complete understanding.  
Most importantly, perhaps, is the “placelessness” of RM and DDS, how the poems 
convey Ashbery’s displacement by never specifying a particular location that either he or the 
reader is familiar with. These poems provide such an elsewhere, a generalised, non-descript 
“nowhere” that can be adapted to suit his particular circumstances and, more importantly, the 
reader’s. The intention behind such an “anti-place” or “nowhere” is the “fact that somebody is 
being born; in other words at the end a person is somehow given embodiment...who was not 
there when the poem began.”25 In this sense, the poems are intended to facilitate embodiment 
because they provide a “nowhere,” which, as Palmer observes, “can [also] be read ‘now 
here.’” 26  The generality of “nowhere” becomes the more specific “now here” when 
embodiment occurs, when the poem is adapted to the particular circumstances of the poet and 
reader. That is, the “now here” is realised when the poem is made to correspond with the 
temporal (now) and spatial (here) circumstances of the poet when he writes and of the reader 
when s/he reads the poem. In what is without doubt Ashbery’s most complete repudiation of 
new critical pedagogy, the poem is posited not as an object to be analysed but an event to be 
experienced, not a representation of the given but a process of becoming in which “we are 
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somehow all aspects of a consciousness giving rise to the poem.”27 Ashbery displaces himself 
from the centre of his poems so that the reader can adapt them to his/her particular 
circumstances and in that way momentarily inhabit them as a place in space, a pause in 
movement that allows him/her to pay attention to the social environment outside him/her and 
those others within it. In addition, they provide an occasion for realising one’s “response-
ability” since they are the product of the poet’s and the reader’s interactions, the actions they 
perform as embodied subjects within the material reality of other embodied subjects as 
similarly happens in the external social world.    
  Understanding one’s spatial and temporal position, the place in space and time one 
inhabits and from which one acts, is key to any sense of embodiment. The increased capacity 
to respond in Ashbery’s poetry assumes a more ethical component when the poem is considered 
an occasion of “response-ability,” especially when Bakhtin’s theory of answerability is 
employed. RM’s title refers to the tradition of Chinese landscape scroll-painting named “shan 
shui hua,” which translates as “mountains, bodies of water, painting.” This tradition of 
landscape painting has two important features that distinguish it from the Western variant and 
make it particularly informative about what Ashbery is attempting in RM more generally. 
Firstly, “shan shui shua” is concerned with neither the mimetic representation of actual places 
nor the self-expression of the artist. Secondly, these paintings are “composed through a series 
of multiple vanishing points”28  instead of the fixed, singular perspective associated with 
Western landscape painting. These combine to produce paintings that “can be seen from a 
distance, [but] a proper appreciation requires a close viewing [since they] provide a different 
mode of visual experience accomplished only by up and down eye movements.”29 “Shan shui 
hua” paintings are not to be viewed as objects accurately depicting a place but experienced as 
a meditative space for examining the tension and harmony between the vertical and the 
horizontal, the solid and the fluid, and presence and absence. The artist is noticeably absent 
due to the lack of a singular vanishing point and the denial of self-expression because they are 
intended to facilitate a state of mind the spectator can get into to explore his/her own “now 
here”. To this end, the poems “Rivers and Mountains” and “Clepsydra” foreground the 
importance of “now here” in this collection through the extended metaphors of cartography 
and time-measurement respectively.      
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 The fact that “shan shui hua” paintings refuse the specificity of a particular place to 
achieve a generality of space means Ashbery’s use of the cartography metaphor in the 
eponymous poem is less to do with the empirical measurement of physical space than it is with 
valuing space and the attendant otherness of the environment surrounding us. In his own take 
on Olson’s “composition by field,” cartography and writing/reading become coterminous 
activities: 
 
 
 Of the trail among dry, papery leaves, 
 Gray-brown quills like thoughts 
 In the melodious but vast mass of today’s 
 Writing through fields and swamps 
 Marked, on the map, with little bunches of weeds.30  
 
 
The “papery leaves” in the terrain and the “bunches of weeds” on the map make the terrain and 
the text synonymous with one another. Additionally, “Rivers and Mountains” argues against 
causality, opening with “the assassins/Cloistered” on the “secret map” and ending with a “letter 
[placed]/On the unassassinated president’s task.” 31  By extension, the poem reverses the 
causality that would normally lead from a physical terrain to a textual reproduction of it: 
 
 
 To get to the other places you found 
 It all on paper but the land 
 Was made of paper processed 
 To look like ferns, mud or other32 (126) 
 
 
Not only are the physical terrain and the textual reproduction completely interrelated, the 
textual even precedes the physical. The terrain can be read as a physical reproduction of the 
textual, made of paper and acted on to look like ferns, mud, etc. Cartography is an act of reading 
and writing the external environment but it also involves imprinting oneself into that 
environment, “…its impact/makes a light print.”33 The singular perspective of the cartographer, 
or place-maker, imposes order on the space surrounding him/her, reduces its otherness by 
making it knowable, but this is countered by “quiet walking” which “only…ever instructs.”34 
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“Rivers and Mountains” collapses the distinction between the textual world of the poem and 
the physical world of the poet/reader to show how other oppositions are equally untenable: 
 
 
 Your plan was to separate the enemy into two groups 
 With the razor-edged mountains between. 
 It worked well on paper 
 But their camp had grown 
 To be the mountain and the map35  
 
 
While organising things into more easily manageable opposites is appealing, what is intended 
to separate the “two groups” in the real world actually confirms their inseparability. The reader 
is thus being asked to contemplate how other oppositions, such as presence and absence, space 
and place, movement and stasis, the physical and the textual, and, ultimately, the poet and the 
reader, are not only co-existent but coterminous. The “two groups” are not separated but rather 
conjoined by the “mountains between” and “the map” in the same way that “Rivers and 
Mountains” does not exist as an object separating the poet and the reader but as an event of 
meditation that brings them closer together. It is a “seminar[y] of instruction,”36 demonstrating 
how the text is a part of the physical world it is trying to depict, and by writing and reading it, 
the poet and the reader are acting in and being acted upon by that world. “Rivers and 
Mountains” is not about the physical or measurable distance between things but instead 
suggests proximity, the event of intersubjectivity during an encounter with another person. As 
he explains in “Fragment,” the “coming together of masses coincides/With that stable 
emptiness.”37 Ashbery’s poem is emptied of any particulars that might correspond with him as 
the subject (matter) but this self-displacement or absence allows for a different type of 
presence: the two masses of the embodied poet and reader “coming together” in the empty 
poem. Although these embodied subjects are located in two different physical places, two 
specific “heres,” the “Rivers and Mountains” between brings the “two groups” closer together 
in the generalised textual space.    
 “Clepsydra” is the first poem written in what is now recognisably the Ashberian style, 
a long, meandering sentence that extends over multiple lines as it introduces a theme, develops 
it further before abandoning it, digressing to something else before resuming and ultimately 
revising it. A clepsydra refers to any timepiece that measures time through the regulated flow 
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of water either into or out of a vessel, “the progression of minutes by accepting them as one 
accepts drops of water/As they form a shower,” 38  providing the rivers to the mountains 
identified above. It is a physical materialisation of a passage of time and indicates Ashbery’s 
interest in time, that is, how his sentences in “Clepsydra” provide a textual materialisation of 
time, its movements backwards and forwards: 
 
 
                                                       We hear so much 
 Of its further action that at last it seems that 
 It is we, our taking it into account rather, that are 
 The reply that prompted the question... 
 /.../ 
 To have this to be constantly coming back from –  
 Nothing more, really, than surprise at your absence 
 And preparing to continue the dialogue into 
 Those mysterious and near regions that are  
 Precisely the time of its being furthered.39  
 
 
 
He is not concerned with rhythm exactly, or any sense of linear progression, but the passage of 
time itself and how the poem can move both backward to “the reply that prompted the question” 
and project forward into unknown yet “near regions.” The “backward-movement between past 
and present...is made possible by [the poem’s] time-space conflation [and] serves as a useful 
guide to reading the poem.”40 Reading “Clepsydra” involves looking backward and forward to 
previous and subsequent qualifying statements to determine the variant meanings, with the 
effect that we are “returning to the conclusion, its premises/Undertaken before any formal 
agreement had been reached” and “the contract now/.../...drawn up and consented to as 
insurance/Against the very condition it was now so efficiently/Seeking to establish.” 41 
Conflating time and space means “Clepsydra” provides a passage of time in textual form that 
can be moved around in, depending on which theme or sentence group is concentrated on by 
the reader as s/he moves backward and forward within it. Like “Rivers and Mountains” in terms 
of space, this poem achieves a similar effect in terms of time, encouraging contemplation in 
the reader regarding the time s/he is located in. In addition, just as the terrain and the textual 
are synonymous in the eponymous poem, the temporal and the textual are coterminous in 
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“Clepsydra” because it is ultimately a passage of time whose “unstated circumference”42 is its 
beginning and ending. Ashbery displaces himself from the poem by denying any particularities 
that might correspond with his autobiography or coincide with a particular time so that his 
absence allows for the presence of the reader who can adapt the poem to suit his/her own 
particulars, providing “As graceful a kind of non-absence as either/Has a right to expect.”43 In 
this sense, the poem is inhabitable because the reader makes its “now” coincide with his/her 
own: 
 
 
 Though one must not forget that the nature of this 
 Emptiness, these previsions, 
 Was that it could only happen here, on this page held 
 Too close to be legible, sprouting erasures, except that they 
 Ended everything in the transparent sphere of what was 
 Intended only a moment ago, spiralling further out, its 
 Gesture finally dissolving in the weather.44  
 
 
 
Ashbery is asking the reader to concentrate on the “now here” of the poem, not as an object for 
new critical analysis, where attention is only given to the words on the page, but as something 
happening, an event occurring in a particular time and space. A close reading is insufficient 
because displacement is absolute: of any sense of self from the poem and its meaning into the 
posterior, “spiralling further out.” While “Rivers and Mountains” suggests that two different 
spatial locations can be brought closer together through the text, “Clepsydra” is “A moment 
that gave not only itself, but/Also the means of keeping it.”45 Being emptied of particulars that 
would make the poem coincide with only one particular moment means it can be adapted to fit 
the reader’s current circumstances, thereby providing “the means of keeping it[s]” original 
“now” by making it coincide with the other “nows” of subsequent readings.  
 “Rivers and Mountains” and “Clepsydra” have the characteristics of both mountains 
and rivers since, as material texts, they exist as static objects whose content does not change 
and, as events, they allow for multiple “now heres” to occupy the poem and make change a 
constitutive feature of their meaning. Like the “shan shui hua” aesthetics discussed earlier, they 
encourage meditation on the tension between stasis and fluidity in the reader. In addition, like 
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a map and a clepsydra, they are also designed to help orient the reader in space and time 
respectively, to make him/her contemplate his/her spatial-temporal position and in doing so 
adapt the vacated, empty poem to suit his/her circumstances, thereby inhabiting it. Absence in 
“Rivers and Mountains” and “Clepsydra” means “that it could only happen [now] here, on this 
page,” that is, the empty, vacated poem provides an opportunity for the poet and the reader to 
become embodied, to be subjects who inhabit a particular space and time and who are 
responsible for the actions performed there that give rise to the poem. The text will always have 
a certain stasis due to its material nature and the reader’s inability to literally change its content 
but when read as a “one-size-fits-all” type of poetry, the absence of the poet allows for the 
presence of the reader who can adapt it to fit his/her own set of particulars and, therefore, 
radically change its meaning. The poet and the reader exist as embodied subjects who inhabit 
the “now-here” of the poem as event and in doing so bring two different and distant spatial-
temporal locations closer together, into greater proximity. This signals the emergence of 
Ashbery’s “poethics,” how his poems allow for, rather than just discuss the possibility of, an 
encounter between “(my)Self” and “(an)Other” to ensure they are a way of, not just about, 
living in the “real reality,” the social world of other embodied subjects.    
 
 
(3.2) The Poem as Event 
 
Toward the end of “Clepsydra,” Ashbery poses a question that reveals his intention in RM: to 
collapse the distinction between the textual world of the poem and the experiential world of 
the poet and the reader, “Why shouldn’t all climate and all music be equal/Without 
growing?.../…/…because everything is relative.” 46  This question is central to TP, where 
Ashbery creates poems informed by the Cagean model for composing texts determined by 
changes in the environment conditioning them, but in RM it proposes the “law of placement:” 
how the unique position I occupy in time and space conditions my experiences. Ashbery’s 
relativistic position means that everything is relative to a particular framework or perspective 
that is equally valid since no standpoint is privileged above all others. The only difference 
between “climate” and “music” according to this logic is a question not of absolute, essential 
qualities but one of axiological judgement. Differentiating between the noises that surround us 
in our immediate, everyday environment and the noises that are given aesthetic value is a 
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question of what we pay attention to and what we consequently include and exclude from the 
category “music” based on individual standards of taste and personalised cultural values. But 
if “everything is relative,” as Ashbery suggests, then such habituated practices of categorising 
harmony, rhythm, tonality and structure as “music” and noise, dissonance, chance and atonality 
as belonging to the climate, the particular conditions of the environment surrounding us, are 
no longer credible. Making each perspective equally valid obviously builds on the self-
displacement discussed earlier, yet while it is immensely empowering it also involves certain 
obligations. Bakhtin’s first philosophy, particularly his argument concerning “Being-as-
event”47 and the “answerable act”48 in TPA, is crucial here. Furthermore, his use of aesthetic 
experience to conceptualise his first philosophy makes him especially useful for understanding 
how the ethical commitments involved in creating and interpreting a poem according to one’s 
axiological judgements are readily transferrable into how one interacts with the social world as 
an embodied, ethical subject amongst others.  
 For Bakhtin, being is an event, one that occurs according to specific spatial-temporal 
conditions. It is constituted by the “actually performed [answerable] act,” the “actualisation of 
a decision” that exists in “its actual, unique factuality” as an act performed by an embodied 
subject rather than something “contemplated from outside or thought of theoretically.”49 As 
Ashbery insists it “could only happen [now] here, on this page,” Bakhtin similarly asserts that 
“I, too exist…actually – in the whole and assume the obligation to say this word.”50 This is the 
point of origin of the answerable act, which he explains using the “fact of my non-alibi in 
Being,”51 and reveals the reason behind Ashbery’s emphasis on the spatial-temporal position 
one inhabits when writing and reading a poem in “Rivers and Mountains” and “Clepsydra.” 
According to Bakhtin: 
 
 
I, too, participate in Being in a once-occurrent and never-repeatable manner: I occupy 
a place in once-occurrent Being that is unique and never-repeatable, a place that cannot 
be taken by anyone else…In the given once-occurrent point where I am now located, 
no one else has ever been located in the once occurrent time and once-occurent 
space…That which can be done by me can never be done by anyone else. The 
uniqueness or singularity of present-on-hand Being is compellently obligatory.52    
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The sense of answerability proposed here helps explain the emergence of “response-ability” in 
Ashbery’s poetry, no longer just the increased capacity for the reader to respond as seen in the 
heteronomic poems of TCO but the obligation to do so from the unique spatial-temporal 
position s/he inhabits and the necessity to be answerable for those responses. Bakhtin’s “non-
alibi in being” is particularly useful to understanding how “response-ability” can be achieved 
in poetry because he conceptualises it using aesthetic experience. The fact that “everyone 
occupies a unique and never-repeatable place [means] any being is once-occurrent”53 and 
his/her axiological judgements are, consequently, informed by the spatial-temporal position 
s/he inhabits. In aesthetic experience, the spatial, the temporal and the valuative moments are 
all “consolidated or “bodied” here…all are correlated with a concrete centre of values.”54 In 
terms of an aesthetic event, a way of, not just about, living in the “real reality,” the “actual 
world of the performed act,” there is a “contraposition of I and the other”55 because: 
 
 
Life knows two value centres that are fundamentally and essentially different, yet are 
correlated with each other: myself and the other; and it is around these centres that all 
of the concrete moments of Being are distributed and arranged. One and the same object 
(identical in its content) is a moment of Being that presents itself differently from the 
valuative standpoint when correlated with me or when correlated with another.56 
 
 
Ashbery’s self-displacement allows for the placement of another in the “now-here” of the 
poem. Considering the poem as an object means the poet and the reader are situated outside of 
and separated by the text, whereas in the poem as event, the poet and the reader function as the 
contrapositions of I and other with the potential for these value centres to be brought closer 
together. As Ashbery explains in “Clepsydra:” 
 
 
 In this way any direction taken was the right one, 
 Leading first to you, and through you to 
 Myself that is beyond you and which is the same thing as 
         space, 
 That is the stammering vehicles that remain unknown, 
 Eating the sky in all sincerity because the difference 
 Can never be made up: therefore, why not examine the 
         distance?57 
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He is emphasising a crucial feature also found in Bakhtin’s notion of being as “an event that is 
shared...a simultaneity...always a co-being”58 but most significant perhaps is the insistence on 
difference and distance. While the poet and the reader can be brought closer together by 
inhabiting the poem and making it coincide with their respective spatial-temporal positions, 
complete convergence in terms of identification should be avoided. In other words, only 
proximity should be sought after.  If the poem is to articulate a sense of self it must first engage 
with you, that is, “(my)Self” must encounter “(an)Other.”  
“A Blessing in Disguise” elaborates this need “…to tell/Of this in a way, that knowing 
you may be drawn to me.”59 Ashbery’s verse, therefore, is projective in an alternative way to 
Olson’s theory in that he projects himself into the future of subsequent readings, “beyond [the] 
you” of the current reading, into “now-heres” yet to be realised, waiting for another reader to 
inhabit the poem and make it coincide with his/her spatial-temporal position, thereby 
completing the contraposition of I and other. First and second-person pronouns are integral 
because they provide the positions to be inhabited by the poet and the reader, “…the chance to 
know you, to sing of me/Which are you……/…/…you always tell me I am you,/…/I prefer 
“you” in the plural, I want “you,”/You must come to me.” 60  Due to Ashbery’s self-
displacement as the subject of his poems, the “I” of the poem can be inhabited by the “you” of 
another person during subsequent readings. There is no singular other to whom the poem is 
addressed but ““you” in the plural, the innumerable, unknown others who will read the poem 
in the future. He blames drawing a blank in terms of the pronouns in his poems on not having 
“a very strong sense of my own self”61 but there is profound ethical significance to what he is 
doing. Any sense of self can only be accessed and articulated by engaging with another, the “I” 
needs “you.” But simply acknowledging the importance of outside influence, the uncertainty 
and ineffability of “you” that challenges the certainty of “I,” is no longer sufficient. The outside, 
the otherness and difference of “(an)Other,” must be allowed to inhabit the inside, thereby 
constituting “(my)Self.” Ashbery is uncharacteristically explicit about this in “Clepsydra:”      
 
 
                                                                                       I am 
 Not speaking of a partially successful attempt to be 
 Opposite; anybody at all can read that page, it has only 
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 To be thrust in front of him. I mean now something much 
                   broader, 
 The sum total of all the private aspects that can ever 
 Become legible in what is outside62 
 
 
“I” and “you” are not mere opposites and his poems are not intended to be read simply as 
addresses to an unnamed other. That would be too easy. Ashbery’s “you” is a source of 
irreducible otherness because of the “private aspects” inherent in another person, the individual 
experiences unknown and ultimately unknowable to him that each reader brings to his text:  
 
 
I see myself in this totality… 
/…/ 
And even this crumb of life I also owe to you 
For being so close as to seal out knowledge of that other 
Voluntary life63  
 
 
In the first explicit indication of a “poethics of proximity” in his work, the first and second-
person pronouns are central. The closeness of another person brings what is outside the self 
inside or put another way, the otherness and difference of “you” constitutes, or gives life to, 
the “I.” Being indebted to another person affirms Levinas’ idea of “sensibility” discussed 
earlier, how subjectivity is this openness toward and subjection to another person, but 
proximity indicates ethical subjectivity, or intersubjectivity. Proximity is crucial to the poem 
as event, the occasion for an encounter between the poet and the reader as embodied subjects 
in different and distant spatial-temporal positions that foregrounds intersubjectivity because 
the poet is affected by the reader’s interpretation and the reader is affected by the poet’s 
composition. In this sense, the poem as event is informed by a “poethics of proximity” because 
it is a way of and not just about living in the social world of other embodied subjects.      
 “Into the Dusk-Charged Air” attests to the poem as an event to be shared. It is a 
procedural poem: the subject or the object of each sentence is a river and is enjambed so that 
each line contains one:  
 
 
 Leaves fall into the Conneticut as it passes 
 Underneath. The Liffey is full of sewage, 
 Like the Seine, but unlike 
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 The brownish-yellow Dordogne. 
 Mountains hem in the Colorado 
 And the Oder is very deep, almost 
 As deep as the Congo is wide.64 
 
 
However, it also engages with the complex negotiation of presence and absence that results 
from Ashbery’s self-displacement to allow for the placement of another and is, therefore, more 
than just a taxonomy of rivers because it denies singular authority in favour of multi-
centredness. First published in Locus Solus in 1962, a journal of experimental poetry edited by 
Ashbery, Kenneth Koch and James Schuyler that contained numerous collaborations between 
them, it makes the implicit connotations of collaboration within the poem more explicit. The 
contrapositions of I and other are the value centres involved in the poem as a multi-centred 
event of collaboration, thus using aesthetic experience to conceptualise an encounter between 
“(my)Self” and “(an)Other” and making a “poethics of proximity” more apparent. Ashbery’s 
poem confirms David Huntsperger’s definition of the procedural poem as being characterised 
by “the tension between volition and constraint.”65 Throughout the first stanza, the procedure 
is adhered to but he momentarily deviates from it in the second stanza by not including a river 
in each line and using the second-person pronoun as the subject of the sentence: 
 
 
                                             ...Crested birds 
 Watch the Ucalyali go 
 Through dreaming night. You cannot stop 
 The Yenisei. And afterwards 
 /.../ 
 A particle of mud in the Neckar 
 Does not turn it black. You cannot 
 Like the Saskatchewan, nor refuse 
 The meandering Yangtze, unleash66 
 
 
Ashbery is absent as the subject of the poem because the formal procedure is prioritised over 
spontaneous composition and expression but is present due to his agency in determining the 
procedure and in the decisions to either adhere to or deviate from it. A procedural poem 
“enables prosthetic practices of writing” 67  because the procedure replaces spontaneous 
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composition while still extending the poet’s capability, thereby achieving both absence and 
presence. The poet’s limited vocabulary and the rule of one river per line completely demystify 
the occasion of writing. Consequently, what seem to matter are the circumstances informing 
“Into the Dusk-Charged Air” and whether the reader can identify them or not. The unnamed 
other “cannot stop” the flow of the poem and Ashbery denies the potential for aesthetic value 
since “you cannot/like” it. A procedural poem epitomises the multi-centredness of 
collaboration in that it requires the poet to firstly determine a procedure and secondly for the 
reader to identify it. They require the "response-ability" of the reader to realise it. S/He must 
identify the procedure in order for it to be a procedural poem, otherwise it is just another 
conventional free-verse composition. The reader is asked to “retrace...the process of the poem’s 
generation,” to not only participate in creating the poem’s subject but to also “be conscious of 
participating.” 68 The procedure makes the conditions of the poem’s composition immediately 
discernible and the reader must only identify this procedure in order to understand the 
circumstances conditioning the poem. Ashbery, therefore, makes the reader acknowledge that 
the poem’s composition is conditioned by unique circumstances that s/he can never change or 
completely appreciate; they can be identified but will ultimately always be different to and 
distant from the circumstances informing the reader’s interpretation. “Into the Dusk-Charged 
Air” relies on collaboration between the poet and the reader, making it a multi-centred event 
in which the interpretation is equally as important as the composition because if the reader does 
not identify the procedure then it is not a procedural poem.  
  
 
(3.3) “This Leaving-Out Business” in “The Skaters” 
 
Organised into four sections that, respectively, establish an argument, elucidate through 
contextualisation, deepen understanding and finally recapitulate, providing an extended 
meditation on autobiography, and is without the type of disjunctiveness seen already with only 
a sparing use of collage, “The Skaters” should be a relatively easy, or at least easier, poem to 
grasp. Such expectations, however, are both anticipated and negated by Ashbery who makes 
the present and presence the subject of his poem, “calling attention” to the “now heres” of 
composition and interpretation, which “Isn’t the same thing as explaining,”69  that is, not 
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clarifying how the poem was written and how it might be read. “The Skaters” is probably 
Ashbery’s noisiest and most densely populated poem, admitting at the beginning that “These 
decibels/Are a kind of flagellation, an entity of sound/Into which being enters and is apart.”70 
The innumerable intertexts and non-/literary allusions make it difficult to determine who is 
speaking at any one time, but this sense of other voices being present, or the presence of others, 
is heightened by Ashbery’s “dim intuition that I am that other “I” with which we began.”71  He 
creates a poem that is “all there and available to the reader,” so s/he will “be able to experience 
the poem without having to refer to outside sources to get the complete experience.”72 In this 
regard, “The Skaters” confronts us with the complete failure of the reading strategy of selecting 
key lines and passages, “treating these as interpretative centres around which to organise the 
[otherwise] heterogeneous materials” and thus reducing the poem “to a skeletal structure of 
points that yield most readily to a particular interpretative orientation.”73 While there is no way 
to decide how the poem should be read and, therefore, no single reading will suffice, “there is 
error/In so much precision,” 74  meaning that paying close attention to decontextualized 
quotations as the basis for a complete interpretation is how “The Skaters” should not be read, 
which:  
 
 
               …is a portion of the subject of this poem 
 Which is in the form of falling snow: 
 That is, the individual flakes are not essential to the 
         importance of the whole’s becoming so much of a truism 
 That their importance is again called into question, to be 
         denied further out, and again and again like this. 
 Hence, neither the importance of the individual flake, 
 Nor the importance of the whole impression of the storm, if 
         it has any75 
 
 
"The Skaters" consists almost entirely of others' voices, it is constitutively informed by the 
presence of others. Echoing "Some Trees" in the image of a "varied assortment of trees,"76 
"their merely being there/Means something." Ashbery declares that “Everything is trash!”77 
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like the discarded objects in Cornell and the “garbage” in TCO, capable of being (re)made 
meaningful once a particular type of attention, one not in the service of explanation, is paid to 
it. The poem makes "a new kind/Of demand" on the reader because it is "not new/In the sense 
of the next one in an infinite series/But, as it were, pre-existing or pre-seeming," 78  it 
complicates the notion of the singular, original poetic utterance and the type of poetic subject 
this normally gives voice to.  
This element of secondhandness points to the business aspect of “The Skaters:” 
 
 
This leaving-out business. On it hinges the very importance 
       of what’s novel 
Or autocratic, or dense or silly. It is as well to call attention 
To it by exaggeration, perhaps. But calling attention 
Isn’t the same thing as explaining… 
/…/ 
                                                 …Except to say that the 
        carnivorous 
Way of these lines is to devour their own nature, leaving 
Nothing but a bitter impression of absence, which as we 
        know involves presence, but still. 
Nevertheless these are fundamental absences79  
 
 
Once the presence of other voices is acknowledged, the fundamental absence of Ashbery as 
the original source of the text is made apparent, he is the “professional exile.”80 Yet this still 
involves presence in the sense of the selections he has made when writing the poem, what he 
has paid attention to, such that there is “so much snow, but it is littered with waste and ashes,”81 
traces of Ashbery who is absent but also present. His absence allows for a different kind of 
presence, the presence of others in terms of different voices but also the other “I”s, or eyes, the 
different perspectives of others who inhabit their unique spatial-temporal position as embodied 
subjects:  
 
 
 The figure 8 is a perfect symbol 
 Of the freedom to be gained in this kind of activity. 
 The perspective lines of the barn are another and different 
        kind of example 
 (viz. “Rigg’s Farm, near Aysgarth, Wensleydale,” or the 
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        “Sketch at Norton”) 
 In which we escape ourselves – putrefying mass of 
        prevarications etc. –  
 In remaining close to the limitations imposed.82  
 
 
“Rigg’s Farm…” and “Sketch…” suggest landscape paintings, viewing an environment from 
another person’s perspective, but Ashbery reaffirms the sense of absence and presence, “The 
lines that draw nearer together are said to “vanish.”/The point where they meet is their 
vanishing point.”83 The vanishing point is where the perspectives lines converge and is directly 
opposite the viewer’s eye. Ashbery is clearly punning with “eye” and “I” here, with the 
contrapositions of the viewer’s eye and the vanishing point suggesting the contrapositions of 
“I” and that other “I,” or you. Ashbery seems to be suggesting that rather than continue to create 
false impressions of how things might be, we can escape our singular perspective by 
acknowledging that the “limitations [it] impose[s]” are actually opportunities for encounter 
between “I” and “you,” between different and distant perspectives. Phonetically, “I” and “you” 
are “entit[ies] of sound/Into which being enters, and is apart.”84 Ashbery’s self-displacement, 
therefore, is to allow for the placement of the reader who becomes a part of the poem but 
remains “apart,” different to and distant from the poet because his/her perspective is informed 
by his/her unique spatial-temporal position.   
 Of all the different voices included in “The Skaters,” the voyager and “island dweller” 
Robin Crusoe’s is the most important because Ashbery uses it to encourage a particular 
misreading. Following his description of the desert island in the castaway episode, Part III, of 
being ““Frei Aber Einsam” (Free but Alone), the ensuing passage appears to be a thinly veiled 
autobiographical account of his expatriate years in Paris, in a “middle-class apartment” where 
he “feel[s] cut off from the life in the streets.”85 Some of the most astute Ashbery critics are 
misled by the juxtaposition between obvious fictional constructions and apparent 
autobiography. For example, David Lehman reads the poem as a “latter-day equivalent of T. 
S. Eliot’s The Waste Land…[offering] a vision of urban alienation, a portrait of a ‘professional 
exile’” that relies on whether or not Ashbery “ever [actually] lived in a slum” or a middle-class 
apartment;86  David Shapiro argues that the “snow is not only the snow of evocation and 
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childhood scenes, the farmyard perhaps where Ashbery lived as a child, but also the February 
snow of the present time of the poem;”87 and Shoptaw suggests that through the “four chapters, 
corresponding roughly to the four seasons of childhood, youth, maturity, and old age,” a faint 
autobiographical design can be traced outlining “Ashbery’s snowbound childhood in upstate 
New York, his ‘voyage’ to Cambridge and New York City, his coming of age in Paris, and an 
imagined, Prufrockian old age.” 88  More specifically, the appeal is to read the passages 
following his description of the desert island as authentic autobiography after he admits that 
“In reality of course the middle-class apartment I live in is nothing like a desert island,”89 
suggesting the intertext is intended to correspond with Ashbery’s own experiences as an 
expatriate. An autobiographical reading of “The Skaters” is further encouraged by the 
proliferation of “disarmingly direct first-person speakers”90 and Ashbery’s insistence that: 
 
 
 I mean this. Through the years 
 You have approached an inventory 
 And it is now that tomorrow 
 Is going to be the climax of your casual 
 Statement about yourself, begun 
 So long ago in humility and false quietude.91  
 
 
However, Ashbery is only “calling attention” to the act of autobiography, which “Isn’t the same 
thing as explaining” a particular life, compiling an inventory of the events that constitute a life. 
Autobiography points to the business aspect of Ashbery’s “leaving-out,” the need to account 
for oneself, for the actions one has performed. It is an instance of self-representation but 
Ashbery’s self-displacement to allow for the placement of the reader means it is the reader, the 
“other I” who must account for him/herself, who must be answerable for his/her interpretation. 
The content of autobiography is irrelevant, as Ashbery questions “How much of any one of us 
survives?”92 but the act itself matters, of authoring a self as the writer and the reader of the 
poem who must be answerable for the composition and interpretation respectively, thereby 
suggesting the possibility of authoring a responsive and responsible ethical subject through an 
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encounter between the contrapositions of “I” and “you,” between “(my)Self” and that “other 
I,” “(an)Other.”              
 
 
(3.4) “Begin[ning] Again:” Reading as Writing in The Double Dream of       
Spring 
 
Developing on the understanding of the poem as an event between the contrapositions of I and 
other, DDS contains numerous references to the idea of dwelling and what Ashbery identifies 
as “a kind of signature poem,” “Soonest Mended” being a “One Size Fits All Confessional 
Poem” in the style of “what Gertrude Stein called ‘everybody’s autobiography.’”93 Similar to 
adapting the “now-here” of poems in RM to the particular circumstances of the poet and reader, 
Ashbery suggests in DDS that his poems can be inhabited, with the result that the occasion of 
reading becomes equally as important as the occasion of writing because the reader occupies 
the poem as an embodied subject who must be answerable for his interpretation in the same 
way the poet is answerable for his initial composition. To this end, the opening poem, “The 
Task,” evokes Stein’s 1926 lecture “Composition as Explanation,” which proposes that 
composition is repeatedly reconstituted through subsequent acts of interpretation. Ashbery’s 
opening line, “They are preparing to begin again:”94 uses the colon to suggest that the poems 
to follow will serve to explain his version of Stein’s approach to composition as interpretation: 
 
 
 Beginning  again  and again  and  again  explaining  composition  and time is a natural 
thing. It is  understood by this time that everything is the same except composition and 
time, composition and the time of the composition and the time in the composition.95  
 
 
Stein’s distinction between the “time of” and the “time in” the composition is important 
because it signals the two occasions of composition, the time of the initial composition by the 
poet and the time of the reader’s composition as s/he interprets the text and makes it coincide 
with his/her particular circumstances. These two occasions will always be different to and 
distant from each other because they correspond with the spatial-temporal positions inhabited 
by the poet and the reader. Everything is the same because “nothing changes from generation 
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to generation except the thing seen” but “what is seen depends upon how everybody is doing 
everything.”96 As a material object, the text does not change but how it is seen does, how it is 
perceived, described and explained, which for Stein is the act of composition. Composition as 
explanation or interpretation occurs in what Robert Duncan identifies in “Rites of 
Participation” as “between there and here or then and now,”97 a “now here” belonging solely 
to neither the poet (there and then) nor the reader (here and now) because it is between the 
spatial-temporal positions they inhabit, a shared space of collaboration. While the text itself 
does not change, the different spatial-temporal positions inhabited by the poet and the reader 
make “the thing we are looking at very different and...[this] makes a composition.”98 Extending 
this logic, my interpretation of the text will be different from any other person’s, therefore like 
the poet, I must be answerable for my composition due to the “fact of my non-alibi in Being” 
as a reader, that is, no one else can be answerable for it.  
DDS is also “poethic” because how the poems are written and designed to be read 
constitute a way of living in the real world in accordance with Bakhtin’s theory of being as an 
on-going event that is shared. Stein reaffirms the implicit “poethics” in composition as 
interpretation: 
 
 
the thing seen by every one living in the living they are doing, they are the composing  
of the composition  that at the  time they are  living is  the composition  of  the time in 
which they are living. It is that that makes living a thing they are doing.99        
 
 
Conflating Bakhtin’s notion of performative actions and Stein’s idea of composition as 
interpretation results in the performative act of authoring, which has pronounced “poethical” 
importance because it refers to both the act of authoring a text and the act of authoring a self 
through the performance of particular actions for which one is answerable. The classic 
representative figure of “Everyman”100 in “The Task” suggests DDS has a double function in 
the form of an allegory that creates the ethical meaning of the collection: 
 
 
 I plan to stay here a little while 
 For these are moments only, moments of insight, 
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 And there are reaches to be attained,101 
 
 
The “one size fits all,” or what Ashbery terms character, poems of DDS provide “moments of 
insight” into the event of being using the analogy of authoring, how the poet and the reader can 
inhabit the space (“here”) and time (“a little while”) of the poem, writing an embodied subject 
into existence through the performative act of authoring. A “poethics” is apparent because 
“they are the composing of the composition that at the time they are living is the composition 
of the time in which they are living.”102 Or put another way, the commitments involved in 
writing and reading that Ashbery foregrounds make these activities part of everyday living, 
how we perform actions as embodied subjects for which we are obligated to be answerable, 
how we encounter others and realise our “response-ability.” 
 “Soonest Mended” specifically provides the “one size fits all” type of poem discussed 
already. As the title suggests, one primary component of the scenario must be erased so the 
other can be foregrounded, “Least Said, Soonest Mended.” Accordingly, Ashbery removes the 
particulars that would make the poem correspond solely with him as the subject, until it 
becomes “About [the everyday question shared by everyone of] how to receive this latest piece 
of information./Was it information?…/… [and] our little problems (so they begin to seem),/Our 
daily quandary about food and the rent and bills to be paid?”103 In the authentically personal 
and autobiographical confessional poem, the emphasis is on self-disclosure but, he asks, aren’t 
“we rather acting this out/For someone else’s benefit.”104 He further argues how:   
 
 
It was still a shock when, almost a quarter of a century later, 
The clarity of the rules dawned on you for the first time. 
They were the players, and we who had struggled at the game 
Were merely spectators, though subject to its vicissitudes 
And moving with it out of the tearful stadium,105  
 
 
Self-disclosure according to the standards of confessional poetry is intended to move the 
reader, to emotionally and/or intellectually affect him/her in a certain way by having him/her 
identify with the experiences disclosed by the poet. Quite unlike Ashbery’s approach, 
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explained in “Years of Indiscretion,” where “It’s all there./[because] These are things offered 
to your participation.”106 But as Ashbery suggests: 
 
 
 This is what you wanted to hear, so why 
 Did you think of listening to something else? We are all 
        talkers 
 It is true, but underneath the talk lies 
 The moving and not wanting to be moved, the loose  
 meaning, untidy and simple like a threshing floor.107 
 
 
Communication should not just facilitate uncertainty reduction to reaffirm what is already 
known since beneath the content is the more important function of communication, the “loose 
meaning” that is at once simple but apparently disorganised, indeterminate and disrupted, in a 
word, difficult. The sense of “moving and not wanting to be moved” is similar to the 
pronounced uncertainty and indecision at the end of the poem, “For this is action, this not being 
sure, this careless/Preparing…/Making ready to forget, and always coming back/To the 
mooring of starting out.”108 The compulsion to talk and the attendant need to always begin 
again make uncertainty and indecision important actions because they suggest not-knowing, or 
at least demarcate the limits of knowing, resulting in “a kind of fence-sitting/raised to the level 
of an esthetic ideal” because “meaning could be cast aside some day/When it had been 
outgrown” and “the promise of learning/Is a delusion.”109 As Ashbery further explains in “For 
John Clare,” “There is/so much to be said, and on the surface of it very little gets said.”110 
Instead, “Underneath the talk lies” this not-knowing, therefore, communication refers to 
something prior to information transference and hermeneutic disclosure. In this sense, the least 
said the better because what matters is not simply the content of the poem but the occasion it 
provides. As a “one-size fits all” poem, “The being of our sentences, in the climate that fostered 
them,/[are] Not ours to own, like a book, but to be with, and sometimes/To be without,”111 such 
that “Soonest Mended” is “fence-sitting/raised to the level of an [“aesthethic”] ideal” because 
it is shared between the poet and the reader and functions, as Ashbery explains in “Summer,” 
“just as life is divided up/Between you and me, and among all the others out there.”112 Just as 
                                                      
106
 John Ashbery, “Years of Indiscretion,” CP, 205. 
107
 Ashbery, “Soonest Mended,” CP, 185. 
108
 Ibid. 
109
 Ibid. 
110
 John Ashbery, “For John Clare,” CP, 198. 
111
 Ashbery, “Soonest Mended,” CP, 185.  
112
 John Ashbery, “Summer,” CP, 186. 
  
 
114 
 
living is an event of co-being, the interactions of embodied subjects, so too the poem is a shared 
event between the contrapositions of I and other embodied by the poet and the reader as they 
perform acts of composition and/as interpretation for which they are singularly answerable 
from the different and distant spatial-temporal positions each inhabits. To reiterate Stein, living, 
then, “is the composition of the time in which they are living.”  
 
 
(3.5) Ash(es)bery: Absence and/as Presence 
 
Two recurrent ideas in DDS make the purpose behind Ashbery’s self-displacement as the 
subject of his poems and his simultaneous effort to encourage the placement of the reader in 
his stead more apparent. Firstly, “dwelling” appears in a number of different guises, such as 
the “house, a parting of the ways”113 in “Song,” the “building...on the edge of the street”114 in 
“For John Clare,” “Popeye’s apartment” 115  in “Farm Implements and Rutabagas in a 
Landscape,” “the great urban centres, with/Their office buildings and populations, at the centre 
of which/We live our lives”116 in “French Poems,” the “house in which you may wish to live”117 
in “Years of Indiscretion,” the “house”118 in “Parergon” and the “rectangular shapes”119 in 
“The Bungalows.” In addition, home also refers to a place of dwelling and belonging, as in 
“Soonest Mended,” “the avatars/Of our conforming to the rules and living/Around the home 
have made – well, in a sense, “good citizens of us;”120 in “Variations, Calypso and Fugue on a 
Theme of Ella Wheeler Wilcox,” “Now that once again I have achieved home/I shall forbear 
all further urge to roam;”121 and in “Definition of Blue,” “the permanent tug that used to be its 
notion of ‘home.’”122 However, Ashbery is “a vigorously homeless poet…[who] tracks the 
mental journey of our search for home even though he is less than confident that such thinking 
is enough to summon us into dwelling.”123 The numerous places of inhabitation mentioned in 
DDS are not dwellings per se, they are not intended as places that engender familiarity and 
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identification with all the negative connotations of being in-habit, which explains the second 
recurring feature of the collection. There are numerous references to limits, such as “the barriers 
of that other”124 in “Spring Day;” “living on the margin”125 in “Soonest Mended;” “growing in 
that knowledge/We may perhaps remain here, cautious yet free/On the edge”126 in “Evening in 
the Country;” the “margins that care and are swept up again like branches/Into actual 
closeness”127 in “Sunrise in Suburbia;” the “thresholds/Above the tide of others”128 in “The 
Bungalows;” and the “central perimeter/Our imagination’s orbit, Other words” 129  in 
“Fragment;” as well as what potentially occurs there, such as occasions of “closeness”130 in 
“Song,” of sociability in “The Chateau Hardware,” “And turning out the way I am, turning out 
to greet you,”131 and of contact in “Sortes Vergilianae,” “It is the nature of these people to 
embrace each other.”132  
Ashbery’s concurrent emphases on places of inhabitation and the function of limits as 
places of potential contact, closeness and sociability suggest DDS is concerned with the 
potential when inhabiting such limits. If difficulty marks the furthest reach of poetic meaning, 
then it too signals a limit, a place of potential contact, closeness and sociability. The difficulty 
of this collection derives from the momentariness of meaning, how it provides “moments 
only…of insight” as Ashbery eschews certainty, preferring to reduce the immediate relevance 
of meaning in favour of deferring it further since the poems are ultimately going to change, 
“Tomorrow would alter the sense of what had already been learned/That the learning process 
is extended in this way, so that from this standpoint/None of us ever graduates from college.”133 
This is intended to make the reader aware that s/he is constantly reaching the limit of meaning, 
as he explains in “The Bungalows:” 
 
 
For only you could watch yourself so patiently from afar 
/…/ 
                                                            …always on the way, 
For it all builds up into something, meaningless or 
       meaningful 
As architecture, because planned and then abandoned when 
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       completed, 
To live afterwards, in sunlight and shadow, a certain amount 
       of years. 
Who cares what was there before? There is no going  
       back,134  
 
 
The effect on the reader is that s/he is at the limit of meaning, “Waiting for something to be 
over before [s/he] is forced to notice it.”135 Using the almost pastoral idyll of “Growing up 
under the shade of friendly trees, with our/brothers all around” in “Variations, Calypso and 
Fugue…,” Ashbery immediately dismisses any rooted sense of belonging by admitting that “all 
good things must come to an end, and so one must move forward/Into the space left by one’s 
conclusions.”136 Stasis is denied as the poet moves beyond his conclusions into uncertainty, on 
to another different topic: 
 
 
       …I can tell you all 
 About freedom that has turned into a painting; 
 The other is more difficult, though prompt – in fact 
 A little too prompt: therein lies the difficulty.137  
 
 
Poems that consistently confront the reader with the limits of meaning, whether it is deferred 
further or denied because the poem will inevitably change, have the constant effect of 
“begin[ning] again,” or as he phrases it in “Sunrise in Suburbia:” 
 
 
 A blank chart of each day moving into the premise of difficult 
         visibility 
 And which is nowhere, the urge to nowhere, 
 To retract that statement, sharply, within the next few  
         minutes. 
 For it is as though it turns you back,138      
  
 
Despite his committed self-displacement as the autobiographical subject of his poems in RM 
and DDS, we still encounter Ashbery but as an absent presence; the “Ashes” O’Hara uses to 
refer to him in “At the Old Place” suggests the remains of either a physical body or the remnants 
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of a tangible object no longer present. Ashbery is present in “The Skaters” in RM, “And so 
much snow, but it is to be littered with waste and ashes,”139 and in “Rural Objects,” “Mountain 
ash mindlessly dropping berries: to whom is all this?”140 in DDS. However, the dichotomy of 
absence and presence, or an absence that allows for different kind of presence, differentiates 
him from the other prominent example of self-displacement in innovative American poetry of 
the period, Olson’s “Projective Verse.” While Ashbery’s attitude toward reading as a further 
act of writing reaffirms Olson’s practice of “composing as though verse was to have the reading 
its writing involved” and both consider poetry a way of living in the real world because it 
“involves a stance toward reality outside a poem as well as a new stance towards the reality of 
the poem itself,”141 Ashbery’s “leaving out business” is more radical than that theorised in 
Olson’s “Projective Verse” as the “getting rid of the lyrical interference of the individual as 
ego.”142 The individual might be displaced from the poem as ego but the poet projects himself 
into it instead as a physiological presence through the dictates of breath. Darren Wershler-
Henry reveals how the typewriter is key to Olson, “functioning as a tool [or prosthetic device] 
with which to restore to both the writer and reader the sense of the poet’s presence in this 
finished work, a presence [normally] stripped away by the conversion of manuscript to the 
printed page.” 143  Due to its immediacy, the typewriter makes accurate notation possible, 
recording “exactly the breath, the pauses, the suspensions even of syllables, the juxtapositions 
even of parts of phrases which [the poet] intends.”144 Because the breath of the poet determines 
the typographical arrangement of the poem on the page, s/he also “indicate[s] how [s/]he would 
want any reader, silent or otherwise, to voice his[/her] work.”145 This is quite at odds with 
Ashbery’s “one size fits all” poetry. While he might confess to writing in Olson’s style, “It’s 
nothing that [he’s] ever codified into a practice,”146 the purpose behind his self-displacement 
is to encourage the placement of the reader as he uses “fundamental absences” to allow for a 
different type of presence, unlike Olson, whose presence is inscribed according to the principles 
of "Projective Verse." 
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 In “Definition of Blue,” Ashbery provides his most explicit statement about the 
treatment of the individual in modern poetry, or poetry since “the close of the nineteenth 
century,”147 arguing that: 
 
 
 In our own time, mass practices have sought to submerge the 
         personality 
 By ignoring it, which has caused it instead to branch out in all 
         directions148  
 
 
According to this logic, Olson’s “projective verse,” characterised by the “one steady, intense 
line,”149 would be a continuation of such “mass practices” since the absence of the individual 
as ego means it is present in an even more immediate form. Despite the radical formal 
innovations of the period, “there is no point in looking to imaginative new methods/Since all 
of them are in constant use,” they amount to little more than “’packaging’” for Ashbery.150 
Ashbery practices the “imaginative new methods” but pushes “them further”151 to achieve 
something altogether more radical: an absence that allows for a different type of presence, the 
presence of “(an)Other:” 
 
 
         …erosion produces a kind of dust or exaggerated pumice 
 Which fills space and transforms it, becoming a medium 
 In which it is possible to recognise oneself.152  
 
 
Gradually eroding himself as the subject of his poems still results in ashes, the dust or pumice. 
Complete self-disclosure is precluded but self-articulation, writing a self into existence, is still 
possible once the poet commits to being only an absent presence, “being hidden and 
present.”153 Pre-empting what will become a central tenet when he investigates the fundamental 
ethical commitments involved in acts of self-representation in “Self-Portrait in a Convex 
Mirror,” he insists that completed representations of the self deny poetry’s value as a way of 
living in the real world: 
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 Each new diversion adds its accurate touch to the ensemble, 
         and so 
 A portrait, smooth as glass, is built up out of multiple  
         corrections 
 And it has no relation to the space and time in which it was  
         lived.154  
 
 
For poetry to be considered amongst the other activities of living, for it to be informed by the 
temporal-spatial circumstances of the poet during its composition and of the reader during its 
interpretation, completion, accuracy and improvement must be eschewed in favour of 
incompletion, indeterminacy and misunderstanding, which leave the poem open for subsequent 
readers to make it fit their particulars and encounter the poet as “(an)Other who is not and 
cannot be known. The result? The opportunity to “begin again,” to “Waken each morning to 
the exact value of what you did and said, which remains.”155 Ashbery is absent but he is still 
answerable for what “remains,” for what he “did and said.”  
“Rural Objects” is an example of a “poethics of proximity.” Most importantly, it 
demonstrates how despite his committed self-displacement, we still encounter Ashbery when 
we read his text:  
 
 
Mountain ash mindlessly dropping berries: to whom is all 
       this? 
I tell you, we are being called back 
 
For having forgotten these names 
For forgetting our proper names, for falling like nameless 
       things 
On unfamiliar slopes. To be seen again, churlishly into life, 
Returning,156      
 
 
The reader is “called back” to the poem where s/he encounters “ash...berr[y]” as an absence 
“which as we/know involves presence.” Writing poems that are potentially everybody’s 
autobiography are not intended to allow the reader to identify the poet according to his proper 
name. Similarly, Ashbery does not attempt to predetermine who his reader will be. Instead, the 
poems are about returning, turning back to the former position, to the “first philosophy,” that 
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is constitutive of his “poethics of proximity,” the encounter between “(my)Self” and 
“(an)Other” in the poem as event.  
 
 
Conclusion: Giving All Our Attention to You 
 
In RM and DDS, Ashbery gives his readers “moments only” but this is not so much occasional 
poetry as it is an occasion in itself, an event that momentarily posits different individuals in 
common and where the poet and the reader can potentially encounter each other. In “The Poem 
as Event,” Louise Rosenblatt suggests the reader is “engaged in a creative process at once 
intensely personal, since the poem is something lived through, and intensely social, since the 
text…can be shared with others.”157 Her emphasis on the lived experience of the text, which 
includes both the author’s and the reader’s creative activities, was intended to remedy the 
sterility of new critical orthodoxy. While New Criticism initially provided a counter to 
“irresponsibile impressionism and dogmatic subjectivity” 158  as they informed particular 
reading methods, it ultimately went too far by ignoring the reader’s potential contribution 
altogether and insisting on an impersonal and objective approach to the text. For Rosenblatt, 
the poem must be “thought of as an event in time [and space]…an occurrence, a coming-
together, a compenetration, of a reader and a text…[and this] encounter gives rise to a new 
experience, a poem.”159 This sense of encounter is not merely textual, however, because it 
involves the experience of proximity to another person, to the poet as someone who is present 
and absent, which becomes part of the reader’s lived experiences. It is significant, therefore, in 
both its aesthetic and its ethical capacity. One way Ashbery thinks we can “begin again” is, as 
he explains in “Spring Day,” to give “all our attention to you,”160 to turn our attention to the 
“other ‘I’ with which we began” and confirm our heteronomic as opposed to our autotelic 
subjectivity, to give primacy to others rather than “(my)Self.” For him this involves turning 
toward the other “I’s” of the readers whereas for the reader it requires approaching Ashbery as 
an “other I,” as “(an)Other,” who can be encountered but never properly comprehended.  
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Chapter 4: “The Pragmatic and Kinetic Future” in Three 
Poems and “Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror” 
 
Refusing to posit the poem as an object separating the poet and the reader and instead 
configuring it as an event of potential encounter involving the contrapositions of “I” and “you” 
as different and distant subjects means Ashbery correlates poetic practice with a philosophy, 
or more specifically an ethics, of everyday living. In TP and the eponymous poem in SPCM, 
Ashbery articulates an ethics of the creative act, an ethics of writing and reading poetry that is 
readily transmissible to the commitments involved in living in the social world of others as an 
ethical subject. In doing so, he, firstly, affirms the centrality of “poetic making” [or poiesis] as 
an “activity…to the pragmatist sense of what meaning is” 1  and, secondly, exposes the 
pragmatic aspects of Levinas’ phenomenological ethics that make it particularly suited to 
conceptualising a “poethics of proximity” as enacting a way of, not just expressing or 
representing a potential way of, living in the social world of others.          
 
 
(4.1) A Pragmatic Conversation 
 
It is important to remember that TP was Ashbery’s first collection written entirely in America 
following his return from Paris in 1965. While the immediate pressures exerted by the strategies 
of containment and discourses of consensus associated with the early Cold War period were 
probably less apparent, their residual effects were undoubtedly still palpable in the form of 
heightened surveillance and the backlashes against feminist and sexual equality movements. 
One area in particular where the intellectual effects of the Cold War were more readily apparent 
was the country’s “best-known and most widely disseminated philosophical tradition, 
pragmatism.”2 From the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century, philosophers such as 
Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, John Dewey and John Herbert Mead utilised the 
“disestablishment impulse in American culture” 3  and the principle of uncertainty in 
Transcendentalism to create an anti-foundationalist philosophy as an alternative for those 
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disillusioned with absolutist philosophies. However, a philosophy arguing against the absolute, 
transcendental value of truths so that its practitioners could attend to what Dewey called the 
“problems of [wo/]men” 4  was marginalised because the “Cold war in general, and Mc 
Carthyism in particular, produced strong institutional incentives for academics in the United 
States to retreat from the public sphere and adopt more insular concerns and methodologies.”5 
Despite, or perhaps even because of, this situation, pragmatism provides Ashbery with the 
means of articulating an ethics of writing and reading poetry as a way of living in the social 
world of others and gesturing toward a future beyond the Cold War logic of containment and 
consensus he has insistently resisted since ST. Most important to understanding why Ashbery 
might be attracted to American pragmatism in his attempt to realise a “poethics of proximity” 
is the centrality placed on the performed act in this indigenous philosophy. According to the 
pragmatist maxim first formulated by Peirce, “the meanings of hard words and abstract 
concepts”6 can only be ascertained by considering the practical consequences of them. For 
Peirce, the pragmatist should “consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical 
bearings, we conceive the objects of our perception to have. Then, our conception of these 
effects is the whole of our conception of the object.”7 Or put another way, the consequences of 
our thoughts and perceptions can only be identified when they are put into action through 
practical application. Mead advances a corresponding proposition in his pragmatist world view, 
where (self-)awareness is only possible by acting in what he terms a “problematic situation,” 
the occurrence of conflicting tendencies to act. This “situation [is] the source of 
consciousness,” awareness of oneself as an embodied subject in a particular environment, 
because “it is only when we are confronted with a problem that inhibits our action that we 
become aware of the world in which we live.”8  
For both Peirce and Mead, meaning requires putting our thoughts and perceptions into 
action in a particular environment. Yet it is not just that meaning is related to consequences but 
that action itself, or the performed act, is at the centre of how we understand the world outside 
us, the others who inhabit it and our position within it. Dewey supplements this pragmatic 
theory of meaning with his more instrumentalist approach to pragmatism in the form of a 
specific method of inquiry that suggests learning is always experimental. For him, pragmatism 
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“inevitably turn[s] out persons who [are] alive to the necessity of continually testing their ideas 
and their beliefs by putting them into practical application.”9  Consequently, philosophical 
inquiry must “necessarily [contain] a practical factor, an activity of doing and making which 
reshapes antecedent intellectual material which sets the problem of inquiry.”10 The objects of 
inquiry are created and manipulated through experiment because the inquirer actively 
intervenes in rather than merely represents the world. A pragmatic method of inquiry is not 
simply concerned with altering how we view the social world of others and our position within 
it but with irreversibly changing how we might act in and interact with it.  
Peirce’s theory of meaning and Dewey’s method of inquiry lead to practical, or 
pragmatic, intelligence, which “involves the creative construction of new values.”11  Most 
importantly, there is an implied ethics that makes it particularly relevant to Ashbery’s “poethics 
of proximity.” Because pragmatic intelligence requires that our thoughts and perceptions are 
made actual through performed acts so their practical consequences can be ascertained, it 
necessitates acting in the social world outside us and interacting with those others who inhabit 
it. A particular ethical commitment is involved since the consequences of one’s acts are seldom 
limited to one’s own perspective. Mead explains this fact using the “principle of sociality,” the 
capacity for an action to be “multiple [different] things at once” because when it is experienced 
from “other perspectives [it is] set into new contexts.”12 This principle is also important to 
approaching the poem as event. Rather than being seen as an object that is distorted by the 
different perspectives considering it, it is actually constituted as the occasion of multiple 
perspectives encountering each other. Posited as an event as opposed to an object, the poem 
allows for the exercise of pragmatic intelligence in that it “liberate[s]…action” by “project[ing] 
new and more complex ends.”13 Rather than being restricted to pre-formed and fixed ends, 
pragmatic intelligence “develops within the sphere of action for the sake of possibilities not yet 
given…[and is] inherently forward-looking.”14 Since the poem requires the performed acts of 
the reader to make it actual, it is inherently oriented toward the “pragmatic…future.”15  
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Being “forward looking” means being oriented toward uncertainty and the unknown in 
the sense of possibilities not yet realised and toward another person with whom I interact with 
through my actions. Conversation, the act of communicating, is not about uncertainty 
reduction, however, quite the contrary in fact. It provides the opportunity to put one’s thoughts 
and perceptions into action by interacting with another person and determining their 
consequences depending on how that person responds to them. In terms of a poem, this other 
person is unknown and ultimately unknowable, s/he is “(an)Other,” an absence that permits a 
different kind of presence through the performance of actions by the poet and the reader for 
which each is answerable. As will be seen, Ashbery’s orientation toward the 
“pragmatic…future” addresses the central pragmatist question: “how we should go from 
present practice to a future practice.”16 Approaching the poem as an event, a conversation 
between “(my)Self” and “(an)Other,” highlights the practical applicability of Ashbery’s 
“poethics,” how the meaning of his texts consist of their consequences for subsequent 
experience, their capacity to be put into action as the poet and the reader author, and in doing 
so enact, their ethical subjectivity.   
While Levinas could never be considered a pragmatist along the lines of Peirce, Dewey, 
et al, his approach to ethics is resolutely pragmatic. In TI, he uses the everyday, concrete 
experience of the “face-to-face” encounter that occurs during conversation to delineate an 
ethics founded on proximity between “(my)Self” and “(an)Other.” Levinas is primarily 
concerned with what he terms “the calling into question of the same by the other.”17 For him, 
“the strangeness of the Other, his irreducibility to the I, to my thoughts and my possessions, is 
precisely accomplished as a calling into question of my spontaneity [my ability to act without 
premeditation and uninhibitedly], as ethics.”18 Therefore, “the relation between the same and 
the other is not always reducible to knowledge of the other to the same.”19 A conversation 
between two people perfectly captures his pragmatic, inherently dialogic, ethics, the “face to 
face approach, in conversation.”20 Because I cannot completely comprehend the content of 
another person’s consciousness, because I can never understand another person’s perspective 
entirely, s/he is “(an)Other,” inaccessible to me and outside my understanding, intentionality 
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and control, or as Levinas puts it, “over him[/her] I have no power. [S/]He escapes my grasp 
by an essential dimension.”21  
For Levinas, this discursive relation with “(an)Other” constitutes ethical subjectivity. 
While a poem can never be considered a literal conversation, Levinas modifies his claim by 
suggesting discourse, the communication of thoughts and perceptions by words as in 
conversation, is “an original relation with exterior being”22 and consequently “the first ethical 
gesture.”23 Therefore, poetic discourse can be taken as an example of a conversation between 
at least two different people because its language “presupposes interlocutors, a plurality.”24 
Ashbery’s poetry, founded on absence to allow for a different kind of presence, adheres to 
Levinas’ view that “language precisely maintains the other – to whom it is addressed, whom it 
calls upon or invokes.”25 The “other called upon is not something represented, is not a given, 
is not a particular” which is why “language institutes a relation irreducible to the subject-object 
relation.”26 As in language, therefore, the reader as “(an)Other” to the poet is absent in the 
sense that s/he is located in the future as someone yet to read the poem and the poet as 
“(an)Other” to the reader is absent because he is displaced as the subject (matter) of the poem. 
As Levinas explains: 
 
 
The who involved in activity is not expressed in the activity, is not present, does not 
attend his own manifestation, but is simply signified in it by a sign in a system of signs, 
that is, as a being who is manifested precisely as absent from his manifestation: a 
manifestation in the absence of being – a phenomenon.27  
 
 
 
To speak, to engage in conversation with another person or to perform the acts of composition 
and interpretation as in poetic discourse, is “to make the world common, to create 
commonplaces” by laying “the foundations for a possession in common.”28 In TP and “SPCM,” 
Ashbery articulates an ethics of writing and reading poetry that confirms Levinas’ insistence 
that “only in approaching the Other [do] I attend to myself.”29 Only by approaching the reader 
as “(an)Other” can the poet attain self-consciousness as an ethical poet. Similarly, only by 
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approaching the poet as “(an)Other” can the reader achieve self-consciousness as an ethical 
reader. In the act of communication, understood as either conversation or poetic discourse, “I 
expose myself to the questioning of the Other, and this urgency of response…engenders me 
for responsibility.”30 The face-to-face encounter between “(my)Self” and “(an)Other” Ashbery 
achieves in TP and “SPCM” is proximity, the actualisation of intersubjectivity as the poet and 
the reader interact with one another as embodied subjects during the event of the poem, 
responding to each other as others and, therefore, realising their ethical subjectivity in a 
pragmatic manner. However, his poetics of proximity are radically “poethic,” that is, they are 
readily transmissible into how one lives in the social world of others as an ethical subject 
because of their practical applicability. In an interesting way, Ashbery’s return to America 
results in a poetry of return, of returning to America’s indigenous philosophy and a return to, 
or a turning toward, the other in conversation, the event of communication that is proximity.  
       
 
(4.2) Ashbery’s “Whether System” in Three Poems 
 
TP begins with Ashbery dealing with a very practical situation that is crucial to his decision to 
compose a collection consisting of three poems exclusively in prose: 
 
 
 I  thought that if  I  could  put  it  all  down,  that   would  be one 
 way.  And  next  the  thought  came  to  me  that  to  leave all out 
 would  be  another,  and  truer,  way. 
 
    clean-washed sea 
                           The flowers were. 
 
 These are examples of leaving out. But, forget as we will, some- 
 thing  soon  comes  to stand  in  their place.  Not  the  truth,  per- 
 haps, but – yourself. It  is  you  who made this, therefore you are 
 true.31  
 
 
Despite the impression that prose somehow includes more details or information than poetry, a 
sense heightened by Ashbery literally covering each page with words so that “everything and 
everybody were included after/all, and any thought that might ever be entertained about 
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them,”32 TP is fundamentally informed by the same “leaving out business” identified in the two 
previous collections. The omission of explicit autobiographical correspondences and 
extratextual references means “putting it all down” is still an example “of leaving [it all] out,” 
an absence that allows for a different type of presence, the presence of “you” or “(an)Other.” 
What differentiates TP from earlier examples of prose poetry in Ashbery’s oeuvre, such as “The 
Young Son” in ST and “Variations, Calypso and Fugue…” and “For John Clare” in DDS, is his 
emphasis on poiesis, the creative act of making poetry. Ashbery’s decision to write TP in prose 
is also integral to the ethics of writing and reading poetry he advances for two reasons. Firstly, 
the prose poem “aspires to be poetic/literary language’s own coming to self-consciousness, the 
place where poet and reader alike become critically aware of the writer’s language.”33 Arriving 
at self-consciousness in the prose poem suggests that poiesis in TP is as much about the making 
of poetry as it is about making the self, how a particular type of subject is authored in the acts 
of writing and reading this poem. Secondly, in his study The New Sentence, Ron Silliman charts 
the meaning of “prose” and “verse” back to their shared root, “proversus, the past participle of 
provertere, meaning ‘to turn towards,’” so that the “single Latin verb lies at the etymological 
root of both [words]…, verse coming from the root which meant ‘to turn’ and prose from 
‘towards.’”34 The prose poem, therefore, is founded on the action of “turning toward” and is 
inherently suited to arriving at self-consciousness, understood as being oriented towards 
“(an)Other” who questions “(my)Self” and obligates a response. Consequently, if TP is to be 
read as a creative act involving the contrapositions of I and other, or as a conversation between 
the poet and the reader, it is not due to the reductive proposal that prose is more dialogic than 
poetry but rather because of the fundamental action of “turning toward” that the prose poem is 
etymologically founded upon.  
The choice Ashbery posits between “put[ting] it all down” and “leaving [it all] out” is 
equally, if not more, important to how the poem is read as it is to how the poem was written. 
Standard methods of analysis are consistently precluded because any attempt to substantiate a 
specific interpretation with a relevant quotation is problematised by Ashbery, for example: 
 
 
It’s just beginning. Now  it’s started  to work again. The visita- 
tion, was it more or less over. No, it had  not yet begun, except 
as a  preparatory dream  which  seemed  to have the rough tex- 
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ture of  life, but  which dwindled  into starshine  like all the un- 
wanted memories.35  
 
 
TP is intended to engender a very particular reading experience. The “truer way” of “leaving 
[it all] out” refers to how the collection should be experientially engaged with rather than just 
hermeneutically analysed in terms of its content, how as an:  
 
 
                                              …intervening space [it] now came 
to  advance  toward  us separately, a wave  of  music which we 
were, unable to grasp it as it unfolded but living it36   
 
 
 
As a “self-critical,” even self-reflexive, genre, the prose poem has “genre-testing potential” 
because it “consists in speaking of genre not as a given ‘thing’ but as the expression of a 
relationship between a reader and a text.”37 The genre of Ashbery’s Three [Prose] Poems 
expresses the immersive relationship between the reader and the text. Its length, density, 
consistency of tone and complete dissolution of poetic form creates a “much more – I hate to 
say environmental [type of poetry] because it’s a bad word – but more of a surrounding.”38 For 
all that is said in TP, a lot remains unsaid; so much so that it is best approached in terms of the 
experience that reading it engenders, than in terms of its teleological meaning. In arguing that 
Ashbery creates “a surrounding,” I am subscribing to Angus Fletcher’s definition of 
environmental poems, where the poet writes neither about the surrounding world nor 
analytically represents that world but actually shapes the poem to surround the reader, “such 
that to read them is to have an experience much like suddenly recognising that one actually has 
an environment, instead of not perceiving that surround at all.”39 Ashbery’s “whether system” 
requires a different kind of attention, so the text can be “something new. Outside, can’t you 
hear it, the traffic, the trees, everything getting nearer. To/end up with, inside each other.”40 
The environmental poem collapses any distinction between text and context until it becomes a 
lived space that functions as an analogue for desirable social circumstances not yet achieved, 
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somewhere “One may at least stay…a while hoping for more and better things to come.”41 TP 
is staged as both a lecture, for example, Ashbery’s explanation of the difference between frontal 
and latent happiness in “The System” (293-304), and a performance, as suggested in the closing 
statement: 
 
 
                                        …The performance had ended, the au- 
 dience  streamed  out;  the  applause  still echoed in  the  empty 
 hall. But the idea of the spectacle as something  to be acted out 
 and absorbed  still hung  in  the air long after the last  spectator 
 had gone home to sleep.42  
 
 
 
Approaching the collection as a performative lecture highlights a further correlation with Cage 
but in an entirely different manner than the “Aesthetics of Indifference” discussed in ST. If 
Cage’s performative lecturers reveal how “silence [is always] already filled with noises,” 
Ashbery’s text provides noise already filled with silences. What matters for Cage and Ashbery 
is the activity of paying attention itself, engendering self-consciousness during the experience 
of listening and reading in order to realise a “poethics,” a way of living in the real world as a 
responsive and responsible ethical subject.  
In his “Lecture on Something” (1949), Cage professes his non-dualistic sensibility, 
which views sound and silence, nothing and something, and perhaps most importantly, 
composer and spectator, as unopposed rather than components of an oppositional hierarchy that 
implicitly privileges one over the other. He describes his lecture as “a talk about something and 
naturally a talk about nothing. About how something and nothing are not opposed to each other 
but need each other to keep on going.”43 He also defines poetry in his “Lecture on Nothing” as 
having “nothing to say…[and] saying it” because “words help make the silences,” comparing 
it to “an empty glass into which at any moment anything may be poured. As we go along.”44 
His silent composition 4’33” puts his theory of poetry into musical practice, demonstrating how 
“in the dualistic sense of sound versus silence, there was no silence…only intended and 
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unintended sounds.” 45  Like Cage’s similarly immersive performances and lectures, TP 
necessitates a different kind of attention:  
 
 
                                                                          …Suddenly you 
realize that  you have  been talking  for a long time without lis- 
tening to yourself; you must have said it a long way back with- 
out knowing it… 
                                            …Now  there  is  so  much  to   talk 
about  that it  seems neither  of you  will ever  get done talking. 
And the word  that  everything hinged on  is buried back there; 
by mutual  consent neither of you examined it when it was pro- 
nounced and rushed to its final resting place46   
 
 
 
Both seem to advocate that we simply listen (to) ourselves, that we become self-conscious of 
ourselves as listeners by paying attention to how and to what we listen to. Cage makes the 
performance of his silent composition dependent on listening, thereby transposing “the 
performance onto the audience members both in their utterances and the acts of shifting their 
attention to other sounds.”47 4’33” is both nothing and something, an occasion of what Liz Kotz 
identifies as Cage’s “self-effacing desubjectivisation”48 so the audience can pay attention to 
what is normally categorised as the others of music: noise and silence. 4’33”, therefore, is a 
performative site because paying attention to noise and silence in the context of a formal 
musical composition radically and irrevocably changes the meaning of each term.  
It might seem a misnomer to discuss what is without doubt the best example of Ashbery 
“put[ting] it all down,” his attempt to “include everything: the furniture of this room, everyday 
ex-/pressions, as well as [his] rarest thoughts and dreams,”49 in terms of what remains unsaid, 
what is excluded and silenced, but this highlights the necessary difficulty of his “whether 
system.” Like Cage, he “dismantle[s] dualistic separations”50 by shifting attention to what is 
normally considered other to expose the profound interdependence between apparent 
oppositions. Ashbery and Cage both demonstrate how possibilities exist other than those 
currently being practised by reorienting our attention toward what is normally considered other. 
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Ashbery enacts how things might be using the concrete, everyday encounter between 
“(my)Self” and “(an)Other” that occurs during conversation in the lived space Levinas terms 
proximity. Retallack’s entire concept of “poethics” derives from a similar capacity she 
identifies in Cage, what she terms an “aesthetic pragmatics of everyday life.”51 By relying on 
both sound and silence, Cage creates a “whether system,” a “terminal either/or 
complementarity” in which it is “conceptually…impossible to take in both possibilities at the 
same time, since each one is in part constituted by the functional absence of the other.”52 The 
dualism of such a “whether system” is similar to that created by Ashbery’s competing options 
to either “put it all down” or “to leave [it] all out.” While ultimately irresolvable, it nevertheless 
demonstrates the powerful role of the reader “to determine the way in which at any given time 
it’s to be read.”53 TP is necessarily difficult, therefore, because of what it asks of the reader, 
“getting down to business, or back to the business of day-/to-day living with all the tiresome 
mechanical problems that/this implies” when “philosophy [has] broke[n] down/completely and 
[is] of no use” and the “new situ-/ations that arise each day…re-/sist categorization to the point 
where any rational attempt to/deal with them is doomed from the start.”54  The situation 
confronting us has not become more complex, it: 
 
 
                                                                                         has prob- 
 ably  been with  you always;  now it has a different  name and a 
 different curriculum vitae;  its qualities  are  combined in such a 
 way as to  seem  different from all  that has gone before, but ac- 
 tually it is the same old surprise that you have always lived with.55    
 
 
 
The difficulty is “the business of day-to-day living,” the obligation to realise one’s “response-
ability” as an embodied, ethical subject by choosing and remaining answerable for that choice, 
which requires “the ability to enter into the complexities of/the situation as though it really 
weren’t new at all.”56 His “aesthetic pragmatics of everyday life” return back to the “first 
philosophy” Bakhtin and Levinas pursue. Parodying Robert Frost’s “The Road Not Taken,” 
“You discovered/that there was a fork in the road, so first you followed what/seemed to be the 
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less promising…the more obvi-/ous, of the two branches” before returning to “investigate the 
tangled/way,”57 Ashbery accordingly dismisses the supposedly different choices available to 
us:   
 
 
                                                                                  …And in so  
 doing you  began to  realize that the  two branches were joined 
 together again, farther ahead; that  this place of joining was in- 
 deed the end, and  that  it was the  very place you  set out from, 
 whose  intolerable  mixture  of  reality and  fantasy  had started 
 you on the road which is now come full circle.58   
 
 
 
Like the impetus to “begin again” in DDS, Ashbery is being intentionally anti-teleological 
here, elsewhere comparing TP to the system of prose writing, to:  
 
 
                                                          …the clear, compact shape 
 of the plot of a novel, with all its edges and inner passages laid 
 bare for the reader, to be  resumed and  resumed over and over, 
 that is taken up and put aside and take up again.59  
 
 
 
What matters is the capacity to choose rather than the choices themselves as he provides the 
opportunity to realise one’s “response-ability” instead of delineating a set of prescribed 
responses, so TP remains “a permanent medium in which we are lost, since/becoming robs it 
of its potential.”60  The “whether system” creates “the impression of a climate in which 
nothing/can go wrong, including the major question that revolves/around you, your being 
here.”61 Because each option is equally valid, there is no right or wrong response, and by 
extension, no correct interpretation. TP is a performative site, “a time of doing…an active 
time,”62 in which the poet and the reader can realise their “response-ability” by responding to 
the question posed to them by the presence of “(an)Other.” As Ashbery explains: 
 
 
        …At  that point  one  must, yes, be  selective, but not selec- 
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 tive in one’s choices, if you see what I mean. Not choose this or 
 that  because it pleases, merely to  assume  the idea of choosing, 
 so that  some things can  be left behind. It doesn’t  matter which 
 ones. I  could tell  you  about some of  the  things I’ve discarded 
 but that wouldn’t help you  because you  must choose your own, 
 or rather  not choose  them  but let them  be inflicted  on and off 
 you.63    
 
 
TP reduces writing and reading poetry to their most basic and, consequently, their most difficult 
fundamentals. Confronted with innumerable choices but without recourse to right or wrong 
answers, the collection is “an open field of narrative possibilities”64 the reader must act in and 
interact with it because “its meaning inheres in the performance of the text.”65 The difficulty of 
TP is necessary because reading it, acting in and interacting with this textual environment, is 
supposed to engender a similar experience to living in the social world of others:  
 
 
                      …the complex climate that is formed by the vac- 
ilating  wills  and   energies  of  the  many  who  surround  you 
[…] 
                          …[living] in that labyrinth that seems to be di- 
recting  your steps but  in reality it  is you who  are creating  its 
pattern, embarked on a new, fantastically difficult tactic whose 
success is nevertheless guaranteed.66 
 
 
 
TP’s success or failure depends on whether the actions performed during the writing and the 
reading of it can be acted out in the social world of others, hence Ashbery’s disinterest in the 
particulars of the choices available. What concerns him is the capacity for poetry “to cite social 
practice without itself being that social practice, or at least being some other form of social 
practice  which indicates [its] potential…as critique,” 67 its ability to enact a way of living in 
the real world that changes things. In terms of cultural constitution, the “proposition that 
poetry forms while it refers points to the complicity of poetry with the realities and 
significations of cultural process”68 but the actions by which poets and readers constitute these 
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norms and boundaries foreground that such actions also have the potential to simultaneously 
disrupt by questioning them.  
 
 
(4.3) “No Longer a Figure of Speech But an Act” 
 
“The New Spirit” contains the most explicit indication of how the experience of reading TP 
is intended to engender “response-ability” in the reader as an embodied and embedded agency 
within the material reality of the larger environment of other subjects, “the/multitudes that 
swarm past one in the street…Who are all these people? What does/it mean that there are so 
many? Is it possible that the desires of/one might not conflict with the desires of all the others, 
and/vice versa.”69 Using constellations of stars as an example of how one can read and write 
ethically, Ashbery raises TP above the status of a mere aesthetic paradigm by "calling 
attention" to the commitments involved in these creative acts and revealing their coexistence 
amongst the other acts we perform in the extratextual environment that constitute our ethical 
subjectivity, “one moves closer…to come to examine the merit of its individual parts so as to 
en-/joy even more connecting them up to the whole.” 70  As an open field of narrative 
possibilities, one image above all else captures the type of environment Ashbery has created 
and the consequent responsibility he envisions for his reader:  
 
 
                                                                                      ...That space 
 was  transfigured  as  though by  hundreds  and  hundreds  of tiny 
 points of light like flares seen from  a distance, gradually merging 
 into one  wall of even  radiance like the  sum of all  their  possible 
 positions,  plotted  by  coordinates,  yet  open  to  the  movements 
 and   suggestions   of   this  new  life  of  action  without  develop- 
 ment, a fixed flame.71  
 
 
 
Like the silence Cage immerses his audience in so they can decide themselves what sounds they 
listen to and in doing so radically change that environment, TP is “one wall of even radiance” 
until the reader realises his/her “response-ability” by paying attention to and selecting particular 
coordinates until a constellation is formed. Ashbery even reads the “hundreds and hundreds of 
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tiny/points of light” first by including “Aries, the Ram, the agent of Mars and fire and the first 
of the/twelve signs of the Zodiac”72 as an example of what the reader must do subsequently. 
This way of reading as a responsive and responsible subject is “another way” to that represented 
by the “horrible vision of the completed Tower of Babel, flushed in the/sunset as the last 
ceramic brick was triumphantly fitted into/place, perfect in its vulgarity.”73 The tower is an 
example of a homogenous, easily understood language becoming an object and Ashbery 
counters it using constellations: 
 
 
                                                                            ...In the other 
 direction one saw the  desert and drooping  above it the con- 
 stellations that  had presided impassively over the building of 
 the metaphor  that   seemed   to  erase  them   from  the  skies.74 
 
 
 
The text as object can only ever be a metaphor, it can make comparisons to a real situation but 
can never be that situation itself. As Ashbery argues, mapping out the constellation above the 
complete textual object, “the Archer, languidly stretching/his bow,” is “no longer a figure of 
speech but an act.” 75  This performed act is a response to the “major question that 
revolves/around you, your being here,” which: 
 
 
                                                               ...is again affirmed in the  
stars: just  their  presence, mild and unquestioning, is proof that 
you have got to  begin in  the way of  choosing some one of the 
forms of answering  that question, since  if they were  not there 
the  question  would  not exist  to  be  answered,  but  only  as a  
rhetorical question in  the impressive  grammar of cosmic unrav- 
ellings of all kinds, to be proposed but never formulated.76  
 
 
 
TP is the stars, the “hundreds and hundreds of tiny/points of light,” whose very presence 
questions the reader and obligates him/her to answer for him/herself, to realise his/her 
“response-ability” by paying attention to it and selecting certain parts to make a constellation 
for which s/he is answerable for. It is possible, therefore, to “consider poetic utterance as a 
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version of performativity where the text itself is an act: a performative…to the extent that it is 
uttered (written [and read]) by an appropriate person (a poet [or reader]) in a certain set of 
historical and cultural circumstances.”77 Configuring writing and reading the poem as plotting 
a constellation suggests that poetry can be seen as homologous with performatives as it creates 
something that was not there beforehand, it “creates its own meaning, and above all does 
something with words.”78 The collection, therefore, can never be seen as a “completed Tower 
of Babel,” a homogenous, closed-off and finished text, because it is not about the teleological 
pursuit of completion. Such an approach can never be anything else but partial because other 
possibilities always exist and Ashbery, like Cage, denies the authority of a single centre in 
favour of a plurality, a multi-centredness, based “not [on] coercion but choice, not hierarchy 
but egalitarianism, not self-promotion but sharing, nor conformity but freedom.”79 Ashbery’s 
inclusion of constellations also refers to astrology, reading the stars so as to determine “the 
plans of the cosmos” and create a “sense of destiny.”80 This sense of predestination is affirmed 
by the figures from tarot cards, “The Hermit,” “the Hanged Man,” “The Archer” and “The Five 
of/Cups.”81 Ashbery incorporates such predestination by including a reading of the future, 
“‘Trouble from a loved one. Trouble introduced into/the midst of an already realized state. 
Amorous dangers. Perils/through a woman.’”82  He also emphasises the comfort it affords 
despite the reality of the situation by quoting another person: 
 
 
                                      ...“You born today,”… 
                                                                                         …‘a life  
 of   incredulity   and   magnanimity  opens  out   around  you… 
 […] 
                             …But draw comfort meanwhile from the fact  
 that the  planets have  congregated  to haruspicate at  your birth; 
 they can  no longer  disentangle themselves  but  are  fixed over 
 you, s howering  down  material and  immaterial  advantages on 
 whoever has the patience to remain immobile for a while, mind- 
 less of  the efforts of his coevals  to better  themselves at the ex- 
 pense of humankind in general.’83  
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Reading the stars, “the hundreds and hundreds of tiny/points of light,” to predetermine certain 
events can be applied to TP as Ashbery himself gestures toward “the pragmatic and kinetic 
future.”84 However, the only event he predestines to happen is that the collection will be read 
by another person at a later date. Just as the “even wall of radiance” contains all the potential 
constellations that indicate possible futures, TP indicates its own future: 
 
 
                                                                               …to have one 
 person’s  affirmation  of  the way  it  happens  for him . . . Yes, 
 but you do not know this person. 
 
 He  exists,  but  he  is  a  stranger for  you in  your  own  home. 
 Just his being there  beside you makes  him a stranger  because 
 you can’t tell how he got there. Nor can he, or at least he never 
 seems to feel the urge to do so.85   
 
 
 
The reader’s interpretation is a future composition that questions Ashbery’s by detailing how 
“it happens for him[/her],” explaining him/herself by recounting his/her experience of reading 
it. This situation necessarily involves others who confirm or oppose the poet’s assertions and 
hence points to a relation between “(my)Self” and “(an)Other” in the poem. The presence of 
another person is implied throughout TP, whether in the form of an intimate partner to whom 
“The New Spirit” is addressed, the audience listening to his lecture on how the “system was 
breaking down”86 in “The System” or the spectators leaving after “the spectacle…to be acted 
out” finishes in “The Recital.” This constitutive relationship between the contrapositions of “I” 
and “you” is a “first philosophy,” the presence of “(an)Other”  who questions “(my)Self” and 
makes a response obligatory. The “past is dust and ashes,” consisting solely of traces of the 
poet, but the “incommensurably/wide way”87 of TP “leads to the pragmatic and kinetic future.” 
It is only actualised when the reader realises his/her “response-ability” and acts out what was 
done in the performative, or poethic, site of TP in the social world of others, in the lived space 
of proximity where s/he authors him/herself as an ethical subject.   
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(4.4) “(an)Other” Tradition 
 
Expanding on the idea that every interpretation is a further, or “(an)Other’s,” composition, how 
a text is read is equally important to how it is written. The self-referential aspects of TP, 
however, means the occasion of composition is more readily foregrounded, “it turns/out you 
have been pursuing the discussion in a leisurely way/throughout January and February.”88 
While the “actuality of writing,”89 the occasion of composition, is pronounced, the actuality of 
reading is, albeit of equal if not more significance, more difficult to depict: 
 
 
 It could be  anything, you  say.  But it could  not have been an 
 exercise in defining  the  present  when  our  position, our very 
 lives depend  on those fixed  loci of past and  future that leave 
 no room for the nominal existence of anything else.90   
 
 
 
Depicting the past is relatively easier because it can be known by articulating experiences the 
reader can identify with, “its every contour is at last revealed for/what it was, but this can be 
known only in the past.”91 Similarly, representing the future is possible because it is what can 
be known once the reader is convinced by and adheres to the prescriptions provided by the 
poet. However, determining the present, how the reader will actually respond to the text is not 
and cannot be known. Including the present of reading is characterised by its “necessary 
difficulty” because it signals where “(my)Self” ends and “(an)Other” begins, thereby marking 
the very limit of the known and the knowable.  
 According to Levinas, turning toward “(an)Other” is to be open toward the 
“unforeseeable future”92 which, as the full title Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority 
implies, exists outside of or beyond the totality of my comprehensible, or graspable, time, the 
“now here” of my present. Understood as the spatial-temporal position of “(an)Other,” the 
future is unknown and unknowable because it is more than just the projection of possibilities 
determined by either my past experiences or intentions. Understanding another person is to 
grasp his/her interiority, the content of his/her consciousness that determines how s/he will 
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respond in a particular situation. However, this would result in the merging of his/her 
consciousness with my own and my interiority, my perspective and past experiences, would 
contain both mine and his/her’s, thereby making the other part of myself and reducing his/her 
alterity to categories of the same. For Levinas, self-consciousness is plural since it emerges 
from the face-to-face encounter between two different and distant embodied subjects who are 
exterior to each other, resulting in “a multiplicity in being, which refuses totalisation but takes 
form as fraternity and discourse.” 93  Conversation is the commonplace required for this 
encounter between “(my)Self” and “(an)Other,” the lived space of proximity. Levinas’ 
definition of ethics as “a calling into question of the same...by the other” 94  requires 
conversation to conceptualise it. Conversation is not about uncertainty reduction but about 
exposing oneself to what exceeds the limits of what I currently do and potentially can know 
that calls me into question and obligates me to answer for “(my)Self,” to respond to the 
interpretation of the other and in doing so realise my “response-ability.” As Levinas explains, 
“the relation with the Other, or Conversation...is an ethical relation...a teaching...because it 
comes from the exterior and brings to me more than I contain.”95 This phenomenon reveals that 
the fundamental condition of self-consciousness is plural and because of this condition 
something new is possible. Conversation with “(an)Other,” therefore, is to encounter that which 
cannot be appropriated into “(my)Self” but nevertheless is constitutive of my self-
consciousness as an ethical subject because it requires me to realise my “response-ability” by 
putting my interpretation into question and obligating me to be answerable for it.    
While plurality is crucial to proximity, Levinas is arguing for “a radical multiplicity, 
distinct from numerical multiplicity”96 where each individual is “one” and therefore similar to 
every other “one.” Because “(an)Other” exceeds any concept I have for him/her, its alterity is 
the result of an uncontainable excess so that “multiplicity therefore implies an objectivity [or 
exteriority] posited in the impossibility…of conjoining the I and the non-I in a whole [or 
totality].”97 However, this impossibility is not negative because the “primordial multiplicity [of 
“(my)Self” and “(an)Other”] is observed within the very face-to-face that constitutes it. It is 
produced in the multiple singularities and not in a being exterior to this number who would 
count the multiples.”98 Only in the experience of conversation can the “multiple singularities” 
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of “(my)Self” and “(an)Other” come into proximity “[w]here the alterity of the other does not 
result from its identity but constitutes it…[as] Other.”99 Its alterity results not simply from 
his/her being different to or distant from “(my)Self” but in its exteriority, what exceeds my 
own perspective and past experiences and prevents “(an)Other” being appropriated by reducing 
him/her to the categories of the same used to understand “(my)Self,” a surplus “exceeding the 
limits”100 of the known and knowable that demarcate “(my)Self.” “(an)Other” is the “pragmatic 
and kinetic future” due to his/her irreducible alterity. By extension of this logic, the reader is 
“(an)Other” who is unknown and ultimately unknowable to the poet, someone who inhabits a 
different and distant spatial-temporal position the poet can only gesture toward as he responds 
to a potential reader in poetic discourse, that is, in conversation.    
  TP rather appropriately contains the first instance of what Ashbery terms the “other 
tradition,” the “unrelated happenings that form a kind of sequence/…/according to an inner 
necessity of their own” and have a “living aspect” that has never been examined but has 
“developed/parallel to the classic truths of daily life.”101  This phrase is particularly significant 
as it was the first stage in the genealogy that provided the title for his “Charles Eliot Norton 
Lectures,” Other Traditions. Between “The Other Tradition” and “Other Traditions” Ashbery 
termed it “Another Tradition,”102 which suggests he is not concerned with othering particular 
authors but instead identifying that there always exists a different way of doing things, a way 
of being different that is not always assimilable because it remains troublingly other despite 
our efforts to comprehend it. In these lectures he concentrates on the “certifiably minor poets” 
John Clare, Thomas Lovell Beddoes, Raymond Roussel, John Wheelwright, Laura Riding and 
David Schubert who “are not…of the centre stage” but are more importantly of the “jump-start 
variety,” those he “reads habitually in order to get started,” those he turns to “when [he] really 
need[s] to be reminded yet again of what poetry is.” 103 In a body of work that is oriented toward 
“(an)Other,” his comments on the poets he reads in advance and responds to suggest he is 
delineating and positioning himself within “‘(an)Other” Tradition” founded on “response-
ability” and proximity, a tendency that has gone unrecognised because it so closely parallels 
“the classic truths of everyday life” and consequently makes poetry or poiesis, the making of 
poetry, a fundamental activity of living in the social world of others.  
                                                      
99
 Ibid, 251. 
100
 Ibid, 26. 
101
 Ashbery, “The System,” CP, 282. 
102
 Ashbery, Other Traditions, 122. 
103
 Ibid, 4-5. 
  
 
141 
 
Three features define Ashbery’s “‘(an)Other’ Tradition.” Firstly, Clare achieves a sense 
of encounter because of the “sudden, surprising lack of distance between poet and reader [that] 
is in proportion to the lack of distance between the poet and the poem; he is the shortest distance 
between poem and reader.”104 He also continually “re-insert[s himself] in [the] present…[by] 
re-establishing ‘now.’” 105  Clare represents for Ashbery the ability to stage an encounter 
between the poet and the reader as embodied subjects who occupy a “now here,” the unique 
present they inhabit, through the commonplace of the poem, the shortest distance between them 
that is the lived space of proximity. Similarly, Roussel is championed for having nothing to say 
yet still saying it and creating a “totally neutral medium for the ‘nothing’ he is telling us” that 
brings “us face to face with…the now where anything can and must happen, the Locus Solus 
[lonely place] where writing begins.”106 Again, the “now here” as a place of beginning again, 
where composition and interpretation as a further act of composition begins, is foregrounded 
to make the writing and reading of poetry “something like daily life as it is actually lived.”107 
Secondly, Ashbery focuses on Beddoes’ dramatic fragments, which provide “a place where he 
can test approaches to life”108 and which “require a specially trained audience” due to “the 
practical questions they pose.”109 His reading of Schubert affirms the performative capacity of 
“response-ability” since “the ideal situation for the poet is to have the reader speak the poem” 
because the poems consist “of speaking of what cannot be said to the person I want to say it.”110 
A conversation is possible between the poet and the readers who utter the poem from multiple 
points of view to create a multiplicity of possible interpretations, thus “transform[ing] the 
mundane experience” of writing and reading a poem “into one of life’s major points” because 
it reveals the “first philosophy” of ethical encounter between “(my)Self” and “(an)Other” that 
occurs through conversation and poetic discourse.111 Thirdly, Riding’s poetry is assessed in 
terms of its difficulty, how her poems are to be misread, which exploits the fact that “no poem 
can ever hope to produce the exact sensation in even one reader that the poet intended.”112 
Ashbery quite tellingly posits the “reader/critic,” making both interchangeable to suggest that 
every act of interpretation is a further composition for which s/he is answerable. He also 
explains how our “inability to understand it does not affect [our] assessments of its beauty or 
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ugliness,”113 that is, its aesthetic validity, which is always an axiological issue for Ashbery. 
Such difficulty “demands more attention and attentiveness” because the poems require “some 
previous adjustment or tuning.”114 Her poems are characterised by a “necessary difficulty” that 
demands a different type of attention or increased attentiveness to oneself as an embodied, 
answerable subject in the social world of others. Ashbery’s preference for poems that require 
“‘special treatment’…writing that isn’t simple, where there is more than at first meets the 
eye”115 extends to his reading of Wheelwright, whose poems are defined by their “repeated 
stretching toward opposite poles wherein he stops just short of closure.”116 Contradictions are 
not resolved and opposites are not reconciled because Wheelwright provides choices for his 
readers, opportunities for them to become responsive and responsible subjects that respond to 
his “call to social action…[in the form of] a call to all human action.”117   
All of the primary characteristics identified thus far to explain Ashbery’s “poethics of 
proximity” also define his ““(an)Other” Tradition,” how the necessarily difficult poems require 
a different kind of attention, a new way of writing and reading, because they provide the 
occasion for an encounter between the poet and the reader in conversation that enacts the ethical 
encounter between “(my)Self” and “(an)Other” in the lived space of proximity. As Ashbery 
demonstrates, ““(an)Other” Tradition” that “parallel[s]…daily life” has always existed but by 
articulating an ethics of writing and reading poems as commonplaces inhabited by the poet and 
the reader poetry becomes “poethic,” enacting a way of living in the real world. 
 
 
(4.5) The “Poethics” of Ekphrasis  
 
That Ashbery chooses a self-portrait as the subject of his most detailed ekphrastic poem is not 
accidental, especially if we consider how looking at Parmigianino’s painting visualises the 
face-to-face encounter between “(my)Self” and “(an)Other,” and how ekphrasis itself literalises 
the fact that interpretation (analysing a painting) is a further composition (writing a poem about 
it), an example of poetic discourse based on conversation. More importantly perhaps is that the 
consistent concern in the eponymous poem from SPCM is the “representation of (self) 
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representation.” 118  As Ashbery understands it at least, self-representation, like self-
consciousness, involves interacting with the interpretations of others and responding to the 
questions they pose to answer for myself. In this sense it does not correspond to a pronoun, to 
the self-contained “I,” but is rather a “pro(cessual)noun,” part of an ongoing, open-ended 
conversation in which I am questioned by the interpretations of others that exceed the limits of 
the known and knowable circumscribing “(my)Self” and obligated to realise my “response-
ability.” The ekphrastic poem highlights interpellation, thus emphasising the sense of 
interpellation that makes language crucial to the ethical encounter between “(my)Self” and 
“(an)Other.” In addition to responding to preceding utterances, the poem is always addressed 
to a not predetermined interlocutor in the future, someone who cannot be called by name 
because s/he is unknown and unknowable to the poet, s/he is “(an)Other.”  
 Ashbery’s decision to use ekphrasis to highlight the “aesthethic” issues surrounding 
self-representation is crucial to him developing on all the features identified in the preceding 
collection to finally realise a “poethics of proximity” in a single poem for two reasons. Firstly, 
ekphrasis is not a poetic form but a “rhetorical situation and set of practices that offer non-
prescriptive possibilities,”119  thus making it particularly suited to articulating an ethics of 
writing and reading poetry. In other words, it is a discursive strategy.  Ashbery immediately 
comes full circle in his description of Parmigianino’s painting (Fig. 5), identifying the same 
combination of “reticence,”120 the word itself is included in “SPCM,” and accentuation from 
“Some Trees” in how:  
 
 
…Parmigianino did it, the right hand 
Bigger than the head, thrust at the viewer 
And swerving easily away, as though to protect 
What it advertises121  
  
 
This circularity, or return to source, is also important to how Ashbery uses ekphrasis, elsewhere 
“beseech[ing Parmigianino to] withdraw that hand,/Offer it no longer as shield or greeting,/The 
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shield of a greeting”122  and in doing so evoking the first example of ekphrasis: Homer’s 
description of Achilles’ shield in Iliad.  
 
 
 
(Fig. 5) Parmigianino, Self-Portrait in a Convex  
Mirror (1524)  
 
 
Returning to source also means James Heffernan’s reductive definition of ekphrasis as the 
“verbal representation of visual representation”123 is eschewed in favour of its etymological 
meaning “to speak out” (ek (out) phrasis (to speak)) and its traditional rhetorical function, to 
articulate the experience of a person, place or thing in such a way that a reader who never 
encountered the work in question can share in that experience, “This past/Is now here: the 
painter’s/Reflected face, in which we linger.”124 This return makes ekphrasis perfectly suited 
to articulating an ethics of reading and writing based on the principle of conversation because 
“to speak is to make the world common, to create commonplaces,”125 to create a “now here.” 
The ekphrastic poem, therefore, is such a commonplace, occupying a place between the visual 
and the verbal but also transforming poiesis, the making of poetry, into the performative act of 
creating commonplaces, occasions of encounter between the poet and the artist, and by 
extension the poet and the reader, that enact a “poethics of proximity,” the lived experience of 
an ethical relation between “(my)Self” and “(an)Other.”  
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In speaking out to create a commonplace, the ekphrastic poem embodies the crucial 
function language itself performs in this ethical relation. It makes one’s world common, 
opening one’s perspective and past experiences to oneself and to the other, thus accomplishing 
“the primordial putting in common.”126 Language does not simply “exteriorise a representation 
pre-existing in me: it puts in common a world hitherto mine” and is a “first action…that inserts 
us into the world, with the risks and hazards of all action,” thereby “answer[ing] to the face of 
the Other or…question[ing] him[/her to open]…the perspective of the meaningful.”127 While 
the material details of the ekphrastic setting are foregrounded, “Vienna where the painting is 
today, where/I saw it with Pierre in the summer of 1959; New York/Where I am now”128 and 
how “we must get out of it even as the public/Is pushing through the museum now so as to/Be 
out by closing time,”129 the ekphrastic poem can never properly recreate the actual place. 
Consequently, the site is “transformed from a physical location to a discursive”130 one, a 
commonplace made in language, or more specifically through poetic discourse. Using 
Parmigianino’s Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror demonstrates Levinas’ assertion that “the face 
speaks” because the “manifestation of the face is already discourse,” as Ashbery describes the 
“gloss on the fine/Freckled skin, lips moistened as though about to part/Releasing speech.”131 
Like language itself, the ekphrastic poem “presupposes interlocutors, a plurality”132 because 
the poet is responding to something that preceded his composition, “as Parmigianino did it.” 
Ashbery is writing in response to the painter’s interpretation, contemplating “the silence in the 
studio as he considers/Lifting the pencil to the self-portrait” and the “many people [who] came 
and stayed a certain time” according to his perspective and past experiences, “I think of the 
friends/Who came to see me, of what yesterday/Was like.”133 The ekphrastic poem captures 
“the ethical condition or essence of language” because it relies on both “expression and 
responsibility.” 134  In writing an ekphrastic poem, the poet is obligated to realise his/her 
“response-ability” because in the “relationship with the Other that is cast in the relation of 
language…the essential is the interpellation, the vocative.”135 Ashbery’s use of a self-portrait 
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in which the face of “(an)Other” is foregrounded makes the ekphrastic poem crucial to 
understanding this sense of interpellation, how the “face opens the primordial discourse whose 
first word is obligation,” the conversation that “obliges [my] entering into discourse” that 
cannot be “evade[d] by silence.”136 By including the interpretations of art critics, such as 
Giorgio Vassari’s identification of Self Portrait…’s mimetic qualities, “‘Francesco one day set 
himself/To take his own portrait, looking at himself for that purpose/In a convex mirror…/…he 
set himself/With great art to copy all that he saw in the glass,’”137 and Sydney Freedberg’s 
comment, that “Realism in this portrait/No longer produces an objective truth, but a bizarria . 
. . ./…/…[that] retain[s]/A strong measure of ideal beauty,”138 Ashbery’s “SPCM” captures the 
poet entering into conversation with others, responding to their interpretations and answering 
for himself by expressing his own. While Parmigianino’s Self-Portrait…as the subject of 
Ashbery’s “SPCM” helps us conceptualise the ethical impetus behind the face-to-face 
encounter, it also reminds us that a literal encounter in the poem is impossible, “…the soul is 
a captive…/…unable to advance much farther/ Than your look as it intercepts the picture,”139 
it can only occur in discourse, entering into conversation with “(an)Other” who puts me into 
question by resisting my interpretations and obligating me to realise my “response-ability” by 
answering for myself.  
If ekphrasis exploits the ethical condition of language to illustrate how poetry can be 
informed by the same principle of interpellation and “response-ability” motivating 
conversation between “(my)Self” and “(an)Other” then, secondly, such poems also 
demonstrate how an encounter with what is other is possible in poetry. According to W. J. T. 
Mitchell’s description of ekphrasis as the “genre in which texts encounter their own semiotic 
‘others,’”140  the ekphrastic poem has a certain ethical imperative because it does not just 
resemble the self-other relation but is the fundamental model of this encounter. More 
importantly, the engagement with otherness or alterity is “not determined systematically or a 
priori, but in specific contexts of pragmatic application,”141 in the “working through” of the 
encounter between text and image, and by extension self and other, in the acts of writing and, 
as will be seen, reading an ekphrastic poem. “SPCM” is a third term since it is the ekphrastic 
depiction of Parmigianino’s “reflection, of which the portrait/Is the reflection once 
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removed,” 142  the commonplace of encounter between apparent opposites, otherwise 
understood as the lived space of proximity between “(my)Self” and “(an)Other.” However, the 
poem also utilises ekphrasis as a “universal principle of poetics”143 to affirm the importance of 
absence in how we engage with otherness, how we might encounter “(an)Other,” in a poem. 
Because the complete verbal re-presentation of visual experience is impossible, “the ekphrastic 
encounter in language is purely figurative. The image...cannot literally come into view,”144 
unlike, for example, the verbal and visual encounters that occur in “imagetexts” such as The 
Vermont Notebook, the collaboration between Ashbery and the poet-painter Joe Brainard that 
immediately preceded the publication of SPCM. The other of the text, the image, can never be 
properly present, it exists only as “a potent absence or a fictive, figural present.”145   
In “SPCM,” Parmigianino’s Self-Portrait... presents such a “presenced absence” but 
Ashbery heightens the difficulty by emphasising the ethical imperative behind his use of 
ekphrasis. Just as Parmigianino’s painting arrests the occasion of its composition, Ashbery’s 
poem catches him in the act of not only interpreting the painting but responding to 
Parmigianino who is literally absent yet figuratively present as the subject of the self-portrait. 
This relation between the poet and the painter is made more difficult to portray because self-
portraiture is informed by Levinas’ argument that the presence of the other is qualified by a 
certain absence, it’s a face “whose presence is discreetly an absence.”146 The self-portrait, the 
face of Parmigianino, is the source of radical otherness that interpellates Ashbery. According 
to Levinas, the face “determines a relationship different from that which characterises all our 
sensible experiences”147  because it at once denotes a particular, embodied subject who is 
present but also a source of radical otherness that is not present. Levinas calls this “imperialism 
of the same” because it “consists in negating or possessing the non-me.”148 Appropriately, 
Ashbery does not mimetically describe Parmigianino’s face but rather enacts the experience of 
encountering it, exploiting the ethics of ekphrasis founded on the fact that the poem does not, 
cannot, appropriate the painting, therefore, the image, in this case the face of Parmigianino, is 
“(an)Other,” both a particular person and a source of radical otherness. An ekphrastic poem 
whose subject is a self-portrait perfectly captures how the face of another person confirms that 
the world is seen from innumerable different perspectives informed by experiences otherwise 
                                                      
142
 Ashbery, “SPCM,” CP, 474. 
143
 Mitchell, 156. 
144
 Ibid, 158. 
145
 Ibid. 
146
 Levinas, TI, 155. 
147
 Ibid, 187. 
148
 Ibid, 87. 
  
 
148 
 
inaccessible to me and why language, why entering into conversation with another person, is 
necessary because through it I am called to escape containment in and the consensus of my 
singular point of view, how “it is certain that/What is beautiful seems so only in relation to a 
specific/Life, experienced or not.” 149  Because of “The distance [and difference] between 
[them],”150 Parmigianino is a source of otherness that cannot be properly represented because 
he exceeds all categories of the same determined by Ashbery’s experiences, “he overflows 
absolutely every idea [he] can have of him.”151 It also demonstrates the “necessary difficulty” 
of ekphrasis because it is impossible to determine where the poetic ends or begins in relation 
to the other artistic text. Ekphrasis enacts a social practice since by its nature it “opens into 
networks of social encounter within and beyond the boundaries of the poem”152 that includes 
at least one other than “I.” In this sense, it can be seen as enacting how one might respond to 
others in a way that constitutes him/her as an ethical subject. As a poem in which interpretation 
is a further act of composition, it shows how one realises his/her “response-ability” by reading 
someone else’s work, how one can write a responsive and responsible ethical subject into 
existence within the social world of others by the way one reads. “We live from acts – and from 
the very act of being...What I do and what I am is at the same time that from which I live”153 
and according to Ashbery’s “poethics,” writing and reading poetry are just such constitutive 
acts. 
    
 
(4.6) Face-to-Face with Ashbery 
 
If aesthetic experience, how one encounters and responds to a particular artwork, can be 
considered a source of individuation, a means of making “I” different from “you,” then its most 
suitable symbol is the human face due to its uniqueness, irreducibility and untransferability. In 
its physical uniqueness, the face of Parmigianino “is a sign of the individuality,” of the 
difference, of another person and “is simultaneously symbolic of the originality, difference, 
polyphony, and veracity of art.”154 Accordingly, as Ashbery posits it in “SPCM,” the aesthetic 
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experience of poetry involves a face-to-face encounter, “it is a facing toward one another, a 
proximity of faces which reveals the one to the other.”155 Therefore, the face of Parmigianino 
is more than just an image, it reveals “(an)Other,” it intimates in the same way art and, as 
Ashbery hopes to, poetry intimates. He writes a poem that is, like Parmigianino’s self-portrait, 
revealing of the other and in being so demands the reader to engage face-to-face with that 
potentiality. Since “it is only in approaching the Other that I attend to myself…that I expose 
myself to the questioning of the Other” which “engenders me for responsibility,”156 the type of 
attention involved required for an ekphrastic poem about a self-portrait is concurrent with the 
ethics of writing and reading poetry that Ashbery advances. As Levinas explains, 
“attention…[is] not a refinement of consciousness, but consciousness itself…Attention is 
attention to something because it is attention to someone.”157 If attention is “consciousness 
itself,” how we pay attention to others determines the type of person we are. Therefore, how 
Ashbery reads Parmigianino is crucial to the ethics he advances. This emphasis on attention to 
someone other than “(my)Self” reveals that “the act of reading is inscribed upon the ekphrastic 
text and serves as its basic...presupposition” since the “reader of the literary text must read and 
interpret the reading process of the writer, who, in turn reads and interprets a visual text.”158 
More importantly, “in reading the poet reading another text, we...as readers have the 
opportunity to get a glimpse of how we read,”159 of how and to what we pay attention to, thus 
realising self-consciousness. In reading, therefore, “we find ourselves...but only in the language 
of the other.”160 That is, only by entering into conversation with the poet as “(an)Other” in the 
commonplace, the lived space of proximity, made by language, can I hope to attain self-
consciousness of “(my)Self” as a reader, as an embodied ethical subject who has realised 
his/her “response-ability.”  
 That Ashbery intends his own “SPCM” to perform the same function as Parmigianino’s 
does for him is apparent when he describes how “A breeze like the turning of a page/Brings 
back your face.”161 Like the painter, he captures the occasion of his own interpretation as 
composition so accurately “that you could be fooled for a moment/Before you realise the 
reflection/isn’t yours.” 162  The eponymous poem is Ashbery’s self-portrait and, like 
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Parmigianino’s does for him, it allows whoever is interpreting it to perform his/her own act of 
self-representation, to author “(my)Self” because “The words are only speculation/(From the 
Latin speculum, mirror).”163 In an identical manner to the poet, the reader is meant to author 
his/her own self-portrait by responding to Ashbery as “(an)Other,” a source of otherness who 
is both present and absent: 
 
 
                                          ...the whole of me 
 Is seen to be supplanted by the strict  
 Otherness of the painter in his  
 Other room.164     
 
 
 
Replacing “painter” with “poet” and “Other room” with the “now here” of the poem’s 
composition reveals how the ekphrastic encounter between Ashbery and Parmigianino, “the 
painter’s/Reflected face, in which we linger,”165 makes “you notice life,”166 it is:  
 
 
                                                                 ...a metaphor 
Made to include us, we are a part of it and 
Can live in it as in fact we have done167  
 
 
 
and must continue to do if the ethics of writing and reading poetry he articulates is to have 
“poethical” implications. Ultimately, how Ashbery reads Parmigianino, how he realises his 
“response-ability” in the face-to-face encounter of the aesthetic event, is how we might read 
Ashbery and in doing so author “(my)Self” by responding to “(an)Other.” As with ekphrasis, 
when the reader interprets Ashbery’s “SPCM” s/he provides a further composition similarly 
informed by a “poethics of proximity,” s/he writes an ethical subject into existence in the way 
s/he reads and responds to the poet. Parmigianino’s face confronts the poet with an irreducible, 
inassimilable otherness:  
 
 
an unfamiliar stereotype, the face 
/…/ 
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…[that] looks like everything 
We have forgotten, I mean forgotten 
Things that don’t seem familiar when  
We meet them again, lost beyond telling, 
Which were ours once.168  
 
 
 
Ashbery’s self-portrait, “a bitter impression of absence, which as we know involves presence,” 
is meant to do the same for the reader, meaning that the conversation, the call and response, 
between poet and reader is not about uncertainty reduction, quite the opposite in fact: 
 
 
                                        ...This always 
 Happens, as in the game where 
 A whispered phrase passed around the room 
Ends up as something completely different. 
It is the principle that makes works of art so unlike 
What the artist intended. Often he finds 
He has omitted the thing he started out to say 
in the first place169 
 
 
 
Just as I cannot predict or control the other due to “the unforeeableness of his reaction,”170 the 
painter cannot control what happens to his painting, cannot determine how “(an)Other” in the 
“pragmatic, kinetic future” will respond to it. Such explicit dependency on the interpretation 
of another person means the poet cannot have any certainty about something as basic as the 
content of his poem, thereby signalling the complete negation of his singular authority during 
the poem’s composition in favour of making each subsequent interpretation a further 
composition because it produces “something completely different” to “What the artist 
intended.” 171  This otherwise aesthetic encounter has important ethical implications that 
irrevocably thicken Ashbery’s poetics with an “h:” 
 
 
                          ...Is there anything 
 To be serious about beyond the otherness 
 That gets included in the most ordinary  
 Forms of daily activity, changing everything 
 Slightly and profoundly, and tearing the matter 
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 Of creation, any creation, not just artistic creation 
 Out of our hands, to install it on some monstrous, near 
 Peak, too close to ignore, too far  
 For one to intervene? This otherness, this 
 “Not-being-us” is all there is to look at 
 In the mirror172 
 
 
Ashbery’s text, the speculative words, is a mirror placed before the reader, who confronts an 
irreducible, inassimilable otherness to which s/he must respond and in doing so compose 
his/her own self-portrait. Creation here refers to both the aesthetic activity and the act of 
creating, or authoring, a self, or put alternatively, self-representation is the correlative of self-
consciousness. Consequently, the act of creating as posited by Ashbery is like any other action 
performed during one’s daily activities of acting in and interacting with the social world of 
others, that is, it precludes “(my)Self” as an autotelic subject because it means engaging with 
the otherness of “(an)Other” that constitutes the subject in the first place. It is the “first 
philosophy” that occurs in the commonplace of the face-to-face encounter, the lived space of 
proximity. Like Levinas’ ethics, Ashbery’s “poethics” is an “optics,”173 a way of seeing beyond 
the totality of the singular, autotelic self, with its categories of the same that reduce all 
differences to its self-centered ontology, and toward the social world of others, learning that 
“(my)Self” is never alone but always already encountering “(an)Other.”      
 Without Parmigianino’s Self-Portrait…, Ashbery’s insistence on the crucial role played 
by the face-to-face encounter between “(my)Self” and “(an)Other” in all acts of self-authoring 
could not have been so committed. Nevertheless, this experience is purely aesthetic and visual, 
which differs significantly from the experience of proximity possible in a poetic text. 
Therefore, it functions only as an analogue for the face-to-face encounter between the poet and 
the reader as respective others in the commonplace of the text: 
 
 
                                                           Each person 
Has one big theory to explain the universe 
But it doesn’t tell the whole story 
And in the end it is what is outside him 
That matters, to him and especially to us 
Who have been given no help whatever 
In decoding our own man-size quotient and must rely 
On second-hand knowledge.174  
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Unlike Parmigianino, whose convex mirror allows him as the composing subject to see himself 
as the interpreted object in the environment he inhabits, situated amongst “A few leaded panes, 
old beams,/Fur, pleated muslin,”175 Ashbery cannot be both subject and object, his self-portrait 
requires at least two perspectives, his own and some other’s “second-hand knowledge.” Such 
reliance on another person’s perspective, an exteriority to supplement one’s own interiority and 
help “tell the whole story,” is best explained using Bakhtin’s “excess of seeing,”176 the fact 
that:  
 
 
When I contemplate a whole human being who is situated outside...me, our concrete, 
actually experienced horizons do not coincide. For at each given moment, regardless of 
the position and the proximity to me of this other human being whom I am 
contemplating, I will always see and know something that he...cannot see himself: parts 
of his body that are inaccessible to his own gaze...the world behind his back, and a 
whole series of objects and relations, which...are accessible to me but not to him...this 
ever-present excess of my seeing...in relation to any other human being is founded on 
the uniqueness and irreplaceability of my place in the world.177  
 
 
 
This "excess of seeing" confirms the importance of outsideness for Bakhtin, or in this case, for 
a Bakhtinian understanding of "aesthethic" activity, since we cannot author ourselves because 
we cannot see ourselves from within the self, we "lack any approach to ourselves from outside 
the self."178 Another person is required who "has a unique position of outsideness"179 that 
engenders an "excess of seeing" due to my inability to properly see myself within my 
immediate environment, the impossibility of experiencing "I" as just another object amongst 
others. The reader provides the “excess of seeing,” the exteriority that exceeds the interiority 
of the poet, because s/he is informed by the circumstances of the unique spatial-temporal 
position s/he inhabits and from which s/he interprets the poet in his/her environment. As he 
explains, it “is very difficult to decide at certain moments what the ideal reader is going to 
know about and what he isn’t going to know about.”180  The reader’s “excess of seeing” 
                                                      
175
 Ibid, 474. 
176
 Mikhail Bakhtin, Art and Answerability: Early Philosophical Essays, trans. Vadim Liapunov, ed. Michael 
Holquist and Vadim Liapunov (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1990), 22. 
177
 Ibid, 23. 
178
 Deborah Haynes, Bakhtin Reframed: Interpreting Key Thinkers for the Arts (London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 
2013), 56. 
179
 Ibid. 
180
 Ashbery, “Craft Interview,” 123. 
  
 
154 
 
prevents him/her being appropriated by the poet into categories of the same, it allows the reader 
to retain his/her alterity as “(an)Other” because his/her perspective remains inaccessible to the 
poet.    
Due to the nature of the aesthetic event, Parmigianino cannot respond to Ashbery, the 
encounter is one-sided, hence his request that the painter “withdraw that hand,/Offer it no 
longer as shield or greeting” 181  because he is confined to the past, “cold pockets/Of 
remembrance” 182  and cannot  inhabit the “now here” with Ashbery, his “soul is a 
captive…/…unable to advance much farther/…/…[it] has to stay where it is:”183  
 
 
Longing to be free, outside, but it must stay 
Posing in this place. It must move 
As little as possible. This is what the portrait says.184 
 
 
 
In the poem as an event, on the other hand, the call and response between the poet and the 
reader is possible because Ashbery’s “past/Is now here,”185 “New York/Where I am now, 
which is a logarithm/Of other cities,”186 it is potentially any place. The reader is “(an)Other” 
for Ashbery, an absence and a presence, to whose interpretation in the “pragmatic and kinetic 
future” he responds in order to answer for himself, to write himself into existence as a 
heteronomic yet non-appropriative ethical subject. Because the reader cannot be known to 
Ashbery, only proximity is possible. Ashbery enters into communication as proximity with his 
reader where the intention is not uncertainty reduction but the ethical encounter between 
“(my)Self” and “(an)Other:” 
 
 
 But we know it cannot be sandwiched  
 Between two adjacent moments, that its windings 
 Lead nowhere except further tributaries 
 And that these empty themselves into a vague 
 Sense of something that can never be known 
 Even though it seems likely that each of us 
 Knows what it is and is capable of 
 Communicating it to the other.187  
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Because it will be changed by each subsequent reading, the actual content of the poem is not 
as important as the act of communication itself, the moment of interacting with another person 
beyond my limits of the known and knowable. This suggestion of communicating the unknown 
gestures toward what subsequently replaces Levinas’ ethics of the face-to-face encounter, the 
saying and the said, which, as will be seen later, is central to Palmer’s “poethics.” The reader’s 
projected interpretation obligates Ashbery to explain himself, to realise his “response-ability” 
by writing a poem and in doing so authoring a self. That Ashbery does not try to prescribe 
particular readings or coerce his readers into assuming a particular perspective is proof that he 
does not appropriate the other, he does not reduce his/her alterity by assimilating the other into 
the categories of the same through which he perceives and makes sense of the world, thereby 
writing an ethical subject into existence.  
However, since Ashbery’s “SPCM” is supposed to allow whoever is interpreting it to 
compose his/her own self-portrait, it is a “moment of attention,”188 an occasion that calls 
readers’ attention to how they make, or author, themselves through the acts they perform when 
responding to another person in the commonplace of the text. The reader must respond to 
Ashbery as “(an)Other,” that is, without completely identifying with him or reducing his 
alterity by trying to understand the world from his unique perspective, hence him being 
consistently “reluctant as any landscape/To yield what are laws of perspective.”189 Ultimately, 
we must “miss each other”190 because “SPCM” is “a gauge of the weather, which in French 
is/Le temps, the word for time.”191 Like any other poem, it can be used to determine the 
environment or times in which it was written but, perhaps more importantly, it must be made 
to correspond with the times in which it is read or rewritten by the reader who completes the 
act of communication because as a material text it is literally “sandwiched/Between two 
adjacent moments,”192 the two “now heres” inhabited by the poet and reader as they encounter 
each other in the lived space of proximity. The reader is called to respond by Ashbery since he 
inscribes further unknown and unknowable compositions into his own text, “which/Follows a 
course wherein changes are merely/Features of the whole.”193  This ethics of writing and 
reading poetry, however, has practical application, it is a “poethics,” because the actions 
performed by such a responsive and responsible ethical subject are the same as those performed 
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when one acts in and interacts with the social world of others, they are all “the most 
ordinary/Forms of daily activity.”194 Responding to the interpretations of “(an)Other” who 
challenges my singular interpretation of our situation in order to answer for myself while never 
appropriating him/her is to enact a “first philosophy,” it is to write a non-appropriative, 
heteronomic subject into existence constituted by “response-ability” during the experience of 
proximity, the encounter between “(my)Self” and “(an)Other” as different and distant subjects 
that occurs in the commonplace of conversation or, in this case, the event of the poem.     
 
 
Conclusion: The Shield of a Greeting 
 
Despite the reader’s best efforts, s/he can never properly comprehend Ashbery, but this is 
precisely the point because the epistemological aspect of understanding him can never be 
separated from the problematic ontological issue of appropriating “(an)Other” into the 
categories of the same through which “(my)Self” interprets the world and his/her position 
within it. Just as he “beseech[es Parmigianino to] withdraw that hand,/Offer it no longer as 
shield or greeting,/The shield of a greeting,” Ashbery too withdraws his hand. This is not due 
to an inability to self-disclose, as will be seen with Palmer, but a decided unwillingness and 
refusal due to a persistent reticence for personal and political reasons. While he does extend a 
gesture toward the reader, intimating the possibility of a handshake due to his reliance on 
another’s “second-hand knowledge,”195 they ultimately “miss each other.”196 The potential to 
“touch, love, explain” 197  identified at the beginning of Ashbery’s exploration of self-
representation is never actualised. To encounter Ashbery as an “(an)Other,” to experience 
proximity, he can never be properly grasped, a difference and distance remains to prevent a 
complete identification either of or with Ashbery and ensure his constitutive alterity is 
preserved. Miscomprehension, therefore, is crucial to any attempt at “self-representation” for 
Ashbery because it ensures, even forever prolongs, this longing, calling out for someone else’s 
interpretation to pose a question and interrupt the autotelic subject. Consequently, it also 
affords the reader both the permission and the obligation to realise his/her “response-ability,” 
to answer Ashbery’s call as someone who remains unknown and unknowable, thus writing 
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“(my)Self” into existence as a responsive and responsible reader. The experience of proximity 
engendered by his work is always a lived experience, a “poethics” readily applicable to how 
“(my)Self” acts in and interacts with the social world of others. As with Parmigianino for 
Ashbery, the poet is not empirically available to the reader, he is an absence and a presence, at 
once the face of a particular person and every other person, such that our response in the “now 
here” of the poem is both particular to the textual occasion of reading but also a performed act 
with consequences in the extratextual world  for which “(my)Self” is answerable. The difficulty 
of his work should not detract from the fact that he does extend a gesture toward the reader, 
the “other I with which we began,”198 as he turns his attention toward him/her in conversation. 
How one decides to respond, with either a shield or a greeting, is secondary to the act of 
responding itself, acknowledging Ashbery as “(an)Other” and, in turning his/her “attention to 
you,” 199  representing “(my)Self” as a responsive and responsible subject through his/her 
performed acts. If “everything is surface,” 200  as Ashbery proposes, his “words are only 
speculation/(From the Latin speculum, mirror).” This ensures the surface he creates is one that 
reflects the reader’s own speculations and uncertainties regarding what it means to act in and 
interact with the social world of others as an ethical subject. As a result, the difficulty is 
necessary because it prolongs the experience of proximity to what is unknown and unknowable, 
posing a question to “(my)Self” that interrupts any attempt at self-representation and ensuring 
“response-ability” is realised.    
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Part II: “Difficult but not Impossible:” The Saying of the 
Said in Michael Palmer 
 
The eponymous, concluding poem in S immediately orders whoever is reading it to “Write 
This,” to articulate the “secrets beyond the boundaries of speech,” and to “Say This,” to 
enunciate a “poem…called What Speaking Means to Say.”1 However, Palmer’s imperative to 
the reader simply extends his own vocation, the call from an unknown and unknowable source 
outside the self that expresses nothing but irrevocably calls one’s attention to a possible way 
of living. The collections up to and including those gathered together in CA, NEL, FF and S, 
are his response to the calling to write and say “this,” a deceptively simple task because it 
“return[s us] to where it [all] began,” to when we “never used words, never/knew any.”2 
Writing as saying, or saying as writing, “this” foregrounds the various commitments involved 
in self-articulation prior to any consideration of the semantic content of what is written or 
spoken, to what is “beyond the boundaries of speech,” to what speaking itself says. Signifying 
my presence as a subject amongst innumerable others who not only permit but obligate my 
“response-ability” necessitates the difficult task of living according to an ethical sensibility, of 
being attentive toward others before I attend to myself. For this reason, “poetry is a form of 
listening” 3  prior to the writing or saying of “this,” that “here I am.”4 Both the “making and 
the receiving [of poetry] are forms of listening…to an unknown language found everywhere 
among our daily words, in the current of our common speech.”5 “Reading [and writing poetry, 
therefore,] has never been separate from living…for [him],”6 they are the vital activities that 
open-up the autotelic subject and make it heteronomic, make it responsive and responsible.  
For someone who places such ethical significance on these activities, his work often 
seems preoccupied with exposing the failures of language and our attendant incapacities to 
express, comprehend or explain either ourselves or others. Palmer’s poetry, however, is 
informed by what he terms a “scientific/silence,”7 not careless omissions or conceited erasures 
but a carefully constructed oeuvre wherein the impossibility of reading and writing in any 
conventional sense is proclaimed in order to foreground the possibility of listening. 
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Furthermore, he writes on “Pages which accept no ink,”8 revealing the inherent difficulty 
experienced when composing and interpreting since the empty spaces that accompany his often 
sparse, condensed and muted poems suggest that what is not, cannot and must not be said is 
equally important to what is said. In his scathing review of S, William Logan, more than likely 
despite his best intentions, highlights a crucial aspect of Palmer’s poetics by arguing that 
“reading [him] is like listening to serial music” and his “language is frequently reduced to 
surface gestures.”9 Palmer admits there is an undeniable “musicality that the poetry....tends 
toward” as it: 
 
 
build[s] up a rather dense harmonic structure that begins to constellate meanings, not 
simply on its own but meanings’ relationships. Meanings’ rhymes...It points you 
backward and forward; it takes away linearity. It also subverts intent in an interesting 
way, and creates its own intention, and overcomes the limits of one’s momentary 
thinking by announcing that these two things, so far apart, go together...it can challenge 
the apparent and multiply meanings, take us beyond what we thought we were talking 
about to something more like a subject that reveals itself as you go along – which 
interests me as a way to overcome my own habits of thought.10   
 
 
Musicality allows for a “particular poetic logic that seems to have a dimension of thought to it 
that’s less available in other forms of discourse,” such that the “juxtaposition of fat and cat...is 
made logical by the music but is countered by the sign itself.”11 Approaching Palmer’s work 
as a kind of serial music “demands from us an involuntary responsiveness...a participation prior 
to understanding,”12 a way of thinking otherwise as we give our attention to what is normally 
silenced by our habitual thinking and listen to what he says prior to analysing the semantic 
content of what is actually said. Palmer refers to “T. Sphere [Thelonious Monk]...speaking in 
the dark with his...hands” 13  to explain how listening “prior to understanding” involves 
approaching language as gesture, a way of speaking a language of the unsayable through 
poiesis, a matter of the hands making the poem and gesturing toward another person. S signals 
Palmer “closing Mr. Circle with a/single stroke,” 14  suggesting this collection somehow 
articulates the initiating acts that engender his self-articulation. Therefore, analysing what is 
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said in subsequent collections is secondary to understanding how he negotiates the various 
ethical commitments involved in writing and saying “this” in the first place.   
The difficulty of Palmer’s work has resulted in the critical commonplace of including 
him amongst the Language poets, the self-styled avant-gardists who rose to prominence in the 
seventies and eighties. The most in-depth studies of his work to date, for example, Linda 
Reinfeld’s Language Poetry: Writing as Rescue (1992), Nerys Williams’ Reading Error: The 
Lyric and Contemporary Poetry (2007) and David Arnold’s Poetry and Language Writing: 
Objective and Surreal (2007), determinatively classify him as a Language poet, despite his 
numerous protestations regarding the “so-called language-oriented identity...[with] its possible 
suggestion of a purely formal orientation”15 and his wish “to mute the interest in [critical] 
theory [and poststructuralist philosophy] that the term implies”16 when used in connection to 
the work of the founding poet-critics Charles Bernstein, Ron Silliman, Bruce Andrews and 
Barrett Watten. While I am not suggesting that Palmer ostracises himself from his national and 
historical contemporaries, his particular approach to how and why someone writes and reads 
poetry means he is admittedly more at home in the company of Friedrich Hölderlin, Charles 
Baudelaire, Arthur Rimbaud, Rainer Maria Rilke, Paul Celan, César Vallejo and Edmond 
Jabès, who constitute an international genealogy of the modern lyric that ignores national 
borders and the consequent notions of nationalist identities and foreign languages because their 
subject is the “daily word,” the “current of our common speech,” hence his insistence that while 
he “learned language on this island but did not speak on this island” and his claim to “writing 
a book, not in my native language.”17  Each poet focuses his attention on the “disintegration of 
faith in the sign,” the “unravelling of the sign” as “involved with the unravelling of the subject,” 
and the resultant “sense of doubt about the relationship between (within a sign, let’s say, the 
signifier and the signified) the acoustical image and the concept.”18 Their work ultimately tries 
to articulate what cannot be written or spoken in language when understood as a vehicle for 
self-expression and self-disclosure because their concern is the inexpressible, the limits of 
language itself and what happens beyond the boundaries of what can be said personally, 
politically and poetically.  
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In this sense, Palmer, as Ward correctly observes, “wrote poetry before there was 
Language”19 in that his poetics originate in an attitude preceding the Language poets’ and in 
terms of his attempt to articulate what lies outside the capacities of language, a significance 
that precedes, even exceeds, what is written and spoken. Furthermore, his friendship with 
Robert Duncan, whose high Romantic sensibility encouraged his own questioning of the 
speaking subject,   prevented complete assimilation to Language poetics, or any singular poetic 
movement, by confirming the importance of a “symposium of the whole” in which:  
 
 
all the old excluded orders must be included. The female, the proletarian, the foreign; 
the animal and vegetative; the unconscious and the unknown; the criminal and failure 
– all that has been outcast and vagabond must return to be admired in the creation of 
what we consider we are.20 
 
 
Following the example of Duncan, Palmer embodies a sensibility toward difference emerging 
in the sixties and seventies that finds probably its most explicit realisation in the ethnopoetic 
anthologies of Jerome Rothenberg, who advanced the idea of a hypothetical worldwide body 
of poetry that was equivalent in value to “combat cultural genocide in all of its 
manifestations.”21 Studying “bodies of work that reflected lives and aspirations of politically 
and socioeconomically underrepresented members of the world’s many communities, as well 
as underrepresented aspects (hidden social…histories, collective origins, [etc]) of more 
traditionally canonical verse”22 involved listening out for and responding to others’ forgotten, 
ignored or erased voices. The tendency of aligning Palmer with the Language poets can be 
understood since his concern for difference corresponds with the classical avant-garde position 
these poets demarcated and resolutely inhabited. Like them, he “extend[s] modernist 
experimental traditions…[by engaging] with Left political commitments” but he is also 
“unabashedly lyric[al].” 23  His work combines a “hermeneutics of linguistic and political 
suspicion [with] a penchant for…austere elegance,” suggesting a poet “committed to 
interrogating codes and the limits of signification” from the very beginning but who also 
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“possesses an equal tendency toward the lyric[al].” 24 His insistence on the necessity of this 
lyrical sensibility as a way of responding to the urgent need for a critique of the discursive 
systems that subject us in both senses of the term demonstrates the futility of completely 
aligning Palmer with the Language poets, whose cardinal principle is the deconstruction of the 
lyrical subject in their de-authorised work. It is important to recognise that from the very 
beginning, Palmer encourages his readers to “misspell [his] name”25 and warns “Don’t say his 
name for him,”26 a strange strategy for a poet so concerned with self-articulation. However, 
this is neither a reductive attempt at self-erasure nor a self-othering but rather a way of 
exploring the act of naming itself to determine the possibility of using language to increase 
uncertainty, ensure miscomprehension, prevent identification, and, by extension, make poetry 
a space of impossibility where the personal and political failures of language can be redeemed 
and an ethical subject written into existence.       
  Throughout his various innovations, Palmer’s poetry demonstrates how “writing is 
also a kind of reading”27 in order to “question…the identity of the speaker and reader and 
listener, their interpenetrations.” 28  Unlike the Language poets, he is not concerned with 
critiquing late-capitalism by reconfiguring the relationship between the reader and the text. 
Palmer goes even further by determining the very possibility of poetry itself, its ability to 
respond to the political urgencies of the period without imposing equally proscriptive solutions, 
to acknowledge the experiences of others without appropriating them into the same categories 
through which I interpret the world, and to oppose prevalent socio-cultural discourses without 
being oppositional. Palmer’s critique is consistently levelled at “confessional expressionism,”29 
a particular method of writing and reading poetry that cannot engage with otherness, difference, 
alterity, etc., due to its inherent emphasis on self-disclosure. For this reason, he pursues the 
impossible poem, “a poem which does not exist! The absolute poem…[that] certainly does not, 
cannot exist.”30 For Palmer, poetry is a space of impossibility where he responds to the call of 
“(an)Other,” the question that interrupts him as an autotelic subject. How he writes and reads 
is a way of living in the social world of others, of listening in order to articulate “(my)Self” as 
a responsive and responsible subject. Most importantly, Palmer’s method of “close 
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writing…[as] close reading” 31  results in a densely interwoven network of intertextual 
references intended to make his “poethics” explicit: 
 
 
I like the possibility of intertextuality. I am a reader, perhaps too much of one, and I 
live to some degree in the book…Reading becomes co-extensive with the other 
experiences in my life…it is also a directive to people to go out and look [or listen to 
what is outside the self].32  
 
 
Palmer’s “poethics” means that he lives in the social world of others through the acts performed 
when writing and reading poetry, how he self-articulates. However, his call to the reader to 
“write this” and “say this” indicates that he is equally concerned with the reader realising 
his/her “response-ability.” The difficulty of Palmer’s work is necessary because it confirms 
there is always something personally and politically at stake in how and why we write and read 
poetry. By listening “prior to understanding” we are “free to speak and become the things we 
speak,”33 to articulate “(my)Self” as a responsive and responsible ethical subject in the social 
world of others.  
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Chapter 5: Outside(r) Influence in Blake’s Newton and 
The Circular Gates 
 
Palmer has always sought the counter-cultural, that which is incompatible with, and 
consequently excluded by, normative standards. This “counter tradition” exists “at the margins 
of thought, as the poem so often does, and as the poet all too often exists at the margins of 
material society”1 and is consequently characterised by a “necessary difficulty” because it 
refers to the very limits of the known and knowable, the margins where a profound otherness 
is encountered. He considers those associated with this “counter-tradition” to canonical 
mainstream poetry as being “outside, I mean outside, unpublished and unpublishable.” 2 
Beginning with those excluded from the “Frost-Eliot-Auden core of officially accepted 
Modernist poetry,”3 such as William Carlos Williams, HD, Gertrude Stein, Ezra Pound and 
Marianne Moore; he also includes the Objectivists Louis Zukofsky, Charles Reznikoff, Lorine 
Niedecker, George Oppen and Carl Rakosi, and the San Francisco Renaissance poets Robert 
Duncan, Jack Spicer and Robin Blaser. However, Palmer’s “Origins (Plural),”4 as he terms 
them, are not confined to his indigenous predecessors. This “counter-tradition” includes those 
who pursue “a poetry that’s demanding and complicated, a poetry that engages all of one’s 
being rather than being something like a decor for culture,”5 as demonstrated by poets such as 
Dante, Edmond éés, Friedrich Hölderlin, Paul Celan, César Vallejo, Osip Mandelstam and 
Marina Tsvetaeva. All these poets, to one extent or another, “tend to be outside, in their 
lifetimes, outside what becomes defined (very roughly) as the canonical mainstream.”6 For 
Palmer, each is interested in “the possibility of a life entirely given over to the poem,”7 to the 
belief that poetry is a way of acting in and interacting with the social world of others. As a 
result, a radical reconfiguration of poetry occurs because poiesis is no longer just about writing 
and reading poems but also about poetry as making, as a performative action that demarcates 
a space for outsiders, a space beyond the categories of the same where encounters with what is 
normally considered “Other” are possible. Such a space for outsiders allows for what Palmer 
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terms a community that is “not so much defined as imagined,”8 a community of differences 
rather than sameness that precludes strategies of containment and discourses of consensus. 
 Palmer refuses “to support any exclusionary authentication of focus or practice by a 
particular group,”9 which often turns out to be as exclusive as it is subversive. However, while 
he deliberately positions himself as a complete outsider from the beginning, Norman 
Finkelstein is correct in suggesting that his relocation to San Francisco in 1969 signalled the 
“heir to some of [the] most important figures [of the Renaissance] symbolically [coming] 
home.”10 Consequently, his early work, especially BN and CG, can be seen as being informed 
by what Blaser identified as the “practice of outside”11 to explain Spicer’s poetics but which 
Duncan and himself also practiced to varying extents. Blaser’s admission that he “come[s] to 
poetry with a definite sense of foreignness”12  is equally applicable to Spicer’s poetics of 
dictation and Duncan’s derivative poetics, as each is moved by a “desire…to write of that other, 
outside world.”13 This requires recognising that poetry surpasses individual authorial intention 
and denies a singular perspective because it exceeds the individual and admits the outside, what 
lies beyond the self, into the poem in its multiple manifestations as the unknown, the 
indeterminate, the unintentional and, as will be seen, “(an)Other.” However, Palmer does not 
just repeat the “practice of outside.” Instead he reconfigures it into a position of ekstasis, the 
initial result of his interest in a “counter-tradition” of outsiders that, through the influence of 
Duncan’s derivative poetics, eventually develops into a “poethics of proximity” as a way of 
living in the real world. He identifies a prominent example of ekstasis in Duncan’s:  
 
 
dialectical contention between creation and decreation...form and void, being and non-
being...[as] the creative imagination struggles endlessly to manifest itself, and by that, 
paradoxically, to transcend the limits of the self, to obliterate the self, to become other. 
[Poetic work]...involves a form of psych-osis, a standing outside the boundaries...Ec-
stasis would offer the brighter image of this state...[as] forces formed within...the 
“I”...must be channelled toward the obliteration of that “I” or self.14   
 
 
I am not suggesting a limiting genealogy of influence that posits Duncan as the only source 
from which Palmer derives his poetics since he himself acknowledges “obvious difference[s] 
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in [their] work.”15 Nevertheless, the reason they “could have a conversation for close enough 
to twenty years was that [they both] had so profound a sympathy about what the vocation of 
poetry was and about the responsibility of the poet to the work through the poem itself.”16 
Following the example of Duncan firstly and his experience at the Vancouver Poetry 
Conference (1963) secondly, Palmer confirms the importance of ‘outside(r) influence’ in BN 
and CG as a practical means of resisting the residual containment culture and consensus politics 
persisting from the fifties into the sixties and beyond. 
 
 
(5.1) Ekstasis: The Practice of Being an Outsider  
 
“Ekstasis,” as it functions in Palmer, involves both positioning himself outside particular 
groups in a practical, everyday sense to avoid questions of orthodoxy, assimilation and 
oppositionality, and gesturing toward otherness in terms of the poem and the self it writes into 
existence. From the beginning, Palmer demonstrates a committed “determination not to begin 
with an entirely preconceived and circumscribed subject or a normative predisposition toward 
the form and informing nature of poetry,”17 which refers to “a model for poetry” that “was 
proposed to [him] in school” and “came out of the New Critical attitude…a model that had 
become very pedantic…[and] had social implications that were noxious to [him]”18 In this 
sense, questions about poetic form as being either open or closed are, whether intentionally or 
not, involved in the larger political debates surrounding strategies of containment and 
discourses of consensus. For this reason, whether the poem is considered a self-enclosed, 
autotelic object of original poetic utterance or an open, heteronomic event conditioned by 
outside influences is more significant than the reductive, commonplace opposition between 
closed and open forms implies. Poetry as poeisis refers to the performative act of making, 
which involves acting in and interacting with the always politicised social world of others.
 In “Figure,” for example, Palmer uses “the gammadion”19 to demonstrate how these 
changing circumstances can radically alter the meaning of a text despite the intentions of the 
poet: 
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 formed of four capital 
 gammas 
 in a cross 
 or voided Greek cross 
 the same gammadion 
 the gamma she reads 
 meaning cornerstone.20    
 
 
The gammadion originally symbolised both the unity of the four corners of the world and the 
four constitutive elements of water, fire, air and earth. However, given its appropriation by the 
Nazis and its subsequent identification with right-wing politics, it is now “voided” and no 
longer “the same gammadion.” Because the symbol consists of Greek letters, “four 
capital/gammas,” it is also a word, thus demonstrating how the meanings of words are often 
outside the individual’s control but also, and perhaps more importantly, how even the personal 
use of language cannot be separated from the politics of the period. Palmer relates this to: 
 
 
 not seeing 
 the Gegenschein 
 or counterglow 
 an elliptical light 
 opposite the sun21       
 
 
As will be seen, this is not the only use of astrological terms to explain how his poetry might 
be read. Palmer is identifying the need to at least acknowledge the complete opposite of what 
might be intended by the author of any particular utterance. The reference to “Sagittarius the 
centaur,”22 the wanderer of the Zodiac, suggests that only those who remain beyond the bounds 
of society can properly understand oppositions without becoming confined within them. 
Palmer’s early poetry indicates how a position of ekstasis encourages readers to become 
outsiders in this sense, capable of reading the poem to engage with the other of what the poet 
intends and consequently encounter the otherness implicit in the text. Developing this theme, 
he explains in “The Old Movie (Or Le Fou, June 1967)” how: 
 
 
 I’m in it and it’s 
 dark 
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 and I’m reading Kit Smart.23  
 
 
Reading Christopher Smart, an eighteenth century English poet who wrote his most famous 
poems while confined in numerous mental asylums during a period when the very nature of 
madness and its treatment were being debated, illustrates Palmer’s interest in the position of 
the outsider, s/he who deviates from the normative standards of the period: 
 
 
 Last night I lost my 
 
 watch (my clock), 
 but I’m coming out to 
 
 get it 
 and get you too.24  
 
 
Palmer aspires to “coming [or getting] out” in a personal and political sense, to becoming an 
outsider and in doing so enacting how his readers can do the same. BN is concerned with 
madness as a relative construct according to rational thinking since it is named after William 
Blake’s Newton, a poet and painter who embodies the outsider position as he was regarded a 
madman by his contemporaries when he was actually a visionary who was ahead of, and 
therefore outside, the habitual epistemological systems of his time. 
It is in this context that Duncan’s poetry proved so revelatory as a way of living in the 
social world of others; a way of exploring the personal and political issues pertinent in the 
sixties that remained open to others’ differences. Furthermore, it also explains why Palmer’s 
relocation from the East to the West Coast to, amongst other things, converse with Duncan 
proved so significant. As he explains, Duncan proposed an alternative “to the poets I was 
encountering at that time in Harvard, the confessional poets, whose work was grounded to a 
greater or lesser degree in New Criticism.” 25  Palmer’s movement westward is his literal 
distancing himself from poetry that had “a cultural frame already attached to” it and was closely 
related “to the cultural centre” that manifests within this work.26 During his formal education 
at Harvard from “’61-’65,” 27  Palmer experienced an “eagerness to laud formulaic 
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contemporary verse, verse which displayed its theme and culture in no uncertain terms and 
which tended to subscribe to conventions of voice, tone, etc.”28 Similar to Ashbery’s decision 
to remain in Paris for ten years to evade the appropriative, neutralising force of the “acceptance 
world”29 in mainstream American culture, Palmer’s relocation to San Francisco represents a 
complete rejection of the establishment. In his case the normative critical standards of East 
Coast poetry centred around the Ivy League universities, due to the dominance of New 
Criticism’s normative critical standards as the authority despite it “aesthetically and 
politically...[tending] toward a reactionary nostalgia,”30 and the expressivist poetics of the 
confessionalists. While the “practice of outside” associated with the San Francisco Renaissance 
poets was important to Palmer’s own developing poetics, he provides an indication in “Bad to 
the Bone: What I Learned Outside” as to why Duncan in particular would prove so influential, 
addressing what he identifies as his search for a “door out of [normative standards] and into 
alternative [personal and political] values and bahaviours,31 a positive gesture of negation and 
anarchic refusal of temporal and spatial boundaries that circumscribe what can be said in 
poetry. Duncan is intrinsic to what Palmer identifies as an “evolution of the relationship with 
inside and outside.”32 Even before considering how his derivative poetics preclude a distinction 
between the inside and the outside because both are inscribed in the text, “Relativity, A Love 
Letter, and Relative to What; A Love Letter” (1937/1938) is an early example of how Duncan 
radically complicates these categories: 
 
 
      To come suddenly upon something. Suddenly upon something and 
 And partly only in being. To be outside and partly in being in by the 
 inside. Suddenly inside to come suddenly partly only to being. Being 
 only as for one partly understanding and a shut door.  
      Shutting out and shutting in. Shutting out shutting in and shutting 
 in shutting out. Inside and outside shut in. Inside and outside shut out.  
 Shut out. Shut, partly being shut and partly being shut. Inside and shut. 
 To come suddenly out and shut in.33 
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The final line suggests that Duncan’s negation of the binary opposition that the categories of 
inside and outside reinforce is informed by his unique homosexual politics, his understanding 
that to “come…out” as gay is to be simultaneously “shut in” the category of homosexual. 
It is easy to understand why Palmer, who himself warns that being oppositional “will 
eventuate in futility, with our own means turned against us,”34 would identify so completely 
with the author of “The Homosexual in Society,” who argued that “minority associations and 
identifications were an evil wherever they supersede allegiance to [fellow-manhood] and share 
in the creation of a human community good...[where there is] only the tribe and its covenant 
that are good, and all of mankind outside and their ways are evil.”35 While Duncan’s stance 
was pioneering, his homosexuality was always a secondary concern to his deconstruction of 
any bounded sense of identity in order to make a difference by making something different: 
 
 
What I think can be asserted as a starting point is that only one devotion can be held by 
a human being seeking a creative life and expression, and that is a devotion to human 
freedom...To do this one must disown all the special groups (nations, churches, sexes, 
races) that would claim allegiance. To hold this devotion every written word, every 
spoken word, every action, every purpose must be examined and considered.36 
 
 
This is the vocation Palmer identifies with, a way of living in the social world of others and 
negotiating “the old fears, the old specialities [that] will be there, mocking and tempting; the 
old protective associations [that] will be there.”37 Duncan’s politics take precedence over his 
sexuality as he critiques oppositional minority groups for perpetuating the same strategies of 
containment and discourses of consensus exercised by the normative majority, the “somehow 
hostile, the sinister affiliation offered by groups with whom [he] had no common ground other 
than the specialised sexuality” and the attendant “anxiety concerning the good opinion of the 
community.”38 As a result, Duncan always writes “against closed communities...in order to 
appeal to a general public trust, rather than allied or exclusive group interests.”39 Because he is 
aware of the “multiple exclusions and the dynamics between them and the included 
categories,”40 he makes a “community of values [in his poetry that] is more openly defined.”41 
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In a period marked by a “terror and hatred of all communal things, of communion,/of 
communism,” 42  Duncan’s refusal to perpetuate the exclusionary ethos of minoritising, 
oppositional groups in favour of inclusivity and openness toward individual differences 
illustrates the politics of ekstasis. 
Ekstasis, positioning oneself outside the body-politic, is not to deny one’s responsibility 
but an opportunity to realise one’s “response-ability,” albeit without the “protective 
associations” provided by strategies of containment and discourses of consensus. Duncan’s 
example was crucial for Palmer at a time when “a much more nomadic human responsiveness” 
was needed; he was someone who didn’t “think political responsibility [was] diminished by 
that...if anything, the immediate political responsibility [was] increased but it’s a responsibility 
to the actual human world rather than to abstractions.”43  He believed “effective political 
poetry…[should avoid] oppositional, polarising attacks,” such as those found in the Vietnam 
War-era.44 This led to his infamous disagreement with Denise Levertov, whose involvement in 
the war resistance movement Duncan saw as the absorption of the “participating individual into 
factional group opinion”45 that only further polarised debates and reduced the capacity to effect 
social change. Duncan “was always against the coercion of group action, or a movement with 
a cause”46 because he was an advocate of individual volition and Levertov’s overt political 
alignments not only circumscribed her agency but “betrayed the position of the artist”47 by 
limiting her imaginative activity and abandoning her individuality by accepting the mass 
position. His ground-breaking, or opening, triptych from the sixties, The Opening of the Field 
(1960), Roots and Branches (1964) and Bending the Bow (1968), demonstrates how poetry is 
about making a space for political agency rather than advancing a particular political position 
that might exclude others and erase individual differences. The opening poem of this period, 
“Often I am Permitted to Return to a Meadow,” complicates the distinction between open and 
closed forms, and inside and outside, by “turning continually on the dichotomy of inner and 
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outer world,”48 thereby indicating how a position of ekstasis functions as an immediate counter 
to strategies of containment and discourses of consensus. The “meadow” refers to:  
 
 
a scene made-up by the mind, 
that is not mine, but is a made place, 
that is mine, it is so near to the heart,49  
 
 
“Composition by field” is the dominant metaphor as Duncan’s poem is the manifestation of the 
creative act, of poiesis as the making of a communal space where the poet, “all architectures I 
am,” is acted upon by outside(r) influences: 
 
 
 I say are likenesses of the First Beloved 
 whose flowers are flames lit to the Lady. 
 
 She it is Queen Under the Hill.50   
 
 
Duncan is responding to his muses here, he is realising his “response-ability” toward others so 
the poem is about the primal act of language. Like the “children’s game/of ring a round of roses 
told,”51 the poem is a variation on a codified ritual despite its apparent originality and is literally 
brought round to its origins with the repetition of the title, which is also the opening line, in the 
closing sentence. The circularity of “Often I am Permitted...” makes the poem enclosed but it 
is not closed-off due to the “disturbance of words within words.”52 This suggestion that words 
inherently contain other, even others’, words, foregrounds the profound sense of intertextuality 
in Duncan’s work, so meaning cannot be contained within the boundaries of single poems or 
even collections. The Opening of the Field introduces the serial poems “The Structure of Rime” 
and “Passages” that feature throughout the sixties’ collections and beyond, so that this opening 
poem is “an eternal pasture folded in all thought/so that there is a hall therein.”53 Duncan’s 
“made place” is a common space, a point of entry into his work but one that remains “a place 
of first permission,”54  not a prescriptive guide to how the poems should be read but an 
opportunity for the reader to realise his/her “response-ability” by, as Palmer himself notes, 
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“wandering...through the passages...finding one’s way without a map beforehand, to see what 
specific information [and intertextual references] would arise from the words themselves.”55 
Duncan’s work necessitates a certain responsiveness in the reader and Palmer envisions BN 
having a similar function, demarcating and thus making a space for the reader to realise his/her 
“response-ability:” 
 
 
 This is a room 
 
 Give me this and 
 this. This 
 
 book ends some 
 time when it ends and 
 
 this is a room.56     
 
 
By referring to both a “made-up” and a “made place,” Palmer’s poem is an imagined common 
space and an actual space of political agency where he enacts how strategies of containment 
and discourses of consensus can be undermined by allowing the aberrant voices of outsiders to 
enter the poem. In this sense, the poem is a:  
 
 
place for prohibited content (there’s a politics of sexuality and a politics of the political 
involved here) and as a place where things can be inscribed, for attending to 
the...problematic limits that our everyday discourse tends to put on what we are able to 
say...as something that can shatter those limits rather than address those limits and 
inscribe itself within those limits.57 
   
 
Like Duncan, Palmer is concerned with returning poetry to its origins, to making, in this case, 
a space where “response-ability” can be realised by those who want to remain outside the 
bounds of the body-politic.  
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(5.2) The Poetics of Derivation in Blake’s Newton 
 
In the final pages of Palmer’s first collection, two inclusions are particularly important for 
appreciating how he begins developing a position of ekstasis learned from the San Francisco 
Renaissance poets into his own “poethics of proximity.” Firstly, Duncan provides the 
autobiographical blurb for the book and is, therefore, inseparable from Palmer’s first act of 
writing himself into existence as a poet, he is present at the origins of Palmer’s body of work. 
Secondly, Palmer provides an index detailing some of the sources he has “drawn [on] or 
distorted,”58 for example, “New Spring” by Heinrich Heine in “Its Form,” the diary of Jacopo 
da Pontormo in “Holy Tuesday” and letters by Hart Crane in “Here (2)” and “Here (3).” Palmer 
also includes phrases “from books such as [Noah] Webster’s Second [Edition of The American 
Dictionary of the English Language], Colin Cherry, On Human Communication; Willard Van 
Orman Quine, Word and Object, From a Logical Point of View.”59 As seen with Duncan 
previously, Palmer begins BN with “Its Form,” a poem that is “somewhat in fragments – 
fragments of, constellations of voices”60  and which enacts the poetics, and the political and 
personal commitments, he will concern himself with as a recurring topic throughout his work. 
It is the primal act of language Palmer will constantly return to. This constellation of voices 
makes Duncan’s presence even more pronounced, especially since he describes himself in the 
jacket copy of Roots and Branches “not [as] experimentalist or [as] an inventor, but a derivative 
poet, drawing [his] art from the resources given by a generation of masters.” Consequently, 
Palmer’s index can only be seen as a partial list of his sources, with the result that the reader is 
constantly questioning whether a particular poem, or the entire collection in fact, is an original 
utterance by the poet, a distortion of other material, or the presence of others’ voices. Such an 
effect is intentional given Palmer’s use of Cherry’s On Human Communication (1966), which 
addressed the “cocktail party effect,” the ability to selectively attend to a single voice amid a 
cacophony of other voices. “Speech (Across Time)” further substantiates Palmer’s 
investigation of voice according to Cherry’s premise: 
 
 
 The tract of voice 
 now in wave form. 
 Relative energy, decibels 
 a woman’s rising 
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 pitch clearly graphed.61 
 
 
The constellation of voices is “‘A stream of sound’” similar to Cherry’s analogy of the cocktail 
party, “…a large crowd/laughing. Spectrum/of harmonics.”62 While “Speech (Across Time)” 
might be derived from Cherry’s text, it also indicates how derivation itself functions in 
Palmer’s poetry, how “sound/pulls on sequent sound.”63 This opportunity for the reader to 
realise his/her “response-ability” is necessarily difficult because s/he is encouraged to identify 
and isolate the voice of the poet from the constellation of other voices in the text. 
Palmer’s use of Quine’s Word and Object (1960) further emphasises his interest in the 
“necessary difficulty” attendant upon a “poetics of derivation.” This text contains the American 
analytic philosopher’s thought experiment “radical translation,” which proves his thesis 
regarding the inscrutability of reference. For Quine, translation is always indeterminate because 
no determinate interpretation is possible since the meaning of a word changes according to its 
context. For this reason, multiple translations of the one sentence are possible because any 
given sentence can be changed into a whole range of other sentences where the different parts 
will change what they reference but the meaning of the whole sentence is maintained 
nonetheless. “After Picabia” demonstrates Palmer’s use of the inscrutability of reference in his 
“poetics of derivation:” 
 
 
 how pretty you are 
 maybe 
 more  
 than you think 
 you are pretty 
 you are prettier 
 than they64 
 
 
The inscrutability of reference is absolute here since, in terms of its semantic content, the 
referent of the second-person pronoun is completely indeterminate, while the original source 
of the derivation cannot be determined. Palmer’s inclusion of what appears to be the title of a 
poem by Francis Picabia, “L’Abime de la Perfection,” means it could literally be a translation. 
However, by repeatedly emphasising the beauty of its subject, Palmer’s poem could equally be 
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referring to Picabia’s Portrait of a Young American Girl in a State of Nudity (1915) or Behold 
a Woman (1915), where the depiction of women in perfectly utilitarian, mechanical terms also 
represents “l’abime de la perfection,” the depths of perfection. Palmer’s derivations are 
designed to create “imbrication[s],” 65  layers of multiple possible meanings that mediate 
between the poet’s intention and the reader’s interpretation. As he explains: 
 
 
I don’t think the reader has any responsibility per se. I think it depends on the reader 
involved. I’m unhappy to think of the idea of readers reading at a level untouched by 
the notions of where I’m sampling from. Some readers will recognise more initially; 
some won’t recognise any. I don’t think one kind of reading is privileged over another; 
I think that they’re interestingly different.66  
 
 
Quite significantly, this discussion of the extent of the reader’s responsibility explains how 
Duncan’s example influences Palmer’s nascent “poethics of proximity.” Duncan’s insistence 
that “Responsibility is to keep/the ability to respond”67 confirms the possibility of “response-
ability,” of the reader encountering a profound otherness in the text, “a disturbance of words 
within words.” For Palmer, if he “frame[s his derivation] as a text from elsewhere, it loses that 
multidirectionality that it has in relation to the I of the poem in here.”68 In providing the source, 
Palmer insists, you’re “depriving the reader” of the ability to question “that I who is 
speaking.”69 A poetics of derivation raises important ethical questions about the type of self 
being written into existence. Rather than seeing it as an instance of the postmodern preclusion 
of originality and authenticity, it is the proposal of a “composite identity grafted from a range 
of citational particulars.”70 The self is shown to be entirely dependent on external sources, or 
outside influences, and is realised by the poet’s “response-ability” to these through his/her 
derivations. Consequently, a “poetics of derivation” bears similarities with the act of translating 
because the derivations are not simply repetitions but instances of interpretive re-composition 
as the poet changes the meaning of the source material by placing it in a different context. For 
Palmer: 
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all poetry is, of course translation, a bearing across from one region to another, a 
crossing of borders, a conjoining of same with other. It is a voyage out of the self-
same...into a fluid semantic and ontological field...The extensions of voice, beyond that 
one with which we come into the world. The elsewhere so necessary to any 
understanding of the here-and-now.71 
 
 
Considering derivations as translations allows for an encounter with otherness, with what lies 
beyond the “self-same,” because it accepts difference through engagement with others’ voices 
rather than refusing or excluding them as foreign. As a result, the poems are always at least 
two-voiced, which fundamentally reconfigures the category of poet and the conventional 
notion of authorship as autonomous, spontaneous self-expression. In such poems, the line 
between poet and reader is blurred since this compositional method is predicated on “a dual 
practice of reading writings and writing readings,” such that “reading becomes a type of writing 
and writing becomes a type of reading.”72 Any discussion of the reader’s responsibility to 
determine the various sources for the poet’s derivations consequently changes to the question 
of the reader’s “response-ability,” his/her capacity to determine the extent of his/her level of 
participation. The difficulty of derivative poems is that the innovations in how such poems are 
written require similar innovations in how they are read. They require a method of “open 
reading” that “extends beyond the poet’s own work,”73 so both the poet and the reader are 
involved in poiesis, in the act of making. In the case of the poet, this refers to making a space 
for political agency, whereas for readers it involves making another text by translating and in 
doing so writing him/herself into existence as a particular type of reader.  
As mentioned already, Palmer uses the visual metaphor of constellations to indicate his 
intention to make a space for the reader and how reading his poems serves an insistently 
political function. Commenting on itself, “A Vitruvian Figure by Juan Gris:” 
 
 
 begins with a line from Donne 
 or anyone, that drawes Natures works 
 from Natures law74             
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When Palmer explicitly discloses the source of his derivations, as demonstrated by the index 
containing Cherry and Quine, he is revealing its particular purpose. By quoting from John 
Donne’s “Sappho to Philaenis,” a poem that defends the lesbian relationship between the 
women in its title to advance the possibility of complete equality, Palmer reveals the similarly 
utopian vision in BN. These outsiders embody a non-hierarchical relationship between 
individuals that is accepting of difference. The title might imply a standard ekphrastic poem 
but the subject is “an unidentified painting.”75 It can even be argued that Gris’ A Vitruvian 
Figure is a derivation of Da Vinci’s Vitruvian Man, albeit reinterpreted and translated so the 
gender hierarchy of the original is negated: 
 
 
 features this time a woman’s figure 
 defining a circle compressed 
 where the arms are too weak to extend.     
 /.../ 
                 ...and the legs 
 spread wide marking 
 the limits of the ring. 76  
 
 
While radically different, Gris’ translation, “supposedly/building up forms from/the separate 
parts,”77 reaffirms Quine’s proposal that the constituent parts might change but the overall 
message remains unchanged, or as Palmer phrases it, “Each day some features change.”78 
Palmer’s poem can be read as heightening the interrelationship between the personal and the 
political as it evokes Da Vinci’s reconciling of the microcosmic with the macrocosmic. 
Vitruvian Man was part of his “larger project to show how the human body illustrated and 
replicated all the processes at work in the larger cosmos,” to provide a “cosmography of the 
microcosm” that showed how “normal units of measurement were derived from the dimensions 
of the human body” and would result in “knowledge of the human body” revealing the 
workings of the world and of the political...order.”79 The subsequent poem, “A Measure,” 
reinforces Palmer’s interest in this aspect of the scientist-artist’s original drawing. “A Vitruvian 
Figure...,” therefore, lends a whole new meaning to the body-politic Palmer concerns himself 
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with since in referring to an alternative, female body to collapse the gender hierarchy, the 
political system he envisions must be equally alternative to establish non-hierarchical 
relationships between individuals.   
 Through the arrangement of BN, Palmer encourages the reader to consider how the 
collection as a whole might be read, thus making the politics of his poetics more readily 
apparent. The first three poems “Its Form,” “Speech Across Time” and “Holy Tuesday,” which 
immediately introduce his “poetics of derivation,” are followed by “A View of Miaplacidus,” 
“A Curious Thing The” and “Among Various,” three poems that address constellations. Firstly, 
Miaplacidus, one of the brightest stars, is mentioned as a demonstration of how one particular 
derivation can be used by the reader to determine how the entire collection is interpreted. BN 
is a constellation of different voices but being able to identify one to begin with allows for the 
particular constellation Palmer has in mind to be mapped out: 
 
 
 Mid-December of our year 
 nearing solstice 
 a view of Miaplacidus 
 at a third remove.80  
 
 
The reader’s interpretation is at “a third remove” since it translates Palmer’s translation of an 
initial text through his derivation. Multiple texts and subtexts, therefore, might exist in a single 
poem but its structure, “Its Form,” ensures that each component contributes to the whole rather 
than subordinating certain elements to privilege others. This feature of his emerging poetics is 
correlated to his formative years in New York City, a culture where no single “coherent 
narrative [is] at the centre” that consequently made him “interested in representing the 
constellations of voices.”81 As will be seen, the painting Palmer names the collection after, 
Blake’s Newton, casts an “invisible light”82 throughout that encourages reading the entire 
collection as a response to, if not a derivation of, it. Secondly, “A Curious Thing The” refers 
to “…Pegasus/whose stars; in October/the Centaur opposite the sun.”83 This poem conveys the 
“counter-visuality” in Palmer, a “resistance to the static image:” 84 
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 houses are red and green 
 the ducks have gone while there’s 
 room 
 and the ice is clear85 
 
 
The scene described here requires a lot of work to make it complete because its subject moves 
between the houses, the ducks and the ice, producing “an invocation of [an image] that is more 
nomadic and that forces the reader into a somewhat more active mode of reading.”86 A more 
active, responsive approach to reading inscribes the role of the reader using the figure of the 
wanderer Sagittarius, “the Centaur.” S/He must wander through the non-hierarchical “field of 
oriented possibilities,” 87  the multiple derivations that each poem consists of, without a 
predetermined map. The reader is constantly questioning what is a derivation, which “can be 
answered/‘everything,’ 88  since his method of not appropriating a source verbatim but 
translating it, radically altering it according to “the impetus of the poem itself, the demands of 
the rhythm, the surrounding material”89 creates the suspicion that every poem is a derivation 
of some sort. Extending Palmer’s mention of the centaur here, a “poetics of derivation” figures 
writing and reading as hybrid activities because writing is informed by what the poet is reading 
and reading constitutes a further act of writing. Thirdly and finally, “Among Various” asks:  
 
 
Can you still mark each 
 
interval by stars. 
Two 
colours mix in the pipe 
 
one hiding l’s and r’s 
and then the lost letters.90   
 
 
Palmer seems to be questioning the possibility of keeping his various derivations separate and 
the reader’s ability to differentiate between them when they are so rarely repeated verbatim but 
instead translated so that some parts of the original are hidden and some parts are omitted. This 
method of composition leads the reader to question who is actually speaking:  
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                                …Later 
 that night 
 
 she uses a different voice 
 to tell the future after 
 it arrives 
 
 without surprises.91 
 
 
Palmer explicitly accentuates an important feature of his “poetics of derivation,” the “fact that 
all of these voices are coming through even though you’re doing the saying,” 92  which 
inevitably disorients the reader and limits his/her ability to separate the “I” of the poet from 
that of others in the constellation of voices he creates. The question of who is speaking raises 
important “poethical” issues, as the subject is being written into existence through an extended 
conversation with others. 
To remedy what might otherwise be considered a failure on behalf of the reader, Palmer 
advocates trusting “a kind of errancy, which is also an erring, making errors…to see what 
specific information would arise from the words themselves.”93  The emphasis here is on 
“making errors,” on the reader utilising the opportunity to realise his/her “response-ability” by 
resisting normative standards and avoiding habitual thinking in order to pursue a particular 
derivation that s/he considers significant but others potentially don’t. In realising his/her 
“response-ability,” the reader must be responsible for that particular response, for whatever 
derivations s/he has selected and paid attention to in his/her interpretation. By insisting that 
error is a vital part of this process, Palmer is encouraging his readers to be outsiders and makes 
a space for them where their “response-ability” can be realised. As “Its Form” demonstrates, 
with its constellation of voices, he achieves what Duncan always hoped his readers would, 
identifying the alternative political model he advances and consequently enacting it in his/her 
daily life, in his/her work. 
    Rather than dismissing derivative poems as mere quotation, they should be seen as 
advancing quite radical ideas about language as a communal entity, creativity as a non-
hierarchical collaboration and form as open-ended, inclusive and organic. By enacting how one 
might position oneself outside the normative standards of the body-politic, derivative poems 
embody a “model of political anarchism.”94 Despite the negative, and often misinformed, 
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attitudes toward anarchism, its basic philosophical principles endorse a system of “continual 
evolution – such as we see in Nature,” a system in which the “mutual relations of its members 
are regulated, not by laws, not by authorities, whether self-imposed or elected, but by mutual 
agreements between the members” that continually develop and readjust “in accordance with 
the ever-growing requirements of a free life.”95 This should not be confused with some kind of 
utopian democracy, which would still require that the “individual abdicate his sovereignty by 
handing it over to a representative”96 and the minority “submit to an external...force: the will 
of the majority.”97 Palmer’s “poetics of derivation” and the method of “open reading” they 
encourage help normalise an anarchist politics through its emphasis on the poem as a 
communal space that displays the non-hierarchical interdependency of the constituent 
derivatives, the different voices of others. The constellation of voices “tends to set up its own 
valences of cross-referencing…the words begin to do the talking…[and] to speak to each 
other.”98 Derivative poems are “a social art, things known/written down”99 because they make 
the communal activities required for an alternative political model to be achieved more evident. 
Because BN raises the possibility that every poem is a potential derivation, the “idea of volition, 
the freedom to make a choice, and then the perseverance to maintain the decision”100  is 
foregrounded as the reader is free to pursue derivations without being coerced into a particular 
interpretation or having to adhere to a prescribed method of reading.  
Without knowing it, the reader enacts an alternative political model where “the 
individual is free to act as long as his actions do not impinge on the freedom to act of other 
people,” 101  similar to the reader being responsible for his/her interpretation while also 
acknowledging the possibility of innumerable different interpretations by other readers. Palmer 
effectively engages the reader through the “political consciousness…[in his] work…[rather 
than] an overriding ideology”102 to imagine and enact an alternative way of living through 
his/her activities of reading his work, of interpreting and translating it. He, like Duncan, 
opposes only oppositionality, the segregating movements that isolate the individual from 
society and ultimately deny individuality.  Therefore, BN advocates a way of living in the social 
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world of others “based on the assumption that the most desirable human good is…freedom of 
the individual human being…[in] a society in which [wo/]men will have the liberty to develop 
their personalities…in a world where there exist no longer the bonds of…coercion.” 103 
Realising what he learned from Duncan, the collection is a “made place” of volition, of 
“individual choice in thought and action in the community of others also acting individually,” 
where “response-ability” is possible and being responsible for one’s responses is necessitated, 
which highlights the distinction between individuals acting cooperatively and interacting as 
equals, and individuals acting uniformly under the coercion of a [hierarchical authority].”104  
Palmer’s anarchism involves changing how we write and read poetry to critique the 
predominant assumptions about meaning, to question who exactly is speaking, to interrogate 
the autotelic subject, to complicate the binaries of inside(r) and outside(r), and to negate the 
hierarchies structuring how we live in the social world of others. Ultimately, this serves the 
purpose of demonstrating how the reader can participate in similar activities and in doing so 
position him/herself outside the existing system, how s/he can become an outsider like the poet 
and join a community of different voices, of voices making a difference. Realising “response-
ability” in this instance involves valuing and responding to the activities of others without 
recourse to coercion and acknowledging that they are irreducibly different to one’s own but 
nevertheless motivated by a common concern.  
 
 
(5.3) Against Containment 
 
Perhaps BN’s most important feature is how it collapses any tenable distinction between the 
personal, the political and the poetic. For example, the distinct categories of prose and poetry 
are invalidated in the “Prose” series, six poems typographically arranged into stanzas but whose 
sentences display the type of enjambment associated with prose. “Prose” also introduces the 
serial poem, a recurrent feature throughout Palmer’s work used to violate the boundaries of 
single collections. An otherwise simple issue of poetics becomes a significant personal and 
political question due to a rare autobiographical admission in “Prose 1,” “I changed my/name 
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not to be recognised.”105 Palmer, “who changed his own name after college”106 from George 
to Michael, personally enacts the complicated, political problem of naming, “Today I woke up 
and it was the following/stage.../...In the/mirror nothing was the same.”107 As he explains, 
changing his name was vital to him becoming a poet as it “was a very modest way of freeing 
myself of an identity that I had grown up with. I think for me to become a poet…was a project 
of self-rearticulation out of the…social expectations that had been laid upon me, out of the 
habits of…obedience.” 108 This act constituted “alternative possibilities for constructing a life 
that would be other than” the bourgeois reality he was accustomed to, “that would be other.”109 
By insisting on the arbitrariness of the signs used to define identity, Palmer problematises the 
corresponding categories that contain individuals, limit their thinking within prescribed 
epistemological systems and determine how they act in and interact with the social world of 
others.  
In naming the collection after Blake’s Newton, Palmer conflates the imaginary and the 
intellectual and using the visionary poet’s monotype of the empirical scientist indicates the 
constitutive hybridity that complicates any attempt to either impose or maintain determinate 
categories. Blake is significant as a poet who privileged outside influence through his dictation 
theory of textual production, his ability to “write from immediate dictation twelve or sometimes 
twenty or thirty lines at a time without Premeditation & even against my Will.”110   The 
importance of Blake is heightened by the fact that the collection is an image-text combining 
Palmer’s poems and Bobbie Creeley’s illustrations. The poet’s admission that he’s “never 
considered the arts as isolate entities, either one from another or from other pursuits in this 
life”111 is corroborated by a subsection entitled “A Ring: Seven Poems,” which consists of six 
poems and one illustration. However, this is not simply a question of poetics since it is 
coextensive with the other personal and political “pursuits in this life,” it enacts a way of living 
in the social world of others that negates strategies of containment and subverts discourses of 
consensus. Because of his status as a poet-painter, “any attempt to characterise the typography 
or calligraphy of Blake’s illuminated books is frustrated by his subversion of the normal 
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categories into which we sort texts...[since he] deliberately violates the boundary between 
written and pictorial forms.”112 Palmer appreciates that it is not just about “pushing painting 
toward the ideogrammatic realm of writing” but also pushing “alphabetic writing toward the 
realm of pictorial values, asking us to see his alphabetic forms with our senses, not just read 
through or past them to the signified speech or ‘concept’ behind them, but to pause at the 
sensuous surface of calligraphic and typographic forms.”113  In this sense, Creeley’s non-
figurative, black and white illustrations are much more than just an addendum to Palmer’s 
poems (Fig. 6 & 7).  
 
 
                                 
                     (Fig. 6) Bobbie Creeley,                            (Fig. 7) Bobbie Creeley, 
                                illustration                                                    illustration 
 
 
The majority resemble estuaries, dynamic, semi-enclosed bodies of water situated between the 
land and the sea where rivers meet the ocean, with the numerous white passages weaving 
among differently shaped and sized islets of various shades of black. They literally visualise 
the intended experience of reading BN, of having to negotiate the numerous possible passages 
through the collection and engaging with the constellation of others’ voices, some of which 
consolidate together around a disclosed derivation while the rest remain less apparent allusions 
or completely altered repetitions. Working together, the relationship between the components 
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of the image-text demonstrates how differences can be acknowledged without reducing them 
through assimilation by or appropriation into categories of the same, a prerequisite for the 
“poethics of proximity” Palmer develops to encourage his readers to realise how they can 
encounter and respond to another person without reducing his/her constitutive alterity, his/her 
fundamental difference.        
“A Reasoned Reply to Gilbert Ryle (after Blake’s Newton)” and “For L.Z.” provide the 
most complete invalidation of oppositional categories in BN in a rare example of Palmer’s 
intentions being immediately apparent through the individuals referred to in the titles. Ryle 
famously introduced the “category mistake” in The Concept of Mind (1949) to critique the 
Cartesian dualism of mind and body. The dualistic theory makes a basic “category mistake” 
because it attempts to analyse the relation between mind and body as if mental processes could 
be separated from physical processes. Ryle dissolves the Cartesian mind-body dualism by 
identifying an implicit misuse of language, of applying properties that are appropriate to one 
category to make sense of another, a pertinent example of reducing the difference of something 
by containing it in categories of the same. In addition, Blake’s Newton collapses the 
oppositional categories of art and science. Blake and Newton represent the inevitable 
occurrence of one component in an oppositional construction becoming ascendant over 
another, which often leads to the latter’s exclusion from the normative standards of the period. 
In this case, Newton’s mathematical systems and calculations achieve ascendency over Blake’s 
imagination and prophetic inspiration. The imposition of mathematical forms onto nature 
symbolises the ultimate denial of difference, the reduction of otherness and the refusal to 
engage with what cannot be, even should not be, completely known. Palmer provides “A 
Reasoned Reply...” by invalidating the oppositional categories used to understand, but which 
ultimately limit the potential of, poetry. His suggestion that “Sound becomes difficult/to 
dispose of”114 implies that the sense and the sensuality of poetry cannot be disentangled, that 
the sound cannot be entirely subordinated to the semantics of poetry. The difficulty highlights 
“...the problem/of light and air,”115 or sight and sound, raising the question about poetry as 
something to be read or something to be listened to. Palmer avoids making the “category 
mistake” of prioritising one over another and also confuses the apparent opposition between 
the literal and the figurative: 
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Trouble through the other 
 
eye 
which stays open 
 
unless the window itself 
is broken.116 
 
 
As a result, the distinction between the rational and the imaginative is complicated through the 
image of the eye representing a physical perspective “through” which things are perceived and 
a psychical window into someone. As he explains in “Allen Says We Let in No Light,” these 
are “difficult poems/.../as anyone listening or/reading will notice.”117 They are difficult because 
the poems require analysis both in terms of their semantic sense and their aural sensuality.  
“For L.Z.” continues this critique of the false dichotomy of mind (intellectual) and body 
(sensual): 
 
 
 A reasonable ear 
 in music, Bottom, 
 let’s have it 
 out of tongs 
 and bones, was it 
 tongues?118 
 
 
 
Palmer values Zukofsky’s “combination of eye and intellect,”119 his “reasonable ear” that 
interrelates sense and sensuality. The poetic utterance involves both listening (“ear”) and 
speaking (“tongues”), hinting toward the “response-ability” realised when “(my)Self” 
encounters “(an)Other” through a “poethics of proximity.” As Zukofsky insists, “the sound and 
pitch emphasis of a word are never apart from its meaning,”120 the aural sensuality of words is 
always a part of their semantic sense because the oppositional categories of mind and body are 
invalidated. Referring to Zukofksy’s Bottom: on Shakespeare (1963) further reveals Palmer’s 
appreciation for the Objectivist poet as someone who committedly refuses to be contained in 
stable, clearly demarcated categories. Zukofsky condenses his entire synthetic text into one 
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line, “I’s (pronounced eyes)”121 so that speech and vision are interchangeable. The text is 
intended to engender a synesthetic experience, creating “poets [and readers] who see with their 
ears, hear with their eyes, move with their noses and speak and breathe with their feet.”122 
Bottom is Zukofsky’s most pedagogical book as it documents his own self-education in how to 
read Shakespeare to educate his readers about living by evoking the character of Nick Bottom, 
the weaver from A Midsummer Night’s Dream. The first volume is a textual collage that weaves 
together innumerable quotes as he investigates the “soothsayer – whose physical 
vision…effuses like an old pictograph thru the syllabary or word it has become. Looking back 
to see itself with its acquired sounds, it must ‘see’ with a motion forward to a circuitous self-
answer.”123 A simultaneity is suggested here by the soothsayer, who looks both forward and 
back to “show…the image of voice.”124  This conflation of sight and sound demonstrates 
another aspect of Zukofsky that Palmer identified with, the “notion of simultaneity…a notion 
that everything happened at the same time rather than in a linear sequence, that one attended to 
simultaneous events rather than” 125  restructuring everything into a manageable, coherent 
sequence of separate, individual parts.  
The refusal of oppositional categories in Bottom goes further than its theme as the 
second volume consists of his wife Celia’s operatic setting of Shakespeare’s Pericles, Prince 
of Tyre. Transcribed in musical notation with accompanying lyrics underneath, the words are 
beneath the music. Zukofsky inverts the conventional hierarchy by placing the semantic aspect 
of the text at the bottom while the aural, sensual accompaniment is foregrounded. By negating 
the logic structuring the binary of sound and sense, the conventional dualism of mind and body 
is collapsed while the attendant oppositional constructions of speaking and listening, poetry 
and music, and writing and reading are also precluded. Zukofsky repeatedly argues that “the 
order of all poetry is to approach a state of music wherein the ideas present themselves 
sensuously and intellectually” 126  and that poetry should be “an order of words that as 
movement and tone (rhythm and pitch) approaches in varying degrees the wordless art of 
music.”127 Palmer’s equal emphasis on sight and sound in BN, on the visual through Creeley’s 
illustrations and the aural through his own densely woven constellation of voices, means that 
reading and listening are coterminous activities. Further substantiating what Palmer argues 
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through his own “poetics of derivation,” Zukofsky’s Bottom requires the reader to listen and 
respond to others’ voices as they appear in a collage of quotations, to appreciate the sounds 
that accompany the semantics of poetry. Like his long poem “A” also suggests, Zukofsky 
exemplifies those poets who write “one poem all one’s life” so “all that he has written may be 
felt as indivisible, and all one.”128 While Zukofsky can never be considered an autobiographical 
poet in the conventional sense, Bottom is “a poet’s autobiography, as involvement of twenty 
years in a work shows him up…his words show it, are his life.”129  Palmer finds another 
example “of a life entirely given over to the poem” in Zukofsky, in turn learning how reading 
and writing a certain type of poetry can be a way of living in the social world of others that 
manages to invalidate the oppositional categories used to separate and contain individuals and 
preclude any possible encounter with what is different.  
 
 
(5.4) A “Community without Community”       
 
Duncan, and to a certain extent Zukofsky, might have provided the initial catalyst for Palmer’s 
interest in the potential for “living differently…[through] the discursive practice” offered by 
poetry as a “sort of political resistance” to “state-mandated ways of life” 130 but the Vancouver 
Poetry Conference (1963) made the personal, the political and the poetic resolutely and 
irrevocably interrelated for him. From 24th July to 16th August 1963, the University of British 
Columbia hosted a series of lectures and workshops organised by Warren Tallman during 
which Olson, Duncan, Levertov, Robert Creeley and Allen Ginsberg encouraged attendees to 
consider what was at stake, both personally and politically, in the “new” American poetry, in 
writing and reading poetry that deviated from the normative formal and thematic standards of 
the time. Firstly, it remedied what Palmer immediately identified as the “deeply flawed”131 
nature of Donald Allen’s The New American Poetry (1960), whose arrangement of innovative 
poets into relatively arbitrary categories determined by coincidences in geographical location 
and social proximity reaffirmed the presumed necessity for categorical, homogenising 
identifiers to help manage the increasing heterogeneity of postwar American culture. Secondly, 
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the event provided the literal manifestation of the position of ekstasis and the “poetics of 
derivation” that would feature so heavily in BN and CG as the foundation for his “poethics of 
proximity.” Because the attendees included poets from both the U.S, such as Palmer, David 
Bromige, Clark Coolidge and Philip Whalen, and Canada, including Margaret Avison, George 
Bowering, Frank Davey, Daphne Marlatt and Fred Wah, the Vancouver conference demarcated 
a position of ekstasis beyond the American body-politic where “outside(r) influence” could be 
felt. 
            Due to the presence of Olson, Creeley and Duncan, the Vancouver conference can 
mistakenly be considered a Black Mountain affair informed primarily by the open-field and 
projectivist poetics endorsed by its members. However, Palmer was not interested in becoming 
“a second-generation Black Mountaineer or an Official Projectivist, using breath measure and 
so on”132 because of “the presumptions about [a univocal] speaker and subject still carried out 
in a breath-projected model, with the bodily origins of that metaphor.”133 Instead, he found 
there “a community of sympathetic writers, people who I had been reading but who turned out 
– somewhat to my surprise – also to exist. And who provided me, not so much poetic models, 
but human models of people operating outside the world”134 of normative personal and political 
standards. The event is crucial to understanding how the position of ekstasis and the “poetics 
of derivation” that Palmer espoused are important not just in terms of his poetry but also for 
how they represent a way of living in the social world of others. The conference was 
characterised by its openness toward the outside, its receptivity regarding others. In this sense, 
it literalises a “poetics of derivation,” which involves bringing the voices of others from outside 
the poet into the poem but without normalising their differences. This gestures toward the 
potential for an encounter between “(my)Self” and “(an)Other” based on “response-ability,” 
on listening and responding to others as different rather than appropriating them into categories 
of the same and denying their difference, reducing their alterity.  
The Vancouver conference managed to complicate an understanding of community as 
a closed, exclusionary group that excludes difference to maintain a stable and cohesive 
collective identity and in doing so pre-empted the more recent attempts by poststructuralist 
philosophers to reconceptualise community according to a more ethically informed paradigm, 
for example, Maurice Blanchot’s The Unavowable Community (1983), Jean-Luc Nancy’s The 
Inoperative Community (1986) and Giorgio Agamben’s The Coming Community (1990). Like 
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the attendees at the Vancouver conference, they are responding to the totalising and 
exclusionary notion of community by asserting the fluidity and instability of identities, opening 
up “closed communities from within, in order to conceive of a more ethically attuned form of 
togetherness.” 135  Palmer is interested in this sense of what he terms the “‘imaginary’ or 
‘negative community,’” a “community of those who have no community, a community of 
differences” that is the “space of encounter of the poetic imaginary with the social.”136 A 
“community without community” is realised according to this ethically informed type of 
togetherness, a community founded on the differences between those within it rather than a 
collective, essentialist identity. If the “form of togetherness that is proper to modernity, and the 
most familiar style in which modern community is imagined, is that of the nation,”137 the 
Vancouver conference allowed the attendees to “break down the larger containers separating 
the nation from a global community...and stage a critique of the nationalist politics that set the 
parameters of universalism.” 138  The geographical location of the conference makes the 
figurative literal, it is a “made place” of ekstasis beyond the national body-politic where the 
participants could disrupt “the liberal logics underwriting…nationalism and thus reintroduce 
excluded individuals into a new cosmopolitan commonality which would not erase singular 
differences between identity groups or individuals.”139  
A “community without community” relies on the commonality of differences between 
those within it rather than the more conventional idea that each member of the community 
shares some essential quality, “the idea that individual experiences rest on a common social 
ground, on an ontological fundament.”140 According to the latter, essentialist position, the 
community is “ultimately unable to positively respond to differences” 141  as it gradually 
homogenises around a collective identity of essential qualities to celebrate a sense of unity 
contingent upon either the exclusion of others or the negation through assimilation of individual 
differences. While a liberalist view of community might contest a definition of community as 
individuals collectively sharing certain essential qualities, it does not provide a different type 
of togetherness to counter the essentialist position. Removing the common by showing that 
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community is “a mental construct of identifiable beings”142 where individual interests are 
articulated as a means of both establishing relations between individuals and differentiating 
oneself from others initially seems quite progressive in terms of how it engages with difference. 
However, by emphasising self-interests, the liberalist view “stresses the individual will as being 
the sole will responsible for common…agreements,” 143  which consequently results in a 
fundamental and irreconcilable antagonism between the self and the community of others.  
Allen’s anthology is “deeply flawed” for these two precise reasons. Firstly, his separate 
categories of (I) Black Mountain, (II) San Francisco, (III) The Beats and (IV) New York 
suggest that those contained in each can be homogenised together according to a collective 
identity of essential qualities that determines who is included and who is excluded, thus 
adhering to the essentialist position on community. Secondly, the categories imply that The 
New American Poetry consists of rival factions where each member pursues the self-interests 
of the group, prioritising their respective differences from others rather than acknowledging 
the commonality of difference they all share. The Vancouver Poetry Conference counters the 
implications of Allen’s text by imagining an alternative narrative of community as a counter to 
the conventional paradigms of both the essentialist and the liberalist position. As a result, the 
participants actualise a “community without community” based on an ethically informed type 
of togetherness that precludes both the exclusion of difference and any sense of rivalry between 
differences. This requires a reconfiguration of community as involving “being with others,”144 
inhabiting a position of ekstasis outside the body-politic and encountering others as others.  
Nancy’s suggestion that community does not refer to an immanent collection of 
autotelic subjects but rather to how community is always “being with others,” helps explain 
the significance of the Vancouver conference as an example of “outside(r) influence” that 
signals Palmer’s pursuit of a “poethics of proximity.” Nancy’s radical thinking about 
community as “an opening up”145 toward others is profoundly ethical since it highlights the 
necessity of “(an)Other” to realise both “(my)Self” and a “community without community.” 
He opens up otherwise closed, exclusionary communities from within by refusing to “locate 
the sense of community...in a given substance or in a specific essence...shared by the 
members”146 and instead insists on the proximity of others as others. He provides a counter-
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voice to Benedict Anderson’s idea of the “imagined community” and “the most familiar style 
in which modern community is...imagined:”147 the inherently limited and sovereign nation-
state. The Vancouver Poetry Conference not only violates the boundaries of the nation-state 
but imagines a different kind of community as a literary event, what Nancy terms “literary 
communism.” This term has nothing to do with what is usually understood as communism but 
instead “designates a general and anonymous speech which is shared by the different members 
of the society and which utters a particular form of address to them.”148 In this sense, literature 
refers to a “multiplicity which at the same time unites and divides us,”149 unites because it is 
something shared between individuals and divides because it accommodates innumerable, 
different interpretations. Myth is opposed to literature as the “particular style...in which the 
community is imagined,” the “structure of thought that gives the community its purpose and 
legitimacy and that thus brings different individuals together in a collective body.”150 It is 
crucial to the formation of the “operative community,” whereas the “inoperative community” 
Nancy advances uses literature because it allows for “being with others,” it confirms one’s 
existence “in common [with others]” while still resisting “fusion into a [singular] body.”151 
Because thinking of community as essence constitutes closure, Nancy instead conceives of 
community as a matter of difference, where “[being] in common has nothing to do with 
communion...[but] means, to the contrary, no longer having, in any form, in any empirical or 
ideal place, such a substantial identity, and sharing this...lack of identity.”152   
Furthermore, removing the “terror and hatred of all communal things, of 
communion,/of communism” also repudiated the myth that the American capitalist socio-
economic system was superior to its alternative, which had to be guarded against through 
strategies of containment and discourses of consensus. However, Nancy’s understanding of 
myth is not concerned with any specific myth but with the function of myth itself as the 
“original speech...founding the intimate being of a community.” 153  Accordingly, there is 
nothing “more absolutely common than myth” because it “arises only from a community and 
for it: they engender one another.”154 For Nancy, “myth communicates the common, the being-
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common” as it reveals the community to itself and founds it by “say[ing] what is and say[ing] 
that we agree to say that this is.” 155  Ultimately, myth “arranges the spaces and/or 
symbolises...[it] works out the shares and divisions that distribute a community and distinguish 
it for itself, articulating it within itself.”156 Whether a narrative of origins, exceptionalism or 
collective identity, myth is integral to “all the special groups” of nation, religion, gender, 
sexuality and politics becoming closed, exclusionary entities. Nancy envisions a “community 
turned toward the outside instead of in toward a centre,”157 a community open to “outside(r) 
influence” as it consists solely of others who have only their differences “in common.”158 
Constantly engaging with the differences of others means the inoperative community is 
dynamic and never complete, quite unlike the “operative community,” which uses “myth...[as] 
a completion”159 to engender a totalising, homogenising collective identity that includes what 
adheres to it and excludes what deviates. There is no potential for change or interruption as 
difference is either marginalised or neutralised by appropriation. Literature, on the other hand, 
interrupts myth and precludes completion because it inherently involves “being with others,” 
of experiencing the proximity of “(an)Other” as “(my)Self” encounters another person’s unique 
interpretation of events. Literature: 
 
 
does not come to an end at the place where the work passes from an author to a reader, 
and from this reader to another reader or to another author. It does not come to an end 
at the place where the work passes on to another work by the same author or at the place 
where it passes into other works by other authors...It is unended and unending – in the 
active sense – in that it is literature...[and] puts into play nothing other than being in 
common.160  
 
 
The various processes of dissemination and interpretation means literature allows for “being 
with others” and constitutes an “opening up” of community by removing the common, the 
homogenised and consensual, and instead replacing it with the sense of being in common with 
others, of listening and responding to multiple different interpretations.      
As a literary event, the Vancouver Poetry Conference provides an example of a 
“community without community.” However, its significance is furthered by the type of poetics 
that was discussed there. While the processes of literature make it generally conducive to 
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engendering openness and incompletion, the participants at Vancouver were each investigating 
the potential for a “process orientation”161 in poetry, a movement away from the preconceived 
notions of form, the circumscribed idea of the subject, and the normative predisposition toward 
the informing nature of poetry that posit the poem as a closed-off, complete object. The 
processual poetics advanced at Vancouver, whether in the guise of Olson’s “projective verse,” 
Duncan’s “derivative poetics,” Ginsberg’s “spontaneous bop prosody,” Creeley’s serial poetics 
or Levertov’s poetics of organic order, means the event exploited and exaggerated the sense of 
incompletion and openness that Nancy identifies as inherent in literature more generally. The 
Vancouver Poetry Conference provided an opportunity for the participants to enact what had 
hitherto only been articulated in their poetry. In this sense, the position of ekstasis and the 
“poetics of derivation” Palmer identified with manifested in the “community without 
community” realised there, thus demonstrating how the personal, the political and the poetic 
are always mutually interrelated. The conference was a further act of poiesis, as the participants 
“made [a] place of first permission,” a place for outsiders where difference was actively 
encouraged to open up the community to outside influences, to foreground the ethical 
imperative of encountering others and listening and responding to them as others.           
 
 
(5.5) Outside Influences: The Serial Poems of The Circular Gates    
 
Nancy’s radical reconfiguration of community has obvious parallels with Levinas’ 
understanding of ethical subjectivity, while the notion of a “community without community” 
enlarges a concern for the individual subject to consider its social applications. Levinas’ 
phenomenology of the subject functions as a model for imagining a more ethically informed 
notion of community in which its members are oriented toward others. This notion of 
community based on ethical subjectivity also bears similarities with the heteronomic turn seen 
earlier in Ashbery and Palmer’s interest in this reconfiguration as an example of how one might 
live in the social world of others signals the beginning of his development of a “poethics of 
proximity.” Although Palmer explains that the Vancouver Poetry Conference is “part of the 
landscape of NEL,”162 the influence of this event is more readily identifiable in the serial poems 
of CG, which show him investigating how what he experienced at the conference might 
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function in poetry with the intention of encouraging the reader to consider the work required 
and the difficulties involved in realising a “community without community.” Accordingly, 
serial poems expose the arbitrary nature of closure and containment, and foreground the 
simultaneity of singularity and plurality, thus raising similar questions as Nancy does regarding 
how the individual relates to a community of others. Because the meaning of a series gradually 
accumulates as the poems are read, the boundary between the single poem and the series, and 
by extension the singular and the plural, is continuously transgressed. These serial poems, 
therefore, provide occasions where outside influence is most apparent, which in turn enact the 
experience of “community without community” valued by Palmer and introduce the 
constitutive activities of his “poethics of proximity:” listening and responding to others in their 
singularity within a plurality, that is, within the social world of others.         
 The first section of CG consists of two series, “The Brown Book” and “The Book 
Against Understanding,” and immediately reveals the importance of the personal and the 
political questions raised by the Vancouver conference for Palmer’s emerging poetics, which, 
like the numerous recurring series he creates, run like threads throughout his collections. The 
first series begins with a quote from The Brown Book, a partially completed attempt by 
Wittgenstein to transcribe his lectures that was eventually abandoned, “But do we interpret the 
words/before obeying their order,” and the poet’s insistence that “This is difficult but not 
impossible.”163 Palmer indicates the “necessary difficulty” of his poetry here as he indicates 
words have meanings that exceed the poet’s intentions, the order he has put them in, due to the 
outside influence of language itself beyond his control. “The Brown Book” addresses 
incompletion not as an instance of failure but rather in terms of circularity, “so that it becomes 
harder/…/…to distinguish what seems to be/the beginning of the story from the end.”164 
Circularity is important because it means “there [is] no teleology,” no “point…[to arrive at] at 
the end.”165 Rather than closing-off the text, the interchangeable relation between the beginning 
and the end constitutes an opening-up of the text. As he explains in “She It Is,” “…the numbers 
are signs/of a series that’s been memorised/…/[But] The words are learned by word of 
mouth.”166 There are no numbers determining the order in which “The Brown Book” should 
be read because Palmer is not interested in ensuring a predetermined reading experience. While 
numbers imply order and a limiting of how the series can be read, his reference to oral 
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communication indicates his interest in a more open-ended process of listening and responding 
that is ultimately beyond his control. Within the series, the end of one poem marks the 
beginning of another, a feature heightened by Palmer since “…the circle stands for yes//and it 
doesn’t have ends.”167 Similar to the “poetics of derivation” discussed earlier, reading the series 
becomes an instant of writing as each reading changes the previous reading and is changed by 
subsequent readings.  
The second series, “The Book Against Understanding,” makes his motivations more 
explicit. Communication is important but Palmer is working against understanding, preventing 
comprehension in order to achieve something different, as he envisions it in “As If By Saying,” 
“Each looked into the water//and was frightened by a different thing/of his or her own 
making.”168  CG, therefore, is opened toward the outside influence of another person, the 
interpretation of the reader, while s/he is continuously confronted with difference because the 
serial poems gradually accumulate multiple meanings as the poems in proximity to them are 
read, with the result that there is “More of everything like motion/…/…More history than 
today.”169 A more responsive method of reading is required to deal with the difficulty of 
Palmer’s text, the fact that “It is. It was as if.”170 Such a responsive method ensures the reader 
can deal with the need “To learn what to say to unlearn” and find “Words for are and were 
not”171 because the readings it engenders are as open as the texts themselves, that is, open to 
further different interpretations. Serial poems accentuate this inherent feature of poetry because 
“each new combination produces a new meaning,” consequently requiring the reader to realise 
that “each conjunction” of the component parts has meaning, “are capable of rearrangements” 
and that “subsequent arrangement also has a meaning that is in no way ‘secondary’ to its 
original articulation.”172 Without sequential numbers, there is no implied order in “The Book 
Against Understanding” and no hierarchy regarding its component parts. By extension, the 
reader’s interpretation is in no way “secondary” to the poet’s “original articulation,” it is simply 
a single, possible reading amongst a plurality of other, different readings. CG allows the reader 
to appreciate that what Palmer himself values is “difficult but not impossible.” As reading the 
collection demonstrates, living in such a community is difficult because one must be open to 
different interpretations that constantly interrupt and question one’s own but it makes being 
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with others possible through “response-ability,” listening and responding to other 
interpretations and opening oneself up to outside influences.  
In the next section, entitled “Series,” Palmer observes how “The circular gates/start to 
open and close”173 to help the reader differentiate between the different types of serial poems 
in CG. Firstly, there is the open-ended, incomplete series that features in multiple collections. 
“Symmetrical Poem,” for example, a series of numbered poems, first appears in CG and 
continues into WM, NEL and FF. Or “Prose,” again a series of numbered poems that appears 
in multiple collections but has discrepancies in the sequence due to omissions that heighten the 
sense of incompletion. Secondly, there is the closed-off, self-contained series, such as “The 
Brown Book,” “The Book Against Understanding” and the eponymous series, that only ever 
appear in a single collection. However, in “Series,” Palmer gestures toward a third type that is 
more susceptible to, even dependent upon, the outside influence of another person. 
Consequently, this type of series is more indeterminate than the others, having the qualities of 
both but belonging to neither: 
 
                 ...demonstrating a new way of counting 
                    to three. We both lose our place  
looking for the prediscovered end 
                    of the series, in this case 
a shadow instead of the light.174 
 
 
“Series” is different to the other series in CG and foregrounds the difficulty of the collection 
as a whole. It consists of a number of titled and untitled poems, a self-contained series, and the 
open-ended series “Prose.” Any attempt at providing a singular reading is interrupted by the 
questions “Series” raises. Should “Series” be read as a self-contained series since it does not 
appear in any subsequent collections? Is it a miniature collection in CG and simply named after 
the eponymous “Series?” Do the untitled poems belong to another series such as “The Brown 
Book” or “The Book Against Understanding” whose component parts are also untitled? Do the 
titled poems belong to “Series” or are they stand-alone? Is “Series” interrelated with other 
series in Palmer’s work through the thread of “Prose?” By answering any of these questions, 
the reader fundamentally changes “Series.” “Series 2” demonstrates how one interpretation 
might be “in common” with another but it is always different:  
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 A body in light and shade 
 placed between two equal lights 
 side by side 
 
 A body placed 
 at an equal distance 
 between two lights175 
 
 
Both utterances describe a common scene but are nevertheless completely different It is 
“possible to begin again”176 because the act of reading is another writing, thus emphasising the 
sense of incompletion and circularity informing CG as a whole. The open and closed series can 
be realised by Palmer alone but the third requires another person:  
 
 
                   I try to count to three 
and reach two and a fraction before any corrections 
become necessary.177        
 
 
The reader provides such corrections, rewriting the series as s/he reads it and answers the 
questions it poses. In answering these questions, the reader realises his/her “response-ability” 
by contributing to the series while also being continuously interrupted by the irreducible 
differences of its component parts. 
The eponymous series in CG is modelled after Frank Stella’s Protractor Series (1967-
71) as Palmer followed the curvilinear, geometric paintings as an example for his own 
compositional model. On the most explicit level, his paintings help the reader to visualise 
perhaps what Palmer hoped to achieve with CG (Fig. 8). With its numerous intersections and 
overlaps, Firuzabad provides a visual metaphor for the intended effect of Palmer’s series as 
they interrelate with one another, stand independently and create juxtapositions. However, two 
features of Stella’s series are particularly important to his collection. Firstly, the same shapes 
and segments reappear throughout the series in different colours (Fig. 9). 
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       (Fig. 8) Frank Stella, Firuzabad (1970)               (Fig. 9) Franks Stella, Harran II (1967) 
 
 
Palmer replicates this technique in his own series, immediately foregrounding it even, as the 
opening lines: 
 
 
keys, of tears, the store 
harvested white, and electricity.178  
 
 
are repeated in the series with variations of punctuation, prepositions, omission and 
enjambment, for example, “The keys of tears and the store”179 and:  
 
 
 ...the  
 window of the store, keys, 
 and electricity.180 
 
 
The structure of CG creates a densely interwoven pattern of phrases repeated with variations. 
Similar to Stella’s paintings, where the squares and circles are constantly interrupted and 
intruded upon by other shapes (Fig. 10 & 11), the boundaries of Palmer’s poems are continually 
violated and exceeded as the repeated phrases interrelate them together.  
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 (Fig. 10) Frank Stella, Hagamatana II (1967)       (Fig. 11) Frank Stella, Takht-i-Suleiman   
                                                                                                           (1967)  
 
 
However, one recurrent group of words reveals the second and perhaps the most important 
feature of Stella’s paintings for the poet. Palmer repeats words indicating the components of a 
room throughout “The Circular Gates,” such as the walls, the door, the window, and the floor, 
thus demonstrating his appreciation for Stella’s aesthetics as an attempt to make a space. 
Painting, therefore, does not just represent a pre-existing space but is “the making of space.”181 
While his investigations of shape, line and colour are important, they are secondary to his 
interest in making space, whether it is “the space between lines, the space left out of the canvas, 
the space you imagine as you look at his shapes, [or] the real space that exists between the 
painting and the viewer.”182 A Stella canvas is “not a window to another world but a full and 
complete world unto itself.”183  Each painting in his series is individually named after an 
ancient, circular-planned town in Asia minor, thus suggesting his paintings are meant to be 
inhabitable, social spaces.  
In his explanation of what motivated him to write “The Circular Gates,” he reveals his 
desire to have a relationship with his material medium similar to certain painters’ rather than a 
poet’s: 
 
Formally, the central thing was trying to deal with recurrence and sequentiality – 
seriality if you will – in relation to what I derive from someone like Stella, rather than 
a literary, thematic recurrence, though it does thematise itself as it goes along. I wanted 
to do it in the material nature of those recurring phrases...designing a pattern of 
recurrence...And trying to deal with words beside any sense of literary consideration, 
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but the way you would deal with them as paint, deliberately ignoring their actual 
referential nature.184 
 
 
Palmer even bemoans the fact that the same audience who has no problem with the permissions 
innovative paintings represent will “have all kinds of problems with similar permissions or 
liberties or deviations performed in the text.”185  His desire for a painterly relation to his 
material medium is because of the permissions he can provide his audience with, while also 
explaining why he might appreciate Stella’s intention to make a space and how his “Protractor 
Series” provides a way into it, “There are three kinds of gate:/ fan, interlace and rainbow.”186 
Palmer explains that “The Circular Gates” is “about educating oneself toward responsibility 
toward the world,” avoiding “displacement from the world’s events” using the example of 
Stella, whose “position could act as a kind of opening, a gate…into the present.”187 Applying 
the same logic to his collection, it is a similarly, albeit textually, made space: 
 
 
The room is very large 
and my name was George 
This had been a hotel 
I recognise the walls188 
 
 
 
Palmer’s hotel metaphor implies that CG is intended to be temporarily inhabited and is 
designed to put different people in proximity to one another. The hotel metaphor helps the 
reader conceptualise a “community without community,” a community of individuals “being 
with others.” Palmer identifies “There were at least four,”189 suggesting his series provide a 
fourth way into an inhabitable, social space, what he terms “the City/of O.”190 Like Stella’s 
Protractor Series, the collection, informed by circularity and incompletion as each end is 
another beginning, is modelled after this circular city. Because the collection is opened up to 
the outside influence of another person, as demonstrated through the questions posed by 
“Series,” Palmer solves “The problem/of the door/[that] called for an opening.”191 His series 
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provide a way into the collection, into the social space he makes where the reader is required 
to listen and respond to the differences that constantly interrupt his/her attempt to interpret the 
text and write him/herself into existence as a subject.  
In “The Circular Gates,” this sense of difference is accentuated by the phrases that 
reappear throughout with minor variations to make the reader acknowledge that plurality rather 
than singularity is prioritised in a “community without community.” Palmer likens his use of 
repetition to a painter “returning and returning to the first moment of the canvas, and the 
layering process, the process of accretion and the process of emergence” to explain how the 
differences that appear in his work are “relational and are not limited to what we mistakenly 
think of as the scale of the poem.”192 The repetition of phrases gives the impression of endless 
differences and changes the meaning of each poem because it is subject to outside influence, 
to the different meaning a phrase has in another poem that influences how the phrase might be 
interpreted in the poem being read. Listening and responding to these differences, however, is 
not limited to the “scale of the poem” as: 
 
 
we aren’t able to say this is that and next to it 
               is the rest from your book. Is it any 
               different 
from the flood when instead of turning it off I 
turned it really on193  
 
 
CG gives the reader permission to enact a way of living in this social world that is ethically 
informed as s/he is continuously confronted with differences and encounters other 
interpretations to which s/he must respond. By opening up the text to the outside influence of 
the reader, Palmer not only gestures toward the same sense of heternomic subjectivity seen in 
Ashbery but also makes a space for outsiders. If a “poetics of derivation” gives the poet 
permission to listen and respond to others, the serial poetics of CG extends this permission to 
the reader. The personal and political realisations engendered by his experiences at Vancouver 
are replicated in the poetics of CG with the intention of making a space where the reader can 
realise his/her “response-ability” and appreciate how writing and reading poems in this manner 
is a way of living in the social world of others, of acting in and interacting with a “community 
without community” by listening and responding to others as others.     
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Conclusion: Addressing the (as yet) Unknown     
 
What makes the Vancouver Poetry Conference so significant is that the poets there had no 
audience to speak of, no determinate set of readers whose expectations had to be met and, 
therefore, no prescriptive standards that had to be adhered to. As Palmer later observes of his 
experience there, he was in the company of poets “intentionally working outside that cultural 
centre and [who] were not addressing themselves to an audience as yet unknown, an alternative 
audience that was just then taking shape.”194 His observation of how Duncan, Spicer [although 
absent], and Creeley” were addressing themselves to “as yet unknown” others is more than just 
a comment on the residual avant-gardism of the New American Poets. As an exercise in 
community building, in making an “imagined community” where the poet dwells with others, 
the conference would have a profound influence on Palmer’s “poethics of proximity.” It is not 
incorrect to suggest that the attendees felt othered by the hegemonic centre they were critiquing 
from their position of ekstasis for reasons pertaining to the personal, political, poetic and any 
combination of the three. Most importantly, however, the creative and critical dialogues 
between such others confirmed for Palmer the possibility of talking “to self as well as other as 
well as self as other,”195 which manifests in his later reconfiguration of the lyrical mode. 
Although he repeatedly discusses this event in interviews, the conference never features as 
subject matter in his poems. Instead his early collections attempt to enact the personal, political 
and poetic considerations and commitments he himself became aware of when he first 
encountered poets not only writing about but living according to the “practise of outside.”    
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Chapter 6: Writing with Nothing at its Centre in Without 
Music and Notes for Echo Lake 
 
Palmer is not alone amongst his contemporaries regarding his interest in “outside(r) influence.” 
Palmer is normally identified with the collective of poet-critics referred to as Language poets 
which occupied a critical position outside that critiqued the normative standards of the poetic. 
While Language poets such as Bernstein, Andrews, Watten and Silliman are committed to the 
project of “becoming outside,”1 by insisting on private channels of publication and distribution 
for their work, advancing pedantic pedagogical methods through critical essays, making 
teleological pronouncements about the function of poetry in a postmodern world, and creating 
an insular environment of poet-critics to review their work, they inevitably established another 
institution, albeit an oppositional one. In this sense, there is a significant disparity between the 
intention and the actuality of Language poetry, due to what Palmer identified as its “hidden 
orthodoxies,” 2  its commitment to “[creating], let’s say, a fixed theoretical matrix” and 
“work[ing] from an ideology of prohibitions about expressivity and the self.”3 The Language 
poets might achieve a kind of “uncommunity”4 but their committed oppositionality, however, 
means they inevitably perpetuate the same exclusionary principles practiced by the hegemonic 
institution they initially sought to oppose. As discussed earlier, Palmer refuses to identify with 
any exclusionary group, oppositional or otherwise, and critiques the closing-off of the term 
“language” to describe a particular group of poets, differentiating them from by excluding 
others:  
 
 
What troubles me about that “Language” term is that, taken at face value, it is 
manifestly absurd, as well as insulting to other writers equally committed to exploring 
the medium...[since] we are [all] questioning ways of understanding, seeing, and 
various crucial orders of assumption about meaning and representation in a culture 
where most things seem to have become re-presentation.5   
  
 
                                                      
1
 Barrett Watten, “The Turn to Language and the 1960s,” Critical Inquiry 29 (2002): 140.   
2
 Michael Palmer, “On Robert Duncan,” American Poet (1997) Accessed 3rd August 2015. 
<http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/ poets/m_r/palmer/palmeronduncan.htm>. 
3
 Michael Palmer, “Jubilat Interview,” Jubilat 1 (2000): 111.  
4
 Oren Izenberg, Being Numerous: Poetry and the Ground of Social Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2010), 142.  
5
 Palmer, “Interview: Conducted by Tuma,” 9-10. 
  
 
206 
 
The “all” refers to innovative poets who intentionally position themselves outside the 
normative standards of their respective period. Palmer is concerned with the continuous 
counter-tradition constituted by “outsiders” in poetry rather than containing them in particular 
groups with their own “exclusionary authentication of focus or practice,” 6 best illustrated by 
Allen’s anthology.   
 Despite this important distinction between Palmer and the Language poets, both are 
committed to a deconstructive critique of voice-centred poetry and undermining the “workshop 
poem,” a compositional model that embodied the “official verse culture”7 during the seventies. 
Palmer and the Language poets developed an anti-expressionist aesthetic in response to what 
they saw as the commodification of poetry into discrete objects, thus challenging “the little 
self”8 of the post-confessional lyric and the inscription of subjectivity as a static point of 
reference. As their name indicates, Language poets are concerned with the outside influence 
exerted by language, how it constitutes the subject. Rather than producing textual objects that 
embody a specific person’s act of self-authoring and are designed to be passively consumed by 
the reader, they create text-based poems that function as equivalents of language itself because 
they are constituted by the human capacity for creative agency. The univocality of the singular, 
autonomous speaker and the attendant autotelic subjectivity is challenged using the inherent 
polyphony of language, while the creative act is reconfigured according to the dialogic 
principle to problematise the conventional speaker-addressee dichotomy and complicate the 
standards used to separate poetry from other types of concrete utterance.  
 WM is probably Palmer’s most explicit reaction against the “official verse culture” of 
the seventies and helps explain why he is so frequently aligned with the Language poets. “Poem 
Containing Two Songs” and “Three Poems to be Read as One” capture his departure from the 
object-nature of the poem to investigate “living language: language whose mode of existence 
is the event, a language…that lives through and undergoes the experiences of all those who 
speak it and hear it, and which is therefore never self-identical.”9 “Poem Containing Two 
Songs” begins with the perfect analogy: 
 
 
 A train passes that other train 
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 so that unmoving we begin 
 to drift backward, afloat – 
 
 the story everyone knows 
 and repeats to no one else –10     
 
 
The first song uses this illusion of self-motion to call our attention to a fundamental aspect of 
language that is often “misremembered,”11 the corporeality of language that moves us into 
embodying a different perspective. Like the analogy, this movement is never literal or physical 
but rather imaginative or psychical and means the poem cannot be a static object, it must be 
engaged with as an event in language. By insisting that “there is no useful distinction between 
language and poetry,”12 the Language poets are involved in a similar project to Palmer, of 
viewing poetry as just another daily activity performed in the social world of others through 
language. As such, poetry is not some “reflexive confession, but the actual as it respires,” as it 
lives and breathes “hidden in plain sight.”13  Consequently, poetry involves listening and 
responding to a “lost, or forgotten language, that is, one spoken everywhere in the streets and 
yet unheard or unlistened to. It comes to us in both its familiarity and its foreignness.”14 
Language-oriented poetry can be described as “swelling it seemed/toward two points at once”15 
to convey this sense of language, and by extension the poem, as facilitating movement between 
two poles of consciousness. This affirms the dialectic of “familiarity and…foreignness” but in 
a way that suggests the relation between self and other in the encounter with otherness. 
Language poets illustrate “an openness or receptiveness to the strangeness or otherness of 
words,”16  while the resulting poems reconfigure our relation to language as examples of 
listening and responding to its otherness. Viewing poetry as language means it is living rather 
than an object that can be grasped, that can be comprehended or understood completely and 
definitively. 
 Similar to the Language poets, Palmer reveals to his readers what they have repressed 
or forgotten, or has been intentionally hidden by the normative standards of representation that 
protect the political status quo, about their own constitutive relation to language as something 
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living and, therefore, irreducible to an “object, code, system, conceptual scheme, paradigm… 
[or] ideology”17 that reinforces rule-governed forms of monologic behaviour. The second song 
discusses the inherent dialogism in the poem when conceived as an event in or an experience 
with language: 
 
 
                           …They have come 
 to watch you paint 
 
 and be part of your painting 
 they have come to watch you paint 
 
 or to enter your painting 
 
 with open mouth, the suspended figures 
 seated or stretched out 
 
 across the ordered space of that ‘between world’18 
 
 
Palmer here displays a further affinity with the Language poets and their “postconfessional 
quest for a transpersonal poetics…[that] contests the traditional notion of the self as the primary 
organising feature of writing.”19 This urge to allow others into his text, not just to watch but to 
be part of it, aligns Palmer’s work with the “dialogic openness to reader collaboration and 
communal production [in Language writing]…that invite[s] the reader’s interpretive 
participation in the text.”20 Like language, the poem is not something that happened, “yesterday 
[is] quiet, empty and//entire,” but is happening, is an ongoing event similar to living in the 
social world of others, “Today the city is//active, imprecise and clouded.” 21 By ordering the 
“space of the ‘between world,’” Palmer provides a made place of first permission similar to 
Language poets, whose concept and idealised compositional model of multiple authorship 
positions the poem between two or more authors as an intersection between multiple poles of 
consciousness. As Bernstein explains: 
 
 
Rather than work, which is the product of the author’s projection/memory/associative 
process, it is work for the reader’s (viewer’s) projection/construction. The text calls 
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upon the reader to be actively involved in the process of constituting its meaning, the 
reader becoming a neutral observer neither to a described exteriority nor to an enacted 
interiority. The text formally involves the process of response/interpretation and in 
doing so makes the reader aware of herself or himself as producer as well as consumer 
of meaning.22   
 
 
This pronouncement about interdependent agency and collective action is obviously politically 
charged since it breaks “down the boundaries of the autonomous author in favour of both the 
work and its immediate reception within its community,”23 but it also contextualises Palmer 
amongst those contemporaries who similarly posited the poem as an event where “response-
ability” to others can be realised, either in terms of language as an absolute exteriority beyond 
the individual’s control or in terms of other people who are different to and distant from the 
self, thus exposing it to an otherwise.  
“Three Poems to be Read as One” foregrounds the inherent polyphony when the poem 
is conceived as a “between world” where multiple poles of consciousness encounter each other 
by emphasising “That love of conversation.”24 However, Palmer also indicates how using 
multi-voicedness to critique conventional, that is singular, voice-centred poetry is one of the 
primary reasons for the difficulty of WM, “the speakers/are difficult to hear.”25. Because the 
poem is de-authorised by being open toward a variety of heteronomic forces beyond the 
author’s control, the poem is “speaking at the edge of voice.”26 If the poem is happening at “the 
edge of voice,” where the potential for articulation or speaking is at its limit, then a different 
way of responding is required. For Palmer and the Language poets, listening is another way of 
realising one’s “response-ability,” paying attention to the language being spoken everywhere 
in daily life but hitherto unlistened to. As a result, their work offers a “model or theory of the 
person, a pedagogy of personhood” that, rather than using poetry as a vehicle to advance 
assumptions about a particular person, uses poetry as an “occasion for re-establishing and 
reading the concept and value of the person”27 as an active, participating entity open toward 
otherness. Like Palmer, the Language poets provide a way of approaching the problem of 
subjectivity following the poststructuralist critique of the humanist subject because it addresses 
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something far greater than the authoring of the poem itself, the potential for a life lived together 
with others through one’s performed acts in language.  
While the affinities between Palmer and the Language poets are undeniable, there is a 
disparity between the intentions and the actuality of the latter that make it a mistake to 
completely identify Palmer with them. The theoretical writings and manifestos of Bernstein, 
Andrews, Watten and Silliman might advance remarkably progressive and persuasive 
arguments about the social and ethical function of a poetics that has as its “cardinal principle” 
the “dismissal of voice” as the foundational operative of the workshop poem and its claims to 
self-presence and authenticity.28 However, so much of the poetry itself has an “an-aesthetic”29 
quality that derives from the insubstantiality of the poems they have produced. Consider 
Silliman, for example, who refers to his entire body of work as Ketjak, which consists of The 
Age of Huts (1974-1980), Tjanting (1979-1981), Alphabet (1979-2004) and Universe (2005 – 
present), a projected 360 poem sequence of which only the first two have been published to 
date, Revelator (2013) and Northern Soul (2014). Or Andrews’ The Millennium Project, an 
online companion piece to Lip Service (1997) consisting of almost one thousand pages of 
material generated between the mid-80s’ and the early-90s.’ The Grand Piano: An Experiment 
in Collective Autobiography,” consisting of ten volumes written by ten authors published over 
a five year period and totalling over sixteen-hundred pages, perfectly captures the discrepancy 
between the theory and the practice of Language poetry. While it theoretically engages with 
important questions about the constitutive relationship between self and other, the notion of 
“community without community,” the actual, material text places not just difficult but 
impossible demands on the reader’s capacity to attend to it properly. These three examples 
typify the internal logic informing so much Language writing, the “open-ended algorithm of 
addition,”30 that means “it demands neither articulation nor, precisely, attention.”31 Due to their 
scale, the preclusion of differentiating between one poem and another, and the complete 
removal of anything resembling a subject in terms of both matter and a speaker, the attitude of 
“indifference and inattention to the specifics of what is being said is not only a plausible 
response” but the only “response such writing demands.”32  
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This discrepancy between the intentions and the actuality of Language poetry explains 
Palmer’s repeated eforts to distance himself from this group. He sees this discrepancy as “one 
implication of the American model of Derrida. Not so much Derrida himself, but the 
appropriation of Derrida by the American academy.”33 The consequent willingness “to slide 
into a purely deconstructed space...of [the] purely echoic, polysemous,” of pure discourse, 
absence and inauthentic repetition, has the “danger of a return to a hermetically sealed cultural 
space,” it is the “sceptical other side of the mirror of New Criticism” when it has “returned 
poetry to a particularly sealed-off object of study,” it is “just literature, again.”34 Palmer is not 
a Language poet because he retains a certain lyrical sensibility and his densely interwoven, 
derivative texts consisting of others’ voices require frequent re-reading, thus emphasising the 
importance of attentive listening as a way of responding to otherness. Furthermore, the 
emphasis in Language poetry on de-authorisation and disembodiment by ascribing agency to 
language itself rather than the speaking subject makes it not only difficult but practically 
impossible to analyse their work in terms of the poet’s and the reader’s “response-ability.” 
While they radically reconfigure the role of the reader as an active participant in the 
construction of meaning rather than a passive consumer of predetermined meanings, the almost 
complete abdication of authority by the poet similarly precludes responsibility, thus 
undermining the ethical connotations of this gesture in a way that Palmer wholly distances 
himself from.                 
 
 
(6.1) Erasure and Embodiment in Without Music 
 
The constant re-readings that Palmer’s poems necessitate, the sense of closer reading or 
attentive listening they each require, fundamentally distinguishes him from the Language poets. 
This emphasis on (self-)analysis is the result of his attempt to write the “analytic lyric,” a “way 
to address the problematics of the purely private utterance” that he derives primarily from the 
examples of Edmond Jabès and Paul Celan. 35 In Jabès, Palmer identifies the possibility of a 
book filled with silences, where silence is the “place where you reply to the question, where 
you reply to the other.”36 Like the Language poets, Jabès provides “a structure of response to 
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the appropriation of language in his time” motivated by the “hope of recovering the meaning 
of words in a time when words have lost their meaning.”37 However, rather than just creating 
a dispersal of different voices and competing discourses, he “allow[s] for silence,” 38  he 
provides the space for people not just to respond but to ask. In the silent text, he creates a 
“strategy of fragments, of unanswered questions, incompletions and fractures, in a structure of 
loss,”39 thus preventing the poet from either appropriating the discourse or entering into an 
authoritarian role. In Celan, Palmer identifies with a feature that Language poets are similarly 
concerned with, the question of the self in language. However, for Palmer and Celan, this is 
always a question of the “lyric self in language,” the “sense of the dispersal of the subject [or 
the speaker], but also the reaffirmation, the fact that it was nobody’s voice and yet it was, also, 
something.”40 Celan addresses “the circumstance of the impossibility of reading the world.” 41 
In their absolute critique of voice-centred poetry, the Language poets display a complete 
distrust of the lyric but Celan reveals how the lyric can be renewed. The “analytic lyric” derived 
from Jabès and Celan emphasises the:  
 
 
investigatory aspects, the taking over of the lyric concentration on the code itself, on 
the texture of language, the taking over the condensation of lyric emotion and focusing 
it then on the mechanics of language...[to] critique discourses of power, to renew the 
social function of poetry.42          
 
 
It provides a “between world,” a way of ascribing to neither the postconfessional lyric nor the 
language-oriented poem but still managing to critique the conventions of the singular speaker, 
the autonomous writing subject and the notion of address while also retaining the sense of 
embodiment and “response-ability” so crucial to his “poethics of proximity.”  
 WM is Palmer’s most concerted effort at using silence to question the lyrical self. The 
collection is named after a group of essays by Steve Reich entitled Words Without Music, which 
he rephrases in the eponymous series as “Hieroglyphics of the wrist/without music.”43 Palmer 
explains his reasoning, “I thought, well, if I take out words, I’m left without music. So the 
hidden word there is ‘words’ which has been erased, and what’s left is Without Music.”44 
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Through the silences, erasures and concealments of the “analytic lyric” he achieves what he 
terms a “composition with nothing at its centre,”45 a way of investigating the various silences, 
erasures and concealments that occur when writing and reading “I” in lyric poetry. Palmer’s 
“words without music” indicate how the lyric vitally retains elements from its original, classical 
format as poems that are sung with accompaniment from a lyre. As a result, it “provides an “I” 
to whoever reads or sings it,” thereby revealing the “communal nature of the first-person 
pronoun” and problematising the fiction of the unitary, singular self as the source of the lyric 
utterance.46  The opening poem, “For Voice,” immediately reveals the purpose behind the 
“analytic lyric[s]” in the whole collection: 
 
 
 We must not act and speak 
 
 as if asleep 
 Eye precedes ear47 
 
 
Palmer’s “analytic lyric[s],” therefore, seek to deny the implicit formalism that often attends 
lyric poems, the tendency to look at them as objects and to look for clues to interpret their 
meaning, the autobiographical correspondences or the experiences being re-presented. He 
challenges the presupposition that the written poem should be just read rather than performed: 
 
 
                   Now letter and word 
 have begun to disappear 
 the A no longer drawn 
 
 with three remembered strokes 
 but shaping itself 
 a little confused in the way  
 people conceive the possibility 
 
 as theoretical,48     
 
 
This reconfiguration of the lyric is “difficult but not impossible,” it remains only theoretical, it 
remains a written text, until it is actually performed, “Sung this is a song//if spoken.”49 “For 
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Voice” also foregrounds the dialectic of absence and presence in Palmer’s lyrics through its 
own binary, its repeated references to “zeroes” and “ones.”50 “Analytic lyric[s]” fundamentally 
depend on this complicated dialectic, “plus a minus equal to one,”51 as the figure “1” evokes 
the other vertical figure, “I,” that features so often in lyric poems and combines presence (plus) 
and absence (minus). As he phrases it elsewhere, “Let one and letter be equal.”52 Approaching 
what Palmer identified with in Jabès and Celan, they engender a “void centre”53 in which 
“erasure allows for writing of a poetry about nothing through a lexicon of absence and 
otherwise inexpressible referents”54 or silences. The experience of writing and reading such 
poems involves a degree of “oscillation between one and another, between being and non-
being, presence and absence.”55  In a similar way to the acts of self-displacement seen in 
Ashbery as he creates “anybody’s autobiography” in RM and DDS, the silences, erasures and 
concealments in WM are intended to highlight how the “play of absence and presence” is not 
only “central to the lyric experience” but “part of the unsounded nature of all linguistic 
experience, part of that world of the destabilised and the relational we choose to cover over, to 
leave unheard.”56 
 Concealment and erasure is nothing new in Palmer’s poems, it can even be argued that 
they are simply the extension and application of the “poetics of derivation” seen in BN and CG 
into lyric poetry. This might initially seem a paradox since derivative poems provide a 
“constellation of voices” while his “analytic lyric[s]” consist of silences. However, when the 
question of who is actually speaking is kept in mind, the difference between them is not as 
immediately apparent because both address the various considerations and commitments 
involved in writing a subject into existence through poetry. As Ashbery phrased it in “Some 
Trees,” the “silence [is] already filled with noises.” According to the most literal interpretation 
of derivative poems, the poet does not disclose him/herself, s/he hides behind others’ texts from 
which s/he has borrowed. But Palmer complicates this reductive idea of concealment when he 
argues that while the poem might: 
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in a literal sense be borrowed...what it stands for – what it becomes – is not borrowed 
at all, but is a singular act of aesthetic identity, an act of disclosure that speaks quite 
clearly of the intent of the speaker who is not speaking, or who is speaking only through 
the speech of others.57   
 
 
For him, the more insistent the claim to disclosure is, as in “confessional expressionism,” the 
more elaborate the concealedness becomes so that “the very claim itself...lends a suspect 
intentionality to the speaking ‘I’ and a teleological motive”58 to the poem. This proposal reveals 
the “necessary difficulty” Palmer associates with writing and reading “I” in a poem, where “I” 
corresponds with an actual autobiographical or expressive subject that exists outside the text. 
Despite the sincerity of the poet regarding his/her act of complete disclosure in the poem, 
autobiographical and expressive writing inherently involves omissions due to the 
“complication...that while the story is being told the story is [still] going on...[so that] the story 
is manifestly other than the sequence of events that through selection and organisation go to 
make up the story.”59 “Confessional expressionism” depends on the “refusal of displacement 
from the first-person,”60 on the apparent correspondence between the “I” of the poem and the 
“I” of the poet so a sense of presence is engendered. But the first-person pronoun is always 
already an absence, it replaces “myself” and, therefore, empties the subject of self. Palmer uses 
this inevitable omission to suggest that his derivative poems rather than “confessional 
expression” reveal more about the person writing: 
 
 
what is taken as a sign of openness...[i.e. the declared intention of disclosure, 
autobiographical correspondences, assumed symmetry between the speaking and the 
writing “I,” etc] may stand for concealment, and what are understood generally as signs 
of withholding or evasion...[denial of autobiographical correspondences, use of others’ 
voices, etc] may from another point of view stand for disclosure.61                          
 
 
He discredits the singular voice that is so prevalent in the workshop lyric and discovers a 
complex “diversity of selves within myself” by “reading myself and reading those things that 
have gone into the formation of myself.”62 Such poems are autobiographical because they are 
a “way of reconstituting all of those things that do build that self, which is not...a unitary self.”63 
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The “analytic lyric,” therefore, does not simply disclose a subject but analyses that subject as 
it is written into existence in the poem. In this sense, the “writing [of] is also a kind of reading”64 
of the self. Silence, erasure and concealment are not intended to just convey absence but to 
allow for a different kind of presence, the presence of “(an)Other” that the insistence on 
symmetry between the speaking and the writing “I” in confessional expressionism actually 
silences, erases and conceals. Like Ashbery, the dialectic of presence and absence allows him 
to attend to “that other I,”65 to disclose a subject that is not autotelic but heteronomic because 
his poems include all those others that constitute the self as he listens and responds to their 
voices. 
 Although the influence of Palmer’s extended, collaborative relationship with Margaret 
Jenkins is more readily apparent in FF, which will be discussed in greater detail in the next 
chapter, his first explicit references to dance and the experimental choreographer appear in this 
collection of “analytic lyrics.” Since Palmer believes that “we cannot understand the modern 
lyric without understanding Baudelaire,”66 asserting that “To dance is to live”67  in “Tomb of 
Baudelaire”  reveals his interest in how the lyric is embodied and performed as a way of living, 
how the absence achieved by his own acts of autobiographical and expressive self-erasure 
allow for the presence of “(an)Other.” The title of the collection confirms the importance of 
erasure but “The Circle Was the Secret,” written “(for Margaret Jenkins for 
dancing:/permutations without music/on some seventeenth century phrases)”68 indicates the 
equal importance of embodiment. Poetry and choreography are made almost synonymous by 
Palmer as the poem performs its meaning. For example, the first section consists solely of the 
words “circle,” “secret,” “earth,” “fire,” “face” and “empty” arranged in different orders in 
each stanza: 
 
 
The face is the fire 
The earth was the secret 
The circle is empty 
 
The earth is the circle 
The secret is the fire 
 
The earth is the face 
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The secret is empty69 
 
 
Analysing its semantic content is secondary to identifying its pattern, the movement of the 
words into different contexts and relationships with other words that change what they signify. 
“The Circle…” performs its meaning because it is about permutations and it must be read like 
a dance, that is, by focusing on the literal movements of its component parts. Written “for 
dancing,” it is meant to be embodied and performed. The second and third sections include “X” 
in the permutated phrases, connotative of both erasure and the desire to mark a particular 
location. Like the other most recurrent capital letter in confessional expressionism, “I,” “The 
X is nothing,” “The X is empty”70 for Palmer. Implying both erasure and embodiment, the “X” 
as it literally moves around “The Circle” provides an analogy allowing him to demonstrate how 
in any autobiographical or expressive writing “the ‘I’ functions as the most elaborate of 
shifters,”71 although this complexity is not always used or even recognised. When discussing 
these pronominal shifters, Palmer quotes the French structural linguist Émile Benveniste, who 
claims that “I” only ever signifies the person who is uttering the present instance of discourse 
containing “I,” “I cannot be defined except in terms of ‘location.’”72 However, his quote from 
Problems in General Linguistics changes the original “locution”73  to “location.” Whether 
intentional or not, interchanging “location” and “locution” means the “I” demarcates a 
particular place while also necessitating performance, the requirement for it to be uttered to 
have meaning, making the lyric “a song//if spoken.”  
The dialectic of presence and absence “makes explicit the otherness of the ‘I’”74 in 
Palmer’s analytic lyrics. His “poetics of derivation” involves borrowing others’ voices as a way 
of analysing himself as the subject of his lyrics but in reading them ourselves we become 
“borrowers of these voices [who] are no more distant from them than” he is, the “voices are in 
a sense as much ours” as they are his.75 WM demonstrates Palmer’s nuanced understanding of 
Rimbaud’s infamous statement that “Je est un autre,” that “I is an other.” Firstly, as it relates 
to confessional expressionism, the “I” as speaker of the poem is always different or other to 
the “I” writing it. Secondly, and more importantly for how it relates to a “poethics of 
proximity,” if “I” does not correspond to a particular person it indicates an instance of potential 
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performance, it remains empty, waiting to be inhabited by whoever reads and speaks it. “I,” 
therefore, is “an other” to the poet because it is embodied by another person, by “(an)Other.” 
“How They Locate” introduces the consequences of emphasising the otherness inherent in “I” 
as the poem no longer belongs to a singular consciousness, of opening the poem up to the 
potential presence of “(an)Other:” 
 
How they locate across bodies of water, where bodies cross. 
In the second-person nightmare is the third. You are is it.76   
 
 
Palmer is not interested in addressing somebody in particular because if the “I” is nothing more 
than a “void centre,” it stands to reason that the second-person pronoun is even more 
indeterminate. Instead, through his rewording of Heraclitus’ dictum that “you can’t step into 
the same river twice,” “You can never step in the same cloud twice (in the same song twice),77 
he subtly implies that his songs, his lyrics, provide the “bodies of water, where bodies cross.” 
The “X” symbolises two “I”s crossing, the “I” of the poet and that other “I,” or the “I” of 
“(an)Other.” Elaborating on the organic metaphor for his compositions, the poem as “A field 
has its centre, here/and there,” it allows “A continuous field to appear to be grey.”78 The poem 
is not the product of a singular consciousness but a process, an event in language that is multi-
centred because it corresponds with the “now here” of the poet’s original composition and the 
“now here” of the reader’s interpretation.  
As Palmer’s reference to choreography and dance indicates, he is interested in 
embodiment as much as erasure so the constellation of voices he creates is not a deconstructed 
space of pure discourse but the practice of arranging and interrelating different selves so that 
they listen and respond to each other . However, given the medium he is working in, it is “not 
choreography so much as collaboration.”79 Palmer believes it is: 
 
 
evident that everything I do seems a form of collaboration, across time, with the voices 
of poets and others that pass through me as I work. Suffice it to say that another, an 
other, becomes present in a way that is both like and unlike the dialogic work of the 
poem. My ideal of pure collaboration, never fully realised, produces a work that belongs 
neither to one maker nor to the other or others. It escapes or surpasses the kind of 
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intentionality we associate with the product of the individual. It is a work...‘that is 
neither you nor I.’80     
 
 
The silences, erasures and concealments in his analytic lyrics are consistent with what he 
considers the social and ethical purpose of poetry, the “sense that the poet, by the choice of 
vocation, gives up his place.”81 However, “ceding one’s place...doesn’t mean that I don’t write 
my poems. Nor do I mean to say that I don’t stand responsible for them.”82 The insistence on 
erasure and embodiment in WM, the dialectic of presence and absence, ensures that Palmer’s 
questioning of the considerations and commitments involved in writing “I” is always answered 
by an other “I,” by “(an)Other” who listens and responds to him but, most importantly, remains 
responsible for his/her response, that is, realises his/her “response-ability” as an embodied 
ethical subject acting in and interacting with the social world of others.      
 Palmer concludes “How They Locate” with a line that succinctly captures how the 
dialectic of presence and absence, the interrelation of erasure and embodiment, in his analytic 
lyrics is crucial to “response-ability,” to how the poet and the reader write a subject into 
existence by listening and responding to others. “(I live in her letter)”83 succinctly articulates 
how Palmer’s reconfiguration of the lyric utterance allows for an analysis of the subject as 
engendered by the interaction between self and other. This line is an example of “lyric 
cryptography,” a compositional method of erasure and concealment that necessitates 
“productive reading.” 84  Cryptography in this instance proposes a way of listening and 
responding to the actual words on the page. Read literally, “I live in her letter” is a highly 
abstract, if not entirely impossible, state of existence but through “in her,” the partial presence 
of “in here” and “inhere” can be detected. In other words, Palmer is absent as the speaking 
subject of his poems but is present in the trace that remains, in the sense that the “placement of 
words [is] the place meant,”85 that the poem corresponds with his intentions at a particular time. 
As he explains elsewhere, it is the: 
 
 
 Same as the same thing 
 as difference 
 
 so that the choice of a letter 
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 equals a (careful?) not choosing of (all?) the rest86 
 
 
Using “lyric cryptography” also indicates how the reader engages with the absences in his 
“analytic lyric[s]” to engender a different kind of presence. A “productive reading” describes 
a “practice that involves taking the poem as neither an isolated object nor merely as a document 
for cultural study” 87  but as the “material result of innumerable interacting processes of 
production.”88 Consequently, the poem is a joint production of its poet and its generations of 
readers, and the forces – linguistic, personal, cultural, social, historical, and so on – at work on 
them both.”89 Similar to the status of the poet as both absent and present, the status of the reader 
is informed by the same dialectic in that s/he is literally absent from the poem but present in 
the sense that s/he inhabits the “void centre” as s/he reads and speaks it, contributing another, 
different interpretation to the constellation of other voices created by the “generations of 
readers.” Palmer explains how: 
 
 
 I for example have reintroduced the art of continuous  
 revision of the scorecard until it resembles a palimpsest 
 of possible games.90 
 
 
Evoking an important feature of the serial poetics that continue in WM through the eponymous 
series, the sense of over-writing implied by the multiple variations on and continuous revisions 
of a theme that silence, erase and conceal each other, the image of the palimpsest visualises the 
dialectic of presence and absence. Like “lyric cryptography,” one text is immediately apparent 
and present while others are absent though still perceptible. The productive reader “asks not 
(only) what the poem (a word, line, passage, etc) means but by what means was it produced,”91 
what other voices are being silenced, erased and concealed by the poet’s careful not choosing 
of all the rest. The dialectic of disclosure and concealment in the palimpsest textually enacts 
the interplay of erasure and embodiment seen in Palmer’s “analytic lyric[s],” thus further 
emphasising their function as occasions where the subject can be read and written about in 
terms of both presence and absence, that is, in the encounter between “(my)Self” and 
“(an)Other.” However, this dialectic has connotations of either-or, whereas he is “hopeful that/a 
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third term might be invented to describe the process/of going on.”92 Palmer’s “analytic lyric[s]” 
involve “entering thirdly worlds/and worlds of third”93 where this new term is possible due to 
the simultaneity of presence and absence, and the attendant coinherence of self and other. He 
lives “in her letter” by silencing, erasing and concealing himself to allow others’ voices to 
emerge, to allow “(an)Other” to speak, and listening to them attentively before responding. In 
reading and writing the subject as the coinherence of “I” and those other “I”s, Palmer’s poems 
“describe the process/of going on” with the hope that his readers will identify them as examples 
of living in the social world of others as a responsive and, more importantly, responsible 
subject. 
 
 
 (6.2) The Performance of the Lyric 
 
Silence, erasure and concealment are not just themes in WM but prerequisite acts by the poet 
so others’ voices become apparent, so others can speak and perform the poem, “We have come 
to listen and watch/and talk and be talked.”94 For this reason, “There’s less content here/but 
more activity,”95 Palmer refuses “self” as something given, as something that can be disclosed, 
in favour of “self as nothing in itself, as only coming-to-be.”96 Erasure and embodiment are 
vital aspects of the “analytic lyric” but he uses the idea of performance to foreground an 
inherent but often overlooked capacity of the lyric, its ability to reconnect language to the body 
to create “a visceral sensation.”97 By heightening the acoustics of words through rhythmic and 
metrical structures, lyrics make us aware of the materiality of language while “enunciation 
constantly reminds us of the bodily components necessary to produce its sounds.”98 Reading 
the poem as Palmer intends, that is, enunciating and performing it, gives it a “bodily and 
visceral effect rather than a purely cerebral one”99 and demonstrates how we “create reality and 
the bodies that inhabit it”100 through such performances. “Without Music 2” prioritises activity 
over content: 
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 Reading aloud is for emphasis 
 Reading aloud is to practice 
 
 One of one of one word 
 In places of here 
 
 One. Of One of. One word 
 One of one. Of. One word 
 
 One of one. Of one word101 
 
 
The semantic content of “One of one of one word” is secondary to the act of reading it aloud 
as Palmer alters the punctuation to change how it is enunciated. By changing the emphasis in 
each line through punctuation, he accentuates what is implicit in poetry, that the same line will 
be changed according to the reader’s particular way of performing it. In “The Library is 
Burning,” a poem suggestive of the destruction of the solely written word, Palmer explains 
that: 
 
 
 The stirrings are the same and different 
 
 The stirrings are the same and different 
 and secretly the same102 
 
 
 
The poet can create a certain musicality through rhythm, assonance, alliteration, meter, 
enjambment and other devices but every reader’s performance of the poem will ultimately be 
different, s/he will make the poem sound different. By creating poems “with nothing at [their] 
centre,” the reader is able to project him/herself into them, to embody them, through 
performance because “while speaking the words aloud a reader temporarily owns them and 
they then become words to which the reader lends a life,”103 or another life. Just reading “One 
of one of one word” reveals nothing significant but when read aloud in its variations, its 
significance is extralinguistic as the “corporeality of voice can penetrate through the semantic 
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delivery in [its] performance.” 104  Configuring the poem as something to be performed 
illustrates how “sounds make us/including mistakes,”105 thus revealing Palmer’s understanding 
that not only is the “meaning [of the poem] fulfilled by the utterance,” but also how “through 
textual performance, the lyric genre has the potential of turning contents into practice.”106 
Therefore, “Reading aloud is to practice” what it means to be an embodied subject and how we 
articulate our subjectivity, how we write it into existence by performing certain actions.  
As an event, the poem does not refer to a particular time or space but rather corresponds 
to the time and space of writing before “then pass[ing] over to the territory of reader as 
receiver.”107 The poem with “nothing at its centre” “re-presents nothing,”108 simply demarcates 
a “now here” that is inhabited by the poet during its composition and by the reader during its 
interpretation. Consequently, the “void centre” accommodates both the poet and the reader, 
and is characterised by an acute sense of otherness because the “I” spoken by the poet is 
radically different to the “I” pronounced by the reader. Palmer’s self-erasure gives the reader 
permission to participate in the creative act but it necessitates an important responsibility. He 
terms it the “readerly obligation of allowing him-or herself to be equally implicated”109 in the 
poem, which parallels the poetic obligation to distinguish “between an art of the given and an 
art of the actual,” to refrain from “reflexive confession” and instead pursue, through writing, 
“the actual as it respires.”110 It is only within this agreement that the “conversation of the poem 
begins and its social nature is affirmed.”111  
Palmer concludes WM with “The Meadow,” the eight part of a series situated earlier in 
the collection concerned with “Reassembling a meadow,” 112  thus foregrounding the 
responsibility engendered when reading is reconfigured as writing and the reader is permitted 
to participate in the creative act. By highlighting the fact he is quoting from a specific text, in 
this case Duncan’s “Often I am Permitted to Return to a Meadow,” “Resembling a 
meadow/‘folded in all thought,’113 it is apparent that he is using how he reads and writes poetry 
to demonstrate to his readers how permission and responsibility functions. Palmer seems to 
address the types of utterances J. L. Austin identified in his analysis of ordinary language. The 
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first poem describes language according to its purpose in a constative utterance, a sentence that 
makes a statement that is either true or false: 
 
 
Categorically 
he would have us believe 
 
that this isn’t language after all 
that’s being decoded 
 
but something fixed 
in the purpose of its telling114 
 
   
According to Austin, the statement is either categorically true or untrue but its purpose is 
always to describe something pre-existent or something that has already happened. The second 
poem, on the other hand, explains how in a performative utterance, the “message so to 
speak/[is] limited to its function”115 because these declarative sentences are the performances 
of an act under the appropriate circumstances, i.e. “I now pronounce you husband and wife.” 
Never one to quietly accept a conventional binary, Palmer’s poems are neither constative nor 
performative utterances. Unlike the former, they do not re-present or reiterate a given reality, 
which produces something only “like a meadow.” He uses the situation of “Each morning the 
daily paper/...be[ing] left at your door/free of charge”116 to emphasise the lack of change. Yet 
they are also not performative utterances due to his admission of the limited potential to affect 
actual change in the given reality, “If we go on writing books/no one will notice.”117 Rather 
than simply describing or changing reality through language, his poems are events in language 
that create a new reality themselves, they are performative events: 
 
 
 ...distinguished from a language precisely 
 by the invariable correlation of [their] signs 
 to the reality they signify118 
 
 
As Palmer’s series demonstrates, what matters is not the content that determines if it resembles 
a meadow or not but the activity of “Reassembling a meadow,” the actions performed as he 
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listens and responds to Duncan, as he creates a new social reality with him so that “if we stop 
[writing books]/two persons will notice.” 119  One does not perform an act “without the 
knowledge that an ‘other’ will hear and respond” to it, therefore, “responsiveness, our ability 
and our desire to respond to the call of the ‘other’ is crucial to the ethic[al]” considerations and 
commitments involved in the performative event.120 In the context of the creative act, Palmer’s 
reading of Duncan is a reassembling or a rewriting as he responds to him and assumes 
responsibility for that response. “The Meadow” explains how Palmer wants his work to be 
engaged with and it makes the “poethics” informing it more apparent. The reader reassembles 
Palmer’s poems by making them correspond with his/her spatial-temporal circumstances, by 
inhabiting the “void centre” and entering into conversation with another person.  
 
 
(6.3) Poetry and Dialogism 
 
Reconfiguring the lyric to accentuate its performative capacity and emphasise how it 
conceptualises the creative act as a conversation, an event in language, between multiple voices 
cannot be properly appreciated without referencing the principle of dialogism, especially since 
“poethics” emphasises the ethics in poetics, its capacity to enact ways of living in the social 
world of others. Unfortunately, the person credited with identifying polyphony, the presence 
of multiple, competing voices in continuous dialogue, as the natural state of language employed 
poetry as a counterexample to substantiate his polemic explaining how the dialogic principle 
manifests in literature. Bakhtin’s dismissal of poetry is absolute but he considers the lyric in 
particular to be “the least dialogic literary form as it purports to be the univocal utterance of a 
single subject.”121 In complete contrast to novelistic discourse, where the author allows for the 
interplay of different voices, each corresponding to a different axiological system, to displace 
the singular, authorial voice at the centre of the text so it more accurately represents the 
heterogeneity of the socio-cultural circumstances that produced it in poetic discourse: 
 
 
The poet is a poet insofar as he accepts the idea of a unitary and singular language and 
a unitary, monologically sealed-off utterance...The poet must assume a complete, 
single-personed hegemony over his own language, he must assume equal responsibility 
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for each one of its aspects and subordinate them to his own, and only his own, 
intentions.122         
 
 
It is obvious that Bakhtin’s view of poetry assumes that the conventions of the lyric are 
synonymous with poetry itself. Quite significantly, despite its reductive presuppositions, 
Bakhtin’s understanding can be seen operating in the Language poets’ insistence that to subvert 
the conventions associated with the “official verse culture,” such as the traditional subject-
object dichotomy, poets must write decidedly anti-lyrical poems. However, never one to 
acquiesce to such simplistic binaries, Palmer practices an “analytic lyric,” reconfiguring the 
conventions of the lyric to dissociate it from modern malpractices and return the mode to its 
original, that is performative and social, function. Because the epistemological and 
hermeneutical issues that Bakhtin’s principle raises has important political consequences that 
influence how and why one writes and reads particular literary genres, it is necessary to re-
evaluate his dismissal of poetry due to its inherent monologism. This is particularly important 
since Palmer’s politics would closely align him with dialogism, emphasising the centrifugal 
forces in language that decentralise authority, heighten plurality and acknowledge the presence 
of others’ voices, instead of monologism, strengthening the centripetal forces in language that 
insist on rigid hierarchies, the exclusion of difference and the coalescence of meaning and value 
around a hegemonic centre of authority.  
 Bakhtin’s significance should not be limited to the content of his arguments because of 
equal, if not greater, importance is the method of thinking that reading his texts encourages. 
Therefore, he should not be read monologically, that is, as providing stable, absolute categories 
to structure how we read the world and position ourselves within it. The important thing to be 
learned from Bakhtin derives from his ability to place two mutually exclusive, oppositional 
terms in a relation of simultaneous coexistence to emphasise their interdependence. Complete 
monologism is impossible because dialogism inheres in language itself, it “represents the co-
existence of socio-ideological contradictions between the present and the past, between 
differing epochs, [and] between socio-ideological groups in the present,”123 while complete 
dialogism is untenable because of the implicit necessity for a degree of control, convention and 
structure to facilitate mutual understanding and communication through language. For this 
reason, Bakhtin’s conception of monologism and dialogism should be considered a question of 
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degrees dependent on the compositional and interpretive contexts of the particular text. The 
binary demarcates a spectrum, therefore, his dismissal of poetry is not so much based on an 
essentialist differentiation between it and prose but rather on an axiological distinction he 
makes regarding the intentions of the author and the role of the reader regarding poetry and 
prose. Monologism and dialogism are not “inherent characteristics of particular types of literary 
discourse,” they do not refer to “different types of texts but different kinds of intertextual 
configuration,”124 the extent to which authors and readers engage with the presence of other 
voices in the text. When Bakhtin discusses novelistic and poetic discourse, he is addressing 
“force[s] reaching beyond any actual examples” since he sees the “literary field as a space with 
a limited number of poles...where every pole marks the extreme but unreachable point of a 
given generic potential,” i.e. the dramatic, the poetic, the novelistic, etc.125 This explains his 
admission in Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics that “even in poetic speech works are possible 
that do not reduce their entire verbal material to a single common denominator,” 126 i.e. the 
singular speaking subject. While “in the nineteenth century such instances were rare,” the 
“twentieth century [sees] a radical ‘prosification of the lyric” as the genre utilises “one of the 
most fundamental characteristics of prose,” the “possibility of employing on the plane of a 
single work discourses of various types, with all their expressive capacities intact, without 
reducing them to a common denominator.”127 When Bakhtin privileges the novel, therefore, “it 
is less a particular type of text...than it is an experimental space for testing dialogic limits.”128 
He is concerned with novelness, “the orientation of the word amid the utterances and languages 
of others,”129 because it provides a “strategy for thinking [and writing] difference”130 that 
refuses to reduce and contain it within simplistic binaries by allowing a “diversity of voices 
and heteroglossia to enter the [text] and organise themselves within it into a structured artistic 
system.”131  
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As more recent innovations in poetry demonstrate, such as pronounced intertextuality, 
the subversion of complete authorial intentionality, and the emphasis on hybridity to undermine 
generic boundaries, poetry no longer adheres to the criteria of monologism, that the “poet strips 
the words of others’ intentions...[so] they lose their link with concrete intentional levels of 
language and their connection with specific contexts.”132 Poets no longer “immerse [their 
language] in Lethe” so it “forgets its previous life in any other context” and can “remember 
only its life in poetic contexts.”133 However, just as dialogism “cannot be reduced to an essence 
of novelistic language, so monologism cannot be explained away as a property of non-
novelistic or ‘poetic’ texts.”134 In this sense, it is at the level of criticism rather than in texts 
themselves that the association of poetry and monologic unity”135 and of prose and dialogic 
diversity is substantiated. The novel simply provided Bakhtin with a ready-made example of 
how dialogism, what he termed “the conventions governing ordinary linguistic practice,” could 
“serve as [a] model for a desirable political and ethical community.”136 From the novel, Bakhtin 
“derive[s] norms for the conduct of social life more generally”137  based on the theory of 
communication it embodies, the social, intersubjective event of creating meaning rather than 
the monological utterance of a solitary individual. The novel, therefore, represents the most 
accessible and easiest to achieve realisation of his principle of dialogism because it is founded 
on “meeting or encounter, on coexistence and interaction.”138 Discourse in the novel is an event 
that occurs during the dialogic meeting of two or more consciousnesses, an encounter between 
my word and an alien word, a perspective on and interpretation of the world that is different to 
mine. This sense of encounter is heightened in the novel because whenever “we encounter 
another word,” we are “encounter[ing] another consciousness.” 139  For Bakhtin, novels 
epitomise an “opening both to other languages and other consciousnesses,” introducing a 
process of listening and responding that makes “discourse responsive to the discourse of the 
other,” to others’ voices.140 Bakhtin’s preference for the novel over poetry would remain a 
standard question of aesthetic value if it was not for the fact that he considers dialogism, and 
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the associated characteristics of “polyglossia and heteroglossia” as “ethically superior to 
[monologism.]”141  
Writing and reading a text according to the principle of dialogism “display[s] an 
intrinsic identification with difference and alterity”142 because no text is “complete without the 
[interpretation of others] who fill in meaning according to their particular position in time and 
space.” 143  Dialogism, therefore, has profound implications for “response-ability” in and 
responsibility for the text, thus revealing how the significance of the novel derives from it 
explicitly foregrounding a new method of reading that reconfigures the creative act as 
conversation, as listening and responding to others and being responsible for the decisions that 
determine who one listens to and how one responds. Most importantly perhaps, Bakhtin’s 
conception of authorship in the novel is not a purely epistemological issue, i.e. concerned with 
“show[ing] the impossibility of the ‘truth-speaking’ authorial voice escaping the same 
deconstructive considerations which afflict all language,” but rather a social and ethical 
question, in which “the objection to the monologic discursive hierarchy is that it represents a 
politically unacceptable arrogation of authority,” while the alternative provided by the presence 
of others’ voices requires “responsible engagement…with no attempt to arrogate the final 
word.”144 This is not a question of “reviving the old impression of the author as a unique point 
of origin, as the sole author of texts which are his[/hers] alone,”145 s/he is dead as an isolated 
individual who creates autonomous expressions that confirm his/her immanent subjective core 
but is reborn as one speaker within a context of other speakers. Unlike the purely textual 
analyses of many poststructuralists, the author for Bakhtin is “not simply a construct of the a 
priori discourse, a position within its already structured frame, but a person within networks of 
communicative relationships”146 who actively uses language to orient him/herself in his/her 
relationships and interactions. Bakhtin allows us to reintroduce the author not as the point of 
origin of the utterance but as one speaker “enmeshed in relations of communication with 
others,”147 thus helping us retain a more practical and embodied understanding of language. 
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Palmer also “hesitate[s] to say ‘death of the author’…[because] it can lead to a picture of pure 
passivity on the part of the poet…to a kind of romantic negativity where the poet exists purely 
as a receiver” when it is vital that the receiver “be thought of as also this particular genetic 
matrix that interprets signals…a particular way.”148 His interest in a “certain kind of death of 
intentionality” 149  does not mean he doesn’t “write [his] poems…[that he doesn’t] stand 
responsible for them”150 but rather that his interpretation exists as one amongst many other 
interpretations capable of changing the text by making it correspond to different spatial-
temporal circumstances. Reconfiguring the creative act as a conversation demonstrates that 
poetry can be informed by the same principle of dialogism as the novel once the poet decides 
to decentralise the authority of the singular speaker by responsively and responsibly engaging 
with the voices of others. Furthermore, and similar to the social and ethical motivations Bakhtin 
identifies in novelistic discourse, the “listener [or reader] is just as active in the process of 
communication as the speaker” because the “utterance of one person is always in response to 
the utterance of another.”151  
Unfortunately, despite the potential for poetry to be understood according to the 
principle of dialogism, Bakhtin erroneously reads the speaking subject autobiographically, thus 
confirming his own pejorative assessment of poetry’s inherent monologism. Unlike with the 
author of novelistic discourse, Bakhtin refuses to acknowledge how the speaking subject of the 
poem “cannot [always] be identified with the real biographical individual who wrote [the] 
text,” that the “subject of [poetic] discourse is not [always] the speaking or writing individual 
in his own right.”152 As in the novel, “the biographical author [of the poem], the subject 
possessing authorial rights during the writing process, [can] constantly distance himself from 
the intratextual position of the utterance’s subject” because the “subject of discourse is 
ultimately just one of the functions of the communicative event, [in this case] the creative 
function.”153 However, perhaps this refusal actually indicates more of a failure on Bakhtin’s 
part in two regards. Firstly, dialogism “depends upon a readerly competence which recognises 
the political significance of the interaction of voices within the text and that is also able to make 
the transitions” from monologic to dialogical without indications provided by the author.”154 
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Realising dialogism in poetry involves a “necessary difficulty” because the poet “must 
permanently counteract [the] homogenising forces”155  represented by conventions such as 
rhyme and meter, formal structures, and concrete metaphorical images which assert the poet’s 
singular control over language and his/her exclusion of others’ voices that might undermine 
his/her own intentions. By extension, because dialogic texts need “to be evaluated according 
to a different set of aesthetic and ideological criteria to those applied to typically monological 
texts,”156 their distinct contribution can be appreciated; readers are involved in the similarly 
difficult task of implementing a new method of reading that is responsive toward otherness. 
Bakhtin’s refusal to engage with the dialogic potential of poetry, therefore, can be seen as a 
failure to involve himself in a more difficult task. Since neither the novel nor the poem is either 
monologic or dialogic because of their essential characteristics, his preference for the former 
over the latter is more utilitarian than axiological.  
Secondly, and more importantly for a “poethics of proximity,” Bakhtin fails to identify 
how the creative act of writing and reading a poem can be approached as a communicative 
event that allows for an increased sense of “response-ability” in and responsibility for the text. 
Palmer’s admission that he remains responsible for his “analytic lyric[s]” despite the silences, 
erasures and concealments therein reaffirms Bakhtin’s “first philosophy,” his ethical 
philosophy of the performed act. The central ethical and socio-political aspect of Bakhtin’s 
thought is answerability, a singular person’s assumption of his/her “non-alibi in being,” his/her 
irreducible responsibility for the actions s/he has performed. Palmer’s admission, therefore, 
means his poems enact his own “non-alibi in being,” thereby suggesting that poetic rather than 
novelistic discourse is more ethically significant because “it turns a person’s 
indelible…answerability for his/her acts (including speech acts) into one of its artistically 
constitutive moments.”157 Unlike the novelist, “who may devolve the answerability for his/her 
discourse…upon his/her characters,” the poet has no such alibi because s/he “enacts not simply 
the diversity of speech and language [through a dialogic poetics] but an emphatically singular, 
answerable and invested position within this diversity.” 158  Insofar as Palmer’s “analytic 
lyric[s]” are in accordance with the principle of dialogism, they are ethically superior to the 
example of novelistic discourse Bakhtin uses because the writer and the reader are involved in 
an event that foregrounds the importance of both permission to realise “response-ability” and 
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obligation to assume responsibility as one listens and responds to the voices of others in the 
text, thereby demonstrating how his “poethics” functions as a way of acting in and interacting 
with the social world of others. Similar to the difficulty of achieving dialogism in poetry, the 
author-reader relationship enacted in the “analytic lyric” is characterised by a “necessary 
difficulty” because the communicative event of the poem is not concerned with reducing 
uncertainty but instead with encountering the absolute alterity of another person, of exposing 
oneself to the interpretations of others. The writer-reader relationship Bakhtin identifies in 
novelistic discourse is just another version of the I-Other relationship explained in his 
philosophy of the act. However, Bakhtin’s choice of the novel over the poem confirms his 
desire to simplify his radical thinking about the correlation of ethics and aesthetics, whereas 
Palmer’s “analytic lyric[s]” demonstrate that any attempt to write a responsive and responsible 
subject into existence by listening and responding to others must engage with the “necessary 
difficulty” attendant upon encountering the absolute alterity of another, embodied subject.       
      
 
(6.4) The Dialogic Poetics of Notes for Echo Lake 
 
It is too easy to argue that Palmer simply confirms the principle of dialogism in poetry through 
his “poetics of derivation” and the constellations of others’ voices this creates, although such 
an analysis is entirely understandable, if not even encouraged, as he accentuates the polyphonic 
potential in his work, how it can be “for one to seventy-seven voices.”159 Dialogism in his 
poems, therefore, serves to affirm Bakhtin’s insistence that speaking/writing and 
listening/reading is “a nexus of doing things with words with others or in the co-presence of 
others.”160  Palmer’s appreciation for how Bakhtin might be revitalised by putting him in 
dialogue with poetry that deviates from the conservative, neo-Romantic and confessional-
expressionist understanding of the genre largely goes unsaid but his actions are more telling. 
In his anthology of recent writings in poetics, Code of Signals, Palmer includes an essay by 
Michael Davidson, which insists on the need to reappraise and extend Bakhtin’s critique of 
poetry in light of more recent innovations in poetic discourse that heighten what has ”existed 
in poetry since the beginning, ” how it can illustrate the “instability of unitary referential 
paradigms” and, instead of demonstrating “language’s abilitiy to stabilise reality by means of 
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a single image or pattern of metaphore,” how it can “free the actual discourses that occur in 
any given utterance.”161  Ultimately, by including Davidson’s essay Palmer demonstrates that 
Bakhtin should not be read monologically, that is, either in terms of the absolute categories he 
posits, the essential distinctions he identifies between prose and poetry, or as the complete 
authority regarding the principle of dialogism. Instead, Bakhtin must be read dialogically, 
where readers change his argument by making it correspond to their particular circumstances 
so they can perform a “critique of poetry not based upon the authorial expressive subject but 
rather upon the propositions of ‘ subject’ generated by specific ideological disocurses” that 
manifest in the socially heteroglossic poem through the ideological character of discursive 
frames.162 
In “NEL,” the series from which the collection gets its title, Palmer is involved in a 
similar project to Bakhtin as he places literature in closer proximity to philosophy, thus 
changing the otherwise hermeneutical question “Who does the talking[?]”163 into a profoundly 
ontological one. Both are also concerned with the dialectic of presence and absence but as a 
simultaneity rather than an either-or dichotomy. The metaphor of the echo evokes this dialectic 
as the speaking subject is literally absent but remains present because his/her utterance is 
repeated, thus conceptualising Bakhtin’s insistence that “at any given moment of its historical 
existence, language is heteroglot from top to bottom,”164 it consists of other speakers who are 
literally absent but remain present as their previous intentions and values continue to inflect it. 
While this dialectic might be characteristic of all language, a certain kind of poetry, Palmer 
seems to suggest, insists on it in its most concentrated form, “Such as words are. A tape for 
example a friend had assembled containing/readings by H.D., Stein, Williams, others.”165 If 
Bakhtin promotes dialogism as a new way of conceptualising how one acts in and interacts 
with the social world of others through language, Palmer uses it “to reconfigure a model of 
communication having to do with the figure of Narcissus and the figure of Echo,”166 a model 
of lyric communication that makes it possible to “[talk] to self as well as other as well as self 
as other”167 in the heuristic procedure of interpellation and response through which “(my)Self” 
is written into existence. However, this is more complex than simply self-othering, where the 
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self becomes other by identifying with what is different to it. Following the example of his 
fellow analytic lyricist Celan, Palmer constantly questions the poet’s capacity to speak “on 
behalf of the other, who knows, perhaps of an altogether other.”168 “NEL” foregrounds the 
difficulty inherent in realising the principle of dialogism in lyric poetry, likening it to listening 
to “a voice [that] can be heard behind a door”169 and to “Voices through a wall. They are there 
because we hear them what do we hear. The pitch rises toward the end to indicate a 
question.”170 Polyphony might be language’s natural state but a certain competence is required 
if the reader is to listen and respond to these others, to make present what is otherwise absent. 
As he explains in “Notes for Echo Lake 2,” understanding: 
 
 
       …the fullness  of  the message she uttered would  demand of her lis- 
 tener an equivalent attention. The message was the world translated, and 
 speaker and listener became one.171 
 
 
This situation of listening and responding to others has already been addressed in WM and 
while it raises some undeniable difficulties, Palmer is concerned with an even more difficult 
but necessary task in “NEL.”  
Choosing Echo rather than Narcissus indicates Palmer’s commitment to Olson’s dictate 
to get “rid of the lyrical interference of the individual as ego, of the subject,”172 although he 
pursues it further and from a far more ethically informed perspective than the progenitor of 
“projective verse” ever envisaged. He is not interested in the narcissistic obsession of self with 
self, which could be said to characterise the autotelic “workshop lyric” of the period, but with 
an egoless lyric, a lyric that grants primacy to the other so that “I am you and you are me/…/I’ll 
write you in where I should be.”173 The collection is a book of notes for Echo Lake, a private 
notebook made public, but Palmer does not “[intend] to be narcissistic,” it is not “a privileged 
insight into the workings of the poet’s mind but a feature of practice that highlights…the 
importance of opening the self to others.”174 “NEL” is about exposing oneself to others, its 
“form...was generated by this letter Charles Bernstein sent when he was editing 
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L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E magazine: ‘Would you be willing to tell us a little something about 
yourself?”175 Palmer is responding to the interpellation of another person. Exposing himself to 
the question posed by “(an)Other” is the constitutive act of subjectivity, of writing “(my)Self” 
into existence. As he explains, the request for self-articulation is not an instance of permission 
but an obligation to respond:  
 
 
                  ...I don’t think I have the right to leave your letter unanswered. 
I would like  to keep working. I think I  see a new way out. The following 
are matters  concerning me  and the roof  of my  mouth. The  letters  com- 
bined into  the word for  silence. The  song came in  stanzas  as is the man 
ner of such songs.176    
 
 
This need to expose “(my)Self” to “(an)Other” is reflected in “NEL”’s form, as Palmer 
oscillates between the conventional free-verse stanzas of the majority of poems and prose for 
the eponymous series. In his “Notes for Echo Lake,” his attempt at egoless self-articulation, he 
is writing poetry’s other, i.e. prose, and trying to write the lyric’s other, “the word for silence.” 
A further way Palmer attempts to grant primacy to the other is suggested by the cover 
illustration of the collection (Fig. 12), a sketch by the painter Irving Petlin, whose work often 
converses with analytic lyricists, chiefly Celan and Jabès.  
 
                                             
(Fig. 12) Irving Petlin, Notes for Echo Lake  
(cover illustration) 
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In Petlin, Palmer finds “a language of the unsayable,”177 a way of sounding and resounding the 
self through “constant invention,…iteration and reiteration, and the testing of meaning.”178 
Significantly, his response to Bernstein assumes the form of notes, suggesting something 
preliminary as he refuses to even attempt a final word, thus “[emphasising] the open and 
endlessly exfoliating character of [self-]signification, and the play of identity and difference at 
work in the act of [self-]representation.”179 Palmer’s response exposes him to the interpretation 
of “(an)Other,” “As A’s voice tells me B where B would read it differently.”180  Writing 
“(my)Self” into existence involves the endless process of exposing oneself to the question 
posed by “(an)Other” and responding, before having that response interpreted and answering 
for it. Palmer acknowledges this by illustrating how: 
 
 
 …I began again and again, and each beginning identical with the next, 
 meaning each one accurate, each a projection, each a head bending over 
 the motionless form.181 
 
 
His act of self-representation is always “Beginning and ending. As a work begins and ends 
itself or begins and re-/begins or starts and stops”182 because he is constantly being interrupted 
by “(an)Other.”  
Palmer identifies the potential for exposing “(my)Self” to “(an)Other” by writing “a 
poetry that ‘asks to be questioned,’ a poetry whose means remain in question,”183 which might 
then allow for “a possible other voice…that can talk back” and express “a counter-logic in the 
poem.”184 Because the poems have nothing at their centre, they encourage:  
 
 
A questioning of the relations and identities between the first, second and third person, 
between the I and the you and the it…but also in the plural between the they and the 
we, and all the things out there. What are the interrelations? It’s always a question. Who 
are we in relation? Who am I? Am I doing the speaking? Are you doing the listening?185 
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The act of self-representation can never be completed because “(an)Other” engenders these 
questions in “(my)Self,” “(an)Other” who is both present and absent, and cannot be properly 
represented without betraying its significance, its irreducible alterity, perhaps explaining why 
Palmer only manages “Bernstein would read it differently.” However, one way of 
“[acknowledging], or perhaps [inscribing], unrepresentability,” of presenting “the 
unutterable…[is to leave] the text, in any conventional sense, incomplete.”186 By allowing for 
a dialogue between different voices, Palmer realises a “dialogics of difference” that is “open-
ended [because it] fosters the idea that a multiplicity of differences finds no ending.”187 In 
doing so, he demonstrates how the principle of dialogism is more than just a model for writing 
and reading poetry because of its ethical overtones, its capacity to realise a “poethics of 
proximity:” 
 
 
 The  letters of  the  words  of  our  legs  and  arms. What  he  had  seen  or 
 thought  he’d  seen  within  the eye,  voices  overheard  rising  and falling. 
 And if each conversation has no end, then composition is a placing beside 
 or with and is endless,188  
  
 
Creating an egoless lyric to grant primacy to “(an)Other” is “To be at a loss for words” but 
Palmer asks “How does the mind move there?”189  The answer, by ensuring “the subject 
disappears”190 in terms of both intending speaker and intentional matter. As with Bakhtin, 
Palmer’s significance is not limited to the content of his texts but the new way of thinking that 
reading them elicits because, as the quote from Bruno Schulz in the first line of NEL insists, 
“‘An outlook based upon philosophy became obligatory.’” 191  This new outlook involves 
looking out, orienting oneself outward toward the social world of others, so that the poem 
becomes a way of welcoming “(an)Other.” The poem’s “rhythm [is] an arm, rhythm as the arm 
extended”192 in a handshake perhaps, “arms extended to signify welcome”193 such that the 
poem enacts a way of living, “The life would be a life of lines, the straightened arm held out 
from the/body.”194 “NEL” is a response to a question posed by another person but Palmer 
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heightens this sense of being exposed to the interpretation of “(an)Other” inherent in any act 
of self-representation by only providing preliminary notes, “Dear Charles, I began again and 
again to work, always with no confidence.”195 This engenders the “terrifying experience” that 
occurs when the “structural rigidity of a closed form begins to tremble and we begin to feel the 
anxiety of losing structure,” 196  when the poem and the self it articulates is open toward 
“(an)Other.” To resolve it, this poetry “calls for a dwelling in the poem” by “[insisting] the 
reader is part of the meaning, that the reader completes the circuit.”197 The “difficulty [Palmer] 
was having with writing, that is, inventing, an autobiographical note for [his] first book,”198 
with “[imposing] order and offer[ing] an outline of the ‘real’ facts”199 continues into “NEL” 
due to the question posed by Bernstein. However, instead of disclosing himself as pre-existent 
and given, Palmer prefers the “necessary difficulty” of exposing “(my)Self” to “(an)Other,” 
where self is nothing in itself until it experiences the proximity of another person, an experience 
made possible by welcoming “(an)Other,” that is, allowing the reader to dwell in the poem and 
interrupt him with his/her interpretation, with his/her questions.      
 The acts of self-erasure that create poems “with nothing at their centre” in WM are 
intended to allow the reader to project him/herself into the poem and realise his/her “response-
ability” but in “NEL” Palmer demonstrates the only way of writing this unknown and 
unknowable other into the poem. The poem “only occurs, is only there, in the event of the 
poem, which is in its engagement with the reader,”200 that is, when “(my)Self” encounters 
“(an)Other.” The poem occurs when it is correlated to the poet and the reader as embodied 
subjects, when it is made to correspond to their spatio-temporal circumstances as they dwell in 
it by uttering “I”, such that “I exist because I is if I exists.”201 Palmer explains that the poem is 
empty and silent without the poet or reader inhabiting it, when it is no longer correlated with 
the occasion of its composition and yet to be correlated with the occasion of its interpretation:  
 
 
 Those who have lived here since before 
 time are gone while the ones who must 
 replace them have not yet arrived.202 
  
                                                      
195
 Palmer, “Notes for Echo Lake 1,” CA, 4. 
196
 Palmer, “Interview: Conducted by Lee Bartlett,” 127. 
197
 Ibid, 128. 
198
 Palmer, “Autobiography, Memory and Mechanisms of Concealment,” 267. 
199
 Ibid, 269. 
200
 Palmer, “Counter-Poetics and Current Practices,” 246. 
201
 Palmer, “Notes for Echo Lake 8,” CA, 46. 
202
 Michael Palmer, “False Portrait of D.B. as Niccolò Paganini,” CA, 17. 
  
 
239 
 
 
In this state it is open to being inhabited by others, “so many of us/here, so many missing/who 
might have been here,”203 which means it must contain multiple temporalities, “Many gathered 
many friends maybe everyone/Many now and then have entered.”204 Palmer terms this sense 
of multiple temporalities “the other time” 205 and the “space...of poetry:” 
 
 
an “elsew(here) that includes the word “here,” as well as a “no-where” which can be 
read “now here.” Such is the power of juncture, or silence. Here and elsewhere, here as 
elsewhere, elsewhere too as here: a space...of paradox, contradiction and 
polyphony...where the words we here are both the same and different...constructed in 
fact like language itself on the play of identity and difference.206  
 
 
He asks “if you write it has it happened twice”207 to accentuate how:  
 
 
in writing we confront various manifestations of time. There is the ‘real time’ of writing 
itself, the slippery succession of nows during which we compose. There’s the 
phenomenological duration of the text, the time of its silent reading or oral 
delivery...[and the] labyrinth of tenses designating past, present, and projected future 
action, a metaphoric representation of being in time.208 
 
 
Multiple temporalities exist in a single poem so that “Was was and is”209 but it constitutes a 
present by oscillating in the future-past, “He she will or did,”210 a feature heightened by his 
“use of syntax to set up [different] temporal regions [in the] poem:”211  
 
 
 Everyone said never again 
 /.../ 
 And throughout the winter each said one sentence 
 /.../ 
 A thing said as if spoken as if 
 /.../ 
 A chain I dragged along in quotes 
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 In Cairo there had been a fire 
 
 Then he read to her displeasure 
 [...] 
 They know it may seem so212  
 
 
Palmer’s references to different people, i.e. everyone, each, I, he and they, introduce different 
temporal regions but the “main focus is experiencing [these], moment-by-moment, always in 
the present”213 of writing and reading the text. He overcomes the problem of representing the 
unrepresentable, of voicing the unutterable, by positing the poem as a confluence of the 
multiple temporalities of “(my)Self” and “(an)Other,” an event whose “temporality [is thus] 
multidimensional”214  because different “times [are] inhering within other times.”215  Echo, 
therefore, provides a structural metaphor for the entire collection as it suggests not only 
presence and absence but also multiple temporalities. The collection suggests both a “present 
and a presence and an absence and an elsewhere,” a spatio-temporal confluence as the poet and 
reader encounter and re-encounter each other as “(an)Other:”   
 
 
                                                The city 
 is full of ones called us 
 who endlessly greet each other by a name 
 that changes each time.216  
 
 
Using the analogy of a city, the collection is a space where figures encounter each other, where 
“1’s” or “I’s” welcome each other in a play of identity and difference. As Palmer explains in 
the opening line of “NEL,” these “eyes [are] a literal self among selves,” 217  inverting 
Zukofsky’s “I’s (pronounced eyes)” since “eyes” is pronounced “I’s” here. Uttering “I,” 
making it correspond with one’s perspective, is to dwell in the poem “among [other] selves.” 
He further emphasises how “I” and”1” are interchangeable, “And I as it is, I as the one but less 
than one in it.”218 Figures and pronouns here suggest not just the presence but the primacy of 
others, since the “I” of the poet is less than the “I” of “(an)Other,” the less determinate “it,” 
ultimately implying the unknown and unknowable.  
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As Petlin’s paintings ask for “another way of seeing,” of using one’s eyes, “NEL” 
“elicits [another] kind of reading,” of using the “I’s.”219 While Palmer has always insisted that 
writing and reading are inseparable, in “NEL” these activities become crucial to realising a 
“poethics of proximity” because the creative act is a conversation. By taking “the space of the 
page...as a site in itself” 220  that demarcates simply a “now here,” the poem becomes a 
confluence of different spatio-temporalities: the “now here” of writing and the “now here” of 
reading. As a conversation, the creative act involves “(my)Self” encountering “(an)Other” and 
the resulting poem manages to write the other without compromising its alterity because s/he 
remains undisclosed, a potentiality or absence that is only realised and becomes present when 
the poem is read by “(an)Other.” Informed by a dialogics of differences, the conversation is 
open-ended because: 
 
 
the poem converses first with its first reader, the poet him- or herself, as Other, then 
others in the world, the present world, and the world of the future...The conversation...is 
also with figures from the past, such as poets who may be said by their works to read 
and modify and make place for the poem, even as the poem reconfigures the space of 
reception for their work and our temporality.221   
 
 
While this “notion of the lyric [is] abstract,”222 Palmer makes it more “immediate”223 through 
a conceit that has become synonymous for his body of work since he named his selected poems 
The Lion Bridge: 
 
 
 That is A, that is Anna speaking. That is A, that is no one speaking and it’s 
 winter. That is a bridge and a bridge of winter pure as talk.224    
 
 
The poem as a communicative event is a bridge, a site of potential encounter that emphasises 
proximity. Rather than contact a distance persists. A bridge helps us visualise how Palmer 
conceptualises the poem as a play between identity and difference:  
 
 
 Then he misremembers the name of the bridge 
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 /.../ 
 There is writing like a wooden fence 
 
 There is writing now and when 
 /.../ 
 There’s a word at each end of it 
 
 There is exactly what is said 
 
 There is this and what resemble it 
 
 There is a certain distance225  
 
 
This succinctly explains Palmer’s poems, his “line bridge,” how the confluence of different 
temporalities, the “now” of the present and the “when” of the past and future, occurs through 
the encounter between “(my)Self” and “(an)Other” in the poem but encounter involves only 
proximity because a difference and distance must remain. “(an)Other” cannot be identified with 
because it is unrepresentable, it must remain a potentiality, unknown and unknowable, since to 
write “(an)Other” as someone specific is to reduce its alterity and appropriate it into categories 
of the same. This experience of proximity is characterised by a “necessary difficulty” because 
“(my)Self” is at the very limits of the known and the knowable, what Palmer identifies as the 
“terror...of almost knowing,”226 the “terror of partly knowing.”227 The “bridge” can be added 
to the echo as a structural metaphor for NEL since “things in metaphor cross, are thrown across, 
a path he calls the path of names.”228 Just like the echo signifies both difference and distance, 
the “line bridge” allows for a contrapuntal relation that ensures both remain so that “(my)Self” 
might encounter “(an)Other” as a different and distant subject in the communicative event that 
constitutes ethical subjectivity.  
 
 
Conclusion: The Book as World 
 
In the epigraph to NEL, Palmer, rather tellingly, quotes from Augustine’s Confessions, “‘Place 
there is none; we go backward and forward and there is no place.’”229 Through his various 
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strategies of self-erasure, Palmer makes space for “(an)Other,” for the reader to project 
him/herself into the poem and complete the circuit. While the reader is “A part [of the text, s/he 
will always be] apart,”230 will always be different to and distant from the poet because the 
ethical potential in poetry is based on proximity rather than contact, that is complete 
identification and comprehension. However, it is this “other, recurring/difference [and distance 
that] holds us in place,”231 that engenders both the permission and the obligation to encounter 
one another, to listen and respond to each other as other. Reconfiguring the creative act as a 
conversation reliant on incomprehension means the poet and the reader approach the limits of 
the known and knowable, the space of encounter where “(my)Self” ends and “(an)Other” 
begins. Palmer is not simply advancing a new method of composition but encouraging the 
reader to participate in a performative event with real world applications, to enact a “poethics 
of proximity” that constitutes a way of living in the social world of others as an ethical subject. 
His suggestion that “the word con-/tained a silent l”232 explains why he encourages us to “think 
of a larger syntax, e.g. the-word-as-book proposing always the book-as-word.”233 Palmer’s 
poems, therefore, allow readers to enact a way of living in the social world of others. The 
manner in which Palmer is listened and responded to by the reader constitutes a way of being 
a responsive and responsible subject when “(my)Self” encounters “(an)Other.” In this sense, 
“one lives in it.”234 Due to his commitment to poetry as a vocation, life becomes “a life of lines” 
since “In the poem he learns to turn and turn,”235 to orient “(my)Self” outward toward the call 
of “(an)Other.” Palmer’s poems attest to his attempt to give primacy to “(an)Other” by creating 
a “now here” where “At least one did feel welcome, wherever it was.”236 This gesture of 
welcome also implies his understanding of the limits of poetry, or more particularly the lyric 
utterance, because it is something that cannot be said in language. As both WM and NEL 
demonstrate, as one erases the self to make space for the other and in doing so approaches the 
limits of the known and knowable, silence should be foregrounded. For Palmer, there is “no 
boundary or edge to the field in question. As there is everywhere/no language,”237 gesturing 
toward what precedes language, both spoken and written, the act of listening that makes 
“response-ability” possible. 
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Chapter 7: Saying the Unsayable in First Figure and Sun 
 
In attempting to grant primacy to the other in his poetry, Palmer gives the impression that he 
is at the very limits of his medium, a sense heightened by his frequent recourse to surrealist 
constructions. As is so frequently the case when Palmer engages with a particular poetic 
standard or practice, his engagement with this convention is atypical: 
 
 
 This road ends in a field of grain 
 and drunken cows are filling the air 
 or how do we know what we know 
 
 He spoke holding his severed ear238 
 
 
A relatively straightforward surreal image is equated with an epistemological question here, 
revealing the poet’s ability to adapt almost any aesthetic practice to his own personal and 
political motivations, and in the process reveal an often overlooked or intentionally ignored 
aspect of that particular practice. Surrealism is brought into accordance with Palmer’s belief 
that “what poetry knows is a certain not-knowing,” not in the sense of negative capability but 
as a “specific area that challenges the discourses of reason in its authoritative rationales for 
things and its authoritative claims to knowledge.”239 Accordingly, he is “not interested in that 
aspect of making sense, sense not as something prior to the poem, but something that is an 
occasion for making sense, of finding out what sense is and making sense anew, changing what 
sense is.”240  While I would never classify Palmer as a committed surrealist, his frequent 
recourse to surrealist images helps explain a characteristic feature of NEL that informs these 
subsequent collections: the poet’s changed attitude to language. Throughout NEL, the reader is 
intentionally given the impression of a poet working at the very limits of what can be said, 
what can be made sense of, in poetry: 
 
 
 They had agreed that the sign was particular precisely because arbitrary 
 and that it  included  the potential  for (carried the  sign of) its  own dis- 
 solution,241 
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Consequently, language is no longer a tool for enhancing comprehension. Instead, language is 
a “Sign that empties itself at each instance of meaning,” which Palmer sees as the only way “to 
rein-/vent attention.” 242  The resultant poems, therefore, are occasions to question what 
comprehension actually means and “[bring] something possibly to the attention of the 
world...so that it is not quite as it was before.”243 The limits of language demarcate the limits 
of the known and knowable, where “(my)Self” encounters “(an)Other” who cannot be written 
about. In NEL, Palmer proposes that the poem could be seen as a gesture, a “straightened arm 
held out from the/body.”244 In both FF and S, Palmer addresses origins, the initiating actions 
that precede self-articulation, what happens prior to language in the moment of silence before 
speech. Prior to the poem as a speech act is this originating action, this gesture, that precedes 
language but without which language would be impossible. It occurs at that point where 
“(my)Self” ends and “(an)Other” begins and requires a language of the unsayable to articulate 
it, a language whose content is superseded by its inscribing a gesture toward what cannot be 
said without precluding a “poethics of proximity.”    
 
 
(7.1) Gestures of Possibility 
 
Collaboration is crucial to appreciating Palmer’s method of composition because it testifies to 
his absolute refusal of containment and consensus. Additionally, however, his collaborative 
projects with painters and choreographers gesture toward his “ideal of pure collaboration,” 245 
a “poethically” charged notion that the work belongs to “neither you nor I” but is instead a 
communicative event within which different subjects encounter one another. While actual 
collaborative projects are a recurrent feature in Palmer’s oeuvre, equally important is the:  
 
imaginary community in which poets tend to dwell with others. Not to say that it’s 
outside the real, but it’s constructed through the imagination and sometimes in 
opposition to the principles of reality that are laid on us, all of which say “you should 
not be doing this.”246  
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He makes this imagined community, this space of permission, by developing relations of 
reciprocality with other innovative artists to test the potential for a “possible writing,”247 to find 
“models of possibility”248 for the difficult but necessary task of attempting the impossible in 
poetry. Two such models are found in painting and dance, both of which foreground the 
importance of gesture in self-expression. Firstly, Palmer finds in “abstract painting, gestural 
abstraction, action painting”249 a way of testing the potential for “gesture and gesturality in the 
physical, vocalic utterance.” 250 Referring specifically to a Pollock retrospective he attended, 
he identifies the “extraordinary moment in abstract painting…where we have the trace of the 
gesture in the air, actually present, and we have physical paint, and we have the thing standing 
for itself.”251 This moment explains his “tremendous envy of painters, being able to bypass 
some of the circuitry and physically work with the body of this thing.”252 Nevertheless, it 
encouraged a particular approach to poiesis, where “you have the text with the voice itself 
absent [so] there’s an ambiguity just as there’s an ambiguity about the spatiality of the page in 
relation to the space of the physical room.”253 Palmer’s insistence, following the example of 
gestural abstraction, that the “space of the page is taken as a site in itself, a syntactical and 
visual space to be expressively exploited” might seem to correspond with “composition by 
field” but for him there is “no boundary or edge to the field in question.”254 Palmer notes that 
the “first thing” to hit him when he faced a Pollock painting “was this overwhelming, 
wonderful smell of oil.”255 Pollock’s actions are not confined to his field of composition as the 
painting interacts with its surroundings, with the physical space of the world outside it. The 
physiological sensation Palmer experiences and the response it elicits is pre-linguistic, 
providing a useful analogy to explain how the initiating act in self-articulation cannot be 
expressed in language.  
 Secondly, Palmer finds in innovative choreography the possibility to examine “those 
elements common to poetry and dance, such as rhythm, duration, concepts of measure and 
space (space of the page, space of the stage), and the performative.”256 As the typographical 
arrangement of his poems illustrate, “when [he is] using language…[he is] working with the 
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idea of actual space,”257 “initially the page standing for the silence within which writing is 
enfolded,” then the space that “designates the interior silences of a text, the junctures between 
stanzas, lines, words, even letters” and finally “the undisclosed space in which one works as 
affecting the character of things.”258 Perhaps following Duncan’s identification of “another 
dimension in...poetry” since “surely, everywhere, from whatever poem, choreographies extend 
into actual space,”259 Palmer relates to how “In dance, movement articulates space even as it is 
in turn being fashioned by it...[how] the dancers make a dance in a rehearsal space but...[then] 
project it into a variety of possible performance spaces.”260 The choreographic process also 
epitomises his “ideal of pure collaboration” because “all are collaborators: dancers, lighting 
and set designers, costume designer, composers, choreographer all engage in a dance to make 
a dance.”261 Dance, therefore, provides Palmer with another way of enlarging the field of 
composition into a community of differences, a paradigm for poiesis in which “all elements of 
the whole work to modify all others” so that it is “difficult to completely separate one 
contribution from another.”262 Each of the contributors act in and interact with each other to 
create the poem, “each shape[s] and [modifies] the other” so that “in effect, [each] emerge[s] 
from the other,”263 from the encounter with “(an)Other.” Collaboration in this case “take[s] you 
out of yourself, your accumulated habits of making, into a place that is not your own...opening 
a space for making that is neither that of one nor the other.”264  Most importantly, dance 
encouraged Palmer to think “about certain crossings, where language becomes gesture and 
gesture language.”265 Dance serves to “constantly [remind him] of body and voice in actual 
space, and therefore of the body in poetry and the world, circulating among other bodies.”266  
As he explains in FF, “This was not [just an aesthetic] experience/but life itself.”267 Because 
dance is an “embodied corporeal act, one which is embedded in the conditions of its 
articulation,”268 dancers not only express themselves through their movements but live what 
they express through their bodily acts.  
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While dance, in a general sense, undeniably influences Palmer’s attempt to “vitalise the 
present, to strip it of the habitual, the given, and replace that with the actual…[with] the poem 
as act,”269 his numerous collaborations with the choreographer Margaret Jenkins provide actual 
instances of “poethical” praxis. Prior to the publication of FF, Palmer participated in numerous 
dance scenarios with Jenkins, such as Interferences (1975), Equal Time (1976), Straight Words 
(1980) and Versions by Turns (1980). With the dance First Figure (1984), however, “fragments 
of texts from the [poet’s] manuscript” were “use[d] as ‘instructions’ for the dancers to proceed 
by.”270 His involvement in the choreography meant that he witnessed his language become 
gesture as the “Trained dancers…function in this process as ‘untrained’ speakers moving 
through space,” with the result that “Words or verbal signs acquire a gestural character in this 
space, even as gestures (the raising of an arm) acquire often mysterious semiotic 
weight.” 271 Notice his reference to an “arm extended” here, suggesting that as “language 
becomes movement and movement language”272 he identifies how the poem can be regarded 
as a gesture toward “(an)Other” which cannot be expressed in language. The opening two 
poems in FF heighten this sense of something inexpressible in, or that occurs prior to, language. 
As the first poem, “Dearest Reader” implies the epistolary mode, suggesting the collection 
itself is addressed to the unnamed first figure in the title. It immediately proposes that the poems 
to follow should not be read as the transcription of a previous experience by undercutting the 
highly poeticised description of a “wren-/like bird plucking berries from the fire” and “broad 
entryways/beneath balconies beneath spires” in the last lines, suggesting it could equally be 
just a “photograph of nothing but pigeons/and grackles by the shadow of a fountain.”273 He 
later observes how the “Experience cannot be described/except by us,”274 inferring that the 
poem is not intended to re-present a previous experience but to actually enact a lived experience 
between the poet and the first figure he addresses. “Prelude,” the following poem, suggests 
that: 
 
 
 The limit of the song is this 
 prelude to a journey to 
 the outer islands,275  
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What he identifies as the “generative sentence” engenders continuous circularity and deferral, 
“an inside-outside then/an outside-inside”276 since language comes after what concerns Palmer 
in FF and only moves further and further away from it, “Now say the words you had meant 
to/Now say the words such words mean.”277 “Prelude” necessitates: 
 
 
                  ...reading 
 in a way natural to theatre 
 a set of instructions 
 that alters itself automatically 
 as you proceed west 
 from death to friendliness,278 
 
 
If he has any particular plays in mind they would undoubtedly be Samuel Beckett’s, written in 
a language of silence to articulate the unsayable. Beckett uses silence not just to signify the 
incapacities of language but to allow the body to speak as his silent figures function as figures 
of speech. As he explains in The Unnameable, a prose work that pre-empts many of the issues 
in his drama:  
 
I want it to go silent, it wants to go silent, it can’t, it can’t, it does for a second, then it 
starts again, that’s not the real silence, it says that’s not the real silence, what can be 
said of the real silence, I don’t know, that I don’t know what it is, that there is no such 
thing, that perhaps there is such a thing, yes, that perhaps there is, somewhere, I’ll never 
know.279  
 
Throughout his work, language is a gesture toward a silence it cannot ultimately reach as his 
figures have never “said the thing that had to be said, that gives [them] the right to be done 
with speech, done with listening,”280 that is, despite their silences, their bodies speak. Just as 
extracts from FF were used as instructions for the dancers, whose bodily movements are an 
extralinguistic composition, “Prelude” provides instructions for how the collection can be read 
as articulating what is beyond the “limit of the song,” the limits of the poem. When the body 
speaks, it does so in a language of silence, the language of gesture. Dance “is a kinaesthetic act 
of corporeal performance” and “what is always speaking silently is the body,” whose meanings 
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are unspoken because its gestures are “both mute speech and corporeal writing.”281 For Palmer, 
dance confirms that the aesthetic is “pre-eminently a carnal affair, it is kinaesthetic” and the:  
 
 
body as a (kin)aesthetic phenomenon ‘speaks’ many languages: it speaks the language 
of both silence and gesture. In the first place, from the standpoint of embodiment, the 
opposite of speech is not writing but silence...[and] the embodiment of silence is 
action...[it is] the body’s language.282   
  
 
Palmer’s collaborations with Jenkins confirm for him the possibility of language as gesture, an 
embodied language of silence, and emphasise how self-articulation occurs in a lived space of 
sociality as the subject orients him/herself from the most singular experience to living amongst 
others, “from death to friendship,” ensuring what Ashbery termed the “end of friendship/With 
self alone.” Silence is the prelude to the poem that indicates a language of gesture, articulating 
what cannot be spoken in the “generative sentence,” the unsayable because “Language 
paralyses the tongue.”283 By addressing the “possibility of the figural, of generative, initiatory 
figures, figurae, figures of language and knowing disclosing themselves,”284 FF shows Palmer 
foregrounding the encounter between “(my)Self” and “(an)Other” that not only precedes but is 
the required condition for the poem as a communicative event. In doing so, he accentuates the 
etymological definition of “conversation,” “con-versare: to turn together,” thus revealing the 
primary importance of the bodily gesture that precedes anything spoken, “What might be said 
before the sentences enter.”285  
 
 
(7.2) Language as Gesture in First Figure 
 
No universal or objective correlation between meaning and movement is possible, therefore 
discussing Palmer’s FF and Jenkins’ First Figure to establish one is ill-advised. From an 
admittedly reductive perspective, poetry is almost dematerialised whether written as words or 
spoken as sounds, whereas dance is an inescapably material art of the body. Despite his 
admission that “Poetry is poetry, dance is dance, and convoluted attempts to pair them in a 
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conceptual [reciprocity] can lead commentators to invent strained likenesses,"286 the poet and 
dance critic Jack Anderson does exactly that to explain why poets ranging from Eliot, Auden 
and Yeats to Stein, Moore, Lorca, O’Hara and Rexroth were so consistently drawn to dance. 
Despite the important differences in their compositional methods and in the experiential aspects 
of interpreting poetry and dance, he establishes a correlation between the movement of the 
poet’s thoughts and the movements of dancers, insisting that both are:  
 
 
arts of motion through space and time. Dance, of course, is quite literally such an art. 
But poetry inhabits its own space and time. Whereas dance involves bodies moving on 
a stage…, poetry is an art of words moving on a page or in the cadences of a speaking 
voice. Words thereby become the equivalent of bodies, and the way they are arranged 
in print could be called verbal choreography.287   
 
 
This highly “strained likeness” between poetry and dance fails to account for the fact that the 
“essential structure of dance is to be discerned within…the immediacy of lived experience,”288 
whereas the experiential structure of poetry is, by its very nature, mediated through language. 
Furthermore, his suggestion that poems “embody movement” through their “verbal 
choreography”289 ignores the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of reducing the realities of 
motion to verbal formulae, of arresting an ephemeral, non-repeatable event in a medium based 
on the permanence of the written word. 
 Nowhere in FF does Palmer attempt to arrest the ephemeral, dynamic movements of 
dancers in enduring, static forms. His only reference to “actual dancers” sees them “traced 
against the ceiling” like “echoes/as of such voices/which had once claimed to be real.”290 
Rather than purporting to re-present them mimetically, Palmer uses his dancers to help readers 
conceptualise the complex interplay of presence and absence more vividly, the present and 
absent figures that inhabit his work to give voice to something that has hitherto remained 
unspoken: 
 
 
                             …we mounted the scaffold 
 at his unspoken invitation; 
 a liquid darkness there; 
 figures lost among bands of light 
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 came slowly forward; a duplicate 
 of herself encountered in passing 
 nodded and disappeared; it remains 
 visible above the narrow shore; 
 they are visible against the shore; 
 the forgotten word for waves;291  
   
 
His emphasis on “scaffold,” “liquid darkness” and figures slowly appearing and disappearing 
could be read as describing the intended visual appearance of “First Figure,” with its 
“extraordinarily evocative set consisting of four very tall green fabric columns which tapered 
toward the base” that “would both frame the movement and allow the dancers to disappear and 
reappear within the dance space itself” by creating “a spatial field that lent architectural 
definition to the piece.”292 “First Figure” was a “polysemous field susceptible of multiple 
interpretations” because “on different occasions various ‘figures’ might unexpectedly appear 
to modify the experience for audience and performers alike.” 293  Given equal emphasis, 
however, is the inherent sociality of the scene, as Palmer evokes a liminal space of encounter 
between the present and absent figures at the shore, and the suggestion of a pre-linguistic 
gesture of welcome in the “unspoken invitation” and “the forgotten word for waves.” “Actual 
dancers” are not the subject of Palmer’s poem, instead they signal a movement from the 
aesthetic into the ethical by embodying the body-to-body relations, or face-to-face encounters, 
that occur in the creative act of self-articulation. Because the experiential aspect of dance is as 
an “embodied corporeal act” that is “embedded in the conditions of its articulation,” it allows 
for a kind of somatic attention, the corporeal means by which a knowing subject apprehends 
the specificity of others as one attends to and with one’s body in surroundings that include the 
embodied presence of others.294 Palmer’s inclusion of the pre-linguistic alongside his only 
reference to “actual dancers” in FF confirms that dance is important because it demonstrates 
how embodied subjectivity is not constituted through discursive or representational practices 
but through a gestural language that precedes these. The “lived experience of dance is 
immediate,” therefore, it precludes reflection, criticism and evaluation that would differentiate 
it from other lived experiences.295 
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 Palmer’s poem helps us conceptualise a pre-linguistic gesture through the figures of 
“actual dancers” encountering one another in a performative space of other embodied subjects, 
thus revealing a further reason for his interest in dance: how it actualises the fundamental ways 
in which a human being exists in the world.  What makes this most significant is that a non-
verbal communicative medium provides an example for poiesis as the making possible of 
language as gesture. If individuals resort to gesturing when the meanings they wish to convey 
cannot be articulated in words, then gesture is the first figure of speech, an initiatory figuration 
of meaning prior to, or beyond the limits of, language. However, as language users, a formal 
vocabulary of gestures develops according to which bodily movements are “systematically 
interpreted in ways variously related to the articulate speech that may or may not 
accompany”296 them, thus creating body language. On the other hand, an art form is categorised 
as dance if its “principal medium is the unspeaking human body,”297 therefore, dance “cannot 
be completely reduced to a notational system”298 because bodily movements have meanings 
that exceed any formally articulated system. For Palmer, the unspeaking or silent body of the 
dancer gives voice to something in its gestures that cannot be articulated in words, thus 
confirming that “verbal language cannot be the primary modelling system, capable of 
translating all expressible content”299 because bodily movements exist that cover portions of 
the general semantic space of communication which verbal language cannot. The non-
notational nature of dance explains how his collaborations with Jenkins encourage him to use 
poetry as a space for the impossible, for articulating something pre-linguistic by approaching 
language as gesture, or what he terms the “physicality of word as gesture.”300 Palmer refers to 
a period when “All those words we once used for things...have now [been] discarded in order/to 
come to know things.”301 “The last tree/or the letter A” is discovered here, which tells us: 
 
 
                                   ...If you crush one of these herbs between your fin- 
 gers the scent will cling to your hand but its particles will be quite invisi- 
 ble. This is a language you cannot understand.’302 
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The poet is referring to a language that cannot be grasped in terms of comprehension but can 
be grasped in terms of its physicality, “Dismantling the beams of/the letter tree.”303 Semantic 
content is secondary to the physicality of the word because Palmer is suggesting an immediate, 
lived experience with language through the emphasis on somatic attention, which “signals lived 
corporeality as the manner by which one person engages with another.”304 By making dance 
into “a kind of embodied poetry,”305 where bodily movements are understood as a physical 
mode of poetic expression that emanates from the embodied subject, the dancers in the 
collaboration “First Figure” also suggest the possibility of “gestural poetry,”306 whose meaning 
is immediately apparent as a way of living in the social world of others. Dancers confirm that 
the “body lives its ethics” because the “world in which the bodily self is rooted is…from the 
start a thoroughly human world saturated with intersubjective significance and affective 
valence.”307 In doing so, they enact how the “[ethical] self emerges from an irreducible and 
originary contact with human otherness” experienced through the body, which “saturates every 
form of our encounter with the world” and those others who inhabit it. 308  Accordingly, 
language as gesture implies an inherent sociality, as he explains in “The Village of Reason:” 
 
 
 You are in this play 
 You are its landscape 
 
 This is an assumption 
 the length of an arm309  
 
 
Again, Palmer evokes the notion of an arm extended but this time it indicates the presence of 
“(an)Other,” the assumption of sociality as a first figure is present during this initiatory 
encounter prior to language as a vehicle of comprehension. This gesture is perhaps an 
“unspoken invitation” to the unknown and unknowable “you,” the reader to whom the 
collection is addressed, to participate in the play of figures within the “sequence of imaginary 
landscapes”310  that constitute “First Figure,” a “non-hierarchical [field] composition” that 
requires the “viewer [to] become an active participant in the work, scanning a range of events 
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and making numerous decisions about points of focus.” 311  By evoking dance, Palmer is 
gesturing toward the possibility of embodied, or more precisely bodily, conversation between 
the poet and the reader as they turn together toward each other as other. Considering gesture 
as a figure of speech ensures it is not simply a teleological act whose intention is uncertainty 
reduction or “meaning” because it “extracts out of meaning the presence of the gesture, 
portrayed as body performance, and defines not only speaking but writing as a performance 
text.” 312  Rather than simply articulating its semantic content, a poem informed by the 
possibility of language as gesture does not eliminate the presence of the performing body but 
foregrounds it because it is reliant on the performance of the gesture, the turn toward 
“(an)Other” prior to language. In the eponymous poem, Palmer makes this possibility explicit, 
referring to “words altered then crossed out. Returning that is into the body,” 313  to the 
unspeakable language of the body. He introduces what he terms “here the false figure of speech 
playing with a ring,” circumscribed by language’s “habits of afterwards and opposite,” which 
reduces conversation to the endless exchange of opposing perspectives for the purposes of 
comprehension, “Now your turn while the/numbers last. Now ours not theirs.”314      
Instead, “the first figure” allows for “What might be said before the sentences enter,” 
without a “focal point” and with “no idea [of] what the future will bring.”315 Consequently, 
conversation assumes “the/form of a question to be answered by another in the form of a 
question/and so on.” 316  Palmer’s interest in the “physicality of the word as gesture” is 
confirmed when he privileges the somatic aspect rather than the semantic content of language 
due to the attendant ability to immediately sense the significance of the gesture because it is 
unmediated by language, “The name is spelled without letters how can this be./…/The name is 
felt without letters how can this be.”317 Palmer’s poems might preclude comprehension but 
they can be grasped as a gesture of welcome, an arm extended in “silent invitation” toward 
“(an)Other,” with “the five random/letters for the fingers of the hand”318 suggesting the digits 
or figures of the poet’s hand as he writes the poem. By emphasising the “physicality of the 
word as gesture,” of language as the performed act of exposing “(my)Self” to “(an)Other” by 
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extending a gesture of welcome, he conceptualises poiesis as work of the hands. In doing so, 
Palmer reiterates Celan’s proposal that poetic:  
 
 
Craft means handiwork, a matter of hands. And these hands must belong to one person, 
i.e. a unique, mortal soul searching for its way with its voice…Only truthful hands write 
true poems. I cannot see any basic difference between a handshake and a poem.319   
 
 
Celan’s reference to “hands” does not necessarily mean the singular hands of the poet, it equally 
denotes the hands of two different people engaged in a handshake, in the pressing of hands, a 
bodily encounter that is felt “without letters.” Correlating the poem with this particular gesture 
affirms Palmer’s interest in the unspeakable language of the body and articulating what cannot 
be spoken in language. 
 The eponymous “First Figure” demonstrates Palmer attempting the impossible poem, 
one that engenders a bodily experience of encounter between “(my)Self” and “(an)Other.” 
Quite significantly, the fact that FF is explicitly addressed to a reader ensures his proposal of 
language as gesture does not become metapoetic commentary, a poem about all poetry, but 
instead retains its specificity as an occasion that constitutes the poet’s act of self-articulation. 
As Palmer explains, “It’s not addressing...[in the conventional sense of imagining] one’s reader 
or who to imagine as the ideal reader. There’s no ideal reader. One projects a possible reader 
or set of readers who have no outline” and “you [the poet] become, in turn, imagined by that 
reader. I don’t mean imagined as a personality...but imagined into being by that other,” this is 
the “power that affirms the impossible.” 320  In “Echo: Text Antiparallèle pour Pascal 
Quignard,” he explains how the “The letter he had lost reap-/peared in his palm. Identity was 
the cause.”321 Given the epistolary address at the beginning of the collection, FF can be read 
in its entirety as this letter in the palm, a gesture of the hand that articulates something 
inexpressible in language alone. William Waters dismantles Celan’s idea of handshake or 
“Händedruck” into “hands” (die Hände) and “pressure” (der Druck) to foreground the 
possibility of bodily encounter in the poem. He refers to the “other meaning of Druck, 
‘printing,’” so that the “extent to which a handshake (Händedruck) is an impressing (Eindruck), 
or an expression (Ausdruck) by hand, may undergrid the sense in which a poem is not just 
printing (Druck) of something handwritten but also an impression of the writing hand, and the 
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hand’s expressive pressure.”322 This is somatic communication, a bodily encounter between 
two individuals conversing, turning together toward each other. It is the experience of 
proximity to “(an)Other,” to exactly what one does not and cannot know, what is, by extension, 
inexpressible in language. In the same argument about poetry being a “matter of hands,” Celan 
states that “poems are also gifts – gifts to the attentive,”323 which raises interesting questions 
about the present(s) of the poem and presence in the poem. “Identity [is] the cause” because it 
is about self-articulation as a heteronomic process, the need for “someone to be present to the 
poem” and “someone wanting to be present to it,” about “(my)Self” reaching out to “(an)Other” 
who will, by questioning and paying attention to him, help the poet find his voice.324 This is 
communication as proximity, “a matter of presence,” the lived experience of “two human 
beings sharing…the same ontological space” through body-to-body, or face-to-face, 
encounter” as incalculably different and distant individuals are immediately present. 325 
Because a physical handshake is literally impossible, contact and complete identification 
between “(my)Self” and “(an)Other” is precluded in favour of the sense of proximity facilitated 
by the text at hand, a sense heightened by the poet’s reflection on the closeness of his hand to 
the poem during its composition and his constant references to the page the reader holds open 
during its interpretation.  
 
 
(7.3) The Language of the Unsayable  
 
In “Echo: Texte Antiparallèle…,” language itself is understood as an echo, that “which 
resounds. Re-sounds” and “which sounds (sounded) different.”326 It occurs after the gesture 
extended toward an unknown and unknowable other, the “Who (previous to speaking).”327 As 
Palmer explains, if language is considered a gesture, the “word spoken…[cannot be] heard,” 
the “word spoken…[cannot be] seen, even/partially, traced against the screen.”328 This is not a 
failure of language’s capacity to communicate and improve comprehension between people 
but a radical reconfiguration of what communication itself signifies for Palmer, an opportunity 
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to “Be recognised in his own/misunderstanding,” 329  to be questioned by someone else’s 
interpretation.  The initiating experience of proximity to “(an)Other” who embodies what 
“(my)Self” cannot know is “equivocal and precedes its beginning,” 330  it necessitates the 
realisation of “response-ability,” of self-articulation as an ethical subject. “The subject is this,” 
for Palmer, the “rustling at the moment of enunciation” as of an “ar-/ticle of clothing such as a 
dress or green dress. An even greyness as of a page,/recording events.”331 Just as he encourages 
us to read the poem as a pre-linguistic gesture, he is encouraging us to listen to what is not said, 
to what exceeds articulation in language, the sounds at the very beginning of the conversation.  
This counters what he sees as our tendency to pay “attention to each mark” only “After the 
talking is done,”332 to focus on the semantic content of language rather than focusing on the 
initiating act of conversing with another person, the gesture of turning toward one another 
together, that precedes anything spoken in language. Again:  
 
 
…             The  subject  is  this, disregarded, 
story  of  cloth  and  wind  or  the  space  be- 
tween events. 
 
misunderstood as a  measure of  distance. It 
takes no time in  that sense, repeats nothing, 
figures the shape  of the flames. Gesticulate. 
 
a failure in translation.333 
 
 
The subject is the overlooked experience of communication “as if preceding, preceded by, 
itself,” 334  of communication as proximity between two different and distant subjects 
encountering one another, emerging as the respective first figures to each other who manifest 
through the initiating gesture that cannot be transcribed in language, “(an)Other” who obligates 
“(my)Self” to respond. Palmer identifies this occasion as “neither followed nor following” and 
again uses the idea of a handshake to suggest how it might be possible in poetry:  
 
 
 Left arm  and right and  the figures  like the  
fire. There must be a different metric, a ges- 
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ture  and that’s  all, this this  and so on, con- 
comitance,  like writing  but it’s  not a  writ- 
ing, the pieces actually are.335     
 
 
Poetry becomes a space of the impossible for Palmer because its pieces don’t have to mean, 
they just “actually are” proof that the encounter between “(my)Self” and “(an)Other” has 
always already happened, that it is the precedent of anything spoken or written. Gestures “pre-
figure speech by providing a configuration and a direction toward which speech will tend, 
which is always a tendency in the direction of meaning.”336 They are an “intention and also a 
motion...a bodily intention...[or] the intention of the body” that “provides a direction toward 
which its existence will tend insistently.”337 This direction is always toward an other to whom 
it calls as if in response to a question. The gesture, therefore, has no meaning in itself but is 
part of the whole process that engenders meaning, it can only be understood as part of the 
conversation in which it occurs. Similarly, the meaning to be discerned from FF is “not 
locatable within any of the [poems’] parts, but...emerges from the many parts working all at 
once and has...crucially to do with your...investment of an attention that you experience as 
yours.”338  
The importance Palmer ascribes to the initiating gesture that enables a conversation 
between “(my)Self” and “(an)Other,” what is “of interest because unspoken” 339  and 
unspeakable, helps explain his attitude toward language throughout FF. As discussed above in 
“Echo:…,” words “re-sound” the initiating encounter that cannot be articulated in language. 
Palmer is even more critical, however, since he understands that in attempting to articulate the 
experience of proximity with “(an)Other,” language writes over him/her such that there is 
“erasure in the/naming.”340 He aspires to “Forgetting the name as it sounds,”341 a way of 
speaking about “(an)Other” in “words/the opposite of names,”342 a language that does not 
reduce his/her alterity or appropriate him/her into categories of the same. This language is 
spoken in “empty sentence[s]”343 because, as Palmer explains in “French for April Fool’s:” 
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Once I could not speak of it 
Now I am unable to 
/…/ 
Once I could not tell of it 
and now I cannot speak at all344 
 
 
Words become “gestures…erected,” 345  or arrested, in writing as “(my)Self” turns toward 
“(an)Other” prior to speaking, creating “A statement…as if to be said,”346 a way of articulating 
what cannot be spoken in language. Because “the sentence is impossible,”347 the poem becomes 
a space of impossibility, of “necessary difficulty,” where the initiating first figure is 
encountered and the incapacities of language are exposed in the bodily experience of proximity, 
the lived experience of reaching the limits of the known and knowable. As he explains in 
“Voice and Address,” “You would like to live somewhere else/…/but this is not permitted”348 
because this is the reality of living in a social world of others as an ethical subject, the reality 
that his “poethics of proximity” enacts. The experience of proximity, as the originating moment 
of ethical subjectivity, cannot be articulated in language, “You may not even think of it//lest 
the thinking appear as words//and the words as things.”349 For Palmer, “the word for ‘cannot’ 
inscribes itself”350 in response to the question “how could you describe this to a listener? How 
can I describe/this to our listeners”351 when language occurs subsequent to this initiating event, 
“[erasing] the story,/by repeating it exactly as it was told,”352 writing over it by naming and 
erasing “(an)Other?” By concentrating solely on the semantic content of language, paying 
attention to the marks after the talking is done, “Talk[ing] is a naming//Talk[ing] is a naming 
or a being named,” 353  a reduction of otherness into words describing it to improve 
comprehension, to reduce uncertainty. Consequently, we “will remember nothing from 
before”354 as language takes us further and further from the initiating experience of proximity 
between “(my)Self” and “(an)Other,” “what the words now said//again and again,/seemed 
entirely different.”355 To remedy this, Palmer suggests “return[ing] to where it began/amid the 
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errors and incomprehension/of conversation,”356 to the initiating experience of proximity to 
“(an)Other” who is irreducibly different to and distant from “(my)Self.” Performing the gesture 
of turning toward “(an)Other” is to speak the language of the unsayable, to “return to where it 
began,” when we “never used words, never/knew any.”357  
The most important question posed by FF is “Do you remember all the listening?,”358 
“Do you remember this” moment prior to language, before speaking, when “(my)Self” is turned 
toward “(an)Other” and “do you admit to it.”359 As the epigraph to the collection from Celan 
(“Niemandes Stimme, wieder”) attests, Palmer orients himself toward “(an)Other” who speaks 
“nobody’s voice, always,” which in turn allows “(my)Self” to listen to the language of the 
unsayable. This voice the poet listens to belongs to nobody, thus making any attempt to assign 
a name to it impossible. “Nothing can be said” about it, only that: 
 
 
First there’s sameness then difference 
then the letter X across a face 
 
then a line through a name 
which is the wrong name in any case360    
 
 
Palmer uses the idea of erasure here but instead of erasing “(an)Other” by naming him/her he 
instead erases the name. For this reason, he does not address his poems to an ideal reader who 
just follows unquestioningly, “An ant is an ideal reader/and there are so many of them,”361 or 
try to “please the audience/who have remained patiently in their seats since/last year’s 
performance, refusing to become speakers themselves.” 362  He demonstrates in “Left 
Unfinished Sixteen Times” a way of writing “(an)Other” without reducing him/her to 
categories of the same, “And I is the reader’s ‘not yet’ within the letter,”363 within the collection 
addressed to a reader. The condition of possibility for the “poethical” poem is what Maurice 
Blanchot terms a “relation without relation,”364 a conversation in which speaking is not a 
dialectical act intended to facilitate uncertainty reduction but rather indicates the experience of 
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a difference and distance between two speakers who “maintain a relation not with what they 
might establish in ‘common’ but instead with what they mutually acknowledge in the other as 
foreign [and] inassimilable.”365  “I” names the reader but only as a potentiality, a host of 
innumerable identities that cannot be specifically named, hence why “From the speaker’s place 
of speech there’s nothing”366  but the “void centre.” Palmer does not reduce the reader’s 
otherness by comprehending it, by identifying who s/he might be; the reader as “(an)Other” 
“could be said not to be written.”367  
Developing on his notion of the poem as a handshake, Celan explains how the “poem 
intends another,” how it “needs this other” and goes “toward it, bespeaks it.”368 Consequently, 
“everybody is a figure of this other toward which it is heading.”369 In writing “I,” the first 
gesture of self-articulation, the poet is seeking “(an)Other” “not as a mere aspect of the same, 
but by precisely refusing to render the other as an image or extension of the self,”370 thus 
refusing any attempt at comprehension that would reduce “(my)Self” and “(an)Other” to 
opposites. Writing “I” as the “reader’s not yet” enacts a gesture that turns the poet toward the 
reader as “(an)Other,” demonstrating Palmer using the language of the unsayable to name 
“(an)Other” without reducing his/her alterity. In doing so, he draws our attention to the 
initiating ethical encounter that precedes anything said in the poem, insisting that 
“Forgetfulness must be remembered when you/insist ‘I cannot remember.’”371 Rather than 
“omitting, perhaps deliberately, the question of the head and neck, posi-/tion of the hands”372 
and forgetting “who they are and who the others are who watch.//...[forgetting] the words for 
this and not-this, for first and for again,”373 for Palmer, “There is nothing meaningful about the 
text//There is nothing meaningful about a text” because he “translate[s] logos as logos.”374 The 
text is not full of meaning because its meaning derives precisely from what cannot be 
articulated in language, the originating source of all activity that cannot be named as just 
another word. Palmer’s impossible poem “is Paradise, an unpunctuated book,”375 a poem that 
does not just repeat what happened by adhering to the standards of spoken and written language 
                                                      
365
 Zawacki, 119. 
366
 Palmer, “No Page (Unturned),” CA, 95. 
367
 Palmer, “Left Unfinished Sixteen Times,” CA, 122. 
368
 Celan, “The Meridian,” 49.  
369
 Ibid. 
370
 Zawacki, 119. 
371
 Palmer, “Left Unfinished Sixteen Times,” CA, 123.  
372
 Ibid, 122. 
373
 Ibid, 123. 
374
 Palmer, “The Theory of the Flower,” CA, 100. 
375
 Ibid, 100. 
  
 
263 
 
but “which exenterates itself” so that “You may use the paper with my name on it/to say 
whatever you want.”376 Writing “I” as a “void centre” and the “reader’s ‘not yet’” is not just 
an act of self-erasure but a way of un-naming “(an)Other,” of speaking the language of the 
unsayable as the poet establishes a “relation without relation” between himself and a reader yet 
to come. This “form[s] a paradise//(pronounced otherwise),”377 a way for the poet to grant 
primacy to the reader as “(an)Other” over “(my)Self” that enacts a “poethics of proximity.” As 
he explains in “(Overheard at the) Mayakovsky Station,” “‘I am not that one who once spoke 
with you/clockwise from the pages of a voice.”378 We as readers are not encountering Palmer 
as the speaking subject but listening to “nobody’s voice” and responding to the first figure of 
“(an)Other” as we articulate ourselves as ethical subjects. Because Palmer can never be known 
to the reader: 
 
 
words...[are] mistakes for things 
 
where things are the mistake 
that is trying to be made 
by one who never resembled me.”379   
 
 
Palmer provides “one who never resembled” him, an “I” or first figure that the reader 
encounters as “(an)Other,” who s/he overhears by listening to the language of the unsayable 
and responding through a gesture that welcomes him/her into “relation without relation” with 
“(my)Self” as someone who is unknown and unknowable. This is what conversation signifies, 
a turning toward “(an)Other” rather than comprehension. Palmer wants the reader to mistake 
him, to miscomprehend and misunderstand him in order to not only engender but also prolong 
the experience of proximity to “(an)Other” who is not and cannot be known.     
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(7.4) The Saying of the Said 
 
FF conveys Palmer’s desire to provide a space “Where I goes unmentioned [so that] there 
exists an alternate version,”380 to exceed the limits of language he identified in NEL when he 
attempted to grant primacy to “(an)Other.” Unlike Ashbery, who used the face-to-face 
encounter of aesthetic experience to examine how ethical subjectivity is constituted by 
“(my)Self” realising its “response-ability,” Palmer gestures toward an idea of “response-
ability” that precedes any response that might be articulated in language. Palmer’s “poethics of 
proximity” is an “unpunctuated book” that “form[s] a paradise//(pronounced otherwise),” it is 
as “strange as speech/mistaken for a book,” as his poems challenge us to see our ordinary, 
everyday life differently and identify the limits of expressibility by saying what cannot be 
said.381 While his attitude toward language helps differentiate the ethical commitments and 
considerations informing his work from those seen functioning in Ashbery, it also aligns him 
with a similar development in Levinas’ ethical theories as the philosopher addresses the 
“methodological problem” in TI which he seeks to “reduce” in OTB. 382 Quite significantly, 
OTB was written, at least in part, in response to Derrida’s “Violence and Metaphysics,” in 
which he respectfully critiques this “methodological problem,” that by “making the origin of 
language, meaning and difference the relation to the infinitely other, Levinas is resigned to 
betraying his own intentions in his philosophical discourse.”383 Derrida pertinently identifies 
the paradox of trying to “present the Other as such, in a philosophical discourse that, by its very 
inherited nature, enshrines the language of the Same.” 384  He demonstrates that Levinas 
presupposes the very things he seeks to transgress due to misreadings that confirm what he 
intended to reject. However, Derrida accepts these misreadings not merely as errors that 
undermine his project but rather as integral to the “necessary difficulty” of his philosophical 
endeavour, of thinking, and by extension writing and reading, otherwise, to “discuss a realm 
beyond being in a language which can be used to describe being only.”385 Ultimately, he 
appreciates that Levinas’ work must engender miscomprehension for it to succeed because in 
completely clarifying the significance of “(an)Other,” philosophy incorporates it into its 
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structures and categories, thereby reducing its alterity by expressing the inexpressible and 
saying the unsayable. Levinas’ response in OTB, therefore, employs fundamental, necessary 
difficulties in his writing practice to elude comprehension, a decision that is immediately 
apparent in the text’s language. The terms he uses to describe “(an)Other,” i.e. face, enigma, 
accusation, interpellation, etc., and “(my)Self’s” relation to it, i.e. obsession, hostage, trauma, 
etc., are not those normally used by philosophers to describe the object of experience. By using 
them, Levinas is “attempting to cultivate interest and reverence…[rather than] classifying, 
informing, or describing and conveying information,” to “direct [our] attention to an aspect of 
everyday social interaction regularly ignored” and consequently make us think otherwise, at a 
more “basic, determinative level.”386 There is a performative quality to Levinas’ writing as the 
difficulties of reading OTB are inseparable from its meaning because the experience of reading 
it is intended to encourage the reader to think otherwise about language, to make him/her self-
conscious about how s/he uses language in communication.    
 There are significant methodological differences between TI and OTB that have 
important philosophical implications for each text. OTB develops one of the primary theses of 
TI, the “radical impossibility of seeing oneself from the outside and of speaking in the same 
sense of oneself and of others.”387 In TI, Levinas focuses on “the approach of the other in the 
face[-to-face encounter]” that disrupts the same and interrupts the autotelic self in the present 
by calling it to realise its “response-ability, whereas in OTB he focuses on “my approach to the 
other out of a pre-original responsibility” as the self has always already realised his/her 
“response-ability” prior to anything said.388 TI and OTB document a progressive deepening of 
Levinas’ ethics as he moves from the idea that “response-ability” is realised when “(my)Self” 
responds to the question posed by “(an)Other” by speaking to the idea that “response-ability” 
is always already realised prior to anything that can be articulated by speaking. This deepening 
also serves to explain the difference between Ashbery’s and Palmer’s ethical commitments, 
how the former conceptualises the face-to-face encounter using aesthetic experience in a way 
where “everything is surface,” whereas the latter seeks to go deeper by returning to an 
initiating, pre-linguistic experience of proximity that precedes any act of self-representation. 
Like Levinas in OTB, Palmer intends to “return to where it began” by exploring communication 
as “in-formed by an essential, in fact a pre-essential, responsiveness” involving “response-
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ability” “prior to hermeneutic disclosure and other than information transference.”389 Both 
acknowledge that “language is founded on a relationship anterior to comprehension”390 and are 
interested in the experience of an encounter that is prior and irreducible to anything spoken, 
the fact that: 
 
 
When I hear another speak, I turn to this other from more than a need to know who 
speaks or what is said or what I am to do in response. I turn to this other from a pure 
responsiveness…[and] I am created in that prior turning toward the Other 
simultaneously with my turning attention toward the Other.391     
 
 
The act or gesture of turning toward “(an)Other” in conversation is to encounter someone who 
cannot be named, “another otherness, an Other encountered in the other but not reducible to 
my interpretation of the encountered other’s otherness.”392 As can be seen, trying to describe 
the pre-linguistic experience of proximity in language is almost impossible because we 
approach the limits of what can be said intelligibly. To remedy this, Levinas examines the act 
of speaking itself to expose the first move or gesture in conversation that occurs before anything 
is spoken, thus providing a useful way of acknowledging “traces of a conversation possibly.”393  
 The achievement of OTB derives from Levinas’ commitment to the “necessary 
difficulty” of performing the thesis outlined in the opening pages with the intention of 
engendering a similar praxis in his readers, how “the otherwise than being is stated in a saying 
that must also be unsaid in order to thus extract the otherwise than being from the said in which 
it already comes to signify but a being otherwise.” 394  Even in this relatively concise 
explanation, Levinas’ tortuous language confirms he is strategically trying to disorient his 
readers so they will begin to think otherwise about language and communication, and prioritise 
the ethical gesture of what he terms the saying over the semantic content of the said. He uses 
the saying to discuss proximity in terms of an “original language,”395  a “communication 
without phrases or words” 396  that precedes the said, “the language that communicates 
propositions and messages.”397 Prior to any words spoken by either “(my)Self” or “(an)Other” 
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being meaningful, the interpersonal situation in which communication occurs has a pre-
linguistic significance in terms of the sense of proximity experienced there. Saying is 
“communication prior to words and speech,”398 a way of acknowledging “(an)Other” and 
appreciating his/her significance without reducing his/her alterity, it is:     
 
 
not a speech act, nor a type of speech act; it is not the conversational situation nor the 
act of speaking. Saying is not what we do with words...Or, to be more precise, it is not 
one among a variety of such acts. Rather saying is the encounter of utterly unique 
persons, indeed between every two utterly unique persons.399  
 
 
Saying should not be analysed according to Speech Act Theory, which would “suggest that the 
speaking subject performs an act of saying and therefore takes the discursive initiative,” thus 
making “the speaking subject the origin of its Saying.”400 As Levinas explains:  
 
 
the beginning of language is in the face [of another person]. In a certain way, in its 
silence, it calls you. Your reaction to the face is a response…Language does not begin 
with the signs that one gives, with words. Language is above all the fact of being 
addressed…which means the saying much more than the said.401 
 
 
For Levinas, “saying is communication, to be sure, but as a condition for all communication, 
as exposure.” 402  The “intention of making signs, and even the signifyingness of signs, 
presuppose[s]”403 this exposure to “(an)Other” but it writes over the initiating experience of 
proximity, thus subordinating the gesture of the saying to the semantic content of the said. 
Proximity, in this sense, “is the impossibility to move away” from the “precisely other,” it is 
to be obligated or “ordered from the outside,” from an otherwise than being that is sensed but 
cannot be represented in language. 404 Focusing on the saying involves subordinating “the 
contents that are inscribed in the said and transmitted to the interpretation and decoding by the 
other” to the “ethical sense of such an exposure to another,” to the “risky uncovering of 
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oneself…[and] the breaking up of inwardness.” 405  In theory, the saying solves the 
“methodological problem” of  TI, the “erasure in the naming,”406 because it is the: 
 
 
antecedent to the verbal signs it conjugates, to the linguistic systems and sematic 
glimmerings, a foreword preceding languages, it is the proximity of one to the other, 
the commitment of an approach, the one for the other, the very signifyingness of 
signification.407 
  
 
In order for “(an)Other” to manifest, the “subordination of the saying [the gesture of response 
toward “(an)Other” that precedes articulation in words] to the said [the semantic content of the 
utterance]”408 occurs; the initiating ethical encounter between “(my)Self” and “(an)Other” that 
is the precondition of all communication is overwritten by what is actually said in 
communication. Before it “coagulates a verbal sign,”409 the saying is already an ethical gesture 
of “response-ability” toward “(an)Other” but in order that it not be subordinated to the semantic 
content of the said the “saying must also be an unsaid,”410 which requires a “certain impossible 
undoing of language”411  so that my expression of “response-ability” does not effectively 
suppress “(an)Other.” The saying is a “verb understood as a noun designating an event,”412 
such that the said is always already preceded by “hearsay, an already said,” the “hither side of 
the said…that reveal[s] another meaning,” the significance of “(an)Other” to “(my)Self” as the 
otherwise than being that precedes language but initiates communication as an ethical 
encounter.413 
Instead of naming “(an)Other,” Levinas creates richly descriptive, provocative 
metaphors and similes to describe the experience of proximity as the feeling of responsibility 
toward him/her before anything is said. As he suggests, it is:   
 
 
prior to all reflection, prior to every positing, an indebtedness before any loan, not 
assumed, anarchical, subjectivity of a bottomless passivity, made out of assignation, 
like the echo of a sound that would precede the resonance of this sound…a deafening 
trauma…the passivity of being persecuted…[where] the persecuted one is liable to 
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answer for the persecutor. To tend the cheek to the smiter and to be filled with shame, 
to demand suffering in the suffering undergone.414  
 
 
It is immediately apparent from even this short extract that Levinas is not concerned “with how 
language works, semantically, how thoughts and words have the meaning they do and play 
their roles in communication and other speech activities.” 415  What concerns him is the 
possibility of an ethical language, a way “of speaking with [and about] another as already...an 
ethical act,”416 of somehow articulating what cannot be explicitly disclosed in conventional, 
that is, coherent, informative and persuasive language. When he describes the experience of 
proximity as the “passivity of passivity;” 417  the “pre-original reason of difference;” 418  as 
“anarchic, older than every beginning;”419 the “antecedence of responsibility to freedom;”420 
and as “being called into question prior to questioning,”421 it is obvious that he is at the very 
limit of what can be said in philosophical discourse as he pushes language and conceptuality 
to the point of collapse. His proposed remedy relies on the reconfiguration of language as 
gesture: 
 
 
Not the communication of a said, which would immediately cover over and extinguish 
or absorb the said, but saying holding open its openness...delivering itself without 
saying anything said...Saying is thus to make signs of this very signifyingness of the 
exposure...[it is] to make signs by making oneself a sign...This is the pre-reflexive 
iteration of the saying of this very saying, a statement of the ‘here I am’ which is 
identified with nothing but the very voice that states and delivers itself, the voice that 
signifies.422   
 
 
In theory, this remedies the “methodological problem” that naming always involves erasing 
“(an)Other,” thus providing a way of saying that is not solely reducible to the said. It is a 
prerequisite that Levinas fail because what he envisions as the the ideal text written about 
“(an)Other” would be one that “unsays itself,”423 a  “saying without the said...speaking so as to 
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say nothing, a sign I make to another of this giving of signs.”424 If he manages to speak about 
“(an)Other” in the language of the unsayable, in a way that does not reveal anything about 
him/her which might reduce his/her ultimate alterity, he compromises philosophy’s ability to 
disclose that which it wants us to understand. Whereas if he successfully signifies “(an)Other” 
in philosophical discourse he compromises its character as other, as something unknown and 
unknowable. Despite, or perhaps even because of this, Levinas’ greatest success is his 
commitment to the difficult but necessary task he set himself, a project “whose accomplishment 
is always impossible and which is always deferred,”425 to articulate the “saying saying saying 
itself.”426 As a result, OTB has an almost “literary effect,”427 a kind of disruptive expressivity, 
as concepts are endlessly redefined and revoiced until the text becomes a gesture of saying and 
unsaying. Levinas’ argument is continuously interrupted by repetitions and reiterations of 
previous points with variations so that “a saying that is simultaneously an un-saying is 
enacted,”428 a “saying that unsays itself within the said”429 in order to ensure what Levinas 
discusses is not named and consequently erased in language. Because “saying opens me to the 
other…before saying what is said, before the said uttered…forms a screen between me and the 
other,”430  OTB repeatedly perforates the screen separating “my(Self)” from “an(Other” as 
reading it almost engenders an experience of proximity, of being at the very limits of the known 
and unknowable where communication as an ethical encounter is possible.   
 While failure is important to Levinas, he succeeds in making the reader think otherwise 
about language and communication, and the role these play in an ethics of everyday living to 
make him/her appreciate the difficulties, if not the impossibility, of speaking to another person 
as other, not for the purposes of improved comprehension but due to the potential for an ethical 
encounter with someone who is irreducibly different to and distant from “(my)Self.” OTB 
might enact the “necessary difficulty” of articulating what, by its very nature, exceeds 
language, but Levinas concludes with a gesture himself, pointing beyond the limits of his own 
text toward a potential for discussing the otherwise than being he identifies elsewhere, what he 
terms the “poetic said.”431 It allows for “an impossible simultaneousness of meaning” because 
its:  
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language would exceed the limits of what is thought, by suggesting, letting be 
understood without ever making understandable, an implication of a meaning distinct 
from that which comes to signs from the simultaneity of systems or the logical 
definition of concepts.432 
 
 
The “poetic said and the interpretation it calls for ad infinitum”433 represents the possibility of 
the impossible for Levinas in a way that philosophical discourse does not, even cannot. Poetry, 
through its discontinuities, disruptions, and, in the case of Palmer, derivations, permits “an 
interlocutor [to] permanently break through the text,” “(an)Other” who is otherwise than 
“(my)Self” and whose voice echoes in the work to signify a presence through his/her absence. 
It is capable of enacting the “subjectivity of a subject” as the “response-ability” of:  
 
 
being-in-question in the form of the total exposure….prior to dialogue, to the exchange 
of questions and answers, to the thematisation of the said, which is superimposed on 
my being put into question by the other in proximity.434 
 
 
In the writing of the poem, “the saying does indeed become a pure said, a simultaneousness of 
the saying and of its conditions”435 but the text is constantly interrupted by others’ voices 
because they:  
 
 
belong to a world they do not include, but recognise by being written and printed, and 
by being prefaced and getting themselves preceded with forewords…call[ing] for other 
books.436 
 
 
Poems that reconfigure reading as a rewriting, or another’s writing, heighten this sense of 
interruption and can be “interpreted in a saying distinct from the said”437 because they are 
always exposed to “(an)Other,” they are open toward rather than closed-off from the questions 
of another person. Levinas’ admission helps explain why OTB has a somewhat “literary effect,” 
with its complex metaphors and imagistic prose as he attempts the difficult but necessary task 
of representing what is unpresentable in philosophical discourse.  
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Quite significantly for appreciating Levinas’ relevance to Palmer’s “poethics of 
proximity,” the philosopher identifies the “essence of art” in an essay specifically about 
poetry’s ability to “signify only between the lines – in the intervals of time, between times – 
like a footprint that would precede the step, or an echo preceding the sound of a voice.”438 This 
notion of “between times” parallels the “now here” of Palmer’s poems, the “other time of 
poetry, that future-past where it oscillates,” 439  allowing for the alterity of the past (the 
intentions and voices of others which exceed personal memory and conceptual assimilation) 
and the alterity of the future (the radically unpredictable and not to be anticipated 
interpretations that readers will provide) to interrupt him as he writes. Poetry prioritises the 
saying over the said because it “signifies…not in its theme,” its semantic content, but 
“signifies…as song…[it] signifies poetically…not in the fable it sings, but in its very singing,” 
in the performance of the gesture in response to “(an)Other.”440 It is important to note, however, 
that poetic language is not an “aesthetic epiphenomenon” for Levinas but rather “a constitutive 
element of language’s ethicity,”441 a way to “elucidate the ethical dimension of language”442 
itself. The “poetic said” allows welcoming the otherwise than being as a way of writing that 
undermines the primacy of expression, disclosure and exposition for purposes of uncertainty 
reduction. In a footnote to OTB, Levinas suggests that as a “sign given of [the] signification of 
signs, proximity...delineates the possibility of poetry”443 as gesture, of saying what cannot be 
said through “a sign made to another, a sign of this giving of signs, that is, of this non-
indifference, a sign of this impossibility of slipping away and being replaced, of this identity, 
this uniqueness: here I am.”444 Poetry as the saying prior to anything actually said is a gesture 
that confirms the realisation of my “response-ability.” From his poetics of derivation through 
to his dialogic poetics, Palmer acknowledges the “pre-involvement of the other-in-the-
same,”445 how “(an)Other” interrupts any attempt at expression, disclosure or exposition by 
“(my)Self,” thus necessitating an otherwise than writing and reading if the ethical dimension 
of poetic discourse is to be appreciated. In OTB, Levinas “redefines language radically...[in] 
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proximity to poetic language”446 because he aspires to the “impossible simultaneousness of 
meaning” he identifies in poetry, the capacity for questions posed by other voices and other 
possible interpretations to interrupt the text such that the meaning of the work is the experience 
of reading it. As seen already with Palmer, the metaphor of the echo conveys a sense of 
presence and absence, and Levinas uses it to highlight the ethicity of language, how every 
utterance retains a trace of the initiating experience of proximity. It is incorrect to “simply 
conceive [of] the saying as a nonsaid, as a part of the said that remains silent or unspoken.”447 
Because the said contains the echo of the saying, it gives voice to the otherwise than being 
which in turn, as demonstrated throughout OTB, requires a way of writing and reading 
otherwise.   
 Levinas’ interest in the possibility of the “poetic said” confirms that while he is 
normally quite dismissive of art because its “function is expression” and it “rests on cognition,” 
on “telling the ineffable” or containing, closing-off the saying in the said and reducing the 
unknown and unknowable to the known, poetry is the exception.448 However, in his early 
philosophical writings, poetry is dismissed on moral grounds because:  
 
 
the world to be rebuilt is replaced by the essential completion of its shadow. This is not 
the disinterestedness of contemplation but of irresponsibility. The poet exiles himself 
from the city.449 
 
 
Palmer’s critique of “the audience/who have remained patiently in their seats since/last year’s 
performance, refusing to become speakers themselves” corresponds with Levinas’ initial 
dismissal of poetry for its inherent irresponsibility. A radical shift in his thinking occurs when 
he begins to consider how the otherwise than being, the initiating experience of proximity with 
“(an)Other,” is “not the thought, but the language, of the poem,”450 not the content but the act 
of writing, and reading, it. Prior to OTB, and perhaps the reason for his admission regarding 
the poetic said, Levinas asks “is it possible to get out of this circle otherwise than by expressing 
the impossibility of getting out of it, by speaking the inexpressible. Is not poetry, of itself, the 
Exit?”451 Levinas seems to be suggesting that poetry is a space of impossibility, a way of 
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articulating the inexpressible, what “exists outside and beneath thought and language,” so that 
“poetry, of itself, is now an otherwise.”452 Like Palmer, it is Celan who confirms the possibility 
of the impossible for Levinas by providing the appropriate means of communication for ethical 
relations based on the experience of proximity. In “Paul Celan: From Being to the Other,” an 
essay published two years before OTB, Levinas even reveals that Celan’s poetry already is the 
always impossible attempt at articulating a “saying without a said” through gesture: 
 
 
With one stroke of the pen, the poem, the height of language, is reduced to the level of  
an interjection, a form of expression as inarticulate as a wink...a sign to one’s 
neighbour...a sign of nothing, or of complicity for nothing: a saying without a said. Or 
a sign that is its own signified: the subject gives a sign of the giving of sign to the point 
of becoming a sign through and through. 453       
 
 
For Levinas, Celan’s poems are a kind of “elementary communication”454 that are “situated 
precisely at this pre-syntactic and pre-logical level,” written in a “language of proximity...the 
first of all languages, the response preceding the question, responsibility for one’s 
neighbour.”455 Celan enacts the experience of proximity as corporeal sensation by offering the 
poem as a handshake, the “moment of pure touching, pure contact, grasping, squeezing – which 
is a way of giving, right up to and including the hand that gives,”456 a gesture extended by 
“(my)Self” toward “(an)Other.” Levinas’ change in attitude and orientation regarding the 
ethical capacity of poetry is a precise example. OTB is informed by Celan’s ideal of the “text, 
constantly interrupting itself to let through, in [the] interruptions, [another] voice, as if two or 
more discourses were on top of one another, with a strange coherence, not that of a dialogue”457 
but an echo. The semantic content of the poem is secondary to its status as a gesture, the 
performance prior to anything spoken or written is the constitutive act of self-articulation as an 
ethical subject. Levinas includes a quote from Celan (“Ich bin du, wenn/ich ich bin”) as an 
epigraph to a chapter in OTB. “I am you, if/I am I” reveals how poetry, as a way of writing 
“(my)Self” into existence, is always already ethical because it necessitates attention to 
“(an)Other” by providing a “place in which the person, in grasping himself as a stranger to 
himself, emerges.”458 As the quote from Celan demonstrates:  
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it might be me, who am writing here, or speaking, it might be me – yet it would not be 
me, insofar as I could be anyone…insofar as anyone might be me, me as other than me, 
myself as an unnamed, nameless substitute for myself, me as another.459  
 
 
Writing and reading a poem otherwise than for expression, disclosure or exposition of 
“(my)Self” requires listening for the “nobody’s voice” of “(an)Other,” paying attention to and 
articulating the saying on the hither side of the said, the initiating experience of proximity that 
precedes the semantic content, thereby committing oneself to the “necessary difficulty” of this 
impossible task. 
 
 
(7.5) Writing and Reading Otherwise in Sun 
 
Palmer’s consistent use of the serial form and his poetics of derivation suggests he sees no 
absolute differences between his own collections or between his and others’ work, as he 
explains in “Dear Lexicon,” “Book, You were never a book/…You are nothing but a page/torn 
from a book.”460 Palmer contributes one poem to what Duncan termed “a symposium of the 
whole,”461 the “grand collage.”462 For this reason, his entire body of work can be seen to 
contribute one voice or image expressing his poetic vision, that of an enlarged and extended 
“composition by field” where the text exists only as part of a larger (con)text. His poetry is a 
“high energy construct where energy is transferred from one source to another (derivations).” 
With S, we witness P examining where this energy originates in the first place but the collection 
is also about origins in a profoundly “poethical” sense, a “reading project” examining “the 
constellation of voice that have come to constitute whatever I am as a poet.”463 He explores the 
initiating events that constitute him as a poet writing in the latter-half of the twentieth century 
with the intention of engendering similar attention in his readers to what constitutes them as 
subjects. For a poet writing “analytic lyrics” and who writes out of a genealogy that can be 
traced back to Anglophone Modernism of the early twentieth century, S is appropriately 
structured around two poems, “Baudelaire Series” and “Sun,” the latter consisting of the same 
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number of lines as Eliot’s The Waste Land. Palmer’s choices are almost synonymous with 
modernism itself but they represent two very different, often competing, faces of its personal, 
political and poetic values.  
While Baudelaire represents a beginning, it is best conceived  as an opening up because 
his originality stems from the attempt to give voice to what had hitherto been unspeakable and 
his concomitant “will to otherness.”464 For the poet to be a poet at all, to be a problematic 
“figure within patriarchal systems of thought, he “must remain open to all sensations…yet it is 
this very state of openness that most threatens to dissolve his (masculine) subjectivity.”465 
Palmer positions Baudelaire at the “founding [moment] of what we think of as prototypically 
the modernist vision…how we look at the world and…how we conceive of 
contemporaneity.”466 This vision features “trauma as a structure of feeling under the material 
conditions of…[capitalist, urban] modernity which [inaugurates] a ‘crisis in 
representation.’”467 Trauma refers to an experience that often cannot be assigned meaning, an 
event that constantly eludes representation. Baudelaire’s “vexed relationship to reference [and] 
disarticulation of self,”468 therefore, indicate language’s inability to represent or express what 
is beyond comprehension and articulation. His poems “[enact] the trauma of a self emerging 
differentially in language,” 469  suggesting parallels with Palmer’s interest in the initiating 
experience of proximity that constitutes “(my)Self” but nevertheless cannot be comprehended 
or articulated in language. In response to this tendency toward naming, of erasing difference 
and writing over otherness, Baudelaire opens himself up toward what cannot be quantified or 
measured, to what exceeds comprehension and articulation in language yet is constitutive of 
subjectivity and initiates self-articulation.  
On the other hand, the beginning offered by Eliot is more a closing-off, perhaps due to 
his cyclical view of history, such that “In the beginning is my end.”470 While Eliot’s anti-
Semitic sentiments, “reasons of race and religion combine to make any large number of free-
thinking Jews undesirable,”471 and his “confess[ion] to a preference for fascism in practice”472 
need to be contextualised in the socio-cultural atmosphere of the period, they are symptomatic 
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of a more general attitude toward alterity and difference as threats to the established traditions 
and conservative orthodoxies he privileged. Quite significantly, The Waste Land is constituted 
by erasure in two respects. Firstly, the text itself is constantly under erasure since it was 
subjected to the creative revisions, or more precisely omissions, of Ezra Pound, who erased 
whole sections. Secondly, it provides a vision of modernity as “creative destruction,” not an 
original discourse but a repetition that erases what it overrides. Despite the fact that Eliot’s 
assertion of “impersonality as an operating procedure” and his “collaborative version” of 
creativity both place the authorial self under erasure to undermine its primacy and suggest 
submission to an external authority,473 erasure has irrefutable negative connotations as those 
who deviate from a white, middle-class, heterosexual, Christian and male-centred view are 
systematically erased from his text by being denied any sense of individual identity or socio-
cultural specificity that would make them a source of alterity, potentially providing a different 
perspective on the situation they share with the poet. Eliot protects “(my)Self” by erasing the 
alterity of “(an)Other,” naming him/her, for example, “woman,” “Jew,” “working-class,” etc, 
whose question might interrupt his autotelic subjectivity. Palmer is acutely attuned to the 
various erasures of difference that Eliot commits and he responds in “Sun” with “a kind of 
erasure of The Waste Land” as a “brazen gesture,” a “typing over the text, erasing this vision 
of [tradition as consisting of the habitual actions of the “same people living in the same 
place”474] that was such a primary model for the modernist vision and along with it a particular 
Eliotic bigotry” 475  that insisted “population[s] should be homogenous.”476  
“Sun” is “written entirely inside/the body of another”477 as Palmer stays within the 
formal parameters of Eliot’s text with the intention of writing over the original, making it 
“unreadable, even invisible.”478 His reading of The Waste Land is also a kind of writing, or in 
this case a writing over, so that Palmer’s “I is the I who speaks.”479 As a result, “Sun” correlates 
naming, the act of writing and reading names, with violent erasure: 
 
 
Name you this: a region, 
a language... 
/.../ 
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Name you this, painter 
of only shadows, paramorph 
 
figure walking 
in ice, erased figure falling 
 
whose liquid we will drink 
as it coats our skins 
 
Story of hands abandoning their fingers, 
of an organ emerging from the throat 
 
A man with dynamite strapped to his waist480 
 
 
These images evoke the broadcasts that were by this period synonymous with America’s 
activities in regions named “foreign,” in places where “foreign” languages are spoken. Naming 
is the “attempt to categorise and control difference” as “names produce an Other [and] establish 
binaries,”481 so while Eliot incorporates a variety of voices in The Waste Land he names his 
sources, thus reducing their otherness and making the text an “intertextual phenomenon, 
conspicuously a process of allusive appropriation[s]”482 from other, and thus othered, cultures, 
“stolen genres and formats.”483 Palmer recognises “a certain level of violence in all areas of 
address,”484 that is, “an appropriative aspect to naming”485 that reduces the alterity of others’ 
voices by subordinating them to the poet’s purpose, thus “[collaborating] in a mode of 
representation in which naming and power are uncomfortably allied.” 486  Readers are 
implicated in this collaboration if they consider texts like The Waste Land “a mechanism for 
preserving the dead,”487 a way of understanding others “now dead to you, reader.”488 Eliot 
himself is not the subject of Palmer’s critique: 
 
 
                  …Now a filament of light 
 
penetrates the image-base 
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where first glyphs are stored, 
Lucy and Ethel, the Kingfish, 
Beaver and Pinky Lee 
 
are spoken, die and undie 
for you 
 
like a war viewed from poolside 
by philosophers and sheiks, 
 
senators and dialectician-priests489    
 
 
The violence inherent in the act of naming and in reading names is shown to originate in the 
archaic archetypes of the collective unconscious and continue into the present. A propensity 
for reverting to myths is also critiqued, the belief that “All these stories are the same/There is 
only one story –,” 490  because it fails to recognise the difference and distance between 
individuals, reducing unknown and unknowable others of the past to the categories of the same 
through which we make sense of our lived experiences in the present. In “Sun,” therefore, Eliot 
is never named and it becomes apparent that Palmer is trying to write over his erasures, to 
unsay the names, “I sang the trace then//without a sound/then erased it,” or at least find a 
different way of naming, “the anagram for names.”491 Instead of erasing Eliot by appropriating 
The Waste Land into “Sun,” “swallow[ing] your [Eliot’s] words,”492 he demonstrates how even 
“The lines through these words/form other, still longer lines,”493 how “(an)Other” still inheres 
in these lines whose “life of lines” cannot be completely written over. In this sense, Palmer 
writes and reads otherwise in “Sun” to preclude the complete erasure of Eliot as “(an)Other.” 
His reference to “the Kingfish” indicates a way of thinking otherwise about naming, of 
undermining the inherent violence committed against “(an)Other” in the act of naming, as he 
allows Eliot’s voice to interrupt him. The Fisher King appears in The Waste Land as “the man 
with three staves,”494 and Eliot can be heard again in the “man hangs from rope”495 (“The 
Hanged Man”496). In addition, “Five Figures in a Room/or a Triadic Ballet”497 suggests the 
structure of The Waste Land as each of the five sections is dominated by a particular figure and 
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this style of dance provided Eliot with “the model for a potential new form of poetic drama that 
[was] simultaneously primitive and avant-garde.” 498  These interruptions “[intimate] a 
heteronymous relation”499 between Palmer and Eliot and have “a special ethical significance… 
[as they] indicate a point of exposure” 500  during the encounter between “(my)Self” and 
“(an)Other” as the poem is being written. “Sun” is about origins, about Palmer exploring where 
his poetics and the self they articulate originate; his critique of naming is aligned with Levinas’ 
privileging of the saying over the said as constitutive of the ethical force of poetry, of its 
“poethic” capacity as a site for ethical practice.  
Palmer’s text, his writing over of The Waste Land, is an example of the said but the 
interruptions by Eliot’s voice attest to the trace of the saying that is always perceptible in it, 
proof of the encounter between Palmer and Eliot that initiates “Sun” that is the origin of 
Palmer’s self-articulation. The former exists as neither a presence nor an absence but leaves an 
“unrepresentable imprint upon the discourse of the said”501  by interrupting Palmer’s text. 
Interruptions, therefore, signal when otherness is most acutely felt, when “(my)Self” is 
resolutely opened toward “(an)Other” who intervenes in “(my)Self’s” self-articulation. This 
encounter, this experience of proximity, however, cannot be articulated in language because it 
is antecedent to anything written or spoken. “Sun,” therefore, is the manifestation of Palmer’s 
“response-ability” toward “(an)Other” but within it can be glimpsed the encounter with Eliot, 
the initiating experience of proximity with someone different to and distant from him. The 
poem demonstrates how language, before it is a vehicle for the exchange of information to 
facilitate mutual comprehension and ensure uncertainty reduction, is the expression of a 
relation with someone unknown and unknowable to “(my)Self.” By not suppressing these 
interruptions,” the reader can “Suppose there’s a portrait//on this paper I’m holding,”502 that 
someone is speaking to him/her once s/he implements a way of writing and reading otherwise.  
This has the effect of compelling the reader to listen for “(an)Other’s” voice throughout “Sun,” 
an intention confirmed by Palmer having the text “signed Bakhtin’s Names.”503 The reader 
consequently pays attention to the hither side of Palmer’s text, listening for the voice of Eliot 
and in doing so writing “(an)Other” in a language of the unsayable, a “poetic said” whose 
“impossible simultaneousness of meaning” does not name him but senses his presence.  
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Reading in this way rewrites “Sun” to grant primacy to “(an)Other” over “(my)Self,” 
by listening to Eliot’s voice interrupting Palmer’s. To provide just a few, for example, “A 
headless man walks…/…/The hood is black with two holes for my mouths”504 echoes with 
Eliot’s observation of “always another one walking beside you/Gliding wrapt in a brown 
mantle, hooded/I do not know whether a man or a woman;”505 Palmer’s vulnerable “long 
saplings with paper blossoms”506 affirm how “April is the cruellest month;”507 “The blind are 
hideous, the city laughs/and you tread on corpses in your mask”508 evokes Eliot’s personae of 
“I, Tiresias, though blind, throbbing between two lives”509 who has “walked among the lowest 
of the dead;”510 Palmer’s “flat land” with “living pillars of flesh”511 suggest Eliot’s “hooded 
hordes swarming/Over endless plains…/Ringed by the flat horizon only;”512 while the image 
of a “silver//coin under the tongue, bread and money/for the ferryman”513 resonates with the 
figure of Charon in The Waste Land. Palmer’s “Sun,” therefore, encourages the reader to listen 
for the voice of “(an)Other” as a way of remembering the originating event of ethical encounter 
that constitutes “(my)Self” but is the antecedent of anything written or spoken. In doing so, he 
confirms Levinas’ insistence that we cannot and should not forget the initiating experience of 
proximity to someone unknown and unknowable to us that not only precedes self-articulation 
but makes it possible in the first place. However, Palmer’s choice of Eliot to explore his origins 
makes this personal and poetical matter profoundly political, asking “…because the words 
disgusted me why write?”514 Regardless of how adverse we might be toward our origins, how 
different and distant they seem to how we currently interpret the world and our position in and 
relation to it, Palmer insists they should never be intentionally forgotten or over-written. The 
way Palmer reads and rewrites The Waste Land also demonstrates how despite the personal 
and political position of the poet in question, the poem can still be an opportunity for 
“performative doing”515 as the reader encounters his/her textual other. “Sun” enacts Palmer’s 
“poethics of proximity,” demonstrating that when realising our “response-ability” as readers, 
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those occasions when reading is also a kind of writing and we articulate ourselves through how 
we read, we must ensure not to erase “(an)Other,” to not name or completely identify with the 
poet, which would appropriate him into the categories of the same through which we 
comprehend the world. Palmer suggests that instead of over writing him through our 
interpretations, we should let his voice interrupt us, to question us as “(an)Other” and make the 
autotelic into a heteronomic subject.  
“Baudelaire Series” similarly explores Palmer’s origins but posits listening as an ethical 
gesture performed by “(my)Self” toward “(an)Other” that precedes anything spoken or written, 
thus providing the initiating act of self-articulation as an ethical subject. The correlation of 
naming and violence also features in this poem but rather than just accept that language has 
failed on a personal and political level, he redeems it poetically by refocusing his, and by 
extension our, attention on the unsayable, what not just cannot but should not be articulated in 
language. While there is an ethical imperative behind turning our attention toward others, 
Palmer is always careful not to misappropriate their experiences, a further instance of the 
violence committed in the act of naming: 
 
 
there on the screen, where everything is named difference, and is always 
the same for that reason, since you’ve watched it many times before and 
counted the limbs?516  
 
 
Palmer’s is not a poetry of witness because he appreciates how identifying with the experiences 
of “(an)Other” appropriates him/her, ultimately reducing his/her alterity as s/he can be grasped, 
in both senses of the word. Naming is equally culpable, it seems, for the violence of this scene 
and incriminates passive observers alongside those more immediately responsible. Despite, or 
perhaps even to protect, our best intentions, Palmer insists “They [must] refuse you their 
stories,” or else there is “Barely anything to say, everything [is] said.”517 To further emphasise 
this, he privileges the saying over the said throughout “Baudelaire Series,” the gesture of 
turning one’s attention toward “(an)Other” over the semantic content of anything that might be 
said. The collection is full of figures saying, “You say,”518 “She says,”519 “At the table we 
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say”520 and “He says.”521 Most importantly, “Words say, Misspell and misspell your name,”522 
so that language itself is a saying, a gesture toward rather than a means of identifying and 
comprehending “(an)Other,” of naming and, therefore, reducing difference. The 
miscomprehension implied by misspelling is a way of un-naming and Palmer makes reference 
to his proper name, “George, So long [ago],”523 reminding us elsewhere that “(He’s forgotten 
his name)/Don’t say his name for him.”524 He is encouraging the reader not to identify or 
identify with him but to instead un-name him, to misspell his name “Michael” and 
miscomprehend him as an “(an)Other.” “Baudelaire Series” encourages the reader to “examine 
not what language names…but what it says,” to “acknowledge…[our] inability to name” 525 
and instead listen to what “words say.” Palmer warns against the tendency to try to understand 
things from another person’s perspective and appropriate his/her experiences as one’s own, 
“Don’t look through an eye/…/Take nothing as yours,”526 and the poem repeatedly insists on 
our inabilities, our personal and political failures even, regarding how we use language, “Don’t 
see things –/…don’t listen//She says,” “Don’t say things/(You can’t say things),” “Don’t listen 
to things/(You can’t listen to things).” 527  “Baudelaire Series” is about returning to one’s 
origins, about remembering what has been intentionally forgotten or erased, but it also serves 
to remind us of “what is lost [when] language [is] used in a straightforward sense,”528 for the 
teleological purpose of comprehension, for naming things so they can be grasped. Palmer 
reminds us how language as saying rather than just said can “keep[s] us listening for other[s’] 
‘voices,’” 529 writing and reading otherwise as we listen for the unsayable, for what exceeds 
our understanding and confronts us with the unknown and unknowable.  
 Palmer’s poems enact listening as the fundamental component of his “poethics of 
proximity,” his way of living in the social world of others as an ethical subject which he, by 
example, encourages in his readers: 
 
 
 I’m writing your letters back to you 
 which is a sound at least 
 to mirror another sound 
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 where no painting can be found530  
 
 
Implicit in listening to the sound of what is said is the notion of “response-ability,” of 
“writing…back” to “(an)Other” in a language of the unsayable that does not name him/her. 
The gesture of turning one’s attention toward another person expresses the originating 
experience of proximity for Palmer without words. Perhaps playing with the title of his 
previous collection, “words without music,” without words there is music: 
 
 
 Let’s say a particular music, in profile. 
 /…/ 
 And that other music, sort of gasped out now by the synthetron, the in- 
 struments slightly more than real, if ontically problematic at best.531 
 
 
These instruments refer to the beginning of “Baudelaire Series,” where Palmer explains how 
he: 
 
 
                                    …made a book 
 and in that book I left a spot 
 and on that spot I placed a seme 
 
 with the mechanism of the larynx 
 around an inky centre 
 leading backward and forward532 
 
 
The smallest but most fundamental unit of meaning is another’s voice, which confirms that 
someone is speaking in the text, is real in the fact that s/he inheres in the text, but who is 
“ontically problematic” because s/he is present and absent. Palmer explicitly names those 
others who gave him permission but also obligated him to realise his “response-ability” but 
one always remains unnamed because unnameable: 
 
 
 You Paul Celan, César 
 Vallejo, Robert C[reeley] 
 
 and Robert D[uncan], why five533  
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Intertextuality is a pronounced feature of Palmer’s “poethics” so its function is not limited to 
citation and the type of reading this normally necessitates, i.e. the scholarly sourcing of the 
poet’s quotes. Rather than encouraging the reader to simply name the others’ voices in his 
poems, Palmer’s use of intertextuality shows him trying to remember his origins, the initiating 
experience of proximity engendered by his encounters with other poets. Just as the said erases 
the saying, speaking writes over what remains unsaid and unsayable in language, the gesture 
of listening, “to give one’s attention to a sound.”534 Listening is an enactment of “response-
ability” made “manifest through a posture of receptivity, a passivity of receiving the other into 
oneself without assimilation or appropriation.”535 Listening, therefore, is constitutive and prior 
to speaking, it is the “invisible and inaudible enactment of the ethical relation itself”536 in which 
“(my)Self” answers “[its] vocation, [its] calling” to respond in a language of the unsayable that 
does not name “(an)Other” through semantic content but instead expresses the initiating ethical 
encounter with the unknown and unknowable. Writing and reading otherwise involves listening 
not only to what is said but to the saying also, the significance conveyed without words but 
rather through the body’s language, the language of the unsayable that expresses as gesture. 
Palmer laments that the “lines/have neither eyes nor ears”537 but listening allows for “an aural 
eye – an eye [or I] that listens”538 not only to the semantic content of what is said but to the 
initiating experience of proximity that lends it “poethical” significance as a gesture of welcome 
toward “(an)Other.”         
 In what he calls “the Adorno poem,”539 Palmer addresses the infamous proposal that 
“to write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric,”540 demonstrating, like Levinas and Celan, his 
understanding that to say the unsayable is to be complicit in the act of barbarism one is trying 
to comprehend in the first place by perpetuating the violence of naming, of reducing the alterity 
of “(an)Other:”  
 
 
A man undergoes pain sitting at a piano 
knowing thousands will die while he is playing 
 
 He has two thoughts about this 
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 If he should stop they would be free of pain 
 
 If he could get the notes right he would be free of pain 
 In the second case the first thought would be erased 
 
 causing pain541  
 
 
Palmer’s poetry confronts us with the same impasse but because he considers reading to be 
coterminous with living, showing how he can be read also suggests a way of living in this social 
world of others while informed by a “poethics of proximity.” Music, or poetry, is either 
impossible in the first case or irrelevant in the second due to our “dumb words mangled by 
use.”542 However, he suggests that “Such thoughts destroy music/and this at least is good.”543 
Questioning the possibility of expression is to involve oneself in the impossibility that Palmer’s 
poetry allows for, to become a figure with “the inability really to play in ease…sitting at but 
no longer able to play the piano, or alternatively…who now plays seriously by being unable to 
play, unable to ‘play along.’”544 Refusing to “play along,” to continue adhering to the same 
conventions as before: 
 
 
 …is this instance of playing 
 
 he would say to himself 
 my eyes have grown hollow like yours 
 
 my head is enlarged  
 though empty of thought545 
 
 
Listening requires a certain self-abnegating, a hollowing out of the “I’s” to give primacy to 
others. The “instance of playing” is the pause before anything is played. Similar to the saying 
before the said, it is a silence in which a gesture of welcome is extended toward “(an)Other” 
that “listen[s] others to speech” and “open[s] new pathways for both ethics and 
understanding.”546 Listening to the question posed by “(an)Other” regarding the possibility of 
self-articulation signals the autotelic subjectivity of “(my)Self” being interrupted, the moment 
when I am not only permitted but obligated to realise my “response-ability” by turning my 
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attention to the impossibility of speaking in a language of the unsayable, of encountering rather 
than just naming “(an)Other.” Rather than trying to comprehend Palmer, to name him and grasp 
the “things” said in his poems, the reader should instead listen to what he says, that “You cannot 
not hear this,”547 that there is an ethical imperative to listen to the voice of “(an)Other” to 
redeem the personal and political failings of language. By endlessly deferring, even ultimately 
preventing, comprehension, the difficulty of Palmer’s work is necessary because it prolongs 
the initiating experience of proximity with “(an)Other” that permits and obligates my self-
articulation as a reader. Reading and writing otherwise, therefore, is to adhere to his “poethics” 
and in doing so enact a way of living in the social world of others as an ethical subject.    
 
 
Conclusion: Poem of the End 
 
Arguing that a poet who is so attentive to others’ voices, whose work even gives priority to 
what others say, can somehow be reduced to a single idea might seem incongruous, even if that 
idea is what makes poetry possible in the first place. Nevertheless, Palmer’s intention is to call 
our attention to what he considers the permission and the responsibility engendered by the 
impossible poem, the gesture extended by the poet to the reader to which the reader responds 
in kind, that is, the poem written and read otherwise. His “poem[s call] for the utmost 
attention,”548 such that the closer they are read the more illegible they become, or to use 
Ashbery’s image, they can “only happen here, on this page held/Too close to be legible, 
sprouting erasures.” By responding, by paying such close attention, the reader becomes aware 
of the silences, of the empty spaces between and within words, and what must be done in this 
space of impossibility. In the two “C” series in S, entitled “Called Poem of the End” and “Paper 
Universe of Primes,” Palmer “address[es] some point of silence more absolutely than [in] any 
previous work”549 and what is permitted and obligated by this silence. Both series consist of 
four seven-line poems, with the first calling our attention to this, suggesting it is “nothing but 
the printed lines,”550 that it is “(Just a line.)/.../...typed.”551 However, Palmer is not encouraging 
a formalist identification of or with the poem as an object. Instead, he explains how he “came 
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upon by chance” a poem “called Poem of the End.”552 This poem, he suggests, is the initiating 
moment of his self-articulation since he “recalled writing from it//in broken seven lines like 
this,”553 thus signalling his return to what is normally forgotten about poetry: that it depends 
on the experience of proximity to another person, on being addressed by and responding to 
“(an)Other.” Quite appropriately, “Poem of the End” was “found...in a letter” with its 
“name...crossed out.”554 Palmer’s rewriting, therefore, is an act of naming without erasure, 
where “You can’t make a mistake because you understand nothing.”555 Letter simultaneously 
means “both the components of an alphabet, out of which we make words, and written 
communications sent from an author to a reader…[a text] mailed off from the present to some 
unknown future recipient, telling of what we have become, explaining why this ‘future’ may 
be the same as the present, why it is always already here.”556 The beginnining of speech then, 
formulating the first word, is to orient oneself toward someone else, it is a response to 
“(an)Other” that is also an admission of what one does not and cannot know, of “something 
else I wanted to say,”557 something otherwise. In the second series, he discusses the “Paper 
universe of primes,”558 calling attention to the poem as the site of first importance, where there 
are: 
 
 
 reticular figures 
 
 both speaking / 
 
 not speaking559            
 
 
 
What is of first importance is this notion of complexly interconnected figures who are speaking 
but not speaking, who are speaking the unsayable language of gesture by listening to what “the 
speaking says,”560 to the experience of proximity to another person as the initiating act of self-
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articulation. These are “Unutterable//pages”561 and “‘Now you cannot speak/and now...’”562 
you are permitted and obligated to listen. The most absolute silence in Palmer occurs in a 
collection concerned with returning to origins, to initiating actions. In order to articulate 
“(my)Self,” to “Write this”563 and “Say this”564 in response to “(an)Other,” to “become the 
things we speak”565 and “give a direct answer//with the eyes or the breath,”566 I must listen to 
the other “I’s” in the silence Palmer provides, a “silence already filled with noises”567 that is 
the space of impossibility, where “The ink makes a sound.”568 
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Conclusion: A Rejection of Closure  
 
It seems wrong to impose a conclusion on Ashbery’s and Palmer’s “poethics of proximity,” to 
imply that their work somehow comes to an end once the ethical encounter between the poet 
and the reader is realised. But this ending, this realisation, is only another beginning, or an 
other’s beginning, since it signals where “(my)Self” ends and “(an)Other” begins. It is the 
permission and the obligation to, as Ashbery rather explicitly suggests in “The Task,” “begin 
again.”1 Their absence from the existing surveys of the ethical turn in innovative American 
poetry requires our attention because their work seeks to return us to the beginning, to the 
originating ethical encounter that precedes what Peter Quartermain identifies as a “moral 
imperative” informing disjunctive (read: difficult) poetics from Stein and the Objectivists 
through to the Language poets, a commitment to reassess our sense of the textual object by 
“revealing its characteristics as verb, as meaningful act.”2 Their attention to the immediacy of 
the ethical encounter between “(my)Self” and “(an)Other” calls the reader’s attention to the 
permission and the obligation they extend to realise his/her “response-ability,” to respond and 
be responsible during the interpretation as composition of the poem.  
Ashbery and Palmer are part of a far greater opening up of American poetry that 
occurred in the second-half of the twentieth century, a committed departure from the 
pedagogical practices of New Criticism and the personal and political consequences arising 
from such an approach to the composition and interpretation of poetry. That New Criticism 
continues to be the dominant method for the analysis of poetry only seeks to confirm the 
necessity and the difficulty of the task these poets set themselves: to call attention to how 
circumscribed the poem had become in terms of its involvement in extratextual, social issues 
and to write a subject into existence that is not only open to but constituted by what remains 
beyond containment in the known and knowable, what is irreducibly other and different to 
“(my)Self.” As both Ashbery and Palmer illustrate, opening poetry in this manner required a 
corresponding exposure of this medium to innovations in non-verbal art forms, an attempt to 
make readers extend their acceptance of these innovations to their verbal medium and in doing 
so determine why poetry needs to be written and read, and how it should be done, to ensure its 
continued involvement in the personal and political issues of the social world. The difficulty 
of these issues only serves to further emphasise the necessity that they are engaged with in a 
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responsive and responsible manner. Engaging with these issues in a way informed by a 
“poethics of proximity” ensures that the voices of others are listened to and acknowledged for 
the different perspectives they provide. Open and closed poetry, therefore, is not just a question 
of form but of intention, of deciding to make poetry open to or closed off from those others 
who have not had the opportunity to speak and be listened to previously. Perhaps this is the 
truly ethical aspect of poetics, of which the encounter between “(my)Self” and “(an)Other” is 
only ever the first initiating moment. Accordingly, representing or articulating oneself in poetry 
should not be done at the expense of others but always in response to the presence of that which 
cannot and should not be known because it ensures the self is open to the possibility of a 
different way of being, one that is heteronomic rather than autotelic. For this reason, writing 
and reading poetry with the aim of realising a “poethics of proximity” as opposed to self-
expression or self-disclosure makes both the poet and the reader responsive to and responsible 
in the social world of others. Ashbery’s and Palmer’s work can be read as gesturing toward 
possibilities that other poets explore for different personal and political reasons, not in terms 
of a linear chronology but in the “now here” of poetry, in the space of permission and obligation 
that innovative poetry insists upon. Two examples are Lyn Hejinian and Susan Howe, who 
engage with the “poethic” potential of poetry that concerns Ashbery and Palmer through their 
own poetical praxis but without explicitly indicating they are doing so, perhaps because they 
are more concerned with enacting the particular considerations and commitments engendered 
by their lived experiences as women in the latter half of the twentieth century.  
Firstly, Hejinian’s various literary experiments explore what it means to be “at 
beginning,”3 testing the possibility of “construct[ing] a text that dwells in a state of perpetual 
beginning.”4 In her most famous text, My Life, “disarticulations of plot unsettle the sequences 
of beginnings, middles, and endings upon which literary form itself is predicated”5 and since 
this form is the autobiography, it has important consequences for the act of self-representation, 
for how one represents the self in poetry. In The Fatalist, she asks the reader to “think/of the 
future anterior: think of what will have been. It begins/(is beginning) right now.”6 For Hejinian, 
the poem is a space of the impossible, where perpetual beginning is possible, because: 
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poetic language is also a language of improvisation and intention. The intention 
provides the field of inquiry and improvisation is the means of inquiring. Or, to phrase 
it another way, the act of writing is a process of improvisation within a framework 
(form) of intention.7     
 
 
In My Life, Hejinian’s intention is to construct an autobiographical representation of the self, a 
project that is open-ended as demonstrated by her rewriting of it. First published in 1978 when 
she was thirty-seven, it consisted of thirty-seven sections of thirty-seven sentences, only to be 
updated in 1986 with an additional eight sections and eight lines added to each original section. 
Her act of rewriting, therefore, highlights the considerations and commitments involved in the 
act of representing a self in poetry. This refers to both the actual sense of writing an 
autobiographical poem but also the performative sense of subjecting oneself to the 
interpretation of others, a particularly charged issue given her concern for the authoriality of 
the feminist subject and her intention to question the various socio-cultural structures that 
de/legitimise écriture féminine.      
Hejinian’s work explores two important impossibilities, the desire “to remember more 
than more than that, more or less as it really happened” because it “seems that we hardly begin 
before we are already there,”8 and the possibility of “find[ing] a language which will meet its 
object with perfect identity…[achieving] at-oneness with the universe…that is the condition 
of…complete and perfect knowing.”9 Similarly to Ashbery, the perfect identity of word and 
thing is never achieved, they miss each other and this implied sense of longing extends to 
Hejinian’s attempt to encounter “that other ‘I’ with which [she] began” and the other “I’s” that 
will, like her, rewrite her own self-representation. A difference and a distance always remain 
between word and thing, in the same way that “(my)Self” cannot properly grasp “(an)Other,” 
cannot comprehend him/her by containing him/her in the categories of the same. “Perfect 
knowing,” therefore, is not only impossible but ultimately undesirable. Language both permits 
and obligates more than just uncertainty reduction, it is “a medium for experiencing [the] 
experience…of encounter…of becoming another” with only “the implicit understanding that 
this is happening”10 in the “now here” of “perpetual beginning” where writing and reading are 
always rewriting. The only possibility of knowing Hejinian allows for is “to know that without 
what,” which is an “acknowledgement as a preservation of otherness.”11  As a result, she 
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advance what she terms the “open text,” a text that “invites participation, rejects the authority 
of the writer over the reader and thus, by analogy, the authority implicit in other (social, 
economic, cultural hierarchies.”12 The “open text” foregrounds both the “process of the original 
composition [by the poet and]…of subsequent compositions by readers”13 so that both are 
implicated in writing a feminine textual body, which “is recognised by the act that it is always 
endless, without ending…there’s no closure, it doesn’t stop.” 14  For Hejinian, the 
“epistemological value of writing” an “open text” derives from the fact that “each act of 
knowing-in-writing is contextual…is unique…cannot be replicated or even repeated.”15 This 
has significant consequences for the “response-ability” of the reader as s/he is solely 
answerable for the “act of knowing-in-writing” s/he performs when interpreting, or rewriting, 
Hejinian’s self-representation. In order to prevent reading becoming simply an act of naming, 
of reducing the otherness that Hejinian presents to the reader, she enlarges the “gap between 
what one wants to say (or what one perceives there is to say) and what one can say (what is 
sayable)” to provide for both “a collaboration and a desertion,” a sense of encounter that is 
never complete identification.16 The difference and distance that ensures words do not properly 
correspond to things and, more importantly, that “(my)Self” does not identify with “(an)Other” 
makes “the (unimaginable) complete text” impossible, the “text that contains everything” and 
is in fact a “closed text.”17 
Secondly, in Howe’s historical materialist poetics, she interrogates the constitution of 
the self from an explicitly female and feminist perspective, although the latter must be 
disengaged from institutionalised feminist critical practices that have made a space for 
women’s writing within the Anglo-American academic tradition but without properly 
critiquing the gendered assumptions of that tradition. Howe repeatedly foregrounds the 
considerations and commitments necessitated by the poet’s decision to self-articulate in a way 
that does not silence others, in a manner that repudiates complicity in the practices that have 
already engendered so many silenced others. To this end, she explores historical silences in the 
form of silenced witnesses, and erasures from and omissions in official records, as well as 
textual silences, what Palmer identifies in her work as “the space between the words into 
which…meaning erupts, the pause-boundaries between larger units of utterance (the 
                                                      
12
 Hejinian, “The Rejection of Closure,” 43. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Hélène Cixous, “Castration or Decapitations?” Signs 7 (1981): 53.  
15
 Megan Simpson, Poetic Epistemologies: Gender and Knowing in Women’s Language-Oriented Writing 
(Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 2000), 14. 
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 Hejinian, “The Rejection of Closure,” 56. 
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interruptions of sound by silence), perhaps even the phonemic markers of difference.”18 Her 
project is a complex process of citation, erasure and over-writing as she “treads borders, 
boundaries, dividing lines, edges, invisible meeting points” 19  in an attempt “not to 
explain…not to translate…but to meet the [other] with writing…to meet in time, not just from 
place to place but from writer to writer, mind to mind, friend to friend, from words to words.”20 
Like the American author she has most “thorow[ly]” worked with, Henry David Thoreau, 
Howe explores the notion of “nearness” but reconfigures it to encounter history’s others, 
demarcating a margin that is at once “quite literally a textual margin as well as a conceptual 
space on the edges of the dominant culture,” since it is in the “marginalia, what is written in 
the blank spaces of a text, that she finds traces of the voices that have been exiled from the 
privileged, centralised content.”21 In contrast to her “critical” works on women, for example, 
Emily Dickinson in My Emily Dickinson and Mary Rowlandson and Anne Hutchinson in The 
Birth-mark, Howe’s “creative” works focus on a literary and philosophical tradition dominated 
by men, for example, Pythagorean Silence (1982), Singularities (1990) and The Non-
Conformist’s Memorial (1993), to “track the ‘hidden feminine’…veiled behind history’s 
erasures,”22 to discover the feminine in the words of others, which “has to do with the presence 
of absence.”23  
Howe’s engagement with the words of others allows her to listen to others’ words in a 
way that transcends gender. She is not simply delineating an essentialist, “feminised” counter-
history but exposing the machinations of power itself, the violence written into history in both 
a literal and figurative sense through enclosing, marginalising, suppressing, excluding, denying 
and aggrandising. Unlike conventional historiographical texts, which differentiate themselves 
from the “real” they purport to represent objectively and with determinative certainty, Howe 
“restores ambiguity between all the oppositions that serve to enforce the perceived opposition 
between the ‘textual’ and the ‘real.’” 24  Historical knowing in her work is distinct from 
knowledge of or about the past as she continuously ventures into the unknown and unknowable, 
into a “textual” and “real” space of encounter with others, where “You are of me & I of you, I 
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 Palmer, “Active Boundaries,” 220-221. 
19
 Peter Quartermain, Disjunctive Poetics: From Gertrude Stein and Louis to Susan Howe (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), 186 
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 Susan Howe, The Birth-mark: unsettling the wilderness in American literary history (Hanover: NH: Wesleyan 
University Press, 1993), 158. 
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 Simpson, 194. 
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cannot tell/Where you leave off and I begin.”25 Similar to Palmer’s hermeneutics of scepticism, 
Howe’s feminist epistemology is “joined to an emotionally charged lyricism”26 that lends 
personal urgency to an otherwise political and poetic project. How she writes both in and about 
the silences in which others’ voices can be listened to, how “she maintains a near-complete 
silence” by “allowing others to speak for her” has a profound effect on the reader’s “response-
ability,”27 who is permitted and obligated to respond to the hierarchies and machinations of 
authority that are inherent in the linguistic processes s/he is reading. By making the “textual” 
more “real,” by calling attention to the operations of, in this case, gender in the constitution of 
meaning and the articulation of self, Howe provides “not simply a literary technique for reading 
but an epistemological theory that offers a method for analysing the processes by which 
meanings are made”28 and self-articulation is realised. It is not so much what Howe says, whose 
voices she actually lets speak through her texts, but the gesture she performs by opening both 
herself and her text to others, and by extension involving the reader in the enactment of a 
profoundly ethical, heteronomic act of self-articulation.    
While Ashbery and Palmer attempt to provide the first word on ethics in poetry, to 
articulate what can only be experienced in the encounter between “(my)Self” and “(an)Other,” 
the lived experience of absence and presence evoked by the “poet(h)ic,” a word that cannot be 
spoken but can be listened out for, they in no way provide the last word. As Hejinian and Howe 
help demonstrate, investigating the acts of self-representation and self-articulation is vital to so 
many of the creative and critical debates surrounding the reconfiguration of the self-other 
binary that features throughout the latter half of the twentieth century. This analysis of Ashbery 
and Palmer is not intended to close-off their work and the self they write into existence from 
the urgent socio-political issues of the period but rather to demonstrate how the urgency of 
their writing originates otherwise, in a concern for representing and articulating a responsive 
and responsible subject as the initiating act of ethical praxis. To end as we began, then, with 
Olson. If we are to subscribe to his concept of the poem as a “high energy construct where 
energy is transferred from one source to another” then the “reader completes the circuit,”29 
what matters is not the subject of Ashbery’s and Palmer’s poetry but the occasion they provide 
readers to realise their “response-ability” and in doing so extend the activities they perform 
while reading into how they act in and interact with the social world of others. In this sense, 
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there is “no boundary or edge to the field in question. As there is everywhere/no language,”30 
no “everyday” or “poetic” language only language acts, what “(my)Self” does with(in) 
language as s/he encounters “(an)Other” during the lived experience of proximity.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
30
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